Patient Costs and Physicians’ Information*

Michael J. Dickstein¹, Jihye Jeon², and Eduardo Morales³

¹New York University
²Boston University
³Princeton University

December 15, 2023

Abstract

Health insurance plans in the U.S. increasingly use price mechanisms to steer demand for prescription drugs. The effectiveness of these incentives, however, depends both on physicians’ price sensitivity and their knowledge of patient prices. We develop a moment inequality model that allows researchers to identify agents’ preferences without fully specifying their information. Applying this model to diabetes care, we find that physicians lack detailed price information and are more price-elastic than full-information models imply. We predict that providing physicians detailed information on prices at the point of prescribing can save patients 12-23% of their out-of-pocket costs for diabetes treatment.

JEL Classifications: C13, I13.

Keywords: moment inequalities, pharmaceutical markets, physician decision-making.

*We thank Stéphane Bonhomme, Chris Conlon, Liran Einav, Haoran Pan, Ariel Pakes, Marc Rysman, Xiaoxia Shi, and Amanda Starc for insightful conversations, and seminar participants at ASSA Annual Meeting, CEPR Virtual IO Seminar, IIOC, Georgetown University, KAIA virtual seminar, Harvard University, MIT, New York University, Northwestern University, Pennsylvania State University, SITE IO of Healthcare and Credit Markets Conference, and Tinos Industrial Organization Conference for helpful comments. We especially thank Alon Eizenberg for his very useful discussion. We also thank the staff at the Oregon Health Authority for assistance using the APAC dataset. All errors are our own. Email: michael.dickstein@nyu.edu, jjeon@bu.edu, ecmorale@princeton.edu.
1 Introduction

Real per-capita annual spending on prescription drugs increased from $140 to over $1,000 in the U.S. between 1980 and 2018, more than doubling the overall growth in health care spending during the same period (CBO, 2022). In response, as a means to change drug consumption patterns, private insurance plans have embedded price incentives in formularies that map drugs to tiers and require patients to pay more for higher-tier drugs. For example, in 2000, 22% of employer insurance plans had a single copayment level for all drugs, and only 27% had three or more tiers (KFF, 2005). In contrast, by 2022, 85% of employer plans had at least three tiers (KFF, 2022).

The success of price incentives in shifting demand for prescription drugs depends both on preferences—how physicians and patients value the efficacy of a treatment against its cost—and awareness of the monetary incentives. For policymakers seeking to steer prescription drug demand toward cheaper alternatives, it is critical to distinguish information from preferences. If, for example, the out-of-pocket cost for an expensive branded drug increases and usage remains high relative to lower cost options, is the lack of switching because the branded medication has higher effectiveness, because physicians and their patients are price-inelastic, or because physicians are unaware of the relative differences in out-of-pocket costs?

We develop a model that allows us to estimate both physicians’ sensitivities to out-of-pocket costs and the value they place on a drug’s efficacy. Importantly, we do so allowing physicians to vary unobservably in the information they use to form expectations about drug- and patient-specific out-of-pocket costs. In addition, we use the model to test whether physicians with different training or with different prescribing experience possess more or less information about patient prices. Combining estimates of physicians’ preferences with inferences about their information, we evaluate the effects of policies to inform physicians about out-of-pocket costs at the point of prescribing.

We focus our analysis on the study of prescription drug choices for patients with type 2 diabetes. We choose diabetes care as our market of interest because of both the size of the affected population and the rapid growth in treatment costs. In the U.S., 37 million people lived with diabetes in 2019 (CDC, 2022), and the direct medical costs of diabetes totaled $237 billion in 2017, rising 26% above 2012 inflation-adjusted levels (ADA, 2017).

Using Oregon’s All Payer All Claims database for the years 2012-2016, we form a sample of prescription drug insurance claims for diabetic patients covered by private insurance. We collect treatment choices, patient prices, and patient and physician demographic information. Using these data, we start by documenting two facts about out-of-pocket costs. First, there is significant dispersion in monthly out-of-pocket costs, both across insurance plans for a
given drug, and across drugs and plan types for a given insurer. For example, for the class of treatments known as DPP-4 inhibitors, the mean out-of-pocket cost for a 30-day supply lies between $40 and $50, depending on the drug. The interquartile range of out-of-pocket costs is large relative to the mean, ranging between $20 and $30 for a drug in a given year, when computed across the distribution of insurers and plans. If we compute the same statistic across drugs and plans for a given insurer, the interquartile range of out-of-pocket costs is also substantial, lying between $16 and $43 for the top four insurers.

As a second key fact, we observe physicians often choose drugs that are not the patient’s cheapest option. For example, although there are only three drugs in the class of DPP-4 inhibitors, physicians choose patients’ lowest-cost option only 38% of the time, roughly the same as if they had chosen randomly. If instead physicians selected the cheapest alternative at each visit, patients would save roughly $10 per month on average. Furthermore, for some plans, patients would see much larger savings, on the order of $50 to $100 per month.

The observed relationship between drug choices and out-of-pocket costs may reflect preferences, or could indicate that physicians lack information on the price incentives the patient faces. To separate these two mechanisms, we develop a model of prescription drug choice in which the physician selects a treatment based on the effectiveness of each drug and her sensitivity to expected out-of-pocket costs. While we assume the physician’s expectations are rational, we allow the information set to vary flexibly across physicians and office visits. In doing so, physicians’ expectations function like unobserved covariates in our model.

We estimate the model using a moment inequality procedure that combines two sets of moments. The first set, labeled “odds-based” moments, generalize the approach in Dickstein and Morales (2018) to settings with more than two choices. We build the second set, labeled “bounding” moments, as in Fujiwara et al. (2023). We show formally that when researchers combine these moment inequalities with instrument functions that depend on variables that belong to the physician’s information set, the resulting identified set includes the true value of the preference parameters. Thus, our moment inequalities provide bounds on preference parameters even when the researcher only partly observes the agent’s information set.

Before applying our model to the study of diabetes care, we conduct a simulation to illustrate the properties of both our moment inequalities and alternative full-information estimation approaches. We have four key conclusions. First, following Manski (1991, 2004), we show maximum likelihood estimates of preference parameters are inconsistent when the researcher incorrectly specifies the agent’s information set. The bias grows in the degree to which agents’ true expectations differ from the expectations implied by the researcher’s assumed information set. Second, consistent with our formal analysis, our inequalities yield an identified set that contains the true parameter value whenever our instruments—i.e. the
variables we assume agents know—form a *subset* of agents’ true information sets. While now containing the true parameter, the size of the identified set nonetheless grows in the degree to which agents’ true expectations differ from the expectations implied by the researcher’s instruments. Third, we show that if our instruments coincide with the agent’s complete information set, the identified set defined by our inequalities includes only the true parameter. Finally, we show that a researcher can use specification tests of moment inequality models to test whether a vector of covariates belongs to agents’ information sets.

In our study of diabetes care, we use our claims data to quantify the determinants of the physician’s treatment choice. We recover and compare estimates from both a traditional maximum likelihood approach and our inequality approach. We then use the inequality framework to test several assumptions on the content of physicians’ information sets, with the goal of learning how physicians form their price expectations. Finally, we use our estimated model to predict the effect of an intervention that provides patient-specific price information to physicians at the point of prescribing.

In our application, we find that maximum likelihood estimates of preference parameters vary significantly with the specification of the physician’s information set. For example, for the own-price elasticity of a product in the choice set, our estimates imply an elasticity equal to $-0.53$ when we assume providers know the patient’s out-of-pocket costs for each drug. When we instead assume providers form expectations with less information—specifically, with information only on average prices by drug and insurance plan type—we find an analogous own-price-elasticity equal to $-1.77$. If instead we assume physicians know only drug-specific averages of last year’s prices, the same elasticity equals $-3.77$.

Importantly, the distinct informational assumptions and the corresponding parameter estimates also imply different predictions for how demand reacts to counterfactual changes in out-of-pocket costs. As an illustration, we consider a policy change in which three insurers, who collectively account for around half of the patients in our sample, decide to cut a drug’s out-of-pocket costs by 50%. Depending on which information set the researcher assumes, the empirical model predicts the now cheaper product’s prescription share will increase anywhere from 3.5 percentage points to 23.5 percentage points. Here, the models that assume physicians know the most about prices predict the smallest increase, as these models, when combined with the data, estimate relatively inelastic demand.

This sensitivity to informational assumptions, in both parameter estimates and counterfactual predictions, motivates our move to a moment inequality framework. With our inequalities, we test assumptions about physicians’ information sets before evaluating counterfactual policies. In our setting, we reject the null hypothesis that physicians have perfect information on out-of-pocket costs. Instead, our data and model suggest physicians in-
corporate only coarse price information in their choices; specifically, we fail to reject that physicians form expectations on out-of-pocket costs using either contemporaneous or lagged average prices for each drug, or lagged average prices for each drug by insurance plan type. By concluding that physicians form expectations about patient costs using only these aggregate price measures, we depart from the more common approach in the literature that uses realized patient costs in prescription drug choice models (see literature reviews by Goldman et al., 2007; Baicker and Goldman, 2011).

Using our moment inequality model, we evaluate the effect of an intervention to change physicians’ information. Here, we quantify the effect of moving from a setting in which physicians form expectations using broad price averages—specifically, those averages that our moment inequality estimates suggest compose a subset of physicians’ information sets—to a counterfactual setting in which physicians know actual patient prices. When physicians possess more detailed information, we predict a reduction in out-of-pocket costs of roughly $5 to $10 per month, from a baseline of $46 per month. However, the 12 to 23% decline in costs leads to a smaller surplus gain of between $0.10 and $0.24 per patient per month. Here, the gap between the cost savings and surplus gains is due to differential drug quality. With better information on patient prices, physicians switch patients from high quality expensive drugs toward lower quality cheaper drugs.

Finally, we show the cost savings and surplus gains per patient from our informational intervention would be smaller if we provided information only to endocrinology specialists. Our estimates show that endocrinologists begin with better information on prices and are less elastic with respect to expected prices; as a consequence, providing these specialists better price information leads to an average reduction in monthly out-of-pocket costs of only $2 to $5. Thus, if providing physicians with patient-specific prices at the point of prescribing is costly, our analysis suggests a value of targeting this provision toward general practitioners.¹

Our paper relates to several research areas. First, we contribute to a literature that explores heterogeneity in physicians’ drug treatment decisions. This literature studies the influence of several factors, including financial incentives (Iizuka, 2012; Dickstein, 2018), advertising or detailing (Ching and Ishihara, 2012; Grennan et al., 2021), as well as the interplay with secondary markets (Schnell, 2022) and competitive forces (Currie et al., 2023). Our results emphasize the role that physician information plays in prescribing behavior: we show that estimates of price responsiveness are biased if researchers mis-specify physicians’ information sets, and we present evidence that indicates physicians’ price information is

¹Our finding that physicians are heterogeneous in their information and price sensitivity may reflect differential training or a different population of patients: if endocrinologists treat more severely ill patients, for example, their choices may reflect a preference for efficacy over price. Nonetheless, under either source of heterogeneity, the per-patient savings from interventions that target primary care physicians are greater.
imperfect. That physicians form price expectations using only aggregate price information is consistent with Shrank et al. (2005), who use survey data to illustrate that physicians have limited information on prices, and Carrera et al. (2018) and Desai et al. (2022), who show that providers’ prescribing behavior reacts to informational shocks on out-of-pocket costs.

Second, our research relates to a literature studying the role of information frictions in healthcare markets, summarized in Handel and Schwartzstein (2018). These frictions arise in health insurance choice (Handel and Kolstad, 2015; Handel et al., 2019; Brown and Jeon, 2023), and also in the process through which physicians determine the quality of treatments (Crawford and Shum, 2005; Chintagunta et al., 2009; Ching, 2010). We depart from this literature in that we do not micro-found physicians’ information sets, but rather apply moment inequalities to infer their content.

Finally, we contribute to a literature that uses moment inequalities to estimate agents’ preference parameters. This literature, reviewed in Kline et al. (2021), Kline and Tamer (2023), and Canay et al. (2023), has early examples in Pakes (2010), Holmes (2011), and Pakes et al. (2015). Previous applications of moment inequalities in the healthcare context include Ho (2009), Ho and Pakes (2014), and Maini and Pammolli (2023). Applications in other contexts include Eizenberg (2014), Illanes (2017), Wollmann (2018), Morales et al. (2019), Fujiwara et al. (2023), and Houde et al. (2023). Our contribution is to generalize the odds-based moment inequalities introduced in Dickstein and Morales (2018), and subsequently applied in Bombardini et al. (2023), to discrete choice settings with more than two, and possibly many, choices. In our model, we allow for individual- and choice-specific unobserved preference heterogeneity, while also permitting agents to have unobserved expectations over a product characteristic, like price. In this way, our approach can handle many discrete choice settings in which agents face uncertain product attributes.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our setting and data, and present statistics that motivate our analysis. In sections 3 and 4, we present a model of prescription drug choice and introduce the inequalities we use for estimation. In Section 5, we present simulation results comparing the properties of our moment inequality estimator to those of maximum likelihood estimators. We present our estimates and counterfactual results in sections 6 and 7, and test for heterogeneity in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.

2 Empirical Setting and Data

Our analysis focuses on care for type 2 diabetes patients. In Section 2.1, we describe the treatments typically prescribed for diabetes patients. In Section 2.2, we present our data along with descriptive statistics on out-of-pocket costs and physicians’ treatment choices.
2.1 Diabetes Care

The treatment of type 2 diabetes often begins with a diagnosis based on abnormal test results for either fasting plasma glucose or hemoglobin A1c. The treatment’s goal is to achieve a particular A1c level (ADA, 2017). Treatment usually starts with metformin, a generic drug. If the patient fails to achieve the A1c goal after three months, the clinician may start the patient on dual combination therapy. At this stage, physicians must choose among several alternative drug classes, including DPP-4 inhibitors, GLP-1 agonists, and SGLT2 inhibitors. We focus on this set of drug classes in our analysis. The choice across these classes depends on medical factors. We treat the choice of class as given exogenously by the patient’s health status, and focus on the choice of treatment within class as a function of price and efficacy.

2.2 Data

We use data from Oregon’s All-Payers All-Claims (APAC) database for the years 2011-2016. Our sample includes both medical and prescription drug claims for patients with private insurance through the individual insurance market and through group insurance. For each medical claim, we observe the patient’s diagnosis as well as patient demographics, insurance coverage, and the identity of the patient’s healthcare provider. We link these medical claims to the patient’s drug claims, where we observe the treatment prescribed and the patient’s out-of-pocket cost. In addition, we complement the information on a physician’s background in the APAC data by validating the physician’s characteristics in two public registries that contain information on the provider’s specialty, gender, and medical school graduation year.

Sample creation. To form our sample, we include only claims where the identity of providers, patients, and treatments verify certain restrictions. First, we restrict our sample to claims in which the physician’s specialty is one that typically provides primary care for diabetes patients, including family medicine, internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and endocrinology. We also include non-physician providers, such as nurse practitioners, who can prescribe treatments for diabetes patients. Second, we focus only on patients who both receive a diagnosis of type 2 diabetes and who are prescribed a drug in one of three treatment classes: DPP-4 inhibitors, GLP-1 agonists, and SGLT2 inhibitors.

---

2 The classes differ in their efficacy, risk of hypoglycemia, likelihood for weight gain, and other side effects.
3 In March 2016, the US Supreme Court, in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, created an exemption that allows self-insured plans to opt out of reporting their claims to a state’s all-payers database. Following that decision, we lose claims for a portion of self-insured plans.
4 Specifically, we use the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System registry and the Doctors and Clinicians National Downloadable File.
5 Throughout the paper, we use “physician” as shorthand for both medical doctors and other providers who prescribe treatments in our sample.
Finally, we additionally restrict our sample in several minor ways, such as excluding drug observations that reflect refills rather than active choices by a physician. In Appendix A.1, we detail the steps we follow to build our sample.

The resulting sample includes 184,783 claims prescribed by 4,990 providers for a set of 35,721 patients. Close to 70% of providers are primary care physicians with specialties in internal medicine or family medicine; 2% of physicians are endocrinologists with expertise in metabolic diseases like diabetes; and the remaining 28% are non-physician providers or providers with other specialties including obstetrics and gynecology. Although endocrinologists make up a small fraction of providers in our sample, they account for a larger share of claims: on average, endocrinologists record 51 claims per quarter in our sample, relative to 14 per quarter for primary care physicians, and only 9 per quarter for non-physician providers or physician providers with other specialties.

The average patient age is 55 years old. Among the insurance plan type options, 46% of patients enroll in a preferred provider organization (PPO) plan and 33% choose either a health maintenance organization (HMO) or point-of-service (POS) plan. The remaining 21% have self-insured plans. Among the set of insurers, the largest carrier enrolls 25% of the patients, and the top four carriers by patient volume jointly account for 70% of patients.

**Drug choice set.** In the three drug classes we consider, the set of choices available to physicians varies from three to four drug treatments. In all three classes, the most popular treatment accounts for approximately 70% of non-refill drug claims, with the remaining 30% distributed roughly equally across all other available treatments.

We use copayments as our measure of the out-of-pocket costs patients face when filling a prescription. Unlike coverage for inpatient and outpatient services, it is rare for the plans in our sample to use either deductibles or coinsurance for prescription drug spending.\(^6\) When specifying the copayment levels for each drug and plan, however, we face a missing data problem. We do not observe the full drug formulary at the plan level; using our claims data, we can only infer copayments using observations from patients who filled a prescription. To generate the full cost list for a plan, we employ a random forest model that uses our observed data to impute missing drug prices for all plans and years. We provide more detail on this imputation in Appendix A.2.

