Econ 489a. Auctions and Bidding

**Day / time:** M 2:30 - 4:20pm  
**Course Type:** Undergraduate  
**Course term:** Fall  
Not offered  
**Year:** 2014  
**Instructor(s):** Olga Gorelkina  

Permission of Instructor Required

The Seminar will provide a one semester introduction to the theory of auctions and competitive bidding. It will be devoted to answering questions such as: what is the reason that auctions and competitive bidding are so prevalent? What are good bidding strategies, and how do they depend on the particular auction format used? What auction format should the seller prefer?

The course will cover the main results of the theory of auctions and competitive bidding, including discussion of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, optimal auctions, the winner’s curse, double auctions, auctions of multiple objects, and collusion.

The textbook, *Auction Theory* by Vijay Krishna, as well as recent published papers.

Reading: 20+ pages of dense mathematical texts.

**Prerequisites:** Intermediate microeconomics. Participants should be comfortable with mathematical arguments.

**Semester offered:** Not offered  
**Undergrad Course Category:** Microtheory

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