

The Long and Short (Run) of Trade Elasticities*

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Abstract

We propose a novel approach to estimate the trade elasticity at various horizons. When large countries change Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, small trading partners that are not in a preferential trade agreement experience plausibly exogenous tariff changes. The differential growth rates of imports from these countries relative to a control group – countries not subject to the MFN tariff scheme – can be used to identify the trade elasticity. We build a panel dataset combining information on product-level tariffs and trade flows covering 1995-2018, and estimate the trade elasticity at short and long horizons using local projections (Jordà, 2005). Our main findings are that the elasticity of tariff-exclusive trade flows in the year following the exogenous tariff change is about -0.76 , and the long-run elasticity ranges from -1.75 to -2.25 . The welfare-relevant long-run trade elasticity is about -0.95 . Our long-run estimates are smaller than typical in the literature, and it takes 7-10 years to converge to the long run, implying that (i) the welfare gains from trade are high and (ii) there are substantial market penetration costs to accessing new customers.

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1 Introduction

The elasticity of trade flows to trade barriers – the “trade elasticity” – is the central parameter in international economics. Quantifications of the impact of shocks or trade policies on trade flows, GDP, and welfare hinge on its magnitude. However, there is currently no consensus on the value of this parameter, with a variety of empirical strategies delivering a broad range of estimates.¹

This paper develops and implements a novel approach to estimating trade elasticities. Our principal contributions are to simultaneously address (i) endogeneity due to possible reverse causality and omitted variables, and (ii) variation across time horizons. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, our estimate of the long-run elasticity of trade values exclusive of tariff payments is -1.75 to -2.25 , smaller than even the lower end of the range of existing estimates. This implies that the welfare-relevant (i.e., tariff-inclusive) long-run elasticity is around 1 in absolute value, and thus the gains from trade implied by most static trade models are large. Second, the trade elasticity in the year following the initial tariff change is -0.76 , and it takes several years for it to converge to the long-run value. The trade elasticity point estimate stabilizes between years 7 and 10, though the standard errors also widen. Third, there is substantial sectoral heterogeneity in trade elasticities. Across 10 broad HS sections, the long-run values range from -0.5 to over -6 .

To obtain these estimates, our first contribution is to address the reverse causality between trade flows and tariffs. The identification strategy relies on the key institutional feature of the WTO system: the MFN principle. Under this principle, a country must apply the same tariffs to all its WTO member trade partners. We estimate the trade elasticity based on the response of small exporters to an importer’s MFN tariff change. The identifying assumption is that developments in the small exporters do not affect a country’s decision to change its MFN import tariffs. Our estimation procedure then compares the small exporters’ trade flows to a control group of exporters to the same country to whom MFN tariffs do not apply. These are countries in preferential trade agreements with the importer.

Our second contribution is to highlight the role of omitted variables. The theoretical foundations of the gravity equation emphasize the need to control for exporter and importer multilateral resistance terms, structurally ([Anderson, 1979](#); [Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003](#)) or with appropriate fixed effects (e.g. [Redding and Venables, 2004](#); [Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006](#)). We show that the traditional log-levels gravity specification with multilateral resistance fixed effects yields the conventional wisdom elasticities of -3 to -10 . However, multilateral resistance terms do not absorb aggregate or product-specific bilateral taste shocks or other unobserved bilateral gravity variables. Omitting these unobservables can lead to large elasticity estimates – for instance if tariffs are low when the taste shocks are high. Once we augment the traditional specification with a richer set of fixed effects

¹[Anderson and van Wincoop \(2004\)](#) and [Head and Mayer \(2015\)](#) review available estimates.

to soak up bilateral unobserved gravity variables and taste shocks, conventional OLS log-levels estimates fall sharply to below 1 in absolute value. We then show in stages how we arrive at our final estimate.

Our third contribution is to provide estimates over several time horizons, ranging from impact to 10 years. Because tariff changes can be autocorrelated, to estimate the impact of a tariff change at longer horizons we use time series methods, namely local projections (Jordà, 2005). This approach takes into account the fact that tariffs themselves may have a dynamic impulse response structure, implying the elasticities of trade flows at different horizons might depend on the pattern of autocorrelation of tariffs. One useful outcome of this exercise is that we can compare short- and long-run elasticities obtained within the same estimation framework. It is well-known that trade elasticities estimated from cross-sectional variation in tariffs tend to be much higher than the short-run elasticities needed to fit international business cycle moments. Normally, this divergence is rationalized by assuming that the elasticities estimated from the cross-section essentially reflect the long run. However, existing estimates either use purely cross-sectional variation (e.g. Caliendo and Parro, 2015), or a time difference over only one horizon (e.g. Head and Ries, 2001; Romalis, 2007). In both cases it is unclear whether what is being estimated is a long-run elasticity, an elasticity over a fixed time horizon, or a mix of short- and long-run elasticities. Our exercise provides mutually consistent estimates of the short- and the long-run elasticities, as well as the full path of the trade responses over time.

Our analysis uses data on global international trade flows from BACI, and tariffs from UN TRAINS. The sample covers 183 economies, over 5,000 HS 6-digit categories, and the time period 1995-2018.

Having established how our elasticity estimates improve on existing ones in several dimensions, we undertake two exercises that connect our empirical analysis to theory and quantification. First, we derive a formula to convert our point estimates to the long-run elasticity used in static trade models for steady state comparisons, such as the welfare gains from trade. We also account for the fact that our left-hand side variable is trade values exclusive of tariff payments, whereas the most commonly defined elasticity in the trade models is that of tariff-inclusive spending. After these adjustments, the elasticity relevant for computing the welfare gains from trade is about -0.95 . Applying it in the well-known formula of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), the gains from trade are 5-6 times larger than under the commonly used elasticity of -5 .

Second, we calibrate a simple dynamic model that delivers a slowly building time-path of elasticities. The model is a dynamic extension of the Arkolakis (2010) market penetration framework, where the number of customers of a firm plays the role of the firm's capital stock.² The sluggish response of trade

²The notion of customers as capital has been explored by Drozd and Nosal (2012), Gourio and Rudanko (2014), and Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi (2017).

is rationalized by a combination of convex adjustment costs and slow customer base depreciation. Alternative mechanisms leading to a difference between the short and long-run elasticities, such as the extensive margin, exporter learning, or investment to lower future costs of exporting have been explored in an active recent literature (see, among many others, [Costantini and Melitz, 2007](#); [Ruhl, 2008](#); [Burstein and Melitz, 2013](#); [Alessandria and Choi, 2014](#); [Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014](#); [Ruhl and Willis, 2017](#)). The goal of our exercise is not to revisit all of the proposed microfoundations for gradual adjustment of trade to trade cost shocks. Rather, we set up the simplest possible dynamic model, to illustrate the basic mechanics and quantify the parameters governing it.

Related Literature [Anderson and van Wincoop \(2004\)](#) and [Head and Mayer \(2015\)](#) review existing trade elasticity estimates. One common approach is to use tariff variation to estimate this elasticity (e.g. [Caliendo and Parro, 2015](#); [Head and Ries, 2001](#); [Romalis, 2007](#)). Other methods exploit differences in prices across locations ([Eaton and Kortum, 2002](#); [Simonovska and Waugh, 2014](#); [Giri, Yi, and Yilmazkuday, 2020](#)). Existing estimates do not attempt to address the reverse causality of tariffs with respect to trade flows, and do not distinguish different time horizons. An alternative is to estimate an elasticity of substitution structurally (e.g. [Feenstra, 1994](#); [Broda and Weinstein, 2006](#); [Feenstra et al., 2018](#); [Soderbery, 2015, 2018](#)). In some environments the substitution elasticity governs the trade elasticity, but in others it does not. Our empirical strategy is not confined to environments in which the trade elasticity coincides with the elasticity of substitution.