In Table 1, we report summary statistics of the distribution of copayments. The statistics show significant heterogeneity in out-of-pocket costs. Looking within drug, and focusing on the drug Janumet in the DPP-4 inhibitor class as an example, we see in panel A that the mean monthly price is close to $42 with a standard deviation of $28 per month. The implied coefficient of variation is thus 0.67; across the drugs in the classes we study, the coefficient

---

\(^6\)Deductibles and coinsurance are non-zero for 3% and 4% of the patients in our sample, respectively.
Table 1: Distribution of Monthly Out-Of-Pocket Costs

Panel A: By Drug - Variation Across Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug Class</th>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>IQR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPP-4 Inhibitors</td>
<td>Janumet</td>
<td>41.76</td>
<td>28.18</td>
<td>20.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Januvia</td>
<td>44.29</td>
<td>29.53</td>
<td>26.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradjenta</td>
<td>46.52</td>
<td>22.53</td>
<td>23.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bydureon</td>
<td>50.42</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>38.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLP-1 Agonists</td>
<td>Byetta</td>
<td>52.11</td>
<td>40.50</td>
<td>37.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trulicity</td>
<td>59.18</td>
<td>37.16</td>
<td>37.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victoza</td>
<td>61.68</td>
<td>44.62</td>
<td>45.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farxiga</td>
<td>64.43</td>
<td>51.97</td>
<td>65.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGLT2</td>
<td>Invokana</td>
<td>57.63</td>
<td>40.11</td>
<td>61.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jardiance</td>
<td>56.06</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>42.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: By Carrier - Variation Across Plans and Drugs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug Class</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>IQR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPP-4 Inhibitors</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>42.16</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>15.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>36.77</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>23.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>79.95</td>
<td>31.72</td>
<td>43.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>32.23</td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td>17.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLP-1 Agonists</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>51.59</td>
<td>24.58</td>
<td>17.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>35.53</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>23.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>111.05</td>
<td>39.28</td>
<td>38.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>37.32</td>
<td>19.78</td>
<td>21.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGLT2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>49.58</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>21.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>44.19</td>
<td>35.06</td>
<td>43.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>104.54</td>
<td>39.36</td>
<td>52.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>32.07</td>
<td>18.02</td>
<td>22.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: We report summary statistics of the distribution of out-of-pocket costs (in $ per month) in our sample. In each panel, we report the mean, standard deviation (St. Dev.), and interquartile range (IQR). St. Dev. and IQR are computed after residualizing out-of-pocket costs to take out drug-year fixed effects (in panel A) or carrier-year fixed effects (in panel B). Panel A reflects variation in prices across all plans within a drug; while panel B reflects variation across plans and drugs within a carrier.

of variation is similar, ranging from 0.48 to 0.81. In panel B, we report statistics of the price variation across drugs and plans offered by each of the top four carriers. The dispersion in prices within a carrier is slightly smaller than the price dispersion within drug, with coefficients of variation that vary between 0.35 and 0.79, depending on the carrier and class.

With significant heterogeneity in copayments, both across insurance plans for a given drug as well as across drugs and plans for a given carrier, physicians may find it difficult to
predict the specific copayment an insured patient would face for each drug. In the left panel of Figure 1, we show physicians indeed prescribe the cheapest drug at roughly the same rate as if they had chosen the prescribed drug randomly. In the right panel, we show that, relative to a world in which physicians always choose the cheapest drug within a class, patients face additional out-of-pocket costs per month of between $10 (for DPP-4 Inhibitors) and $20 (for GLP-1 Antagonists) on average under the observed distribution of choices.

The choice pattern in Figure 1 could arise due to physician preferences for efficacy over price, or could reflect physicians’ lack of information about a given patient’s out-of-pocket costs for each drug in the choice set. The heterogeneity in prices reported in Table 1 may also reflect some noise due to our need to predict copayments for drug-plan pairs not observed in the data. To better understand physicians’ information and their preferences, we move next to present a model that accounts for the possibility that physicians possess imperfect information about patient prices as well as for possible quality differences across drugs in the choice set. In addition, in Section 4, we outline an estimation approach that can account for classical measurement error in our observed price measure.

Figure 1: Out-of-pocket Costs and Physicians’ Choices

(a) Prob. Choosing Cheapest Drug

(b) Monthly Cost Difference

Notes: In panel (a), by drug class, we report the observed probability of choosing the drug with the lowest out-of-pocket cost. We compare this observed probability to a hypothetical setting in which the physician chooses each drug with equal probability. In panel (b), we report the mean difference in monthly copayments between the observed drug chosen for a patient and the cheapest drug available to that patient in the class.

3 Model of Prescription Choice

We model a physician’s choice of prescription drug within a class at each patient visit. We index visits by $i$ and drugs by $j$. At each visit $i$, we assume the physician’s utility from choosing drug $j$ is

$$U_{ij} = u_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

(1a)
\( u_{ij} = \kappa_j + \alpha p_{ij}, \quad \) (1b)

where \( p_{ij} \) denotes the out-of-pocket cost of treatment \( j \) for the patient at visit \( i \), \( \alpha \) captures the physician’s sensitivity to patient costs, and \( \kappa_j \) and \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) capture the common and idiosyncratic components of the quality of treatment \( j \), respectively.\(^7\) Defining a binary variable \( d_{ij} \) that equals one if the physician prescribes drug \( j \) at visit \( i \) (and zero otherwise), we assume

\[
d_{ij} \equiv \mathbb{1}\{ \mathbb{E}[U_{ij}|J_i] \geq \max_{j'=1,\ldots,J} \mathbb{E}[U_{ij'|J_i}] \}, \quad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, J, \quad (2)
\]

where \( J \) denotes the cardinality of the set of drugs that the physician could have prescribed at visit \( i \); \( J_i \) denotes the physician’s information set at visit \( i \); and \( \mathbb{E}[\cdot|J_i] \) is a conditional expectation operator reflecting the physician’s beliefs. We assume physicians’ expectations are rational and, thus, for any random vector \( A_i \), \( \mathbb{E}[A_i|J_i] \) denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution of \( A_i \) conditional on \( J_i \) in the population of office visits of interest. We impose the following assumptions on physicians’ information sets:

\[
J_i = (W_i, \varepsilon_i), \quad (3a)
\]

\[
(\alpha, \kappa) \subseteq W_i, \quad (3b)
\]

where \( \kappa = \{\kappa_j\}_{j=1}^J \), \( \varepsilon_i = \{\varepsilon_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \) and, for any two random vectors \( A_i \) and \( B_i \), we use \( A_i \subseteq B_i \) to denote that the distribution of \( A_i \) conditional on \( B_i \) is degenerate. As indicated in equation (3a), the information set \( J_i \) thus includes the vector of idiosyncratic shocks, \( \varepsilon_i \), and all variables in \( W_i \). Equation (3b) imposes that \( W_i \) includes the price sensitivity \( \alpha \), and the drug quality terms \( \kappa \), but other variables may also enter that set.

We impose two sets of assumptions on the distribution of \( \varepsilon_i \). First, we assume that

\[
F_\varepsilon(\varepsilon_i|W_i) = F_\varepsilon(\varepsilon_i) = \exp(-\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(-\varepsilon_{ij})), \quad (4)
\]

where \( F_\varepsilon(\cdot) \) denotes the cumulative distribution function of \( \varepsilon_i \). Equation (4) imposes that \( \varepsilon_i \) is independent of all other elements of the physician’s information set, as included in \( W_i \). The equation also imposes that, for any visit \( i \), \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) is independent and identically distributed across all \( j = 1, \ldots, J \), and follows a type I extreme value distribution with location parameter equal to zero and scale parameter equal to one. Second, we assume that

\[
\mathbb{E}[p_i|J_i] = \mathbb{E}[p_i|W_i], \quad (5)
\]

\(^7\)We use quality to denote the drug’s efficacy, side effect profile, or the ease of prescribing the drug.
where \( p_i = \{p_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \). Equation (5) imposes that, once we condition on all other elements of the physician’s information set, the vector of idiosyncratic shocks \( \varepsilon_i \) does not provide any additional information that helps the physician forecast the patient’s out-of-pocket costs.\(^8\)

Equations (1), (3), and (5) imply

\[
E[U_{ij}|J_i] = E[u_{ij}|W_i] + \varepsilon_{ij} = \kappa_j + \alpha E[p_{ij}|W_i] + \varepsilon_{ij}, \quad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, J, \tag{6}
\]

where the first equality is implied by equations (1a), (3a), and (5), and the second equality is implied by equations (1b) and (3b). Equations (2) and (4) further imply that we can write the probability that drug \( j \) is prescribed given \( W_i \) as

\[
P(d_{ij} = 1|W_i) = \frac{\exp(\kappa_j + \alpha E[p_{ij}|W_i])}{\sum_{j'=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha E[p_{ij'}|W_i])} \quad \text{for } j = 1, \ldots, J. \tag{7}
\]

If we assume physicians have perfect information on prices and, thus, \( E[p_i|W_i] = p_i \), our model becomes a multinomial logit model with choice-specific fixed effects. If we place no restrictions on how physicians form their price predictions, observing the conditional probabilities, \( P(d_{ij} = 1|W_i) \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, J \), generally does not allow a researcher to distinguish how a physician’s preference parameters \((\kappa, \alpha)\) or information set, \( W_i \), affect her treatment choices. As a middle ground, we show in Section 4 that the assumption that physicians’ expectations are rational is enough to learn both about the content of physicians’ information set as well as about the value of their preference parameters.

To clarify how we will later apply our model to study diabetes drug choices, we comment on two additional features of the model. First, although formally physicians choose the prescription drug in our set-up, their patients’ information and preferences may influence their choices. Thus, the drug qualities, \( \{\kappa_j\}_{j=1}^J \), the price sensitivity, \( \alpha \), and the physician’s information on prices, \( W_i \), may partly reflect patient input. Second, we emphasize again that the subindex \( i \) on \( p_{ij} \) implies that drug \( j \)’s out-of-pocket costs may vary across visits, consistent with the statistics in Table 1. Similarly, the subindex \( i \) on \( W_i \) implies that physicians’ information about drug prices may vary across visits. Thus, in our setting, we allow patients to face different drug prices depending on their plan, and we allow physicians to have different information about the out-of-pocket costs of patients on different plans.\(^9\)

---

\(^8\)If \( p_i \subseteq W_i \) and, thus, the physician at visit \( i \) has perfect information on \( p_i \), equation (5) naturally holds. However, equation (5) is also compatible with the physician having imperfect information on \( p_i \); it simply requires that all information relevant to the physician’s forecast of \( p_i \) is included in \( W_i \).

\(^9\)Conversely, equations (1) and (4) impose restrictions on the distribution of drug qualities. Quality is the sum of the component \( \kappa \), common across all visits, and the idiosyncratic component, \( \varepsilon_i \). The common quality component matches the empirical setting we study: when we condition on specific classes of diabetes treatments, the patients treated will have similar health statuses and similar treatment effects under drug \( j \).
Finally, we assume the researcher collects a random sample of \( N \) visits. For each visit in the sample, we assume the researcher observes the drug prescribed, \( d_i = \{d_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \); the out-of-pocket costs for each drug, \( p_i = \{p_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \); and, a set of variables that may be used to predict these out-of-pocket costs, \( z_i = \{z_{ij}\}_{j=1}^J \). Here, \( z_{ij} \) is a vector of covariates correlated with \( p_{ij} \) that may belong to \( W_i \); e.g., \( z_{ij} \) may include the average out-of-pocket cost of drug \( j \) across subsets of insurance plans. Crucially, we do not assume the researcher observes the complete set \( W_i \) for any visit.

Given a normalization \( \kappa_1 = 0 \), the goal of estimation is to recover the value of the parameters \( \{\kappa_j\}_{j=2}^J \) and \( \alpha \), and to learn about the content of the information sets \( \{W_i\}_{i=1}^N \). To acquire knowledge about \( \{W_i\}_{i=1}^N \), the researcher can test the null hypothesis that \( z_i \) belongs to the information set \( W_i \) of every physician in a group of interest; i.e., the researcher tests \( H_0: z_i \subseteq W_i \) for a subset of visits. To simplify the notation, we use \( \theta = (\theta_\alpha, \theta_{\kappa_2}, \ldots, \theta_{\kappa_J}) \) to denote the unknown parameter vector, \( \Theta \) to denote the parameter space, and \( \theta^* = (\alpha, \kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_J) \) to denote the true parameter value, which is determined by equation (7).

## 4 Moment Inequalities

In this section, we show how to partially identify \( \theta^* \). We use two types of moment inequalities, odds-based and bounding inequalities, which we describe in sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In Section 4.3, we discuss how we use these inequalities to compute a confidence set for \( \theta^* \).

### 4.1 Odds-based Inequalities

For any two drugs \( j \) and \( j' \), any value of \( z_i \) in its support, and any \( \theta \in \Theta \), we define the following odds-based moment inequality

\[
\mathbb{E}^\theta_{z_i}(z_i, \theta) \geq 0 \tag{8a}
\]

with

\[
\mathbb{E}^\theta_{z_i}(z_i, \theta) = \mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) - d_{ij'}|z_i], \tag{8b}
\]

and \( \Delta p_{ijj'} = p_{ij} - p_{ij'} \). We denote as \( \Theta_0^\theta \) the set of values of \( \theta \) that jointly satisfy the inequality in equation (8) for every value of \( z_i \) in its support and all pairs of drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) in the physician’s choice set. Formally, denoting as \( Z \) the support of \( z_i \), we define

\[
\Theta_0^\theta \equiv \{\theta \in \Theta: \mathbb{E}^\theta_{z_i}(z, \theta) \geq 0 \text{ for all } z \in Z, j = 1, \ldots, J, \text{ and } j' = 1, \ldots, J\}. \tag{9}
\]

Theorem 1 establishes a sufficient condition for the true parameter value \( \theta^* \) to belong to \( \Theta_0^\theta \).
Theorem 1. Let \( \theta^* \equiv (\alpha, \kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_J) \) be defined by equation (7) and the normalization \( \kappa_1 = 0 \). If \( z_i \subseteq W_i \), then \( \theta^* \in \Theta^0 \).

Theorem 1 indicates that, when evaluated at the true parameter value, the inequality in equation (8) holds if \( z_i \) belongs to the information set \( W_i \) for every visit \( i \) in the population of interest. This inequality holds regardless of the value of \( z_i \) on which we condition, and holds for any two drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) we may use to define the moment, as long as these drugs could have been prescribed by all healthcare providers in the population of interest. We provide an intuitive explanation of Theorem 1 below. The formal proof appears in Appendix B.1.

The moment inequality in equation (8) is a generalization to multinomial settings of the odds-based inequality introduced in Dickstein and Morales (2018) for binary choice models. To understand why the inequality in equation (8) holds for \( \theta = \theta^* \), a key equation is

\[
\frac{\mathbb{E}[d_{ij}|W_i]}{\mathbb{E}[d_{ij}|W_i]} = \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]),
\]

with \( \Delta \kappa_{jj'} = \kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} \). Equation (7) implies equation (10) for any drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) in the physician’s choice set and any information set \( W_i \). Reordering the terms in equation (10), we obtain

\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]) - d_{ij}|W_i] = 0.
\]

As the moment function in equation (11) is convex in the unobserved expectation, \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] \), and physicians’ expectational errors are mean zero (as implied by the assumption of rational expectations), Jensen’s inequality implies that

\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})] - d_{ij}|W_i] \geq 0.
\]

This inequality also holds if the variable \( \Delta p_{ijj'} \) is affected by classical measurement error in prices, as classical measurement errors and expectational errors have the same properties in our setting. Finally, applying the Law of Iterated Expectations, we conclude that

\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})] - d_{ij}|z_i] \geq 0,
\]

for any \( z_i \subseteq W_i \), proving Theorem 1 in this way.

---

10 A restriction imposed in the multinomial model in Section 3 that is not imposed in the binary model in Dickstein and Morales (2018) is the requirement that \( \varepsilon_i \) follows a type I extreme value distribution. In the binary choice case, Dickstein and Morales (2018) show one can derive inequalities analogous that in equation (8) if the distribution of \( \varepsilon_{ij} - \varepsilon_{ij'} \) is log-concave; thus, \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) can follow multiple distributions, including the normal distribution.
To gain intuition on why inequalities of the type in equation (8) provide non-trivial bounds, consider the following specific cases of the general inequality in equation (8):

\[ \mathbb{E}[d_{i1} \exp\left(-(-\theta_{\kappa_2} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{i12})\right) - d_{i2}|z_i] \geq 0, \]  

(14a)

\[ \mathbb{E}[d_{i2} \exp\left(-(-\theta_{\kappa_2} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{i21})\right) - d_{i1}|z_i] \geq 0, \]  

(14b)

where we have imposed the normalization \( \kappa_1 = 0 \) and, as a reminder, \( \theta_\alpha \) and \( \theta_{\kappa_2} \) are unknown parameters with true values \( \alpha \) and \( \kappa_2 \), respectively. The function \( \exp(x) \) goes to 0 as \( x \) goes to \(-\infty\); thus, given a value of \( \theta_\alpha \), equation (14a) provides a finite lower bound on \( \theta_{\kappa_2} \) and, similarly, equation (14b) provides a finite upper bound on \( \theta_{\kappa_2} \). Theorem 1 guarantees that, if \( \theta_\alpha = \alpha, \kappa_2 \) belongs to the interval defined by these bounds.

4.2 Bounding Inequalities

For any two drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) in the physician’s choice set, any value of \( z_i \) in its support \( \mathcal{Z} \), and any function \( e_{jj'}: \mathcal{Z} \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R} \), we define the following bounding moment inequality

\[ m_{jj'}^{b}(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot)) \geq 0 \]  

(15a)

with

\[ m_{jj'}^{b}(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot)) \equiv \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{jj'}))|z_i]. \]  

(15b)

The moment \( m_{jj'}^{b}(\cdot) \) depends on \( e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) \), which is a deterministic function of the observed vector \( z_i \) and the unknown parameter vector \( \theta \), and may vary by pair of drugs \( j \) and \( j' \).

Defining \( e \) as the set of functions that includes the function \( e_{jj'}(\cdot) \) for all drug pairs (i.e., \( e = \{e_{jj'}(\cdot)\}_{j,j'=1,j'-1} \)), we denote as \( \Theta_0^b(e) \) the set of values of \( \theta \) that jointly satisfy the inequality in equation (15) for every value of \( z_i \) in its support, and every pair of drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) in the physician’s choice set. Formally,

\[ \Theta_0^b(e) \equiv \{\theta \in \Theta: m_{jj'}^{b}(z, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot)) \geq 0 \text{ for all } z \in \mathcal{Z}, j = 1, \ldots, J, \text{ and } j' = 1, \ldots, J\}. \]  

(16)

Regardless of the set \( e \) used to build the moment inequalities in equation (15), the following theorem establishes a sufficient condition for the true parameter value \( \theta^* \) to belong to \( \Theta_0^b(e) \).

**Theorem 2** Let \( \theta^* \equiv (\alpha, \kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_J) \) be defined by equation (7) and the normalization \( \kappa_1 = 0 \). If \( z_i \subseteq \mathcal{W}_i \), then \( \theta^* \in \Theta_0^b(e) \) for any set \( e \) of functions \( e_{jj'}: \mathcal{Z} \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R} \).

Theorem 2 indicates that, when evaluated at the true parameter value, the inequality in
equation (15) holds if, for every visit $i$ in the population of interest, $z_i$ belongs to $W_i$ and the two drugs $j$ and $j'$ could have been prescribed by the corresponding healthcare provider. Importantly, this inequality holds regardless of the set of functions $e$ used to build the bounding moment inequalities, as long as they are deterministic functions of $z_i$ and the unknown parameter vector $\theta$. We provide an intuitive explanation of Theorem 2 below. The formal proof appears in Appendix B.2.

