Gender, Competition, and Compensation

Faculty Member: Ed Vytlacil

This project is eligible for remote work.

Proposal Description:

Previous experimental analysis suggested that men systematically prefer compensation through a competitive winner-take-all tournament, while women systematically prefer compensation through non-competitive piece-rate compensation. Previous researchers have focused on the explanation that men are systematically over-confident in their own relative ability and have a taste for competition, while women are systematically under-confident and have a distaste for competition.

This project is re-examining that previous analysis. We have run a new laboratory experiment, with the experimental protocol informed by recent developments in the selective trials literature and in the literature on elicitation of beliefs. We are analyzing the resulting data using recent techniques for selection models and heterogeneous effects.

Requisite Skills and Qualifications:

The RA should have a strong interest in working with data, have taken at least two semesters of econometrics, and have proficiency coding in R.

Award: Pascu, Andrei
Sibul, Ben

Tobin Application Link: Tobin Application

Project Type: Tobin RA
Project Year: 2020
Term: Fall 2020

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