An important recent strand of the literature uses customs data to estimate firm-level elasticities of exports to tariffs, and aggregates firm-level responses to recover macro elasticities (see, among others, [Bas, Mayer, and Thoenig, 2017](#); [Fitzgerald and Haller, 2018](#); [Fontagné, Martin, and Orefice, 2018](#)). Often, similar to our strategy, the identifying variation comes from comparisons of MFN and non-MFN destinations. Our approach complements these firm-level analyses. The customs data have the clear advantage of the forensic precision with which different dimensions of firm-level responses to tariffs can be pinned down. On the other hand, this approach normally uses data for a limited set of countries (most often 1) and years, making it challenging to control for multilateral resistance terms and/or exploit time series variation in tariffs for identification.³

[Bown and Crowley \(2016\)](#) describe the empirical features of tariff policy in general, and the MFN system in particular. A feature of MFN tariffs important for our purposes is that countries negotiate upper bounds on MFN tariffs, and are then free to set actual MFN tariffs anywhere below those bounds. In the data, a significant fraction of MFN tariffs is actually below the bounds, and thus countries can vary them without violating their WTO commitments. There is a voluminous theo-

³An exception to the common finding of high long-run trade elasticities is [Sequeira \(2016\)](#), who estimates a virtually zero elasticity of trade flows to tariffs for the Mozambique-South Africa preferential trade agreement. The proposed explanation for this result is that high levels of corruption in Mozambique imply that firms rarely pay the tariffs in the first place. This mechanism is unlikely to account for the comparatively low elasticities we find in worldwide data.

retical and empirical literature on trade policy, both unilateral and within the framework of trade agreements, synthesized most recently in [Bagwell and Staiger \(2016\)](#). This literature emphasizes endogeneity of tariffs to a variety of factors, and thus calls for an effort to overcome that endogeneity in estimation.

A more recent literature has focused on the impact of the 2017-2019 US-China trade war. Closely related to our paper is [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2020\)](#), who use the trade war as a shock to simultaneously estimate demand and supply elasticities. Our approach in contrast isolates variation coming from the responses of third countries to incidents like the trade war. Our estimates are complementary in that we provide both short-run and steady-state estimates, which at the current moment is naturally impossible in the context of the trade war.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the econometric framework and the identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 the main results. Section 5 connects the estimates to theory. Section 6 concludes.

2 Estimation Framework

2.1 Definition

As the objective of this paper is to estimate elasticities of trade volumes to trade cost shocks at different time horizons, we start with a definition of a horizon-specific trade elasticity. Let i and j index countries, p products, and t time. Let $X_{i,j,p,t}$ be the exports of p from j to i , and $\phi_{i,j,p,t}$ the “iceberg” trade cost. Denote by Δ_h a time difference in a variable between periods $t - 1$ and $t + h$: $\Delta_h x_t \equiv x_{t+h} - x_{t-1}$.

Definition. The *horizon- h trade elasticity* ε^h is defined as

$$\varepsilon^h = \frac{\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t}}{\Delta_h \ln \phi_{i,j,p,t}}. \quad (2.1)$$

Note that the long-run trade elasticity is obtained as $h \rightarrow \infty$. It measures the permanent change in trade flows that accompanies a permanent change in trade costs.

2.2 Estimation

In practice, we will be using tariff variation to estimate ε^h . Let the total trade costs be multiplicative in ad valorem tariffs $\tau_{i,j,p,t}$ and non-tariff costs $\kappa_{i,j,p,t}$:

$$\phi_{i,j,p,t} = \kappa_{i,j,p,t} \cdot (1 + \tau_{i,j,p,t}).$$

Then $\varepsilon^h \approx \Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} / \Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p,t}$.

Consider a change in tariffs $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ between $t - 1$ and t . We estimate the following equation using local projections (Jordà, 2005):

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta_X^h \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + \delta_{i,j,p} + u_{i,j,p,t}^X, \quad (2.2)$$

where the δ 's are fixed effects.

The estimating equation (2.2) is deliberately reduced-form and not tied to a particular theory. We posit a fairly general estimating equation that can be viewed as time-differenced gravity, and our intention is to develop a set of estimates that can potentially serve as targets for multiple theories. Indeed, it is a common occurrence in both macro and trade that multiple microfoundations lead to the same estimating equation. For instance, many business cycle models have a VAR representation (Sims, 1980; Canova and Sala, 2009). In trade, the gravity relationship can be derived from Armington, Ricardian, and monopolistic competition models (Head and Mayer, 2015). We relate the econometric estimates to some particular theories in Section 5, and Appendix A derives equation (2.2) from a parsimonious dynamic trade model and illustrates that the fixed effects are those suggested by the theory.

The coefficient β_X^h in (2.2) captures the impact of a single-period change in tariffs from $t - 1$ to t on change in trade flows between $t - 1$ and $t + h$. If $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ was a one-time change in tariffs (that is, $\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p,t} = \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$), the coefficient β_X^h is an estimate of ε^h for each h . One potential problem with this interpretation is that in the data, tariffs themselves may change between t and $t + h$ following an initial shock $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$. If we do not take into account that the tariff changes might be staggered over time, we could either over- or under-estimate the trade elasticity. For instance, if a tariff reduction in the initial year tends to be followed by further tariff reductions, we would attribute a large change in trade flows to a small initial tariff change not taking into account subsequent, dependent, tariff decreases. The opposite would happen if tariffs were mean-reverting, such that initial reductions tend to be followed by increases.⁴ To account for this, we estimate a local projection of the h -period tariff change on the initial shock in tariffs:

$$\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p,t} = \beta_\tau^h \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + \delta_{i,j,p} + u_{i,j,p,t}^\tau, \quad (2.3)$$

where the impact effect of tariffs on tariffs is $\beta_\tau^0 = 1$ by definition.

The horizon h trade elasticity can then be recovered as $\varepsilon^h = \frac{\beta_X^h}{\beta_\tau^h}$. This estimation can be carried out at different horizons $h = 0, \dots, H$, to trace the full profile of ε^h over h . In practice we use a maximum

⁴This is a problem similar to that faced by the empirical fiscal multiplier literature.

horizon of $H = 10$, as discussed in Section 3.

2.3 Identification

Estimating (2.2) by OLS would be similar to the common approach in the literature that treats all tariff variation as exogenous, except that we would explicitly highlight differences in impacts across time horizons. In practice tariffs are set by governments which, in turn, are influenced by lobbyists, and subject to the WTO policy framework. There are three concerns with viewing applied tariff changes as exogenous. First, it is possible that a third factor drives both tariff changes and changes in trade flows. A newly elected government, for instance, could change not only tariffs but also other policies that affect import demand. In a similar spirit, business cycle fluctuations could induce governments to change tariffs (Bown and Crowley, 2013). Again, imports would change in part because of the tariff change, and in part due to the changes in economic conditions. Further, a taste shock for a product from a specific source country could trigger both larger imports of the product and lower tariffs on that product due to lobbying. Second, there could be reverse causality, whereby governments change tariffs because of observed or anticipated changes in trade patterns. Third, it could be that foreign governments influence a country's government to change tariffs, either through the WTO body, or through other channels.

An instrument for tariff changes is difficult to find, as tariff changes (and more broadly, changes in trade policy) are unlikely to ever be unanticipated or orthogonal to economic activity. We turn to the WTO's MFN tariff system to construct a plausibly exogenous instrument. All WTO member countries are bound by treaty to apply tariffs uniformly to all other WTO countries. Exceptions to this principle are countries that are in preferential trade agreements (PTA) such as NAFTA. Tariffs between countries in PTAs may be lower than the MFN tariff rate.

When a country changes its MFN rate on a product, it might do so due to concerns about imports from an important partner country, or lobbying by an important partner country. The baseline instrument uses the insight that third countries are also affected by this tariff change if they are MFN partners. From the point of view of these third countries, the tariff change is plausibly exogenous. The response of imports from these third countries can then identify the trade elasticity. Further, to eliminate concerns that trade flows at the country-product level might be trending over time, we use as a control group countries unaffected by the MFN tariff change because they are in a PTA.