The bounding inequality in equation (15) was first introduced in Fujiwara et al. (2023) for the case in which $e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) = \hat{e}$ for a constant $\hat{e} \in \mathbb{R}$. We show the inequality in equation (15) holds more generally for any $e_{jj'}: \mathcal{Z} \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and, by increasing the set of functions $e_{jj'}(\cdot)$ we consider, we obtain bounding inequalities that yield tighter bounds on $\theta^*$. To understand why the inequality in equation (15) holds for $\theta = \theta^*$, we first multiply equation (11) by $-1$, obtaining the equality

$$E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])|W_i] = 0. \quad (17)$$

As $-\exp(-x)$ is concave in $x$, a first-order approximation to it around any point bounds it from above. Thus, for any $e_{jj'}: \mathcal{Z} \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we derive from equation (17) the inequality:

$$E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) (1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*) - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])|W_i] \geq 0, \quad (18)$$

where $e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)$ is the point around which the first-order approximation is taken. If $z_i \subseteq W_i$, properties of rational expectations imply the sign of the inequality in equation (18) is preserved when introducing the price difference, $\Delta p_{ijj'}$, in place of the unobserved expectation, $E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]$. In this way, we obtain the inequality:

$$E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) (1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*) - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|W_i] \geq 0. \quad (19)$$

This inequality also holds if the variable $\Delta p_{ijj'}$ is affected by classical measurement error in prices. Finally, applying the Law of Iterated Expectations, we conclude that

$$E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) (1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*) - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i] \geq 0. \quad (20)$$

for any $z_i \subseteq W_i$, proving Theorem 2 in this way.

To gain intuition on why the bounding inequalities provide non-trivial bounds, consider the following specific cases of the general type of inequality introduced in equation (15):

$$E[d_{i2} - d_{i1} \exp(-e_{i12}(z_i))(1 + e_{i12}(z_i) - (-\theta_{\kappa_2} + \theta_1 \Delta p_{i12})|z_i] \geq 0, \quad (21a)$$

15
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{i1} - d_{i2} \exp(-e_{i21}(z_i))(1 + e_{i21}(z_i) - (\theta_{\kappa_2} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{i21}))|z_i] \geq 0, \quad (21b)
\]

where, for simplicity, we use a function \(e_{jj'}(\cdot)\) that is constant in \(\theta\). The moments in equations (21a) and (21b) are linearly decreasing and increasing, respectively, in \(\theta_{\kappa_2}\). Thus, given a value of \(\theta_\alpha\), equations (21a) and (21b) identify finite upper and lower bounds on \(\theta_{\kappa_2}\), respectively. Theorem 2 guarantees that, if \(\theta_\alpha = \alpha\), \(\kappa_2\) belongs to the interval defined by these bounds.

For any two drugs \(j\) and \(j'\), using the inequality in equation (15) for estimation requires choosing a function \(e_{jj'}(\cdot)\). This choice is consequential for the size of the identified set \(\Theta^b_{b0}(e)\) and, as shown in Appendix B.3.1, \(\Theta^b_{b0}(e)\) is minimized when, for every pair of drugs \(j\) and \(j'\),

\[
e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) = e_{jj'}^*(z_i, \theta) \quad \text{with} \quad e_{jj'}^*(z_i, \theta) = \theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \mathbb{E}[(\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1]. \quad (22)
\]

Furthermore, if \(e_{jj'}(\cdot) = e_{jj'}^*(\cdot)\) for every pair of drugs \(j\) and \(j'\), and the vector \(z_i\) is such that

\[
\mathbb{E}[p_i|z_i] = \mathbb{E}[p_i|W_i], \quad (23)
\]

the inequalities in equation (15) point identify \(\theta^*\). That is, defining \(e^* = \{e_{jj'}^*(\cdot)\}_{j,j'=1}^{J,J}\), it holds that \(\Theta^b_{b0}(e^*) = \theta^*\). We prove this result formally in Appendix B.3.2.

As we show in Section 5, given a vector \(z_i\) of observed predictors of the choice characteristic \(p_i\), a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) that uses \(\mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]\) as a proxy for the unobserved expectation \(\mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]\) is a consistent estimator of \(\theta^*\) if and only if equation (23) holds—that is, if and only if the researcher correctly specifies the agent's expectations. The MLE is inconsistent otherwise. The advantage of using the inequalities in equation (15) together with the approximation points in equation (22) is that (a) these inequalities yield an identified set that always contains the true parameter value (see Theorem 2) and, (b) when equation (23) holds for every \(j\) and \(j'\), the identified set shrinks to include only the true parameter value. Thus, in settings in which the MLE is a consistent estimator of \(\theta^*\), using the inequalities in equation (15) instead does not entail a loss of identification power. In settings in which the MLE is not a consistent estimator of \(\theta^*\), these inequalities still yield an identified set that includes \(\theta^*\).\(^{11}\)

### 4.3 Using Inequalities for Estimation

We combine odds-based and bounding moment inequalities for estimation. The inequalities in equations (8) and (15) are defined for every ordered pair of drugs \((j, j')\) and every value

\(^{11}\)As we show in Section 5, when the MLE is inconsistent, \(\Theta^b_{b0}(e)\) may not include the \(plim\) of the MLE.
of $z_i$ in its support. In our setting, $z_i$ is continuous and, thus, exploiting the information contained in all these inequalities is computationally challenging. Instead, we compute confidence sets for $\theta^*$ using a finite number of unconditional moment inequalities implied by the conditional ones in equations (8) and (15). Specifically, for each ordered pair of drugs $(j, j')$, and each instrument function $g_k: \mathcal{Z} \to [0, \infty)$ in a set $\mathcal{G}_K = \{g_k(\cdot)\}_{k=1}^K$, we use the odds-based moment inequality
\[
\mathbb{E}[(d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_{\alpha} \Delta p_{i,j'}))) - d_{ij'}g_k(z_i)] \geq 0,
\]
and the bounding moment inequality
\[
\mathbb{E}[(d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{ij'}^*(z_i, \theta))(1 + e_{ij'}^*(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_{\alpha} \Delta p_{i,j'})))g_k(z_i)] \geq 0,
\]
where $e_{ij'}^*(\cdot)$ is defined in equation (22). Thus, given a choice set of size $J$ and $K$ instrument functions, we use $2J(J-1)K$ inequalities to compute a confidence set for a vector with $J$ elements: the drug fixed effects $(\kappa_2, \ldots, \kappa_J)$ and the price coefficient $\alpha$. In our application, $z_i$ is a scalar and every instrument function $g_k(\cdot)$ is an indicator function; we describe in Appendix B.4 the instrument functions we use. In our baseline results, we compute confidence sets for $\theta^*$ following the inference procedure for unconditional moment inequalities in Cox and Shi (2023); we describe in Appendix B.5 our implementation of this procedure.

## 5 Simulation

Before estimating our model on actual physician choices, we perform a simulation exercise. We design the simulation with the goal of comparing the properties of the MLE with our moment inequality estimator. We examine settings in which the researcher only partially observes the agent’s information set or in which agents form expectations with error. Through this simulation, we first show that the MLE is inconsistent unless the researcher’s assumed information set coincides exactly with the agent’s information set. Conversely, consistent with theorems 1 and 2, the odds-based and bounding moment inequalities are satisfied at the true parameter value as long as the researcher correctly identifies a subset of the agent’s information set. Second, we show that both the odds-based and bounding moment inequalities are useful for identifying parameters; i.e. neither type of moment is redundant. Third,

---

12 Andrews et al. (2022) and Cox and Shi (2023) contain computationally convenient procedures for subvector inference in conditional moment inequality settings in which the nuisance parameters enter linearly and the associated covariates depend only on the instruments. No parameter enters linearly in the moment in equation (8), and all parameters are multiplied by $d_{ij}$ (which does not belong to the vector of instruments) in the moment in equation (15). Those procedures are not applicable in our context.
we discuss the size of the confidence set we find using the inequalities, and in particular when
this set is likely to include many parameter values in addition to the true value. Finally, we
show how our inequalities can be used to test hypotheses about the variables agents know
and use when forming expectations.

5.1 Simulation Set-up

We simulate data for \( i = 1, \ldots, N \) observations, with \( N = 4,000,000 \), using the model in
Section 3. We assume agents choose between three choices, \( j = \{1, 2, 3\} \), and we set the
choice-specific quality levels to \( \kappa_1 = \kappa_2 = 0 \) and \( \kappa_3 = 1 \), and the price coefficient to \( \alpha = 1 \).
Unlike in the model in Section 3, we need to specify the data generating process of the price
vector \( p_i \), and the content of the information set \( W_i \), as these determine the choices of the
simulated observations.

For every choice \( j \), we impose the following data generating process for price: \( p_{ij} = \)
\( x_{1ij} + x_{2ij} + x_{3ij} \), with \( x_{kij} \) independent of both \( \varepsilon_i \) and \( x_{k'i'j'} \) for \( k \neq k' \), \( i \neq i' \), or \( j \neq j' \), and
distributed uniformly with a support that increases in a parameter \( \sigma_k \).\(^{13}\)

We impose that the agent’s price expectations depend only on \( x_{1i} \) and \( x_{2i} \), with \( x_{ki} = \)
\( \{x_{kij}\}_{j=1}^{3} \) for all \( i \) and \( k = 1, 2, 3 \). That is, \( W_i = (\kappa, \alpha, x_{1i}, x_{2i}) \) and thus \( \mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|W_i] = x_{1ij} + x_{2ij} \)
for \( j = 1, 2, 3 \) and all \( i \). The agent thus does not have perfect foresight, and \( x_{3i} \) represents
her expectational error.\(^{14}\) We also assume that, for each observation, the researcher only
observes \( (d_i, p_i, x_{2i}) \). Thus, \( x_{1i} \) captures variables on which the agent conditions her decision
but which the researcher does not observe.

Unless otherwise noted, we compute confidence sets using the inequalities in equations
(24) and (25) for all six possible drug pairs and the following two instrument functions:

\[
g_1(x_{2i}) = \mathbb{1}\{\Delta x_{2ij'} \geq 0\} \quad \text{and} \quad g_2(x_{2i}) = \mathbb{1}\{\Delta x_{2ij'} < 0\}.
\]

with \( \Delta x_{2ij'} = x_{2ij} - x_{2ij'} \). We also report MLEs computed as

\[
\text{argmax}_{(\theta_\alpha, \theta_\kappa_1, \theta_\kappa_2, \theta_\kappa_3)} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{3} \mathbb{1}\{d_{ij} = 1\} \ln \left( \frac{\exp(\theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_{\alpha} x_{2ij})}{\sum_{j'=1}^{3} \exp(\theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_{\alpha} x_{2ij'})} \right) \right\}, \quad \text{with} \ \theta_{\kappa_1} = 0.
\]

Thus, while the inequality estimates correctly assume that \( x_{2i} \) belongs to physician \( i \)’s in-

\(^{13}\)The support of \( x_{kij} \) is \( [\mu_{kij} - \sigma_k, \mu_{kij} + \sigma_k] \) for \( k = 1, 2, 3 \). We fix \( \mu_{22} = -0.5 \) and \( \mu_{23} = -1 \), and set
\( \mu_{kj} = 0 \) for all other \( k \) and \( j \). Thus, choices decline in mean price in order from \( j = 1 \) to \( j = 3 \). We fix the
length of the support of \( x_{2ij} \) to equal 8 (i.e., \( \sigma_2 = 4 \)) and present results for different values of \( \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma_3 \).

\(^{14}\)In detail, \( \mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|W_i] = x_{1ij} + x_{2ij} + \mathbb{E}[x_{3ij}|x_{1ij}, x_{2ij}] \), with \( \mathbb{E}[x_{3ij}|x_{1i}, x_{2i}] = 0 \) because \( x_{ki} \) is independent
of \( x_{k'j} \) for \( k \neq k' \) and \( \mu_{3j} \), the mean of \( x_{3j} \), equals zero.
formation set, the MLEs impose that $\mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|\mathcal{W}_i] = x_{2ij}$, which is correct only when $\sigma_1 = 0$.

5.2 Simulation Results

We report the main simulation results in Table 2. In case 1, we explore the scenario in which the researcher observes all variables on which the agent bases her decision (i.e., $\sigma_1 = 0$ and, thus, $x_{1i} = 0$ for all $i$) and agents make no expectational error (i.e., $\sigma_3 = 0$ and, thus, $x_{3i} = 0$ for all $i$). In this case, the MLE coincides with the true parameter vector, and the confidence sets defined by the odds-based and the bounding moment inequalities both include only one parameter value, the true one.

In case 2, we consider a scenario in which, as in case 1, the researcher observes the agent’s information set (i.e., $\sigma_1 = 0$), but agents now make expectational errors (i.e., $\sigma_3 > 0$). The results show that neither the MLE nor the confidence set defined by the bounding moment inequalities are affected by the presence of expectational errors; conversely, the confidence set defined by the odds-based moment inequalities is no longer a singleton, including the true value but also other values of the parameter vector.

In case 3, we consider the scenario in which agents make no expectational errors (i.e., $\sigma_3 = 0$) but the researcher only observes part of the agent’s information set (i.e., $\sigma_1 > 0$). When the true information set is $(x_{1i}, x_{2i})$ but the research assumes it includes only $x_{2i}$, the MLE is asymptotically biased downwards by a scaling factor that decreases in $\sigma_1$. In the presence of unobserved elements of the agent’s true information set, the confidence sets defined by the odds-based and by the bounding inequalities nonetheless contain the true value, $\theta^*$. However, they also include other values of the parameter vector; the number of additional points included in the confidence sets increases in the importance of the unobserved variable, $x_{1i}$, in the agent’s price expectations. For example, in case 3(a), when $\sigma_1$ is small and, thus, the unobserved element $x_{1i}$ contributes little to agents’ price expectations, the confidence set we obtain when combining the odds-based and the bounding moment inequalities includes only the true parameter value. In contrast, when $\sigma_1$ becomes larger in case 3(b), the resulting confidence set grows and includes points beyond the true parameter value.

In case 4, we consider a setting in which researchers do not observe all the variables agents use to form expectations (i.e., $\sigma_1 > 0$) and agents have imperfect information about the payoff variables they must forecast (i.e., $\sigma_3 > 0$). This case, which is likely the most empirically relevant setting, combines the complications present separately in cases 2 and

---

15The confidence sets reported in Table 2 are computed following Cox and Shi (2023). In Table C.3 in Appendix C.3.3, we present analogous confidence sets computed following Andrews and Soares (2010).

16That is, as $\sigma_1$ increases, the parameter estimates move towards zero unless the true parameter value is zero. If the true parameter value is zero, as it is for $\kappa_2$, its MLE remains consistent.
Table 2: Simulation Results - MLE and Confidence Intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( \sigma_1 )</th>
<th>( \sigma_3 )</th>
<th>( z_i )</th>
<th>Estimator</th>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>( \kappa_2 )</th>
<th>( \kappa_3 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.33, 0.33]</td>
<td>[0.67, 1.33]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.80, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.30, 0.30]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(b)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[1, 1] \cup [1.15, 2.50]</td>
<td>[-1.50, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.50, 2.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.50, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 1.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1] \cup [1.15, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.15, 0.15]</td>
<td>[1, 1.40]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.48, 0.50]</td>
<td>[0.65, 1.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.80, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.30, 0.30]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.33, 0.30]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>( p_i )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>( 0.87, 0.87 )</td>
<td>( -0.05, -0.03 )</td>
<td>( 0.85, 0.88 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
<td>( \emptyset )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: MLE denotes the maximum likelihood estimate. Odds-based, Bounding, and Both contain projections on each parameter of 95% confidence sets computed as in Cox and Shi (2023). Odds-based indicates the confidence set is computed using inequalities of the type in equation (24); Bounding indicates the confidence set is computed using inequalities of the type in equation (25); Both indicates it is computed using both types of inequalities. In cases 1 to 4, we use the instrument functions in equation (26). In case 5, we use the instrument functions \( g_1(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_j \geq 0) \) and \( g_2(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_j \leq 0) \). In all cases other than 3(b), confidence sets are computed using a 3-dimensional grid whose sides are \( [0.5,1.5] \) for \( \alpha \), \( [-0.5,0.5] \) for \( \kappa_2 \) and \( [0.5,1.5] \) for \( \kappa_3 \). In case 3(b), we use a grid whose sides are \( [-0.5,2.5] \) for \( \alpha \), \( [-1.5,1.5] \) for \( \kappa_2 \) and \( [-0.5,2.5] \) for \( \kappa_3 \). We mark with an asterisk when the confidence set includes points outside the grid.

3. We observe the MLE is asymptotically biased downwards, inheriting the bias present in case 3. The confidence sets defined by odds-based inequalities, bounding inequalities, or by both sets of inequalities together, include the true parameter value, but also other values.

Considering the results from cases 1 through 4 together, we emphasize two additional properties of our inequalities. First, we cannot conclude that the confidence sets defined by the odds-based moment inequalities only, or by the bounding inequalities only, are always weakly smaller than the confidence sets defined by both types of inequalities; in fact, in some settings (e.g., in cases 3(b) and 4), combining the inequalities leads to a strictly smaller set.
Thus, in our empirical setting, we use both types of inequalities together. Second, if \( \sigma_1 > 0 \) or \( \sigma_3 > 0 \), the confidence sets defined using only the odds-based inequalities include points outside of the grid, as indicated by the asterisks in Table 2. Conversely, the confidence sets defined using only the bounding moment inequalities are always contained within the boundaries of the grid. As we discuss in Appendix Sections C.1 and C.3, we find this outcome because, if \( \sigma_1 > 0 \) or \( \sigma_3 > 0 \), the odds-based moments are globally convex in the parameter \( \theta_\alpha \) and tend to \( \infty \) as \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to \( \infty \) or \( -\infty \). Conversely, the bounding moments are always globally concave in \( \theta_\alpha \) and tend to \( -\infty \) as \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to \( \infty \) or \( -\infty \).\(^{17}\)

Finally, in case 5, we consider a setting in which the researcher wrongly assumes that the agent has more information than she possesses. Specifically, we consider the case in which the researcher assumes that the agent has perfect information on all payoff-relevant variables and, consequently, builds the moment inequalities using the following two instrument functions

\[
g_1(p_i) = \mathbb{1}\{\Delta p_{ij} \geq 0\} \quad \text{and} \quad g_2(p_i) = \mathbb{1}\{\Delta p_{ij} < 0\},
\]

instead of those in equation (26). We compute the maximum likelihood estimates as

\[
\arg\max_{(\theta_\alpha, \theta_{\kappa_2}, \theta_{\kappa_3})} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{3} \mathbb{1}\{d_{ij} = 1\} \ln \left( \frac{\exp(\theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_\alpha p_{ij})}{\sum_{j' = 1}^{3} \exp(\theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha p_{ij'})} \right) \right\}, \quad \text{with} \ \theta_{\kappa_1} = 0.
\]

As shown in Table 2, the confidence sets defined by the odds-based moment inequalities alone, or by both types of inequalities jointly, are empty.\(^{18}\) Given theorems 1 and 2, we can therefore reject that agents have perfect information on prices. The MLE of \( \alpha \) is asymptotically biased downwards and, given that we set the mean price for product 1 to be the lowest in our simulation, the downward bias in the price coefficient translates into a downward bias in the choice-specific fixed effects of all other options in the choice set.

Table 2 presents projections of the 95\% confidence set for \((k_2, k_3, \alpha)\) on each of three dimensions separately. In Appendix C.2, we show in figures projections of the confidence set on the two-dimensional space \((k_2, \alpha)\) and on the two-dimensional space \((k_3, \alpha)\). In Appendix C.3, we present simulation results for additional values of \(\sigma_1\) and \(\sigma_3\), and plot the odds-based and bounding moments as a function of \(\theta_\alpha\) while holding \(\theta_{k_2}\) and \(\theta_{k_3}\) at their true values.

\(^{17}\)As a consequence, given real numbers \(a_1, a_2, a_3\) and \(a_4\), the confidence set defined by the odds-based inequalities may be of the form \((\infty, a_1] \cup (a_2, \infty)\) (as in case 2) or of the form \((\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, a_3] \cup [a_4, \infty)\) (as in cases 3(a) and 3(b)). Conversely, the confidence set defined by the bounding inequalities is always of the form \([a_1, a_2]\). Thus, with a sufficiently large grid, this confidence set will always be included in the grid.

\(^{18}\)As we show in Table C.3 in Appendix C.3.3, the confidence set defined by the bounding moment inequalities is also empty when it is computed following the procedure in Andrews and Soares (2010). In unreported results, we find it is also empty when computed following the procedure in Cox and Shi (2023) but using four instrument functions instead of the two instrument functions in equation (26).
6 Estimation Results

We now use the model in Section 3 to study a physician’s choice of diabetes treatment. In Section 6.1, we present maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters; computing these estimates requires assumptions on the exact content of the physician’s information set. In Section 6.2, we relax these informational assumptions and present estimates that use the moment inequalities described in Section 4. All results we present in this section and subsequent sections cover the class of DPP-4 inhibitors. We also restrict attention to the prescription decisions of primary care physicians and endocrinologists.

6.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates

We start by computing maximum likelihood estimates of physicians’ preference parameters. Following Manski (1991), this estimation approach requires the researcher to first compute measures of the physician’s price expectations for every medical visit and drug in the choice set. We compute these measures by regressing the realized out-of-pocket costs on an information set we specify. In the second step, we compute maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters using a multinomial logit specification. Our specification conditions on drug-specific fixed effects and the expected out-of-pocket costs computed in the first step. Formally, building on the model-implied choice probability in equation (7), we compute

$$\arg\max_{(\theta_\alpha, \theta_\kappa_2, \theta_\kappa_3)} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{3} \mathbb{1}\{d_{ij} = 1\} \ln \left( \frac{\exp(\theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_\alpha \hat{E}[p_{ij}|z_i])}{\sum_{j'=1}^{J} \exp(\theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \hat{E}[p_{ij'|z_i}])} \right) \right\}, \quad \text{with } \theta_{\kappa_1} = 0. \quad (28)$$

Here, $z_i$ is a vector of observed variables assumed to coincide with physician $i$’s information set, $W_i$, and $\hat{E}[p_{ij}|z_i]$ is the predicted out-of-pocket costs for visit $i$ and drug $j$ from the first stage linear regression of $p_{ij}$ on $z_i$. The log-likelihood function in equation (28) has only two fixed effects to estimate because the class of DPP-4 inhibitors includes only three drugs during our sample period. We compute parameter estimates as in equation (28) for different assumptions on the physician’s information sets; i.e., for different vectors $\{z_i\}_{i=1}^{N}$. We report the estimates in Table 3.

Under the assumption of perfect information, we find an estimate of the price coefficient, $\alpha$, equal to $-0.43$. When we instead assume providers form expectations using contemporaneous average out-of-pocket costs at the drug-carrier level or drug-plan type level, we find a coefficient equal to $-1.21$ and $-1.45$, respectively. If we assume providers form expectations on each patient’s out-of-pocket costs using only contemporaneous drug-year price averages, the estimate of the price coefficient equals $-2.09$. Finally, if we assume that physicians’
Table 3: Estimation Results - MLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\kappa_2$</th>
<th>$\kappa_3$</th>
<th>Price Elast. (Janumet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfect Information</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Prices</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>-3.09</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Columns labeled $\alpha$, $\kappa_2$ and $\kappa_3$ present maximum likelihood estimates of the corresponding parameter computed following equation (28). The column labeled Information Set indicates the vector of observed covariates $z_i$ used to build the log-likelihood function in equation (28). To illustrate the elasticity implied by the price coefficients, we report in the column labeled Price Elast. (Janumet) the in-sample average elasticity for Janumet, which corresponds to drug $j = 1$ in our choice set.

information sets equal these same averages but lagged by a year, the point estimates move further away from zero, reaching a minimum value of $-3.09$. In our setting, the estimates of the choice-specific fixed effects $\kappa_2$ and $\kappa_3$ are generally more robust to the specification of the physician’s information set.\textsuperscript{19}

In sum, we find the maximum likelihood estimate of the price coefficient decreases (in absolute value) when we assume physicians form price expectations using more detailed information. This pattern is consistent with results in Dickstein and Morales (2018). In that setting, when the researcher specifies too large an information set, including variables the agent did not use when forming her expectations, the parameter on the mis-measured expectation is asymptotically biased toward zero. Our simulation results in Table 2 and in Appendix C.3 show similar bias patterns.

As the last column in Table 3 shows, the distinct estimates of $\kappa_2$, $\kappa_3$ and, especially, \textsuperscript{19}Here, the distinct estimates of $\alpha$ do not translate into distinct estimates of $\kappa_2$ and $\kappa_3$ because the three drugs in the choice set have roughly similar average out-of-pocket costs, as we report in Table 1.
\( \alpha \), imply different average elasticities of treatment choices with respect to expected out-of-pocket costs. Consistent with the heterogeneity in the estimates of \( \alpha \), we find larger elasticity estimates when the researcher assumes the physician forms expectations using coarser information. For example, in the case of the Janumet, the in-sample average elasticity of Janumet’s share with respect to its expected price grows in absolute value from \(-0.53\), when we assume physicians have perfect information on prices, to \(-3.77\), when we assume physicians form their price predictions using only last year’s average price by drug. The average own-(expected) price elasticities for other drugs in the choice set exhibit similar heterogeneity across models, depending on how we specify the physician’s information set.

Moreover, different assumptions on physician information sets also imply substantially different predictions under counterfactual market environments. To illustrate these differences, we consider an intervention in which three carriers negotiate a better acquisition price for Janumet. These three carriers represent 55% of all sample visits. We impose that, as a result of the negotiation, Janumet’s out-of-pocket cost falls 50% for all patients enrolled in a plan offered by these carriers. In column 1 of Table 4, we show the counterfactual share that Janumet captures after this price reduction. Depending on the assumed information set, this counterfactual share varies between roughly 21% and 41%. Importantly, regardless of the assumed information set, all estimated models match the initial market share of 17.8%. Thus, the predicted change in Janumet’s prescription share ranges from slightly over 3 percentage points under the model that assumes workers have perfect information on prices, to more than 23 percent points under the model that assumes physicians form expectations using only last year’s drug-specific average prices.

There are two reasons why models that differ in the assumed information set will generate different predicted counterfactual shares. First, when we estimate our model with different informational assumptions, we find distinct estimates of the physician’s preference parameters, as shown in Table 3. Second, different informational assumptions yield distinct changes in Janumet’s expected price, because our counterfactual price changes filter through the physician’s information set into her expectations. For example, if we assume physicians use carrier-specific average drug prices in their expectations, their expected price differs in the counterfactual across patients with different carriers. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 illustrate how these two factors influence the counterfactual predictions. From column 3 in particular, we see that the differing predictions by model follow mostly from differences in the estimated preference parameters.

That the parameter estimates, implied elasticities, and counterfactual predictions differ across models illustrates the importance of correctly specifying agents’ information sets. One potential way to identify the physician’s true information set is to use model selection
Table 4: Effect of a Reduction in Out-of-Pocket Costs on Janumet’s Market Share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>(1) Counterfactual Share (Perfect Info. Est.)</th>
<th>(2) Counterfactual Share (Perfect Info. Prices)</th>
<th>(3) Counterfactual Share (Perfect Info. Prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>26.97</td>
<td>21.21</td>
<td>27.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>28.87</td>
<td>21.22</td>
<td>29.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>30.47</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>31.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>37.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Prices</td>
<td>23.61</td>
<td>20.54</td>
<td>22.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>26.87</td>
<td>20.96</td>
<td>26.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>28.88</td>
<td>20.86</td>
<td>28.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>31.87</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>31.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>20.48</td>
<td>45.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models reproduce the initial observed market share of Janumet, equal to 17.83%. We compute the counterfactual market share in column 1 using both the maximum likelihood estimates \( \hat{\theta}, \hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2 \) and the predicted prices that correspond to the information set indicated in the row label. The counterfactual shares reported in column 2 use the predicted prices that correspond to the information set indicated in the row label, but combine them with the maximum likelihood estimates computed under the assumption of perfect information (i.e., those reported in the first row of Table 3). The counterfactual shares reported in column 3 use the maximum likelihood estimates computed under the information set indicated in the row label, but use predicted prices that correspond to the assumption that physicians have perfect information on prices.

We implement the testing procedure in Vuong (1989) to compare the models whose estimates we report in Table 3. As we show in Appendix D.1, this procedure selects the model that assumes physicians form price expectations using the contemporaneous average price at the drug-carrier-year level. We note, however, that this testing approach can only compare the options we specify; if we fail to include the model that uses the true information set among our test options, the conclusion from such a test may be misleading. We provide an alternative approach to testing information sets in Section 6.2 below.

### 6.2 Moment Inequality Estimates

We now use the moment inequalities described in Section 4.3 to estimate the parameters of the drug choice model in Section 3. We consider the same collection of potential information...
sets that we used with the maximum likelihood approach, as listed in Table 3. Importantly, while the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent only if the researcher’s assumed information set coincides with the entire vector of information that the physician uses to form expectations, our moment inequality approach does not require the researcher to specify the entire vector. When using a vector of price predictors within our inequalities, those predictors need only compose a subset of the information the physician uses in her forecast. For each information set we consider, we compute 95% confidence sets implementing the inference procedure in Cox and Shi (2023).

We structure our discussion of the moment inequality estimates to provide two broad insights into diabetes care. First, we show that physicians use relatively aggregate information on out-of-pocket costs when forming expectations about a given patient’s price. Second, we show that physicians exhibit greater elasticity with respect to expected out-of-pocket costs than one might conclude based on estimates from full-information models.

To support the notion that physicians use relatively coarse information to form expectations, we combine our inequalities with the same ten sets of potential instruments listed in Table 3. The resulting 95% confidence sets are empty for seven of them. We report in Table 5 the projected confidence sets for the three instruments for which these confidence sets are not empty. Because we test multiple hypotheses, we compute family-wise adjusted p-values following Holm (1979), as described in Appendix B.5.2. In our setting, the p-values for the tests that yield empty 95% confidence sets remain below 5% even after adjusting for family-wise testing. Thus, for all seven variables listed in Table 3 for which the corresponding confidence set is empty, we reject the null hypothesis that the physician uses the corresponding variables to forecast out-of-pocket costs.\footnote{For each information set we test, we use the same number of instruments and the same instrument functions, as detailed in Appendix B.4. Differences in the value of an instrument functions $g_k(z_i)$ across specifications thus reflect differences in the value of the instrument $z_i$ for each observation $i$. E.g., when testing whether physicians know carrier-specific prices at the drug and year level, patients with carrier A vs. B will have different values of the instrument. When testing whether they know only drug- and year-specific average prices, patients have the same value of the instrument regardless of their carrier. In this way, the fact that we reject the more specific price averages here is a reflection of the value of the instrument and not the number of instruments or the choice over instrument functions.}

In practical terms, in this testing we reject the assumption that all physicians have perfect information on either contemporaneous prices or last year’s prices. We also reject that providers, as a whole, know the most detailed averages of out-of-pocket costs. For example, we reject that physicians know the contemporaneous or lagged average copayment by drug, plan type, and carrier when they forecast patient prices. Finally, we also reject that physicians know contemporaneous or lagged average copayments by drug, carrier, and year. This last finding contrasts with the results of the Vuong (1989) tests described in
Table 5: Estimation Results - Moment Inequalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\kappa_2$</th>
<th>$\kappa_3$</th>
<th>Price Elast. (Janumet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>$[-4.30,-1.20]$</td>
<td>$[1.40,1.70]$</td>
<td>$[-0.65,0.10]$</td>
<td>$[-5.10,-1.40]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>$[-3.55,-1.40]$</td>
<td>$[1.40,1.65]$</td>
<td>$[-0.65,-0.15]$</td>
<td>$[-3.92,-1.53]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>$[-4.10,-1.10]$</td>
<td>$[1.40,1.75]$</td>
<td>$[-0.50,0.25]$</td>
<td>$[-4.60,-1.20]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Columns labeled $\alpha$, $\kappa_2$ and $\kappa_3$ present projected 95% confidence sets computed using the moment inequalities described in Section 4.3 and the inference procedure in Cox and Shi (2023). The column labeled Information Set indicates the vector of observed covariates $z_i$ that we use as instruments in our moment inequalities. The column labeled Price Elast. (Janumet) reports the 95% confidence interval for the in-sample average elasticity of Janumet’s prescription share with respect to its expected price. Janumet is one of the three DPP-4 inhibitors in our sample.

Section 6.1, which singled out average out-of-pocket costs at the drug-carrier-year level as the preferred information set among the alternatives we tested.

The confidence sets described in Table 5 are similar across the instruments that lead to non-empty confidence sets. For example, when we assume physicians form expectations using an information set that includes last year’s average price at the drug-plan type-year level, we obtain a confidence set for the price coefficient, $\alpha$, between $-3.55$ and $-1.40$. When we estimate our model assuming physicians use last year’s average price at the drug-year level to form expectations, the confidence set for the parameter $\alpha$ includes values from $-4.10$ to $-1.10$.

Our confidence intervals of $\alpha$ provide the second key insight on diabetes care: physicians may be more sensitive to expected out-of-pocket costs than the estimates from full information models suggest. Specifically, for the three information vectors that we fail to reject using our moment inequality approach, we can compare the 95% confidence set for $\alpha$, reported in Table 5, to the corresponding point estimate in Table 3. When we impose the assumption that an information set forms only a subset of the physician’s information rather than the complete set, we find elasticities of market shares with respect to expected prices that can be much higher than the level the corresponding maximum likelihood estimates imply. As an example, the maximum likelihood estimator of $\alpha$ equals $-1.69$ when we assume the physician forms price expectations using only last year’s average prices at the drug-plan type-year level. If we instead assume this same information forms only a subset of the physician’s information, the 95% confidence interval ranges from $-3.55$ to $-1.40$. In terms of elasticities, the maximum likelihood estimates imply an elasticity of Janumet’s market share with respect to its expected price equal to $-2.03$, while the moment inequality confidence set implies an analogous elasticity between $-3.92$ and $-1.53$. 
Policy Discussion: Informational Intervention

The estimates described in Section 6.2 suggest physicians face substantial information frictions when forecasting patient prices. In this section, we use our model to predict outcomes were policymakers or insurers to provide physicians with perfect information on out-of-pocket costs for each patient they treat. In this counterfactual setting, physicians learn the patient’s specific prices for each drug at the point of prescribing, possibly through pop-up messages in their electronic medical record (Desai et al., 2022). As a result of this information intervention, we measure the model-implied change in each drug’s market share; the total fraction of treatments chosen that are the cheapest available for a patient; the average per patient realized out-of-pocket costs; and, consumer surplus measured in dollars per patient.

We measure the impact of the informational intervention under each of the three informational vectors that we failed to reject using the testing procedure in Section 6.2; see Table 5. A limitation of our counterfactual analysis relates to the assumptions we now impose on these three information vectors. In estimation, we required only that physicians know at least the variables in the specified vector; e.g., last year’s average prices by drug. Here, we instead assume that physicians’ information set prior to the informational intervention includes only this information variable that we failed to reject. That is, for each of the three information sets we consider, we form pre-intervention price expectations by regressing realized prices on a constant and the covariates that we assume form the physician’s information set. We then combine these price expectations with the set of parameter values in the relevant confidence set we found with our moment inequality model. For example, we compute the lower limit of the confidence interval for drug \( j \)'s initial prescription share as

\[
\min_{\hat{\theta} \in \Theta} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\exp(\hat{\theta}_{\kappa_j} + \hat{\alpha} \hat{E}[p_{ij}|z_i])}{\sum_{j'=1}^{J} \exp(\hat{\theta}_{\kappa_{j'}} + \hat{\alpha} \hat{E}[p_{ij'|z_i}])} \right\}, \quad \text{with } \hat{\theta}_{\kappa_3} = 0, \tag{29}
\]

where \( \hat{\theta} = (\hat{\theta}_\alpha, \hat{\theta}_{\kappa_2}, \hat{\theta}_{\kappa_3}) \), \( \hat{\Theta} \) is the 95% confidence set for \( \theta^* = (\alpha, \kappa_2, \kappa_3) \) and \( \hat{E}[p_{ij}|z_i] \) is the predicted price for visit \( i \) and drug \( j \) computed via a regression of \( p_i \) on \( z_i \). We compute the upper limit in a similar fashion, replacing the minimization over \( \hat{\theta} \in \hat{\Theta} \) with a maximization.