Of course, while we provide some narrative examples of why MFN tariffs change in Section 2.4, it is not possible to pinpoint the rationale behind every product-level MFN tariff change. We presume that reverse causality concerns will mostly apply to large trading partners. Our identification strategy therefore treats MFN tariff changes as possibly endogenous to imports from large trading partners, and thus these trade flows are not part of the baseline treatment or control groups.

Our baseline instrument is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr} &= \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t} = \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \times \mathbf{1} \left(\tau_{i,j,p,t-1} = \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t-1 \text{ at product level} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ in aggregate} \right) \\ &\times \mathbf{1} \left(\text{not a major trading partner in } t \text{ at product level} \right) \\ &\times \left[\tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} - \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

These terms can be understood as follows. The first two indicators simply say that the applied MFN tariff is binding for the countries and product in question both in the initial $t-1$ and final period t . The next four indicators relate to whether or not the exporter is a major trading partner in $t-1$ or t , either in terms of aggregate trade, or in terms of trade in product p . At both the aggregate and the product levels, a trading partner is coded as major if it is in the top 10.⁵ Finally $\tau_{i,j,p,t}^{\text{applied MFN}} - \tau_{i,j,p,t-1}^{\text{applied MFN}}$ is simply the change in the tariff from $t-1$ to t . Note that this baseline instrument conditions on minor trading partners, which means that the major partners are excluded from the analysis: the value of $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr}$ is set to missing for these trade partners.

Then, we estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3) using $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr}$ as the instrument for the one year endogenous tariff change $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}$. Further, we can directly estimate the horizon h trade elasticity, using:

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \beta^h \Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p,t} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + \delta_{i,j,p} + u_{i,j,p,t} \quad (2.4)$$

instrumenting $\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,p,t}$ with $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t}^{instr}$. Note that this specification simply combines the two instrumented local projections (2.2)-(2.3) and directly identifies the trade elasticity at horizon h : $\hat{\beta}^h$ is an estimate of ε^h . Estimating (2.4) directly has the advantage that we can obtain standard errors for the elasticity estimates.

While our baseline estimates treat the trade elasticity as invariant across product categories, below we also estimate these specifications for broad product groups to obtain a distribution of β_p^h 's.

Discussion To succinctly state the source of the identifying variation: we compare the changes in imports from countries hit by a plausibly exogenous tariff change to the changes in imports from countries to whom those tariff changes did not apply. The “treatment” countries experienced tariff changes because they are part of the MFN system. The “control” countries did not experience the MFN tariff changes because they trade on different terms.

⁵We also carried out the analysis considering the top 5 partners as major. The results were very similar.

This “instrumented diff-in-diffs” setup sets a high bar for identification in the following sense. First, the instrument and our estimating equation are differenced, eliminating all time-invariant factors. Second, the estimating equations include importer-product-time and exporter-product-time fixed effects, as well as a time-invariant source-destination-product fixed effects. The former are the changes in multilateral resistance terms, that absorb time-varying importer- or exporter-product-specific supply or demand shocks, as well as broad tariff changes by a country across a number of products simultaneously. The source-destination-product fixed effects absorb trends in product-specific impacts of bilateral resistance forces like distance, addressing concerns about any gravity variables that survive time differencing. These fixed effects also soak up bilateral taste shocks for a product (in levels or trends), that could be correlated with tariffs applied on the product.⁶

The identification problem then arises entirely from time-varying, bilateral, non-tariff barriers $\Delta_h \ln \kappa_{i,j,p,t}$, or other time-varying, bilateral product-specific supply or demand shocks. The residual tariff changes may still be the result of deliberate actions aimed at a specific partner in a specific product. After eliminating the trade partners that are the likely targets of these tariffs, the instrument isolates plausibly exogenous variation in tariff changes. Finally, by only identifying the elasticity from the differential growth rate of the “treatment” group exports relative to a “control” group of countries in PTAs, we leverage the time-series dimension of the data. Relying on the time series variation also makes it straightforward to estimate how the trade response varies over different horizons.

Section 4.3 contains further discussion of threats to identification, alternative instruments, as well as extensive robustness checks.

2.4 Narrative Examples of MFN Tariff Changes

To understand why countries change MFN tariffs, we provide some institutional background and discuss some examples.⁷ When countries join the WTO, their accession treaty sets maximum MFN tariff rates (“bounds”) that they can apply to WTO member countries. These MFN bounds are country- and product- specific, and vary from very low rates for developed countries and large economies to much higher rates for developing countries. For instance, the average bound rate is 3.5% in the US, 10.0% in China, and 48.6% in India. The number of products covered by the bounds is also negotiated and varies by country. In many countries, including the US and China, 100% of products are covered by the bounds. By contrast, 74% of products are subject to MFN bounds in India, and 50% in Turkey. The bounds themselves vary substantially across products. In the US in 2015, about 40% of products had a bound of 0, while about one-tenth of products had bounds above

⁶We vary the level of the product for the fixed effects between HS4 and HS6 to balance the tradeoff between absorbing more confounding variation but leaving less variation for estimation.

⁷Further details can be found in [Bown and Crowley \(2016\)](#). We are grateful to Chad Bown for useful suggestions and examples.

10%. Once these MFN bounds are set, they rarely change, except in subsequent rounds of WTO negotiations. As such, changes in MFN bounds do not provide sufficient variation for an instrument.

In practice, actual applied MFN tariffs are frequently far below the bounds. Thus, countries can and do legally vary their applied tariffs below the bounds. Some motives are business-cycle related. For instance Turkey raised a number of MFN tariffs temporarily around its financial crisis. The tariffs were lowered again post-crisis. Similar patterns were observed in Argentina. Sometimes the rationale for changing the MFN rates is less clear – India raises and lowers tariffs on varied products year-to-year. Finally, MFN rates might also be changed while countries are engaged in a trade war. China lowered MFN rates on 1449 consumer goods and 1585 industrial products while raising tariffs on the US as part of the US-China trade war in 2018. As a result, China’s average tariffs on the US were 20.7% in late 2018, while those faced by other exporters to China were only 6.7%, on average. Since the US was the motivation for these MFN tariff changes, they are plausibly exogenous from the perspective of small exporters to China.⁸

This discussion makes clear the endogeneity of most tariff changes, and the rationale for the inclusion of a rich set of fixed effects (to remove business cycles and broad partner-specific variation). Further, the US-China trade war example illustrates the need to eliminate major partners from the instrument, in order to isolate the exogenous component of MFN tariff changes for third countries.

3 Data and Basic Patterns

Our trade dataset is the BACI version of UN-COMTRADE, covering years 1995-2018. The data contain information on the trade partners, years, and product codes at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation, as well as the value and quantity traded. We link these data to information on tariffs from the TRAINS dataset, also covering 1995-2018. This dataset includes information on the applied and the MFN tariffs. The applied tariffs can differ from MFN tariffs for country pairs that are part of a PTA. Unfortunately, for many countries comprehensive information on tariff rates is often not available before they join the WTO. The sample covers 183 economies and over 5,000 HS6 categories.

We drop observations for which trade is subject to non-ad valorem tariffs. For these tariffs (specific or compound) TRAINS reports ad-valorem equivalents. However, computation of these equivalents requires data on quantities, which are often noisy and could also endogenously respond to changes in tariffs. Since the large majority of MFN tariffs are ad valorem, the impact of dropping these observations for our sample size is small.⁹

The most detailed product classification available in the trade data is at the HS6 level. However,

⁸See the [blogpost](#) by Bown, Jung and Zhang in June 2019 for a discussion.