For each drug and baseline information set we consider, Table 6 reports the initial prescription shares as well as the change in these shares that results from the information intervention. The initial prescription shares observed in the data equal 17.8%, 68.7% and 13.5% for Janumet, Januvia, and Tradjenta, respectively. Although the confidence intervals for these shares reported in Table 6 are relatively narrow, they all generally include the ob-

\[21\text{We do not face this limitation when computing the counterfactual shares: because physicians have perfect information on prices in this counterfactual setting, their expected prices are uniquely determined.} \]
Table 6: Effects of an Informational Intervention - Product Market Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Initial Share</th>
<th>Change in Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>Janumet</td>
<td>[16.1, 20.3]</td>
<td>[0.9, 5.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Januvia</td>
<td>[65.8, 72.6]</td>
<td>[−10.0, −3.7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradjenta</td>
<td>[9.0, 15.6]</td>
<td>[2.8, 5.5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>Janumet</td>
<td>[16.8, 19.9]</td>
<td>[1.0, 3.9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Januvia</td>
<td>[70.3, 74.8]</td>
<td>[−11.9, −5.4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradjenta</td>
<td>[7.1, 11.1]</td>
<td>[4.3, 8.0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>Janumet</td>
<td>[15.2, 18.9]</td>
<td>[1.1, 5.9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Januvia</td>
<td>[68.6, 73.9]</td>
<td>[−13.8, −4.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tradjenta</td>
<td>[8.8, 13.3]</td>
<td>[3.0, 7.9]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The column Initial Share contains 95% confidence intervals for each drug’s model-predicted share in the sample under the information set specified in the row. The column Change in Share contains a 95% confidence interval for the percentage point change in each drug’s model-predicted share when changing physicians’ information set from the one specified in the row to perfect information. Janumet, Januvia, and Tradjenta are the three DPP-4 Inhibitor products available in our sample period.

served shares. The final column in Table 6 shows the change in prescription shares for each product as we provide physicians full information on patient prices. Across all specifications, we see the shares of Janumet and Tradjenta increase, while the share of Januvia decreases.

We see this change in share precisely because physicians can now form better expectations of patient prices. When physicians only have access to aggregate price information, as in our baseline, these rational physicians nonetheless form expectations that are correct on average. However, given that there exists important variation in patient prices around that average, better information allows physicians to update their expectations to reflect the entire distribution of patient prices. Thus, the shifts in shares for Janumet, Januvia, and Tradjenta reported in the final column in Table 6 partly reflect the relative frequency with which patients’ actual prices are below the expected price that generates the baseline shares.

From a policy perspective, the changes in shares reported in Table 6 do not translate immediately into useful measures of patient outcomes. In Table 7, we instead compute more direct measures of the effectiveness of the intervention from the perspective of patients.

First, we show that the share of patients receiving the cheapest drug in their choice set increases significantly following the intervention. Across different specifications, we find the share of patients receiving the cheapest drug jumps roughly 11 to 30 percentage points when we provide price information to providers, relative to a baseline of 35%. This shift suggests that the informational frictions that physicians face at baseline are substantial, and that their price elasticity is sufficiently large to generate changes in prescribing behavior as more information becomes available.

Second, we show in Table 7 that, as physicians shift to prescribing cheaper drugs in
Table 7: Effects of an Informational Intervention - Out-of-Pocket Costs and Surplus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>Share Cheapest</th>
<th>Change in Mean OOP Costs</th>
<th>Mean Consumer Surplus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>[11.6, 31.0]</td>
<td>[−10.1, −5.5]</td>
<td>[0.093, 0.237]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>[13.1, 26.0]</td>
<td>[−9.7, −6.3]</td>
<td>[0.090, 0.191]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>[11.0, 30.6]</td>
<td>[−10.5, −5.4]</td>
<td>[0.079, 0.231]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this table, we report, for three different outcome variables, the effect of changing physicians’ information from the set indicated in each row to perfect information. The change in the Share Cheapest column reports a confidence interval for the percentage point change in the share of all sample visits in which the physician prescribes the cheapest drug. We compute the Mean OOP Costs as a sum across individuals and drugs of the model-implied prescription share multiplied by the corresponding true price, measured in dollars per month. The change in Mean Consumer Surplus corresponds to the change in the expected utility of office visits, averaged across all sample visits and re-normalized to be expressed in dollars per patient per month.

the patient’s choice set, the patient’s average out-of-pocket spending falls. We predict the average patient’s monthly spending to fall between $5.5 and $10.5 from an initial average spending of $46 per month, or between 12 and 23%. This prediction is similar to experimental evidence from Desai et al. (2022), who found an 11.2% reduction in out-of-pocket costs after an intervention in which physicians in the treatment group received real-time patient cost information during office visits.

Finally, the last column in Table 7 reports the change in consumer surplus under the intervention, expressed in dollars per patient per month. We predict a change in surplus of between $0.09 and $0.25 per patient per month. Comparing this change in surplus with the change in average out-of-pocket costs, we see that looking only at changes in cost overestimates the actual welfare gains. Here, the overestimates stem from differential product quality. As we show in Table 6, the information intervention shifts overall demand from Januvia toward Janumet and Tradjenta. However, as we report in Table 5, Januvia, which corresponds to the index \( j = 2 \) in our model, has the highest effective quality, as proxied by the choice-specific effects \( \{\kappa_j\}_{j=1}^3 \). Relative to a normalized quality for Janumet, \( \kappa_1 = 0 \), the 95% projected confidence set for Januvia’s quality, \( \kappa_2 \), lies roughly between 1.4 and 1.7. Tradjenta’s effect, \( \kappa_3 \), includes mostly negative values. Thus, by providing precise information on prices, physicians may change their prescribing behavior towards lower-quality drugs, which limits the gains in consumer surplus.

8 Testing for Heterogeneity in Information

We compute the moment inequality estimates in Section 6.2 under the assumption that a particular variable belongs to every physician’s information set. The results in Table 5 are
thus compatible with the claim that every physician knows average contemporaneous and lagged prices by drug and year, and average lagged prices by drug, plan type, and year. In this section, we examine whether specific subsets of physicians have access to more precise information about prices. We also consider whether heterogeneity in information suggests a benefit from targeting an informational intervention.

We test for heterogeneous information sets as a function of four observable provider characteristics: medical specialty, graduation year, gender, and recent prescribing experience with drugs in our specific diabetes class. For each subgroup of physicians defined according to these observables, we test whether the physicians in the corresponding group know last year’s average price at the drug-carrier-plan type-year level. In Section 6.2, we found that the 95% confidence set for the model parameters is empty when we assume that every physician knows and uses this information in forming expectations. Thus, our goal in this analysis is to look for evidence that some categories of physicians know this more specific price average, even when not all of them do. Throughout, we correct our p-values using the family-wise adjustment of Holm (1979) to handle multiple hypothesis testing.

When splitting physicians by gender, and when splitting them into groups of equal size based on their graduation year and prescribing experience, we find that, for all these groups, we reject the null that physicians in the group know last year’s average price at the drug-carrier-plan type-year level. However, when splitting physicians by specialty, we fail to reject that endocrinologists know the more specific price averages. Conversely, primary care physicians appear to use only more aggregate price information in their treatment choice.

Given the evidence that endocrinologists form price expectations using more detailed information, we re-evaluate the effect of our informational intervention. In our re-assessment, we assume endocrinologists form expectations in the initial scenario, before the intervention, using the more precise information. We report the results in Table 8.

In panel A, we show that endocrinologists’ drug choices are less sensitive to expected prices than the estimates we found when pooling all physicians together. Here, the 95% projected confidence set for an endocrinologist’s coefficient on expected price, $\alpha$, is $[-1.15, -0.50]$; the analogous confidence sets for all physicians, reported in Table 5, included more negative values of $\alpha$, implying greater elasticity to expected prices.

In panel B, we evaluate the effect of providing perfect information on patient-specific prices to endocrinologists. We implement this evaluation in two settings. First, we assign endocrinologists a baseline information set that includes only lagged average drug prices by drug, plan type, and year. In this setting, we also use the parameter estimates we obtain when pooling all physicians together—i.e., the estimates in the second row of Table 5. We use this scenario to illustrate how the counterfactual predictions under our original assumptions
Table 8: Estimation Results & Informational Intervention - Endocrinologists

**Panel A: Confidence Sets for Preference Parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\kappa_2$</th>
<th>$\kappa_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Carrier-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>$[-1.15, -0.50]$</td>
<td>$[1.25, 1.60]$</td>
<td>$[-0.45, -0.05]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: Outcomes of an Informational Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>Share Cheapest</th>
<th>Change in...</th>
<th>Mean...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>$[12.8, 26.9]$</td>
<td>$[-9.6, -6.1]$</td>
<td>$0.073, 0.168$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Carrier-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>$[4.3, 10.1]$</td>
<td>$[-4.7, -2.3]$</td>
<td>$0.014, 0.056$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In panel A, columns labeled $\alpha$, $\kappa_2$ and $\kappa_3$ present projected 95% confidence sets computed using the moment inequalities described in Section 4.3 and the inference procedure in Cox and Shi (2023). The column labeled Information Set indicates the vector of observed covariates $z_i$ that we use as an instrument in our moment inequalities. In panel B, the change in Share Cheapest indicates a confidence interval for the percentage point change in the share of visits during which the physician prescribes the cheapest drug in the choice set. We compute Mean OOP Costs as a sum across individuals and drugs of the model-implied prescription share multiplied by the corresponding price; it is measured in dollars per month. The change in Mean Consumer Surplus corresponds to the change in the expected utility of office visits, averaged across all sample visits and re-normalized to be expressed in dollars per patient per month.

apply for the subset of endocrinology visits. In this case, as we show in the first row of panel B, the effect of the intervention for the subset of endocrinologists is similar to the predictions discussed in Section 7 for the average physician.

We next predict the same outcomes in a second setting in which we assume endocrinologists have more precise price information at baseline. We also employ the endocrinology-specific parameter estimates in our predictions, which show relatively lower price sensitivity. As we report in the second row of panel B, endocrinologists now respond to the intervention with a smaller change in behavior. In this scenario, the share of office visits in which the physician chooses the cheapest drug increases by only 4 to 10 percentage points. As a consequence, the average patient’s monthly out-of-pocket costs decrease between $2.3 and $4.7, and the average consumer surplus increases minimally, from 1 to 6 cents per patient per month.

This example illustrates that heterogeneity in both preference parameters and initial information sets can play an important role in determining the effect of an informational intervention. Here, patients of endocrinologists gained little in terms of out-of-pocket cost savings and consumer surplus relative to patients visiting the wider pool of providers. Our
findings suggest a value from estimating potentially heterogeneous information sets and preferences by subgroups: with these parameters, policymakers can better target interventions toward those visits where physicians are likely to alter their drug choice. This targeting seems particularly useful for interventions like providing price information at the point of prescribing, which may require non-trivial costs to implement.

We emphasize again that our preference measurement could encompass both patient and physician preferences. For example, our finding that endocrinologists are less sensitive to price might reflect their expertise, but might also reflect that their patient population suffers from more severe illness; these patients, and therefore their physicians, might care more about drug effectiveness relative to price. From a policy perspective, however, this distinction does not change the implications of our measurement. Informational interventions that focus on drug prices will nonetheless generate a smaller behavior change when they target endocrinologists, whether that change is driven by physician or by patient preferences.

9 Conclusion

We develop a new moment inequality estimation procedure that allows researchers to estimate preference parameters in discrete choice settings in which the decision-maker must form expectations about a product characteristics—here, price. Our procedure applies in settings with arbitrarily large choice sets. Importantly, our tool requires the researcher to specify only a subset of the information that agents use to form their expectations. This approach contrasts with traditional maximum likelihood approaches, where the researcher must specify the exact information set the agent uses to forecast product characteristics.

We apply our estimation procedure to study the choice of diabetes treatment. Pairing our model with medical claims data, we conclude that physicians do not have perfect information on the out-of-pocket costs that their patients face for each of the drugs in the choice set. Instead, we find that most physicians use relatively broad averages of out-of-pocket costs—for example, last year’s average price at the drug-plan type level—when forming expectations about a patient’s true out-of-pocket costs. In addition, our moment inequality estimates suggest physicians may be more sensitive to patient costs than prior full-information models would suggest.

Applying our estimates in a context in which competing insurers map drugs to multiple tiers with distinct out-of-pocket costs, we find an information intervention can steer prescribing patterns towards more cost-effective treatment options. In a counterfactual experiment in which we give all physicians in our sample perfect information on patient- and drug-specific out-of-pocket costs, we find average costs fall 12 to 23% for diabetes patients.
However, the effect of this intervention is smaller when such detailed price information is provided to endocrinologists. The relatively smaller predicted response reflects the finding that these specialists possess more precise information on prices initially, and that they are less sensitive to prices in their prescribing behavior.

Electronic “pop-ups” in the provider’s medical chart, as trialed in a single healthcare system in Desai et al. (2022), could thus help steer prescribing towards cheaper drugs, particularly for those physicians least likely to know the patient’s true out-of-pocket costs. However, given the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of these interventions—in terms of health system dollars and provider time and hassle costs—our evidence suggests a value of targeted academic detailing (Soumerai and Avorn, 1990). Here, sharing price information with less specialized physicians can have an important effect on the costs patients realize, and on overall healthcare spending.
References

American Diabetes Association, “Pharmacologic Approaches to Glycemic Treatment,” *Diabetes Care*, 2017, 40 (Supplement 1), S64–S74. [1, 6]


Soumerai, Stephen B. and Jerry Avorn, “Principles of Educational Outreach (‘Academic Detailing’) to Improve Clinical Decision Making,” *JAMA*, 1990, 263 (4), 549–556. [34]


Online Appendix for “Patient Costs and Physicians’ Information”

Michael J. Dickstein (New York University)  
Jihye Jeon (Boston University)  
Eduardo Morales (Princeton University)  

December 2023
## Contents

**A Setting and Data: Additional Details**

A.1 Sample Construction ................................................. 2
A.2 Constructing Copayment Measures ................................. 3

**B Moment Inequalities: Additional Details**

B.1 Odds-based Moment Inequalities: Proof of Theorem 1 .......... 5
B.2 Bounding Moment Inequalities: Proof of Theorem 2 ............ 7
B.3 Bounding Moment Inequalities: Approximation Point .......... 8
B.4 Instrument Functions ................................................. 11
B.5 Inference Procedures ................................................. 11

**C Simulation: Additional Details**

C.1 Additional Analytical Results ...................................... 14
C.2 Simulation Results: Figures ......................................... 18
C.3 Additional Simulation Results ...................................... 22

**D Estimation Results: Additional Details**

D.1 Results From Vuong (1989) Test .................................... 29
A Setting and Data: Additional Details

A.1 Sample Construction

The APAC data contain separate information on medical claims and drug claims. Here, we describe the steps we follow to build our sample from this information. Table A.1 provides the number of observations included in the data at each sample restriction stage.

First, for each medical claim, which can include multiple “lines” with different dates and provider identifiers, we choose the earliest date and the mostly commonly listed provider.

Second, we select the subset of medical claims that list: (a) both claim and provider identifiers; and, (b) a type 2 diabetes diagnosis, which we select using the set of ICD-10 diagnostic codes that include the words “type 2 diabetes mellitus” in their description. A list of these diagnostic codes is available upon request.

Third, we link providers’ information to the medical claims data. To do so, we use a provider’s NPI number to validate the provider information in the APAC data using the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES) registry. From the NPPES registry, we collect information on providers’ specialty, and use this information to restrict the sample to claims for which the associated provider is in a specialty that typically treats diabetes patients; i.e., family medicine, internal medicine, endocrinology, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, clinical nurse specialists, and physician assistants.

Fourth, for each provider, we compute the maximum yearly count of: (a) all medical claims, and (b) all type 2 diabetes-related claims. We then exclude outlier claims, corresponding to providers with maximum yearly counts of all medical claims in the highest or lowest 5% of the corresponding distribution. We similarly exclude observations linked to providers with maximum yearly counts of type 2 diabetes claims in the lowest decile of the corresponding distribution. This procedure excludes providers with a maximum yearly count of type 2 diabetes claims of zero or one.

Fifth, we merge the drug claims data with those medical claims that we include in the sample after the first four cleaning steps. The matching process first creates, for each patient identifier, all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical claims</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All medical claims (with non-missing claim ID)</td>
<td>89,921,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include only Oregon-based providers</td>
<td>82,558,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclude missing NPIs</td>
<td>80,108,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apply specialty restrictions</td>
<td>34,238,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include only type 2 diabetes diagnosis</td>
<td>1,123,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclude providers with max. yearly number of claims in the top or bottom 5%</td>
<td>802,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclude providers with max, yearly number of diabetes claims in the bottom 10%</td>
<td>779,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matched claims</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All matched claims</td>
<td>600,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing copay or rxdays</td>
<td>599,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict plan types/ markets</td>
<td>595,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict carriers</td>
<td>588,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclude refills</td>
<td>586,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict to specific drug classes</td>
<td>184,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: each line reports the number of observations that we preserve at each sample restriction stage.
combinations of a drug claim and a medical claim. We then match each drug claim to the medical claim whose date has the smallest distance to the drug fill date, and exclude matches whose distance is outside of the -7 to 180 day range.

Sixth, we exclude claims with missing information on plan type or carrier, or corresponding to plan types and carriers with a small number of observations. We further restrict our sample to claims corresponding to the following plan types: HMO, POS, PPO, SIF (Self-insured POS), SIP (Self-insured PPO), and EPO.

Seventh, we also remove cases in which the drug claim reflects a refill.

A.2 Constructing Copayment Measures

While the claims data report out-of-pocket costs only for the prescription filled by the patient, our analysis requires out-of-pocket costs for all drugs in the patient’s choice set. To solve this missing data problem, we construct for each drug in the patient’s choice set measures of the out-of-pocket costs that the patient would face in any given year. We base this prediction on information on drug and year identifiers as well as the patient’s plan type, carrier, and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) of residence. We restrict the sample to prescriptions for 30-day supplies.

Our baseline prediction model is a random forest model. We conduct several analyses to understand the results, and evaluate the performance of the price prediction model. First, we construct variable importance scores by computing the improvement made in the residual sum of squares averaged over all trees for each predictor. We normalize the scores by dividing them by the maximum score such that the score for the top predictor is 1. Figure A.1 plots importance scores for predictors with a score above 0.01. We find that drug identities are the most important factors followed by certain plan types and carriers.

![Figure A.1: Variable Importance Score](image)

Notes: For any \( x \), “Drug = \( x \)” denotes a dummy variable that equals one for drug \( x \) (and zero otherwise), “Plan type = \( x \)” denotes a dummy variable that equals one for plan type \( x \) (and zero otherwise), and “Carrier = \( x \)” denotes a dummy variable that equals one for carrier \( x \) (and zero otherwise).

In Table A.2, we show different measures of the performance of our prediction procedure. First, we split our sample into: (a) a randomly selected training sample that contains 75% of the
observations, which we use to estimate our random forest model; and, (b) a test sample that contains the remaining 25% of the observations, which we use to compute the out-of-sample predictions of our model. We compute the R-squared from regressing observed prices on predicted prices. As shown in the first three rows of Table A.2, the R-squared is 0.43 for out-of-sample predictions and 0.51 for in-sample predictions. We find that the out-of-bag-error is 0.45, as shown in the last row of Table A.2.

The goodness-of-fit measures for the random forest model are similar to those of a regression model that includes drug-, plan type-, carrier-, patient MSA-, and year-specific fixed effects. However, the comparison of both models is not perfect, as the regression model cannot generate price predictions for observations corresponding to drug-plan type-carrier-patient MSA-year combinations for which the training sample contains no observations. More specifically, the linear regression model yields missing predicted prices for 23% of the drug-plan type-carrier-patient MSA-year combinations.

In the third and fourth columns of Table A.2, we use the random forest method, but omit plan type and carrier indicators, respectively, from the set of independent variables on which we base the price predictions. We find that the R-squared decreases more, and out-of-bag error increases more, when omitting carrier indicators than when omitting plan type indicators, suggesting that carrier indicators are more important factors influencing drug prices than plan type indicators.

Table A.2: Copayment Predictions: Goodness-of-fit Measures of Random Forest Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excluded regressors:</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Plan Type</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Sample (75%)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Sample (25%)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-bag Error, Full Sample</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B Moment Inequalities: Additional Details

We prove theorems 1 and 2 in sections B.1 and B.2, respectively. In Section B.3, we show how to optimally choose the approximation point $\varepsilon_{ij'}(z_i, \theta)$ for every $(z_i, \theta)$ and drugs $j$ and $j'$, and discuss properties of the bounding inequalities when the approximation points are chosen in this way.

B.1 Odds-based Moment Inequalities: Proof of Theorem 1

To prove Theorem 1, we show that, for any choices $j$ and $j'$ and $z_i \subseteq W_i$, equation (8) holds for $\theta = \theta^*$; i.e.,

$$
E[d_{ij} \exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})) - d_{ij'}|z_i] \geq 0,
$$

(B.1)

for any choices $j$ and $j'$ and any $z_i \subseteq W_i$. We organize our proof in three steps, described below.

Step 1. Equation (2) implies that, for any $i$ and any two elements $j$ and $j'$ in $i$'s choice set, it holds that

$$(d_{ij} + d_{ij'})(\mathbb{1}\{E[U_{ij} - U_{ij'}|J_i] \geq 0\} - d_{ij}) = 0. \quad \text{(B.2)}$$

Using equation (6), we can rewrite this expression as

$$(d_{ij} + d_{ij'})(\mathbb{1}\{\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijj'} \geq 0\} - d_{ij}) = 0, \quad \text{(B.3)}$$

where $\Delta \varepsilon_{ijj'} = \varepsilon_{ij} - \varepsilon_{ij'}$ and, as in Section 4, $\Delta \kappa_{jj'} = \kappa_j - \kappa_j'$ and $\Delta p_{ijj'} = p_{ij} - p_{ij'}$. As equation (B.3) holds for every observation $i$, it also holds on average across subsets of observations. Thus,

$$E[\mathbb{1}\{\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \Delta \varepsilon_{ijj'} \geq 0\} - d_{ij}|W_i, d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1] = 0,$$

and, given the distributional assumptions in equation (4), we can rewrite this equation as

$$E\left[\frac{\exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])}{1 + \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])} - d_{ij}|W_i, d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1\right] = 0.$$

Multiplying by $1 + \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])$ on both sides of the equality and grouping terms, we obtain

$$E[(1 - d_{ij}) \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]) - d_{ij}|W_i, d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1] = 0.$$

Conditional on the event $d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1$, the variable $1 - d_{ij}$ equals $d_{ij'}$, and we can thus write

$$E[d_{ij'} \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]) - d_{ij}|W_i, d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1] = 0.$$

Using the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE), we eliminate the event $d_{ij} + d_{ij'} = 1$ from the conditioning set, obtaining

$$E[d_{ij'} \exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]) - d_{ij}|W_i] = 0,$$

and we divide by $\exp(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])$ to further obtain

$$E[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]))|W_i] = 0. \quad \text{(B.4)}$$
Step 2. Consider the expression

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'})))]|W_i],$$

(B.5)

where

$$\Delta \nu_{ijj'} = \Delta p_{ijj'} - \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|\mathcal{J}_i].$$

(B.6)

The assumption of rationality of expectations implies that

$$\mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}|\mathcal{J}_i] = 0.$$  

(B.7)

Using the LIE and the fact that $W_i \subset \mathcal{J}_i$ according to equation (3a), we can rewrite equation (B.5) as

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'})))]|\mathcal{J}_i]|W_i].$$

According to equation (2), $d_{ij}$ and $d_{ij'}$ are deterministic functions of $\mathcal{J}_i$ and, thus, we can further rewrite (B.5) as

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}\mathbb{E}[(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))]|\mathcal{J}_i]|W_i].$$

As $\Delta \kappa_{jj'} \subseteq W_i \subset \mathcal{J}_i$ according to equation (3), the concavity of $-\exp(x)$ in $x$ and Jensen's inequality imply

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}\mathbb{E}[(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))]|\mathcal{J}_i]|W_i] \leq \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])]|W_i].$$

Given equation (B.7), we can simplify the right-hand side of this inequality as

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}\mathbb{E}[(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))]|\mathcal{J}_i]|W_i] \leq \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])]|W_i].$$

and, by the LIE, we can simplify the left-hand side of this inequality as

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))]|W_i] \leq \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])]|W_i].$$

(B.8)

Step 3. Combining equations (B.4) and (B.8), we obtain the following inequality

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))]|W_i] \leq 0,$$

and, given equation (B.6), we further rewrite it as

$$\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-(\Delta \kappa_{jj'}) + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}))]|W_i] \leq 0.$$
According to equations (2) and (3), where, as a reminder, \( \Delta \)
we use the LIE to rewrite the expectation in equation (B.11) as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})] - d_{ij'}|W_i] \geq 0.
\]
Finally, we take the expectation of both sides of this inequality conditional on \( z_i \). If \( z_i \subseteq W_i \), the LIE implies that
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})] - d_{ij'}|z_i] \geq 0,
\]
which coincides with equation (B.1).

### B.2 Bounding Moment Inequalities: Proof of Theorem 2

To prove Theorem 2, we show that, for any choices \( j \) and \( j' \), any \( z_i \subseteq W_i \), and any \( e_{jj'}: \mathcal{Z} \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), equation (15) holds when \( \theta = \theta^* \); i.e.,
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|W_i] - e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))|W_i]\]
\[
\geq \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]))|W_i].
\]
Combining this inequality with the inequality in equation (B.4), and simplifying terms, we obtain the following inequality
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]))|W_i] \geq 0.
\]

### Step 2
Given equation (B.4) and the fact that the function \( -\exp(-x) \) is concave in \( x \), a first-order linear approximation to this function around any point will bound it from above. Denoting the
approximation point for observation \( i \) and parameter value \( \theta \) in the inequality that compares drugs \( j \) and \( j' \) as \( e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) \), it thus holds that
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] - e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))|W_i]
\geq \mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} + d_{ij}(-\exp(-((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i]))|W_i].
\]

### Step 3
Let’s compare the term in the left-hand side of equation (B.10) to the following term
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}]|W_i)]\]
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}]|\mathcal{J}_i)|W_i].
\]
where, as a reminder, \( \Delta \nu_{ijj'} \) is defined in equation (B.6). As \( W_i \subseteq \mathcal{J}_i \) according to equation (3a), we use the LIE to rewrite the expectation in equation (B.6) as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}]|\mathcal{J}_i)|W_i].
\]
According to equations (2) and (3), \( d_{ij}, d_{ij'}, \Delta \kappa_{jj'}, \alpha \), and \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] \) are deterministic functions of \( \mathcal{J}_i \). Thus, we can further rewrite the expectation in equation (B.11) as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*)) + \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta^*))((\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}]|\mathcal{J}_i))|W_i],
\]
and, given equation (B.7), we can further simplify this expectation as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])|W_i].
\] (B.12)

We can thus conclude that
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i])|W_i] = \\
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))|W_i].
\] (B.13)

**Step 4.** Combining equations (B.10) and (B.13), we rewrite the former as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))|W_i] \geq 0,
\]
and, given equations (5) and (B.6), we further rewrite it as
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))|W_i] \geq 0.
\]

Finally, we take an expectation on both sides of this inequality conditional on \(z_i\). If \(z_i \subseteq W_i\), the LIE implies
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta'))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta') - (\Delta \kappa_{jj'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] + \alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'}))|z_i] \geq 0,
\]
which coincides with equation (B.9).

\[\square\]

**B.3 Bounding Moment Inequalities: Approximation Point**

In Section B.3.1, we derive the set of functions \(e = \{e_{jj'}(\cdot)\}_{j,j'=1}^{J,j'}\) that minimize \(\Theta_0^b(e)\). In Section B.3.2, we write the bounding moment inequalities in equation (15) after plugging in the set of functions derived in Section B.3.1, and show that the resulting inequalities point-identify \(\theta^*\).

**B.3.1 Optimal Approximation Point**

The identified set \(\Theta_0^b(e)\) defined by the bounding moment inequalities (see Section 4.2) depends on the value of the set of functions \(e\). We compute here the set \(e\) that minimizes \(\Theta_0^b(e)\). Specifically, given a pair of choices \(j\) and \(j'\), we choose for every \(z_i\) in its support, and every \(\theta\) in the parameter space \(\Theta\), the value \(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)\) that minimizes the moment function in equation (15b).

To do so, we compute the value of \(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)\) that makes the first derivative of \(m_{jj'}^b(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot))\) equal to zero; i.e., we compute the value of \(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)\) that solves
\[
\frac{\partial m_{jj'}^b(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot))}{\partial e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)} = 0,
\]
with \(m_{jj'}^b(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot))\) defined as in equation (15b). This first-order condition equals:
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))(1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_{0} \Delta p_{ijj'})) - d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))|z_i] = 0,
\]
and, grouping terms,
\[
\mathbb{E}[d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_{0} \Delta p_{ijj'}))|z_i] = 0.
\]
Dividing by $\exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))$ on both sides of this expression, we obtain
\[
E[d_{ij}(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i)] = 0,
\]
As, according to the model in Section 3, $E[d_{ij}|z_i] \neq 0$ for every $j$, this equality holds if and only if
\[
E[e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i, d_{ij} = 1] = 0.
\]
The value of $e_{jj'}(z, \theta)$ that satisfies this equation is
\[
e_{jj'}^*(z_i, \theta) = \theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1],
\]
which corresponds to the expression in equation (22). To verify that $m_{jj'}^b(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot))$ is effectively minimized when equation (22) holds, we compute the second-order condition, which equals:
\[
E[-d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))(e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) + d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))|z_i],
\]
and, grouping terms,
\[
E[-d_{ij} \exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta))(-1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i].
\]
As $\exp(-e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)) > 0$ for any $z_i$ and $\theta$, we can divide by this term without changing the sign of the conditional expectation above, obtaining then
\[
E[-d_{ij}(-1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i].
\]
As, according to the model in Section 3, $E[d_{ij}|z_i] > 0$ for every choice $j$, the sign of this conditional expectation is the same as the sign of the following conditional expectation
\[
E[-(-1 + e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i, d_{ij} = 1].
\]
Plugging in this expression the value of $e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)$ in equation (22), we find that it equals 1. Thus, the second-order condition is positive and, consequently, the value of $e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta)$ in equation (22) does indeed provide a minimum to the moment function $m_{jj'}^b(z_i, \theta, e_{jj'}(\cdot))$ for every $z_i$ and $\theta$.

### B.3.2 Bounding Moment Inequality With Optimal Approximation Point

We show here that, if, for any two choices $j$ and $j'$, it holds that
\[
e_{jj'}(z_i, \theta) = e_{jj'}^*(z_i, \theta) \quad \text{for all } z_i \in Z \text{ and } \theta \in \Theta,
\]
with the function $e_{jj'}^*(\cdot)$ defined as in equation (22), and
\[
E[p_i|W_i] = E[p_i|z_i], \quad \text{for all } z_i \in Z,
\]
then the identified set $\Theta_0^b(e)$ in equation (16) coincides with the true parameter vector $\theta^*$. 

**Proof.** Plugging the expression for $e_{jj'}(\cdot)$ in equation (22) into equation (15b), we obtain
\[
E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(- (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1])) 	imes \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad (1 - \theta_\alpha (\Delta p_{ijj'} - E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1])|z_i) \geq 0. \quad (B.14)
\]
If the condition in equation (23) holds, equations (3a) and (5) imply that

\[ E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij}] = 1 = E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i], \]  

(B.15)

for all \( z_i \in \mathcal{Z} \). To understand this equality, note equations (2) and (3a) imply there exists a function \( d(\cdot) \) such that \( d_i = d(W_i, \varepsilon_i) \). Thus, equation (5) implies \( E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i, d_i] = E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i, d(W_i, \varepsilon_i)] = E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] \). As equation (23) imposes that \( E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] = E[\Delta p_{ijj'}|W_i] \), equations (3a), (5), and (23) imply that \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] \) and, thus, they imply equation (B.15).

Combining equations (B.14) and (B.15), we obtain the following moment inequality:

\[ E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])/(1 - \theta_o (\Delta p_{ijj'} - \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])|z_i) \geq 0. \]

Equations (3a), (5), and (23) imply that \( \Delta \nu_{ijj'} = \Delta p_{ijj'} - \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] \), with \( \Delta \nu_{ijj'} \) defined as in equation (B.6). Thus, we can rewrite the moment inequality above as

\[ E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])/(1 - \theta_o \Delta \nu_{ijj'})|z_i] \geq 0. \]

As \( z_i \subseteq \mathcal{W}_i \in \mathcal{J} \), equation (B.7) implies we can use the LIE to derive the following inequality:

\[ E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])|z_i] \geq 0. \]

As this inequality holds for any two ordered choices \( j \) and \( j' \), the following two inequalities also hold:

\[ E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])|z_i] \geq 0, \]

\[ E[d_{ij} - d_{ij'} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])|z_i] \geq 0. \]

Multiplying both sides of the second inequality by \(-1\) and combining it with the first one, we obtain the following moment equality

\[ E[d_{ij'} - d_{ij} \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i])|z_i] = 0, \]

for any \( z_i \) and any choices \( j \) and \( j' \). Equations (7) and (23) imply we can rewrite this equality as

\[ \sum_{j''=1}^{J} \exp(\nu_{ijj''} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj''}|z_i]) - \sum_{j''=1}^{J} \exp(\nu_{ijj''} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj''}|z_i]) \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) = 0, \]

or, equivalently,

\[ \exp(\nu_{ijj'} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) - \exp(\nu_{ijj'} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) = 0. \]

Through simple algebraic operations, we can rewrite this equality as

\[ \exp(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) = \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]), \]

which implies that

\[ \theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_{j'}} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] = \kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \theta_o \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]. \]

This equality holds for every two choices \( j \) and \( j' \) and every \( z_i \in \mathcal{Z} \). Thus, the bounding moment inequalities in equation (15) point identify \( \theta^* \) if three conditions are met: (a) \( \epsilon_{jj'}(\theta) = \epsilon_{jj'}^*(\cdot) \), with
\( e_{jj'}(\cdot) \) defined as in equation (22); (b) \( z_i \) is such that equation (23) holds; and, (c) \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'} | z_i] \) varies across values of \( z_i \) in its support for some pair of choices \( j \) and \( j' \).

### B.4 Instrument Functions

The set of instrument functions \( \mathcal{G}_K \) we use depends on its cardinality \( K \). We only consider cases in which \( K \) is an even number. When computing the simulation results in Section 5.2 and Appendix C.3, we fix \( K = 2 \), and the set \( \mathcal{G}_K \) includes the following two instrument functions

\[
\begin{align*}
g_1(z_i) &= 1\{-\infty < z_i \leq 0\}, \\
g_2(z_i) &= 1\{0 < z_i < \infty\}.
\end{align*}
\]

In our empirical setting, when computing the results in sections 6.2 and 8, we fix \( K = 8 \) and the set \( \mathcal{G}_K \) includes the following instrument functions

\[
\begin{align*}
g_1(z_i) &= 1\{-\infty < z_i \leq p_{25}^{-}(z_i)\}, \\
g_2(z_i) &= 1\{p_{25}^{-}(z_i) < z_i \leq p_{50}^{-}(z_i)\}, \\
g_3(z_i) &= 1\{p_{50}^{-}(z_i) < z_i \leq p_{75}^{-}(z_i)\}, \\
g_4(z_i) &= 1\{p_{75}^{-}(z_i) < z_i < 0\}, \\
g_5(z_i) &= 1\{0 \leq z_i < p_{25}^{+}(z_i)\}, \\
g_6(z_i) &= 1\{p_{25}^{+}(z_i) \leq z_i < p_{50}^{+}(z_i)\}, \\
g_7(z_i) &= 1\{p_{50}^{+}(z_i) \leq z_i < p_{75}^{+}(z_i)\}, \\
g_8(z_i) &= 1\{p_{75}^{+}(z_i) \leq z_i < \infty\}.
\end{align*}
\]

where, for all \( q \in [0, 100] \), \( p_{q}^{-}(z_i) \) and \( p_{q}^{+}(z_i) \) denote the \( q \)th percentile of the distribution of negative and positive values of \( z_i \), respectively. Generally, for any \( K \), we define the set of instrument functions \( \mathcal{G}_K \) such that \( \mathcal{G}_K = \mathcal{G}_K^{-} \cup \mathcal{G}_K^{+} \), with \( \mathcal{G}_K^{-} = \{g_k(\cdot); k = 1, \ldots, K/2\} \) a set of instrument functions that split the set of negative values of \( z_i \) into equally likely bins, and \( \mathcal{G}_K^{+} = \{g_k(\cdot); k = K/2 + 1, \ldots, K\} \) a set of instrument functions that split the set of positive values of \( z_i \) into equally likely bins.

### B.5 Inference Procedures

In Section B.5.1, we describe our implementation of the inference procedure in Cox and Shi (2023). In Section B.5.2, we describe how we adjust the p-values to account for multiple hypotheses testing.