⁹Among the 148 WTO members in 2013, the median fraction of HS6 products covered by non-ad valorem (per-unit, or specific) tariffs is 0.01%, and the mean fraction is 1.76% ([World Trade Organization, 2014](#)).

we face the constraint that the data are provided in several different revisions of HS codes. Further, even within the same year, countries sometimes report trade flows in different vintages of HS codes.¹⁰ While some concordances of HS6 codes over time are available, we do not implement these fully as they necessitate splitting values of trade across product codes in different revisions or aggregating product codes. As we do not observe transaction-level trade, any such split will introduce composition effects into our tariff measures. In particular, we could have spurious tariff changes coming from averaging tariffs when product codes are combined over time. Instead, our definition of a product is an HS6 code of a specific revision, tracked over time. We link product codes across revisions *only* when there is a one-to-one mapping between the codes across revisions. This approach is conservative, but it does reduce the effective sample size – and hence widens the standard errors – for any very long run elasticity estimates, as over a longer horizon there will be fewer product codes that map uniquely across revisions. Hence, the maximum horizon over which we estimate the trade elasticity in the baseline analysis is ten years, which typically corresponds to only one change in HS revisions. Appendix Table A1 provides the fraction of codes that map uniquely across revisions. In a single revision transition, on average 89% of product codes have a unique mapping.¹¹ In a small number of instances, the meaning of HS4 codes changes across revision, which would mean that importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effect categories combine substantively different products across time periods. We manually identified those instances and eliminated them.¹²

While HS6 product lines are often the most detailed level at which applied tariffs vary, a few countries have tariffs that vary within HS6 product groups (for instance at the HS8 or HS9 level). We do not have trade flows at a more detailed level, so we assess the robustness of our results to excluding series where countries apply different MFN tariffs within an HS6 product group.

The values of trade flows reported in these data are not inclusive of tariffs. Thus, the elasticities estimated by our procedure are tariff-exclusive, and must be appropriately adjusted to obtain the elasticity relevant from the consumer’s perspective.¹³

Patterns in tariff changes Figure 1 plots the histograms of tariff changes. The left panels plot all data, while the right panels plot the data conditioning on observing a tariff change. While more than half the mass is below zero, tariff increases comprise a substantial share of tariff changes. The bottom two panels separate treatment (red) and control (green) groups. Both experience a range of tariff changes. Note that our identification strategy does not rely on the control group tariff

¹⁰As far as we are aware, there is no double counting of trade flows reported under different HS revisions.

¹¹Naturally, alternative specifications that include several lags of tariff changes require longer horizons than ten years, reducing the sample size and increasing the standard errors of the estimates.

¹²We have similarly implemented manual fixes for very few HS6 codes that also change substantively over revisions.

¹³Section 5 contains the complete discussion. As an example, if the underlying model is Armington, our long-run estimates would correspond to the elasticity in the CES aggregator $-\sigma$, while the trade elasticity inclusive of tariffs would be $1 - \sigma$.

changes being zero. Our specifications include importer-product-time fixed effects, which means that we are exploiting differential changes in MFN and non-MFN tariffs for identification. Below we check robustness by removing from the control group observations in which non-MFN tariffs change. Figure 2 plots the autocorrelation functions for tariffs. The impact change is normalized to 1. The 1-period negative autocorrelation is evident for the tariffs in our data. This pattern motivates the use of time-series methods that explicitly account for the fact that impact tariff changes are not fully permanent.


Examples of the treatment/control assignments Appendix Table A2 provides an illustration of how the instrument is implemented. As our instrument is defined at the product level, we illustrate it for a 4-digit HS code 6403, “Footwear; with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather.” For three large importers (the USA, Japan, and Germany) in 2006, we list partner countries that fall in each of the indicator categories in our instrument. We then list the source countries that are either in the treatment, control, or excluded groups for this product for these 3 large importers in 2006.

Columns 1-2 list the 10 largest MFN trading partners at $t - 1$ and t . Trading on MFN terms is the first criterion for being selected into the treatment group. (Of course, there are many more than 10 countries in this category). Columns 3-4 list the 10 major trade partners in aggregate. These countries are disqualified from the treatment group. Columns 5-6 list the 10 major trading partners in HS 6403 specifically. These are also disqualified from the treatment group. As expected, there is imperfect overlap between the set of major partners overall and in a specific HS code.


After these countries are dropped, columns 7-9 list the treatment, control, and excluded groups. As the table highlights, for the US NAFTA countries such as Canada and Mexico are important in the control group. The excluded group comprises large trading partners like Germany, China, and France, but also smaller economies such as Vietnam that are important exporters of footwear to the US. The treatment group includes smaller trading partners in footwear who trade at MFN rates, such as Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. While we do not incorporate explicit data on regional trade agreements, the instrument design appropriately assigns countries in customs unions or PTAs to control or excluded groups.¹⁴ For Germany, for instance, EU member countries do not appear in the treatment groups, and are only part of the control groups.

¹⁴The instrument might be improved if we could additionally incorporate information on PTAs. This would help in particular in assigning observations to the control group instead of the excluded group in some instances where the PTA rate is the same as the MFN rate and the country is a large trading partner. Currently, these observations have to be excluded. Unfortunately, while aggregate datasets on PTAs are available, these are typically not product-level. Many free trade agreements exclude certain products, and applying them to all products is problematic for our estimation. Assigning observations to the excluded group increases our standard errors but is the conservative option.


FIGURE 1: Patterns in Tariffs: Frequency of Changes




Unconditional



Unconditional, Excluding Zeros




Treatment and Control



Treatment and Control, Excluding Zeros

Notes: These figures display the frequency of tariff changes in our data. The top two panels display the unconditional frequency of all tariff changes (top left) and frequency excluding zeros (top right). The bottom panel displays the overlap in the frequency of changes in the treatment and control groups, including zero changes (left panel) and removing zero changes (right panel).

FIGURE 2: Patterns in Tariffs: Autocorrelation



Notes: This figure displays the unconditional autocorrelation of tariff changes for the sample.


Appendix B presents additional summary statistics about our sample, including information on the average share of imports by destination and the incidence of MFN and non-MFN trade in the data.

4 Results

We begin by estimating the impact effects of a one-time tariff change on h -periods ahead trade flows and tariffs, as in equations (2.2)-(2.3), using our instrumental variables approach. For the baseline estimation, the product disaggregation for the fixed effects is at the HS4-level. We also exclude major trading partners at the HS4-level in the baseline instrument. The left panel of Figure 3 reports the time path of tariff changes h periods after the initial 1-unit change. Thus, by construction the $h = 0$ coefficient is 1. The mean reversion in tariff levels is evident: following the initial impulse, only about 0.8% of the change remains after 5 years. At the same time, the figure indicates the existence of pre-trend. A tariff increase of one percent is preceded by a reduction of approximately 0.3 in the pre-period, reflecting the negative first order autocorrelation highlighted above. We control for this pre-trend by including a lagged pre-trend control in our baseline estimates. We include other lags in robustness checks.

The right panel of Figure 3 displays the estimates of the impact of an initial tariff change on trade flows. Trade flows have an elasticity to tariff changes of -0.15 on impact, converging to -1.05 to -1.15 in the long run. The figure also plots the local projections estimates for tariffs and trade with our baseline one-lag pretrend control. There is no evident pre-trend with or without pre-trend controls in the estimates for trade values, ruling out confounding anticipation effects that might survive the fixed-effects. Including the pretrend control modestly amplifies the point estimates of

FIGURE 3: Local Projections: Tariffs and Trade



Notes: This figure displays the results from estimating equations (2.2) and (2.3) – the local projection of tariff growth (left panel) and imports (right panel) on one period tariff growth instrumented at various horizons. We depict estimates with and without pre-trend controls. The bars display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair-product level.


the effect of the shock on trade values, though the difference is not significant. Columns 1 and 4 of Table A4 report the coefficient estimates and the standard errors for the tariff and trade local projections, respectively.