#### B.5.1 Cox and Shi (2023)

We describe here our implementation of the CC test described Section 3.1 of Cox and Shi (2023). Denote each of the \( L \) moment inequalities we use for estimation as

\[
\tilde{m}_l(\theta) > 0, \quad l = 1, \ldots, L, \tag{B.16}
\]

where, for each \( l = 1, \ldots, L \),

\[
\tilde{m}_l(\theta) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} m_l(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta), \tag{B.17}
\]
with $N, d_i, p_i, z_i$, and $\theta$ defined in Section 3, and $L = 2J(J - 1)K$. That is, the number of moments, $L$, equals the number of instrument functions we use, $K$, multiplied by the number of ordered pair alternatives one can form from the set of $J$ alternatives in the choice set, $J(J - 1)$, multiplied by the number of types of moment inequalities we use (i.e. 2, corresponding to the odds-based and the bounding inequalities). Given a set of $L$ inequalities and a grid $\Theta_g$ that contains the confidence set, we implement the following steps to compute a confidence set for $\theta^*$.\footnote{When computing the simulation results in Section 5.2 and Appendix C.3, as well as when computing the results in sections 6.2 and 8, we use a grid $\Theta_g$ that contains $41^3 = 68,921$ points.}

**Step 1:** choose a point $\theta_p \in \Theta_g$. Steps 2 to 8 test the null hypothesis that $\theta^* = \theta_p$:

$$H_0 : \theta^* = \theta_p \quad \text{vs.} \quad H_1 : \theta^* \neq \theta_p.$$

**Step 2:** evaluate the quasi-likelihood ratio statistic at $\theta_p$:

$$T(\theta_p) = \min_{\mu : \mu \geq 0} N (\bar{m}(\theta_p) - \mu) L^{-1}(\bar{m}(\theta_p) - \mu)$$

(B.18)

where, as a reminder, $N$ is the sample size, $\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)$ is a matrix defined as

$$\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (m(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta_p) - \bar{m}(\theta_p))(m(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta_p) - \bar{m}(\theta_p))^\prime,$$

(B.19)

$m(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta_p) = (m_1(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta_p), \ldots, m_L(d_i, p_i, z_i, \theta_p))^\prime$ and $\bar{m}(\theta_p) = (\bar{m}_1(\theta_p), \ldots, \bar{m}_L(\theta_p))^\prime$. The vector $\mu$ is of dimensions $L \times 1$, having as many elements as moments we use in the estimation. Equation (B.18) is solved for every $\theta_p$, and thus, the value of $\mu$ that solves the minimization problem in this equation may vary across values of $\theta_p$.

To prevent the issue of singularity of the covariance matrix, we follow Andrews and Barwick (2012) and substitute $\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)$ in equation (B.18) for the following matrix:

$$\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p) = \hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p) + \max(0.012 - \det(\hat{\Omega}(\theta), 0)Diag(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p))$$

(B.20)

with

$$\hat{\Omega}(\theta_p) = Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)) \hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p) Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)),$$

(B.21)

where $Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p))$ is a matrix such that $Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)) Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)) = Diag^{-1}(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p))$, and $Diag(\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p))$ is the $L \times L$ diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are equal to those of $\hat{\Sigma}(\theta_p)$.

**Step 3:** count how many values of $\mu$ equal 0. We denote this number as $r$.

**Step 4:** accept/reject $\theta_p$. Include $\theta_p$ in the $(1 - \delta)$% confidence set, $\hat{\Theta}^{1-\delta}$, if

$$T(\theta_p) \leq \chi^2_{r, 1-\alpha},$$

with $\chi^2_{r, 1-\alpha}$ the 100 $(1 - \alpha)$% quantile of the chi-squared distribution with $r$ degrees of freedom.

**Step 5:** repeat steps 2 to 5 for every $\theta_p$ in the grid $\Theta_g$.

**Step 6:** compare $\hat{\Theta}^{1-\alpha}$ to $\Theta_g$. If none of the points in $\hat{\Theta}^{1-\alpha}$ are at the boundary of $\Theta_g$, define $\hat{\Theta}^{1-\alpha}$ as the 95% confidence set for $\theta^*$. Otherwise, expand the limits of $\Theta_g$ and repeat steps 1 to 8.
B.5.2 Adjusting P-values Following Holm (1979)

We describe our implementation of the method in Holm (1979) to adjust p-values when testing multiple hypotheses. This section’s content follows that of Online Appendix A.8.2 in Dickstein and Morales (2018). Given a family of tests $H_1, H_2, \ldots, H_S$ with individual p-values $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_S$, we proceed as follows:

**Step 1: rank hypotheses.** Rank the $S$ hypotheses in increasing order of their individual p-values. Denote this index as $(i)$.

**Step 2: adjust individual p-values.** Denoting as $\hat{p}_{(i)}$ the adjusted p-value for the $(i)$-th smallest individual p-value, we compute $\hat{p}_{(i)} = \max_{j \leq i} \left\{ \min\{(S - j + 1)p_{(j)}, 1\} \right\}$.
C Simulation: Additional Details

We complement here the results presented in Section 5. In Appendix C.1, we provide theoretical results that generalize the findings in Table 2 in Section 5. In Appendix C.3, we complement the description of the results presented in Section 5 through graphical representations, and present additional simulation results.

C.1 Additional Analytical Results

We describe here properties of the identified set $\Theta_o$ defined in equation (9), and of the identified set $\Theta^b_0(e^*)$ defined in equations (16) and (22). We do so in three settings. Setting 1, discussed in Section C.1.1, is one in which agents’ information sets are observed by the researcher (i.e., $\sigma_1 = 0$) and agents make no expectational errors (i.e., $\sigma_3 = 0$). Setting 2, discussed in Section C.1.2, is one in which agents’ information sets are observed by the researcher (i.e., $\sigma_1 = 0$) but agents make expectational errors (i.e., $\sigma_3 > 0$). Finally, setting 3, discussed in Section C.1.3, is one in which agents make no expectational errors (i.e., $\sigma_3 = 0$) but information sets are partially unobserved by the researcher (i.e., $\sigma_1 > 0$).

C.1.1 Setting 1: $\sigma_1 = \sigma_3 = 0$

Within the context of the setting described in Section 5, the condition $\sigma_1 = 0$ implies that

$$E[p_i|W_i] = E[p_i|z_i],$$  \hfill (C.1)

and the condition $\sigma_3 = 0$ implies that

$$E[p_i|W_i] = p_i.$$  \hfill (C.2)

We describe here properties of $\Theta_o$ and $\Theta^b_0(e^*)$ under the restrictions in equations (C.1) and (C.2).

Properties of $\Theta_o$. Given equations (7), (C.1), and (C.2), we can rewrite equation (8) as

$$\exp(\kappa_j + \alpha p_{ij}) \exp(-(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j'}) + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) - \exp(\kappa_j' + \alpha p_{ijj'}) \geq 0.$$  

Rearranging terms, we obtain

$$\exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_j' + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \geq \exp(\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j'} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}),$$

and, taking logs on both sides and rearranging terms again, we obtain

$$\kappa_j - \kappa_j' + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'} - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j'} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \geq 0.$$  \hfill (C.3)

As this inequality holds for every ordered pair of drugs, the following inequality also holds

$$\kappa_j' - \kappa_j + \alpha \Delta p_{ij'j} - (\theta_{\kappa_j'} - \theta_{\kappa_j} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ij'j}) \geq 0,$$

or, equivalently,

$$\kappa_j - \kappa_j' + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'} - (\theta_{\kappa_j} - \theta_{\kappa_j'} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \leq 0.$$  \hfill (C.4)

Combining equations (C.3) and (C.4), we obtain the following equality
\[ \kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'} = \theta_{ijj'} - \theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \Delta p_{ijj'}, \]

for any two alternatives \( j \) and \( j' \) and any value of \( \Delta p_{ijj'} \) in its support. Therefore, if the support of \( \Delta p_{ijj'} \) includes more than one distinct value for a pair of alternatives \( j \) and \( j' \), \( \Theta_0^b \) is a singleton, and its only element is \( \theta^* \).

**Properties of \( \Theta_0^b(e^*) \).** In Appendix B.3.2, we show the condition in equation (C.1) is sufficient for \( \Theta_0^b(e^*) \) to point identify \( \theta^* \). Thus, the proof in Appendix B.3.2 implies that, if equations (C.1) and (C.2) hold, \( \Theta_0^b(e^*) \) is a singleton and coincides with \( \theta^* \).

### C.1.2 Setting 2: \( \sigma_1 = 0 \) and \( \sigma_3 > 0 \)

Within the context of the setting described in Section 5, the condition \( \sigma_1 = 0 \) implies that

\[ \mathbb{E}[p_i|W_i] = \mathbb{E}[p_i|z_i]. \tag{C.5} \]

We describe here properties of \( \Theta_0^o \) and \( \Theta_0^b(e^*) \) under the restriction in equation (C.5).

**Properties of \( \Theta_0^o \).** Given equations (5), (7) and (C.5), we can rewrite equation (8) as

\[ \exp(\kappa_j + \alpha \mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|z_i])\mathbb{E}[(\exp(-\theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \Delta p_{ijj'}))|z_i] - \exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[p_{ij'}|z_i]) \geq 0, \]

Rearranging terms, we obtain

\[ \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \geq \mathbb{E}[\exp(\theta_{ijj'} - \theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \Delta p_{ijj'})|z_i], \]

or, equivalently,

\[ \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \geq \mathbb{E}[\exp(\theta_{ijj'} - \theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] + \Delta \nu_{ijj'})|z_i], \]

with \( \Delta \nu_{ijj'} \) defined in equation (B.6). Through simple algebra, we can rewrite this inequality as

\[ \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \geq \mathbb{E}[\exp(\theta_{ijj'} - \theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \exp(\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})|z_i], \]

or, equivalently,

\[ \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \geq \exp(\theta_{ijj'} - \theta_{ijj'} + \theta_0 \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \mathbb{E}[\exp(\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})|z_i]. \]

Moving all terms to the left-hand side, this inequality becomes

\[ \exp((\kappa_j - \theta_{ijj'}) - (\kappa_{j'} - \theta_{ijj'}) + (\alpha - \theta_0) \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \mathbb{E}[\exp(-\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})|z_i] \geq 1, \]

and given equations (3a), (B.7), and (C.5), we can further simplify this inequality as

\[ \exp((\kappa_j - \theta_{ijj'}) - (\kappa_{j'} - \theta_{ijj'}) + (\alpha - \theta_0) \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) \mathbb{E}[\exp(-\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})] \geq 1, \tag{C.6} \]

As equation (B.6) implies \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta \nu_{ijj'}] = 0 \) and \( \exp(x) \) is convex in \( x \), Jensen’s inequality implies that

\[ \mathbb{E}[\exp(-\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})] \geq 1, \quad \text{for all } \theta_0 \in \mathbb{R}, \tag{C.7} \]

and \( \mathbb{E}[\exp(-\theta_0 \Delta \nu_{ijj'})] = 1 \) only if \( \Delta \nu_{ijj'} = 0 \) for every individual \( i \) in the population.
Several features of the moment condition in equation (C.6) are worth noticing. First, when evaluated at the true parameter value \((\theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_\alpha) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_j', \alpha)\), it becomes

\[
\mathbb{E}[\exp(-\alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'})],
\]  
(C.8)

which, regardless of \(\alpha\), is larger or equal to one; see equation (C.7). Thus, the odds-based inequality in equation (8) holds at \(\theta^*\). If the distribution of \(\Delta \nu_{ijj'}\) is not degenerate at zero, \(\mathbb{E}[\exp(-\alpha \Delta \nu_{ijj'})] > 1\) and the inequality also holds at values of \(\theta\) other than \(\theta^*\). This is true irrespective of the choices \(j\) and \(j'\) and the value of \(z_i\) used to build the inequality. Thus, if the distribution of \(\Delta \nu_{ijj'}\) is not degenerate at zero, \(\Theta_0^\alpha\) includes values of \(\theta\) other than \(\theta^*\).

To further characterize \(\Theta_0^\alpha\), we assume

\[
(\theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_{\kappa_j'}) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_j'), \quad (C.9a)
\]

\[
\Delta \nu_{ijj'} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2_\varepsilon). \quad (C.9b)
\]

Under these restrictions, the moment in equation (C.6) becomes

\[
\exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) + 0.5(\theta_\alpha)^2 \sigma^2_\varepsilon).
\]  
(C.10)

We note three properties of this moment as a function of \(\theta_\alpha\). First, it converges to \(\infty\) as \(\theta_\alpha\) goes to either \(-\infty\) or \(\infty\). Second, its first derivative with respect to \(\theta_\alpha\) equals zero at

\[
\theta_\alpha = -\frac{\mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]}{\sigma^2_\varepsilon}. \quad (C.11)
\]

Third, its second derivative with respect to \(\theta_\alpha\) is

\[
(\sigma^2_\varepsilon + (\mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i] + \theta_\alpha \sigma^2_\varepsilon)^2) \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i]) + 0.5(\theta_\alpha)^2 \sigma^2_\varepsilon) > 0, \quad \text{for all } \theta_\alpha \in \mathbb{R}.
\]

Thus, the function in equation (C.10) is globally convex, has a minimum at the value of \(\theta_\alpha\) indicated in equation (C.11), and converges to \(\infty\) when \(\theta_\alpha\) goes to either \(\infty\) or \(-\infty\). These properties hold for any two choices \(j\) and \(j'\) and any value of \(z_i\). An implication is that the identified set for \(\alpha\) is of the form \((\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, \infty)\) for real numbers \(a_1\) and \(a_2\), or of the form \((\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, a_3] \cup [a_4, \infty)\) for real numbers \(a_1\), \(a_2\), \(a_3\) and \(a_4\), or, more generally, similar to the latter one but with even more intervals; e.g., of the form \((\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, a_3] \cup [a_4, a_5] \cup [a_6, \infty)\) for real numbers \(a_1\), \(a_2\), \(a_3\), \(a_4\), \(a_5\), and \(a_6\). Although this property is shown under the restrictions in equation (C.9), the results in Appendix C.3.2 show that it also holds in the simulation setting described in Section 5, where expectational errors are not normal.

**Properties of \(\Theta_0^\alpha(e^*)\).** In Appendix B.3.2, we show the condition in equation (C.5) is sufficient for \(\Theta_0^\alpha(e^*)\) to point identify \(\theta^*\). Therefore, the proof in Appendix B.3.2 implies that, if equation (C.5) holds, \(\Theta_0^\alpha(e^*)\) is a singleton and coincides with \(\theta^*\).

**C.1.3 Setting 3: \(\sigma_1 > 0\) and \(\sigma_3 = 0\)**

Within the context of the setting described in Section 5, the condition \(\sigma_1 > 0\) implies that

\[
\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|W_i]|z_i] = \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ij}|z_i], \quad \text{but} \quad \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|z_i]|W_i] = \mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|z_i], \quad (C.12)
\]

and the condition \(\sigma_3 = 0\) implies that
We describe here properties of \( \Theta_0^0 \) and \( \Theta_0^0(e^*) \) under the restrictions in equations (C.12) and (C.13).

**Properties of \( \Theta_0^0 \).** Given equations (5), (7) and (C.13), we can rewrite equation (8) as

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{\exp(\kappa_j + \alpha p_{ij})}{\sum_{j''=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j''} + \alpha p_{ij''})} \exp(-\theta_{k_j} - \theta_{k_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \right] - \mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{\exp(\kappa_j' + \alpha p_{ij'})}{\sum_{j''=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j''} + \alpha p_{ij''})} \right] \geq 0, \tag{C.14}
\]

Grouping terms, we obtain the following moment inequality

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{\exp(\kappa_j' + \alpha p_{ij'})}{\sum_{j''=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j''} + \alpha p_{ij''})} \left( \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \exp(-\theta_{k_j} - \theta_{k_{j'}} + \theta_\alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) - 1 \right) \right] \geq 0. \tag{C.16}
\]

To characterize \( \Theta_0^0 \), we assume

\[
(\theta_{k_j}, \theta_{k_{j'}}) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_{j'}), \tag{C.15a}
\]

\[
\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_p^2). \tag{C.15b}
\]

Under restriction (C.15a), the moment in equation (C.14) becomes

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{\exp(\kappa_j' + \alpha p_{ij'})}{\sum_{j''=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j''} + \alpha p_{ij''})} \left( \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \Delta p_{ijj'}) - 1 \right) \right]. \tag{C.17}
\]

We note two properties of this moment as a function of \( \theta_\alpha \). First, it converges to \( \infty \) as \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to either \( -\infty \) or \( \infty \). To illustrate this point, note that the function in equation (C.16) is bounded from below by the following function

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \frac{\exp(\kappa_j' + \alpha p_{ij'})}{\sum_{j''=1}^J \exp(\kappa_{j''} + \alpha p_{ij''})} \right] \mathbb{E}\left[ \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \Delta p_{ijj'}) - 1 \right]. \tag{C.18}
\]

The first expectation in this equation is always finite and positive, and it does not depend on \( \theta_\alpha \). Under the assumption in equation (C.15b), the second expectation in equation (C.17) becomes

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \Delta p_{ijj'}) - 1 \right] = \exp(2.5(\theta_\alpha - \alpha)^2 \sigma_p^2) - 1,
\]

which indeed converges to \( \infty \) as \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to either \( -\infty \) or \( \infty \). Second, the second derivative of the moment function in equation (C.17) with respect to \( \theta_\alpha \) equals

\[
\mathbb{E}\left[ \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha) \Delta p_{ijj'}) \exp((\theta_\alpha - \alpha)(\Delta p_{ijj'})^2) \right] \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } \theta_\alpha \in \mathbb{R},
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}[p_{ij}|W_i] = p_{ij}. \tag{C.13}
\]
where the sign of this inequality can be established because the moment function equals the product of three positive terms. Thus, the moment in equation (C.14) is globally convex and converges to $\infty$ when $\theta_\alpha$ goes to either $\infty$ or $-\infty$. These properties hold for any two choices $j$ and $j'$ and any $z_i$. An implication is that the identified set for $\alpha$ has the form $(\infty, a_1) \cup [a_2, \infty)$ for real numbers $a_1$ and $a_2$, or the form $(\infty, a_1) \cup [a_2, a_3) \cup [a_4, \infty)$ for real numbers $a_1$, $a_2$, $a_3$ and $a_4$, or, more generally, a form similar to the latter one but with more intervals; e.g., the form $(\infty, a_1) \cup [a_2, a_3) \cup [a_4, a_5) \cup [a_6, \infty)$ for real numbers $a_1$, $a_2$, $a_3$, $a_4$, $a_5$, and $a_6$. Although this property is shown here under the restrictions in equation (C.15), Appendix C.3.2 shows it also holds in the setting described in Section 5, where expectational errors are not normal.

**Properties of $\Theta^b_0(e^*)$.** Given equations (5), (7), (15), (22), and (C.13), $\forall_{ijj}(z_i, \theta, e^*_ijj(\cdot))$ equals

$$
\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j'=1}^J \frac{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})}{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})} \left( 1 - \exp(\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'} + \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) \right) \times \exp(-((\theta_{\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'}})\kappa_{ijj'} - \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) + \theta_\alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1] - \Delta p_{ijj'}) \right) \right],
$$

Grouping terms, we obtain the following bounding moment inequality

$$
\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j'=1}^J \frac{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})}{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})} \left( 1 - \exp(-((\theta_{\kappa_j - \kappa_{j'}})\kappa_{ijj'} - \alpha \Delta p_{ijj'}) + \theta_\alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1]) \times (1 + \theta_\alpha \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1] - \Delta p_{ijj'}) \right) \right] \geq 0,
$$

where this inequality holds for every two choices $j$ and $j'$ and every value of $z_i$ in its support.

The properties of the inequality in equation (C.19) are difficult to characterize analytically. When evaluated at the true parameter value (i.e., $(\theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_{\kappa_{j'}}, \theta_\alpha) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_{j'}, \alpha)$), it becomes

$$
\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j'=1}^J \frac{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})}{\exp(\kappa_{j'} + \alpha p_{ijj'})} \left( 1 - \exp(x) \right) \right] \geq 0,
$$

with $x = \alpha(\Delta p_{ijj'} - \mathbb{E}[\Delta p_{ijj'}|z_i, d_{ij} = 1])$. As $\exp(x)(1 - x) \leq 1$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$, the inequality in equation (C.19) holds at the true parameter value and, thus, as implied by Theorem 2, $\theta^* \in \Theta^b_0(e^*)$. Understanding the analytical properties of the moment in equation (C.19) as the parameters differ from their true values is not trivial. However, as shown in Appendix C.3.2, if $(\theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_{\kappa_{j'}}) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_{j'})$, the resulting moment becomes globally concave in $\theta_\alpha$ and converges to $-\infty$ when $\theta_\alpha$ goes to $\infty$ and when it goes to $-\infty$. An implication of this property is that, if $(\theta_{\kappa_j}, \theta_{\kappa_{j'}}) = (\kappa_j, \kappa_{j'})$, the identified set for $\alpha$ defined by the inequality in equation (C.19) has the form $[a, b]$ for real numbers $a$ and $b$.

**C.2 Simulation Results: Figures**

In this section, we include figures representing the confidence sets discussed in Section 5. For each case considered in Table 2, we include 6 figures. Those in panel (a) include projections of the corresponding 95% confidence set on the two-dimensional space $(\kappa_2, \theta)$; those in panel (b) include projections of the same confidence set on the two-dimensional space $(\kappa_3, \theta)$. In all figures, the MLE is captured by a purple diamond, and the confidence set is captured by a cloud of blue dots.
Figure C.1: Case 1 in Table 2

(a) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_2, \theta)\)

(b) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_3, \theta)\)

Figure C.2: Case 2 in Table 2

(a) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_2, \theta)\)

(b) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_3, \theta)\)
Figure C.3: Case 3(a) in Table 2
(a) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_2, \theta)\)

(b) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_3, \theta)\)

Figure C.4: Case 3(b) in Table 2
(a) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_2, \theta)\)

(b) Projected Confidence Set for \((\kappa_3, \theta)\)
Figure C.5: Case 4 in Table 2

(a) Projected Confidence Set for $(\kappa_2, \theta)$

(b) Projected Confidence Set for $(\kappa_3, \theta)$

Figure C.6: Case 5 in Table 2

(a) Projected Confidence Set for $(\kappa_2, \theta)$

(b) Projected Confidence Set for $(\kappa_3, \theta)$
C.3 Additional Simulation Results

We present here two sets of additional simulation results. In Section C.3.1 we present results for settings analogous to those in Table 2 in Section 5. In Section C.3.2, we present simulation results for settings in which the true value of the choice-specific fixed effects is assumed to be known by the econometrician. We compute confidence sets for the parameter \( \alpha \), and include figures that illustrate the behavior of the odds-based and bounding moment inequalities.

C.3.1 With Unknown Choice-Specific Fixed Effects

Comparing the results in case 2(b) in Table C.1 to those in case 2 in Table 2, we observe that the confidence set defined by the bounding moment inequalities is in both cases a singleton that coincides with the true parameter value. The confidence set defined by the odds-based moment inequalities includes points other than the true value of the parameters, and it is larger in case 2(b) (when the standard deviation of the expectational error equals \( \sigma_3 = 2 \)) than it is in case 2 (when the standard deviation of the expectational error equals \( \sigma_3 = 1 \)). A comparison of the results for cases 2 and 2(b) thus illustrates that the identified set defined by the bounding moment inequalities is invariant to the variance of the expectational error, but the identified set defined by the odds-based inequalities increases in the variance of the expectational error.

Comparing the results in case 4(b) in Table C.1 to those in case 4 in Table 2, we observe that, as we increase the value of \( \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma_3 \), the confidence sets defined by the odds-based inequalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>( \sigma_1 )</th>
<th>( \sigma_3 )</th>
<th>( z_i )</th>
<th>Estimator</th>
<th>MLE &amp; Confidence Sets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>( \kappa_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(b)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.75, 1.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(b)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>( x_{2i} )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.80, 2.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.55, 1.45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[0.80, 1.45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5(b)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>( p_i )</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>( \varnothing )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.65, 0.65]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>( \varnothing )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma_3 \) are parameters of the distributions of \( x_{1ij} \) and \( x_{3ij} \), respectively, as indicated in footnote 13. MLE indicates the maximum likelihood estimate. Odds-based, Bounding, and Both contain the projections on each parameter of 95% confidence sets computed according to the procedures in Cox and Shi (2023). Odds-based indicates the corresponding confidence set is computed using only odds-based inequalities of the type in equation (24); Bounding indicates the confidence set is computed using only bounding inequalities of the type in equation (25); Both indicates the confidence set is computed using both types of inequalities. In cases 2(b) and 4(b), the moment inequalities are built using the instrument functions in equation (26). In case 5(b), the inequalities are built using instead the instrument functions \( g_1(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_{ijj} > 0) \) and \( g_2(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_{ijj} < 0) \). In cases 2(b) and 5(b), all confidence sets are computed by testing points in 3-dimensional orthotope whose sides are \([0.5, 1.5] \) for \( \alpha \), \([-0.5, 0.5] \) for \( \kappa_2 \) and \([0.5, 1.5] \) for \( \kappa_3 \). In Case 4(b), all confidence sets are computed by testing points in 3-dimensional orthotope whose sides are \([-0.5, 2.5] \) for \( \alpha \), \([-1.5, 1.5] \) for \( \kappa_2 \) and \([-0.5, 2.5] \) for \( \kappa_3 \). We mark with an asterisk next to the label Odds-based the cases in which the confidence interval generated by the odds-based inequalities includes points outside the grid; this is never the case when we use bounding inequalities only nor when we combine bounding and odds-based inequalities.
and by the bounding inequalities both increase. The downward bias in the MLE also increases.

Finally, comparing the results in case 5(b) in Table C.1 to those in case 5 in Table 2, we observe that, as we increase the variance of the expectational error (i.e., as we increase \( \sigma_3 \) from 1 to 2), the downward bias in the MLE increases, while the confidence sets defined by the odds-based moment inequalities and by the combination of both types of inequalities remain empty.

### C.3.2 With Known Choice-Specific Fixed Effects

We report here confidence sets for the price coefficient \( \alpha \) conditional on fixing the choice-specific fixed effects at their true values; i.e., conditional on \( \kappa_{sYr} = \kappa_j \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, J \). The advantage of this setting (relative to one in which the choice-specific fixed effects are unknown) is that, as the unknown parameter is a scalar, we can plot the moments in a two-dimensional graph. This facilitates observing the shape of these moments as functions of \( \theta_\alpha \). To limit simulation noise, every result in this section is computed on a simulated sample with \( N = 6,000,000 \) observations.

Case 1 in Table C.2 corresponds to a setting in which the researcher’s assumed information set equals the true one (i.e., \( \sigma_1 = 0 \)) and agents make no expectational error (i.e., \( \sigma_3 = 0 \)). In this case, the MLE equals the true parameter value, and the confidence sets defined by the odds-based inequalities and the bounding inequalities both include only one parameter value, the true one.

Cases 2 and 2(b) in Table C.2 correspond to a setting in which the researcher’s assumed information set coincides with the true one (i.e., \( \sigma_1 = 0 \)) and agents make expectational errors (i.e., \( \sigma_3 > 0 \)). In this case, the MLE is consistent, and the confidence set defined by the bounding moment inequalities includes only the true parameter value. The confidence set defined by the odds-based inequalities includes other values of \( \theta_\alpha \) in addition to the true one. Specifically, the confidence set defined by the odds-based inequalities has the form \((-\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, \infty)\) for real numbers \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \), with \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) increasing and decreasing, respectively, in \( \sigma_3 \). The shape of this confidence set is a consequence of the odds-based moments being globally convex, having a minimum at the value of \( \theta_\alpha \) indicated in equation (C.11), and converging to \( \infty \) when \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to \( \infty \) and when it goes to \(-\infty \). As discussed in Appendix C.1.2, these properties of the odds-based moment inequalities apply more generally than to the specific setting studied in cases 2 and 2(b) in Table C.2. For cases 2 and 2(b), these properties are shown in the left and middle panels in figures C.8 and C.9.

In cases 3 and 3(b), we consider agents that make no expectational errors (i.e, \( \sigma_3 = 0 \)) but whose true information sets are partly unobserved by the researcher (i.e., \( \sigma_1 > 0 \)). The MLE is asymptotically biased towards zero, and the bias increases in \( \sigma_1 \). The confidence set defined by the odds-based and by the bounding moment inequalities includes values of the parameter \( \theta_\alpha \) beyond its true value \( \alpha \). Specifically, the confidence set defined by the bounding inequalities has the form \([a_1, a_2]\) for real numbers \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \), with \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) decreasing and increasing, respectively, in \( \sigma_1 \). The fact that the confidence set defined by the bounding inequalities is convex is a consequence of the bounding moments being globally concave; see right panel in figures C.10 and C.11. The confidence set defined by the odds-based moment inequalities has the form \((-\infty, a_1] \cup [a_2, a_3] \cup [a_4, \infty)\) for real numbers \( a_1 \), \( a_2 \), \( a_3 \), and \( a_4 \). The fact that the confidence set defined by the odds-based inequalities is non-convex is due to the odds-based moments being globally convex and going to \( \infty \) when \( \theta_\alpha \) goes to \( \infty \) and when it goes to \(-\infty \); see left and middle panels in figures C.10 and C.11.

In cases 4 and 4(b), we consider a setting in which the researcher wrongly assumes that the agent has perfect information on prices. The MLE is downward biased, and the bias increases in the importance of the firm’s expectational error (i.e., the bias increases in \( \sigma_3 \)). The confidence sets defined by the odds-based and bounding moment inequalities are empty. As illustrated in figures C.12 and C.13, there is no value of \( \theta_\alpha \) for which all moments are above zero, and this happens more clearly the larger is \( \sigma_3 \).
Table C.2: Simulation Results - MLE and Confidence Intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$\sigma_1$</th>
<th>$\sigma_3$</th>
<th>$z_i$</th>
<th>Estimator</th>
<th>MLE &amp; Confidence Sets $\alpha$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1 [1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1 $(-\infty, -4.37) \cup [0.92, \infty)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(b)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.93 $(-\infty, -1.95] \cup [0.80, \infty)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.78 $(-\infty, -1.73] \cup [1.03, 1.30] \cup [2.93, \infty)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(b)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.89 $(-\infty, -1.73] \cup [1.03, 1.30] \cup [2.93, \infty)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$p_i$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.68 $\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5(b)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$p_i$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.68 $\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>$\emptyset$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_3$ are parameters of the distributions of $x_{1ij}$ and $x_{3ij}$, respectively, as indicated in footnote 13. MLE indicates the maximum likelihood estimate. Odds-based, Bounding, and Both contain the projections on each parameter 95% confidence sets computed according to the procedures in Cox and Shi (2023). Odds-based indicates the corresponding confidence set is computed using only odds-based inequalities of the type in equation (24); Bounding indicates the confidence set is computed using only bounding inequalities of the type in equation (25); Both indicates the confidence set is computed using both types of inequalities. In cases 1 to 4, the moment inequalities are built using the instrument functions in equation (26). In case 5, the inequalities are built using instead the instrument functions $g_1(p_i) = 1\{\Delta p_{ij'} \geq 0\}$ and $g_2(p_i) = 1\{\Delta p_{ij'} < 0\}$.
Figure C.7: Case 1 in Table C.2

(a) All Moments

Odds-based Ineq.  Bounding Ineq.  Both Types

(b) Lower Contour of Moments

Odds-based Ineq.  Bounding Ineq.  Both Types

(c) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Odds-based (Zoom In)  Odds-based (Zoom Out)  Bounding Ineq.
Figure C.8: Case 2 in Table C.2
(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Figure C.9: Case 2(b) in Table C.2
(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Figure C.10: Case 3 in Table C.2
(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out
Figure C.11: Case 3(b) in Table C.2

(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Odds-based (Zoom In)  Odds-based (Zoom Out)  Bounding Ineq.

Figure C.12: Case 4 in Table C.2

(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Odds-based Ineq.  Bounding Ineq.  Both Types

Figure C.13: Case 4(b) in Table C.2

(a) Lower Contour of Moments - Zooming In and Out

Odds-based Ineq.  Bounding Ineq.  Both Types
C.3.3 Confidence Sets Following Procedure in Andrews and Soares (2010)

Table C.3 is analogous to Table 2 in the main text, with the only difference that all moment inequality confidence intervals are computed following the procedure in Andrews and Soares (2010). For detailed description of our implementing of the inference procedure in Andrews and Soares (2010), see Appendix A.7. in Dickstein and Morales (2018).

Table C.3: Simulation Results - MLE and Confidence Intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>$\sigma_1$</th>
<th>$\sigma_3$</th>
<th>$z_i$</th>
<th>Estimator</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\kappa_2$</th>
<th>$\kappa_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.34, 0.34]</td>
<td>[0.66, 1.32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.80, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.32, 0.32]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
<td>[0, 0]</td>
<td>[1, 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(b)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[1.1]∪[1.10, 2.50]</td>
<td>[-1.50, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.50, 2.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.55, 1.45]</td>
<td>[-1, 0.95]</td>
<td>[0.05, 1.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[1.1]∪[1.10, 1.45]</td>
<td>[-0.15, 0.20]</td>
<td>[1, 1.35]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x_{2i}$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based*</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.50]</td>
<td>[-0.48, 0.50]</td>
<td>[0.65, 1.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>[0.80, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.30, 0.30]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>[0.92, 1.10]</td>
<td>[-0.33, 0.30]</td>
<td>[0.70, 1.30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$p_i$</td>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Odds-based</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_3$ are parameters of the distributions of $x_{1ij}$ and $x_{3ij}$, as indicated in footnote 13. MLE indicates the maximum likelihood estimate. Odds-based, Bounding, and Both contain the projections on each parameter of 95% confidence sets computed according to the procedure in Andrews and Soares (2010). Odds-based indicates the corresponding confidence set is computed using only odds-based inequalities of the type in equation (24); Bounding indicates the confidence set is computed using only bounding inequalities of the type in equation (25); Both indicates the confidence set is computed using both types of inequalities. In cases 1 to 4, we build the moment inequalities using the instrument functions in equation (26). In case 5, we build the inequalities using the instrument functions $g_1(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_{ij} > 0)$ and $g_2(p_i) = 1(\Delta p_{ij} < 0)$. In all cases other than case 3(b), confidence sets are computed by testing points in a 3-dimensional grid whose sides are $[0.5, 1.5]$ (for $\alpha$), $[-0.5, 0.5]$ (for $\kappa_2$) and $[0.5, 1.5]$ (for $\kappa_3$). In case 3(b), we use a grid whose sides are $[-0.5, 2.5]$ (for $\alpha$), $[-1.5, 1.5]$ (for $\kappa_2$) and $[-0.5, 2.5]$ (for $\kappa_3$). We mark cases with an asterisk when the confidence set includes points outside the grid. The minimum distance between any two points in the grid is 0.02.

28
D Estimation Results: Additional Details

D.1 Results From Vuong (1989) Test

With the goal of determining which of the alternative models reported in Table 3 fit the data better, we implement tests à la Vuong (1989). We compare all possible pairs of models among those listed in Table 3. The ultimate conclusion of these tests is that the model that assumes that physicians’ information sets equal the average of current out-of-pocket costs by the drug-carrier-year triplet dominates all other models considered in Table 3. We report in Table D.1 the test statistic for every test that compares: (a) the model that assumes that physicians’ information sets equal the average out-of-pocket cost by drug-carrier-year triplet to (b) all other alternative models considered in Table 3. The results show that the test statistic is always positive and far away from zero, indicating that the model with information sets equal to the average of out-of-pocket cost by drug-carrier-year triplet is preferred at all commonly used statistical significance levels.

Table D.1: Vuong (1989) Test Results For Model with Assumed Information Set Equal to Average Current Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year Against All Other Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Assumption on Information Set</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfect Information</td>
<td>34.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>26.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>37.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Current Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>36.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exact Lagged Prices</td>
<td>34.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>25.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Carrier-Year</td>
<td>15.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Plan Type-Year</td>
<td>33.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Lagged Prices By Drug-Year</td>
<td>34.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In the column labeled “Test Statistic,” we report the value of the test statistic for Vuong (1989) tests that compare the model that assumes that physicians know average current prices by drug-carrier-year to models that impose the alternative informational assumption listed in the column labeled “Alternative Assumption on Information Set.”

For any two models 1 and 2, the test statistic in Table D.1 equals

\[
\text{test statistic} = \frac{L_1^1 - L_2^2 - 0.5(K_1 - K_2) \log(N)}{\sqrt{N \omega_N}} \quad (D.1)
\]
where \( N \) is the sample size and, for \( m = \{1, 2\} \), \( L_N^m \) denotes the log-likelihood evaluated at the corresponding maximum likelihood estimate, and \( K_m \) denotes the number of parameters. The variable \( \omega_N \) equals the square root of

\[
\omega_N^2 = \sqrt{V \left[ \log \frac{f_{1i}}{f_{2i}} \right]},
\]

where, for \( m = \{1, 2\} \), \( f_{mi} \) denotes the log-likelihood function for observation \( i \) associated to model \( m \). The models that differ in the assumed information set of the physician are non-nested and, therefore, to implement the Vuong (1989) test, we compare the test statistic in equation (D.1) to the appropriate quantile from the standard normal distribution.
References