Figure 4 reports the baseline estimates of the trade elasticity ε^h across horizons. The impact ($h = 0$) elasticity is -0.26 . Our data are annual, and it is unlikely that all tariff changes go into effect on January 1. Thus, we do not focus attention on the impact elasticity as it can be low due to partial-year effects. The point estimate in the year following the tariff change is probably a better indicator of the short-run elasticity. At $h = 1$, the elasticity is around -0.76 . The 10-year elasticity is -2.12 . Over the first 7 years, the elasticity converges smoothly to the long-run value, and then is stable between years 7-10. The red line reports the OLS estimates. Notice that OLS – which uses all tariff variation – actually produces a significantly smaller trade elasticity than IV at all horizons > 0 , a fact we will return to in Section 4.2. The time pattern is roughly similar for OLS and IV.

4.1 Sectoral Heterogeneity

We next estimate the trade elasticities by sector. HS codes are organized into 21 sections that are consistent across countries. These sections describe broad categories of goods, such as “Live

FIGURE 4: Trade Elasticity: OLS vs IV



Notes: This figure displays the trade elasticity estimated using the baseline instrumented specification in (2.4) (blue), and the OLS estimates of the same equation (red). The equations are estimated with pre-trend controls. The bars display 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the bilateral country-pair-product level.


Animals, Animal Products” (Section 1). In practice, there is insufficient tariff variation in some of these sections to obtain precise estimates of the elasticity at all horizons. Thus, we combine a few of the sections together, leaving us with 11 sections. Table A3 describes the sections and lists the sections that are aggregated.

Figure 5 plots the point estimates of the trade elasticities over h for the 10 HS “Sections.” The long-run elasticities range from -0.5 to over -6 even in this coarse sectoral breakdown. In addition, the elasticities fan out over time. The range at $h = 1$ is from -0.5 to about -1.5 , much narrower than the long-run range. Table A5 presents the summary statistics for the trade elasticities at the 11-Section level, by horizon. The time path of the median elasticity is similar to the aggregate elasticity.

4.2 Relationship to Other Estimates

Our preferred IV estimates of the trade elasticity are -0.76 in the short run, rising to about -2 in the long run. These are substantially smaller than the conventional wisdom range of -5 to -10 (see for instance the review in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Interestingly, even our OLS estimates,

FIGURE 5: Trade Elasticity: Sectoral Heterogeneity



Notes: This figure displays the trade elasticity estimated for HS Sections using the baseline instrumented specification in (2.4). Some HS Sections are grouped into a single aggregate section “Sec agg” as described in the text.

which treat all tariff variation as exogenous as typical in the literature, are much smaller than the values commonly estimated in other studies. Table 1 investigates the source of these differences.

Panel A of the table estimates the elasticity using a log-levels OLS specification, assuming all tariff variation is exogenous. This specification, both without fixed effects and with the most commonly used fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance (importer-product-time and exporter-product-time), yields values between -3.7 and -6.7 , which are similar to previous estimates. We then add country-pair-product fixed effects to the same specification. The elasticity estimates fall sharply to about -1.04 with multilateral resistance terms (column 5), close to our baseline OLS estimates. Making the product dimension of the fixed effects finer in column 6 does not substantively change the estimates. The country-pair-product fixed effects soak up any confounders in the gravity equation that are country-pair-product specific (for instance, different, but constant, shipping costs between a pair of countries for steel and agricultural product groups). Clearly, including them is important for the estimation.

Panel B of the table then presents the results of a 5 year differenced OLS specification. The estimates fall sharply across all combinations of fixed effects, and are often below 1 in absolute terms. Differencing removes additional confounders, as discussed in Section 2.

Panel C then implements a specification in which the five-year differenced tariff change on the right-hand-side is instrumented by the actual one year tariff change at the start of the 5-year period. This is an intermediate step between running simple differenced OLS and our full instrumentation strategy. Here, the estimation is by 2SLS, but we do not claim it is an IV since we are using all initial-year tariff changes, rather than the exogenous subset. When our baseline fixed effects are included (Column 5), this amounts to the estimation of (2.4) by “OLS”, albeit without pretrend controls, for $h = 5$.

The rationale for using only the initial 1-year tariff change is that relying on high-frequency variation minimizes the impact of other confounding shocks that survive the fixed effects and are operative at the same time. In addition, using just the initial year tariff change to identify the coefficient implies that we are closer to picking up a 5-year impact of a tariff change, rather than the impact of tariff changes that occurred late in the 5-year period. This is an object closer to the 5-year elasticity. Again, across all versions of the fixed effects estimates are much smaller and close to or below 1 in absolute value. In our preferred specification in Column 5, which is the same as our OLS estimation of equation (2.4) without pretrend controls, the estimate is -0.448 .

Panels D and E implement two versions of our IV specification. Panel D has the conservative baseline instrument, excluding major trading partners, and Panel E has the IV including all trading partners with pure diff-in-diff identification. Relative to the OLS estimates in Panel C, both instruments

TABLE 1: Elasticity Estimates: Alternative Approaches

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Panel A: Log-levels, OLS</u>						
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.696*** (0.020)	-4.468*** (0.019)	-6.696*** (0.046)	-2.734*** (0.014)	-1.040*** (0.022)	-0.892*** (0.020)
R^2	0.013	0.341	0.383	0.530	0.571	0.837
Obs	107.09	107.07	106.24	105.73	104.91	98.45
<u>Panel B: 5-year log-differences, OLS</u>						
$\Delta_5\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.882*** (0.014)	-1.583*** (0.014)	-0.664*** (0.020)	-1.659*** (0.015)	-0.518*** (0.020)	-0.459*** (0.027)
R^2	0.002	0.066	0.180	0.150	0.263	0.504
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Panel C: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, tariffs instrumented by actual 1-year tariff change</u>						
$\Delta_5\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.337*** (0.018)	-0.968*** (0.019)	-0.470*** (0.028)	-1.019*** (0.020)	-0.448*** (0.030)	-0.406*** (0.037)
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Panel D: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, baseline instrument</u>						
$\Delta_5\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.259*** (0.052)	-2.206*** (0.061)	-1.170*** (0.113)	-2.000*** (0.067)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.381*** (0.194)
Obs	21.75	21.73	21.40	21.49	21.13	19.36
<u>Panel E: 5-year log-differences, 2SLS, all partners instrument</u>						
$\Delta_5\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.967*** (0.023)	-1.426*** (0.027)	-0.471*** (0.053)	-1.579*** (0.027)	-0.653*** (0.054)	-0.901*** (0.098)
Obs	38.54	38.52	38.15	38.21	37.82	35.57
<u>Fixed effects</u>						
importer x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
exporter x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
importer x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
exporter x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
importer x exporter x hs4	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
imp x hs6 x year, exp x hs6 x year, imp x exp x h6	no	no	no	no	no	yes

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the trade elasticity at a single horizon. The dependent variable is log of trade value, in levels (Panel A), or 5-year differences (Panels B-E). Panels C, D, and E differ in instruments used for the tariff change. Column 1 reports the results with no fixed effects. Column 2 adds importer-product and exporter-product fixed effects, column 3 interacts these fixed effects with years, column 4 includes country-pair-product fixed effects, column 5 includes our baseline fixed effects and column 6 uses the fixed effects in column 5 but defines the product at the HS6 level. Standard errors clustered by country-pair-product are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Numbers of observations are reported in millions. All first-stage F -statistics are greater than 10000. The differenced specifications do not have pretrend controls for comparability with the log-levels specification in Panel A.

push estimates back further away from 0. The conservative instrument increases estimates the most relative to OLS, as expected, but has larger standard errors. This instrument brings the estimates to -1.11 at the five year horizon in the specifications with the country-pair-product fixed effects and multilateral resistance fixed effects.

Appendix C provides two more tables that support these conclusions. Table A6 contrasts the traditional gravity specification in Panel A of Table 1 to the results from a balanced panel. While the conventional approach with the balanced panel delivers even higher elasticities (as high as 8-11), the insight that the importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effect decreases the estimate substantially remains the same in the balanced panel. Table A7 presents results for specifications in differences with alternative time horizons (3 or 7 years) as well as a balanced panel. When differencing, the importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effect in levels which is critical in the log-levels traditional gravity specification is removed. The estimates in differences decrease across all panels when the traditional multilateral resistance terms are interacted with years, which eliminates cyclical variation. The importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effect in differenced specifications (taking out trends in taste shocks) does not affect the results substantively.

4.3 Robustness

Pre-trends and anticipation effects Tariff decreases often follow a tariff increase (tariffs are autocorrelated), as shown above. Indeed, the left panel of Figure 3 reveals some evidence of a pre-trend in tariffs. We account for differential pre-trends in tariffs using the standard approach of controlling for lagged tariff and trade changes. Our baseline estimates use a single lag as a pretrend control. Columns 2-3 of Table 2 report results with no lags and 5 lags, respectively, to compare the results to the baseline in column 1. The substantive conclusions change little when adding or subtracting lags, although with more lags the sample size drops substantially and the standard errors increase. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 of Table A4 reports the results of local projections of tariffs and trade flows directly on the initial tariff change, as in (2.2)-(2.3), while allowing for 1, 0 and 5 lags. Once again, the point estimates change little when adding lags.

A distinct concern is anticipation effects. Even if pre-treatment tariffs are constant, countries might already adjust their exports in response to an expected future MFN tariff change by the importer. Note that for these anticipation effects to pose a problem for us, they would need to occur differentially in the treatment and control countries. It is unclear in our context that the control group would not exhibit anticipation effects. The PTA trading partner might also adjust its exports upwards in response to a future MFN tariff decrease against a large MFN partner, for instance.¹⁵

¹⁵If anything, differential anticipation effects would bias the trade elasticity estimates upwards. As an example, suppose a to-be treated country expects tariffs to increase in the future, and responds by exporting more today. Then, in the periods after the tariffs actually rise, trade falls, but from a higher level than without this type of anticipatory

TABLE 2: Trade Elasticity, Robustness: Pre-Trends, Alternative Clustering, Alternative Samples

	Baseline	Zero Lag	Five Lags	FE50	Two-way Clustering	Balanced Panel	Alternative Control Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)	-0.232** (0.094)	-0.262*** (0.096)	-0.592** (0.290)	-0.187** (0.077)
obs	31.66	41.46	14.58	17.62	31.66	5.04	27.33
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.628*** (0.081)	-0.129 (0.208)	-0.599*** (0.133)	-0.756*** (0.141)	-0.098 (0.380)	-0.490*** (0.117)
obs	26.18	32.85	12.52	15.19	26.18	5.04	22.63
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.926*** (0.105)	-0.625** (0.315)	-0.865*** (0.173)	-1.024*** (0.195)	-0.895** (0.472)	-0.743*** (0.160)
obs	20.8	26.16	9.76	12.48	20.8	5.04	17.86
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.146*** (0.429)	-1.012*** (0.215)	-1.237*** (0.253)	-0.916** (0.437)	-0.792*** (0.201)
obs	16.69	21.13	7.3	10.22	16.69	5.04	14.27
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-1.521*** (0.145)	-2.330*** (0.595)	-1.853*** (0.270)	-2.055*** (0.357)	-0.990** (0.489)	-1.383*** (0.251)
obs	13.22	16.95	5.25	8.2	13.22	5.04	11.12
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-1.463*** (0.194)	-2.550** (1.016)	-1.760*** (0.374)	-2.122*** (0.332)	-1.818*** (0.544)	-1.600*** (0.379)
obs	8.31	11.25	3.21	5.25	8.31	5.04	6.84

Notes: This table presents robustness exercises for the results from estimating equation (2.4). All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 vary the pretrend controls (including alternatively zero lags or five lags of import growth and tariff changes). Column 4 reports the results when the sample is restricted to fixed-effects clusters with a minimum of 50 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, except in Column 5 where they are additionally clustered by year. Column 6 restricts the sample to a balanced panel. Column 7 reports results where the control group only contains observations with zero tariff changes. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

We check for the presence of such anticipation effects by examining pre-trends in the trade volume equation estimates. Figure 3 shows no evidence of pre-trends in trade values even without controlling for tariff pre-trends.

Alternative controls, standard errors, and samples Column 4 of Table 2 restricts the estimation sample to fixed-effect groups that have at least 50 observations. Column 5 two-way clusters the standard errors by importer-exporter-HS4 and year. In both cases the estimates and their precision change little. Column 6 reports a balanced panel. While the point estimates are slightly lower, behavior. Thus, the recorded change in trade is larger, implying a higher estimated trade elasticity.

the standard errors widen substantially. Overall, the difference from the other specifications is not significant, in particular we cannot reject an elasticity at year 7-10 of -1.75 to -2 . This is reassuring as the balanced panel conditions on a sample that has positive trade flows in every year. This sample might have different characteristics than the full sample, but the point estimates suggest that sample selection is not a big concern. Finally column 7 reports the results from an estimation where we drop observations in the control group that experience tariff changes. The estimates are similar to the baseline in the short run, and somewhat lower in the long run, albeit insignificantly so.

Alternative instruments, outcome variables, and fixed effects The baseline instrument excludes large trading partners from both treatment and the control groups. Column 2 of Table 3 reports the results when admitting these countries into the treatment group. In this case the instrument is simply the change in the MFN tariff rate for all countries subject to the MFN tariff rate. The point estimates fall to about -0.9 for the long-run elasticity. Columns 3 and 4 report results for quantities and unit values, respectively. It turns out that the impact in the long run is mostly on quantities. The response of unit values is noisy and in general insignificant. For interpreting the unit values coefficients, it is important to keep in mind that these are unit values exclusive of tariffs. Thus, a zero estimated coefficients on unit values indicates complete pass-through of tariff changes to the buyers in the importing country. Section 5.2 returns to the implications of these quantity and unit value estimates.

Extensive margin Our baseline specifications use log differences and our data are at the country-pair product level. Thus, our sample consists of instances where country-pair product flows are positive in both the initial and end periods. Models of firm dynamics emphasize exit and entry of firms into export markets (see, e.g. Ruhl, 2008; Alessandria and Choi, 2014; Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014; Ruhl and Willis, 2017).¹⁶ Firm-level extensive margin that occurs in country-pair-product markets with already positive trade is reflected in our baseline elasticity estimates. However, our baseline estimation ignores the possibility that tariff changes lead to (dis)appearance of trade flows at the country-pair-product level.

To implement the specifications that include the extensive margin, we use the differenced inverse hyperbolic sine transformation instead of log differences for trade flows as suggested by Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988). This transformation allows us to include zero or missing trade flows, while approximating logs for larger values of the data.¹⁷

¹⁶As highlighted by Ruhl (2008), among others, the long-run elasticity may be even higher when the extensive margin is taken into account.

¹⁷Tariff data are typically not missing and we can always construct $\ln(1 + \tau_{i,j,p,t})$, so we do not need the inverse hyperbolic transformation for tariffs. Bellemare and Wichman (2020) highlight that caution must be used in interpreting the estimated coefficient as an elasticity, but in our case the estimated β^h can be interpreted as an elasticity. The estimated coefficient converges to an elasticity as the underlying variable being transformed (trade values in our case) takes on large enough values on average. This is the case in the trade data.

We stress that including zero observations in the sample need not increase the trade elasticity point estimates. How the point estimates change relative to the baseline depends on the relative importance of observations where trade switches from zero to positive, compared to observations where trade goes from zero to zero. If a tariff falls and many zero trade observations turn positive, the elasticity will be pushed up. However, if following a tariff reduction many zero observations stay at zero, the elasticity estimate will be pushed down, since that observation records no change in trade that accompanies a fall in tariffs.

As a result, elasticity estimates that incorporate the extensive margin are quite sensitive to *which* zeros are added to the sample. We report two sets of estimates. In the first, we include all available zero trade observations for exporter-section to any importer in instances where there is some exports ever observed.¹⁸ In the second, we only include observations where trade goes from zero to positive, or from positive to zero. This approach gives the extensive margin maximum chance to increase the absolute values of elasticity estimates, in the sense that it only admits observations in which extensive margin change actually occurs. This sample restriction corresponds more closely to quantitative models and firm-level analyses where the extensive margin is active. However, it should be interpreted as an upper bound on the sensitivity of trade flows to tariffs as it effectively selects the sample based on outcomes. All extensive margin estimates do not include pretrend controls. This is because lagged trade flow changes is one of the pre-trend controls, and we found that in a sample with trade zeros, lagged trade explained too much of current trade, so that there was no role for tariff changes. Therefore the results in this exercise must be compared to the baseline estimates without pretrend controls (Column 2 of Table 2).

The resulting estimates in column 5 and 6 of Table 3 can be interpreted as the “total” elasticity, inclusive of both the intensive and product-level extensive margins. When including “more” zeros (Column 5), the point estimates are similar to the baseline initially, smaller in the long run. We conjecture that this is because the estimation sample now includes many instances of trade being zero at both $t - 1$ and $t + h$. Since these appear as zero changes in the sample, they drive down the point estimate. Column 6 reports the extensive margin response when we only include zeros in instances where trade goes from zero to positive, or from positive to zero. As expected, the 10 year elasticity including the extensive margin is slightly higher (-1.64) than the corresponding intensive margin instrumented specification without pretrend controls (-1.46).

¹⁸That is, if country A ever exports any product in section Z to importer B in any year, all the zero exports of products belonging to section Z from A to B in every year are added to the sample. This leaves out of the estimation sample export flows between pairs of countries in broad sectors that never occurred, and thus are unlikely to respond to tariff changes. A more extreme approach is to just include all the possible zeros. Predictably, this leads to even lower elasticity point estimates, as it increases the share of the sample in which trade flows go from zero to zero.

Additional results, diagnostics, and robustness Column 7 of Table 3 estimates a distributed-lag model as an alternative to the local projection specification. This approach has two disadvantages relative to the baseline: (i) it requires a panel of non-missing log growth rates for trade, tariffs, and the instrument for every lag, reducing the estimation sample greatly even relative to the balanced panel exercise; and (ii) it imposes linearity on the estimates. Caveats aside, the distributed lag specification with 10 lags yields a long-run trade elasticity of 3.17 with a standard error of 1.25, while the number of observations falls to just around 6.08 million. This point estimate is statistically indistinguishable from our baseline estimates.¹⁹ Finally, the last column of Table 3 estimates the elasticity on a sample where tariffs do not vary within an importer-HS6. Again, the results are very similar to the baseline at all horizons.

Appendix C presents the results for all the specifications at every horizon. This appendix also reports the first stage F -statistics for the baseline instrument and the all partners instrument for every horizon. In all cases, the first stage F -statistics are much higher than 10.

Other candidates for instruments One downside of our instrument is that we cannot be certain which partner countries primarily motivated each MFN tariff change. Without specific knowledge of the reasons behind each MFN tariff change, our instrument will always be subject to this concern. There are other candidate instruments that could in principle be considered under the WTO framework. Here, we discuss these potential instruments and issues with each of them.

A natural candidate instrument is WTO accession. When a country such as China joins the WTO, the negotiations are protracted, and there are substantial anticipation effects (see for instance [Pierce and Schott, 2016](#)). However, once China joins the WTO and sets its MFN tariffs, small third countries in the WTO are also affected by these MFN tariffs. These countries are plausibly facing an exogenous change, conditional on the anticipation effects, as they were likely not key players in the negotiations. While there are a few WTO accessions in our data, a key problem with implementing this instrument is that product-level tariff data are typically not available in standard datasets for countries *before* they join the WTO. It is therefore not possible to construct the exogenous tariff change (the change from the pre-WTO rate to the MFN rate).²⁰

¹⁹Formally, we estimate the equation $\Delta_0 \ln X_{i,j,p,t} = \sum_{k=0}^{10} \gamma^k \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t-k} + \delta_{i,p,t} + \delta_{j,p,t} + \delta_{i,j,p} + u_{i,j,p,t}$ instrumenting $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t-k}$, $k \in [0, 10]$ with $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,p,t-k}^{instr}$, $k \in [0, 10]$. The trade elasticity at horizon h reported in Table 3 is then $\sum_{k=0}^h \gamma^k$. As this estimation requires 11 instruments for 11 endogenous variables, we report the Sanderson-Windmeijer F -statistic for weak instruments in Appendix Table A10. Conceptually, there is a subtle difference between the object estimated by local projections and the distributed lag approach. Whereas the local projections take into account the time series behavior of the tariff variable, the distributed lag coefficients cumulated up to horizon h are estimates of the response of trade to a permanent once-and-for-all change in tariffs that happened at horizon 0. Section 5 lays out the details. In the notation of that section, the sum of the distributed lag coefficients $\sum_{k=0}^h \gamma^k$ corresponds to θ^h , whereas the local projection model estimates e^h . We show that in practice e^h is close to θ^h .

²⁰We have contacted the national statistical agencies of countries that joined the WTO in our sample. Most agencies do not have these data.

TABLE 3: Trade Elasticity, Robustness: Alternative Instruments, Outcomes, Fixed Effects, Samples and Models

	Baseline (1)	All Partners (2)	Quantities (3)	Unit Values (4)	Extensive (5)	Extensive Sel (6)	DL (7)	SD1 (8)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.275*** (0.030)	-0.179* (0.093)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.082 (0.063)	-0.413 (0.338)	-0.313*** (0.096)
obs	31.66	57.14	31.66	31.66	131.03	56.35	6.08	28.7
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.624*** (0.047)	-0.664*** (0.136)	-0.027 (0.080)	-0.484*** (0.063)	-0.805*** (0.089)	-0.523 (0.466)	-0.889*** (0.142)
obs	26.18	47.19	26.18	26.18	108.13	49.11	6.08	23.76
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.648*** (0.061)	-0.810*** (0.184)	-0.134 (0.104)	-0.590*** (0.084)	-0.955*** (0.107)	-1.578** (0.685)	-1.228*** (0.200)
obs	20.8	38.16	20.8	20.8	87.22	41.5	6.08	18.86
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-0.718*** (0.073)	-1.422*** (0.232)	0.291** (0.128)	-0.730*** (0.100)	-1.183*** (0.122)	-2.097** (0.861)	-1.180*** (0.253)
obs	16.69	30.89	16.69	16.69	69.73	34.61	6.08	15.12
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-0.940*** (0.091)	-2.166*** (0.292)	0.162 (0.161)	-0.902*** (0.114)	-1.496*** (0.138)	-2.710*** (1.016)	-1.990*** (0.318)
obs	13.22	24.64	13.22	13.22	55.24	28.4	6.08	11.96
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-0.866*** (0.122)	-1.765*** (0.406)	-0.078 (0.221)	-0.941*** (0.153)	-1.638*** (0.181)	-3.166** (1.252)	-2.360*** (0.444)
obs	8.31	15.92	8.31	8.31	35.09	19.24	6.08	7.52

Notes: This table presents alternative estimates for the results from estimating equation (2.4), varying the instrument or outcome variable. Column 2 uses an alternative definition of the instrument where all trade partners subject to the MFN regime are included. Column 3 reports results for quantities, and Column 4 the results for unit values. Column 5 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and all zero trade observations for importer-exporter-section pair with ever positive trade. Column 6 presents results including the extensive margin using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows, and only zero trade observations when trade switches from zero to positive, or vice versa. Column 7 presents results from a distributed lag model. Column 8 reports the results based on a sample where tariffs do not vary within an importer-HS6. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

A second instrument would be a change in the MFN bound, which is the maximum tariff a country in the WTO can apply against other countries. While these are likely less discretionary, the MFN bounds are set in the WTO accession treaty and very hard to change ex-post. The lack of instances of changes in the bounds implies there is insufficient variation in this instrument to estimate the elasticity.

Measurement error A common concern with differenced specifications is that they can exacerbate measurement error.²¹ While our baseline specifications are differenced, we note that the right-hand-side variable is a change in tariffs, which are data that are extremely unlikely to suffer from measurement error. This eliminates concerns that measurement error is biasing our estimates.

5 Applications and Relationship to Theory

We stress that equations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) are “model free,” and under our identification assumptions will produce estimates of ε^h by definition. The mapping between these estimates and parameters in theoretical models then depends on model structure. This section has two parts. The first maps our estimates to the long-run elasticity applicable in static trade models, and performs welfare gains from trade calculations. The second develops a simple dynamic framework of sluggish adjustment to trade cost shocks, and explores what the time path of our estimates implies for the parameters governing adjustment.

5.1 The Long-Run Trade Elasticity and Welfare

This section presents a mapping from the estimated ε^h to the long-run (steady state) trade elasticity, the key parameter in static international trade models. We clarify two points. First, the estimation of ε^h takes into account the time series behavior of tariffs as well as trade flows. If in the data tariffs exhibit any autocorrelation behavior after the initial impulse, the estimated ε^h will reflect the dynamic behavior of both trade flows and tariffs. Thus, the ε^h itself does not answer the question of what happens following a one-time permanent change in trade costs. However, we can use the components of ε^h to recover the steady-state elasticity that applies in static (long-run) models. Second, how the long-run estimated elasticity relates to structural model parameters depends on whether the trade data used in estimation include tariff payments.

²¹As differencing two white noise processes doubles the variance of the resultant process.

Dynamic and static gravity We suppress the product dimension in the exposition to economize on notation. Let the trade flows follow the gravity relationship:

$$X_{i,j,t} \propto \prod_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi_{i,j,t-k}^{\theta_k} \cdot S_{i,t} \cdot D_{j,t} \quad (5.1)$$

where $S_{i,t}$ and $D_{j,t}$ are the multilateral resistance terms, that vary by importer and exporter respectively, but not country pair. The non-standard feature of (5.1) is that time- t trade flows are allowed to depend on past values of iceberg trade costs $\phi_{i,j,t-k}$ with a horizon-dependent elasticity θ_k . This would be the case if, for example, adjustment of trade is sluggish, and conditions in the past affect the trading relationships that exist in the present. Of course, this specification nests the traditional contemporaneous gravity equation, which obtains when $\theta_k = 0 \forall k > 0$. The assumption of dependence of current trade on past trade costs is falsifiable, and our empirical work can be viewed as an econometric test of this assumption.

One can view the static gravity relationship as a steady-state version of (5.1). Suppose that all the $\phi_{i,j,t}$'s and multilateral resistance terms are constant over time. In steady state:

$$X_{i,j} \propto \phi_{i,j}^{\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k} \cdot S_i \cdot D_j, \quad (5.2)$$

which is the textbook gravity relationship. Equation (5.2) shows that the object of interest for static international trade models is the long-run trade elasticity $\theta \equiv \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k$. We assume that the structure of θ_k 's is such that the long-run trade elasticity is finite. This would be the case, for instance, if $\theta_k = 0 \forall k > K < \infty$.

Mapping back to empirical estimates Plugging in the form of iceberg trade costs into (5.1) and taking logs:

$$\ln X_{i,j,t} \propto \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_k \ln \kappa_{i,j,t-k} + \theta_k \tau_{i,j,t-k}) + \ln S_{i,t} + \ln D_{j,t}.$$

The impact of a single-period change in tariffs at t on trade at $t+k$ is:

$$\frac{\partial \ln X_{i,j,t+k}}{\partial \tau_{i,j,t}} \approx \theta_k.$$

However, in the data tariff changes are persistent. The impact of a one-time permanent change in tariffs that occurs between $t-1$ and t on trade at $t+h$ is

$$\frac{\partial \ln X_{i,j,t+h}}{\partial \tau_{i,j,t}} = \sum_{k=0}^h \theta_k \equiv \theta^h. \quad (5.3)$$

Note the switch from a subscript on θ_k to a superscript on θ^h , to denote the cumulative nature of the latter. As $h \rightarrow \infty$, $\theta^h \rightarrow \theta$, the long-run trade elasticity. As a practical matter, we can only estimate parameters up to the horizon $h = 10$ years, and will by necessity treat the 10-year estimates as reflecting the long run. The time series behavior of point estimates suggests that this may be a fair approximation.

We now turn to the question of how to recover θ^h from our estimates. The h -year difference in trade flows is:

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,t} \approx \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta_k \Delta_h \tau_{i,j,t-k} + \Delta_h \ln S_{i,t} + \Delta_h \ln D_{j,t} + u_{i,j,t}, \quad (5.4)$$

where the error term corresponds to the change in non-tariff bilateral trade costs, $u_{i,j,t} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \Delta_h \theta_k \ln \kappa_{i,j,t-k}$.

If there was a permanent shock $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,t}$ to tariffs at a specific calendar t , then the h -period change is simply equal to the initial change: $\Delta_h \tau_{i,j,t} = \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,t}$. In that case it is easy to verify from the definition (2.1) that $\varepsilon^h = \theta^h$, and it could just be estimated by regressing $\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,t}$ on that tariff change for each h , which corresponds exactly to equation (2.2).

However, the tariff changes may be autocorrelated, and so a time- t innovation $\Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,t}$ may be followed by further changes later. Equation (2.3) flexibly captures the autocorrelation in tariffs by relating the h -period change back to the initial impulse. Indeed, Figure 3 reports the estimates of this equation and shows a moderate degree of mean-reversion in tariffs. Combining (2.3) and (5.4), the h -period change in trade flows has the following relationship to a time- t impulse in tariffs (dropping κ 's, S 's and D 's):

$$\Delta_h \ln X_{i,j,t} \propto \left(\theta_0 \beta_\tau^h + \theta_1 \beta_\tau^{h-1} + \theta_2 \beta_\tau^{h-2} + \theta_3 \beta_\tau^{h-3} + \dots + \theta_h \right) \Delta_0 \tau_{i,j,t}.$$

Intuitively, the h -period-ahead response of trade flows to a one-unit initial change in tariffs is a combination of the elasticities of trade changes to lagged trade costs θ_k and the best predictions of what tariffs themselves will be k periods ahead following a time- t innovation in tariffs, β_τ^k . Combining this relationship with (2.2), we can recover the elasticities to permanent trade cost changes θ^h from our estimates of trade elasticities ε^h and the time series behavior of tariffs themselves β_τ^h :

$$\varepsilon^h = \theta^h + \theta_1 \frac{\beta_\tau^{h-1} - \beta_\tau^h}{\beta_\tau^h} + \theta_2 \frac{\beta_\tau^{h-2} - \beta_\tau^h}{\beta_\tau^h} + \theta_3 \frac{\beta_\tau^{h-3} - \beta_\tau^h}{\beta_\tau^h} + \dots + \theta_h \frac{1 - \beta_\tau^h}{\beta_\tau^h}. \quad (5.5)$$

Thus, the elasticity to the permanent shock θ^h is a transformation of the ε^h and the β_τ^h estimates reported above. Since this expression holds also for $h = 0$, (5.5) can be used to recover each θ^h recursively. Once we have done that, we will treat the 10-year horizon θ^{10} as an estimate of the long-run elasticity θ .

Trade flows net and gross of tariffs The second important aspect of the interpretation of our coefficient estimates is whether the elasticity is defined with respect to spending inclusive or exclusive of tariffs. Most theoretical gravity relationships relate spending by domestic agents to trade costs, with the trade elasticity defined correspondingly. On the other hand, the data on our outcome variable $X_{i,j,t}$ does not include tariff payments.

To see the consequences of this disparity, denote by $\tilde{X}_{i,j}$ the steady state spending by consumers in economy i on goods from j , and by $\tilde{\theta}$ the elasticity of this consumer spending to trade costs:

$$\tilde{X}_{i,j} \propto \phi_{i,j}^{\tilde{\theta}} \cdot S_i \cdot D_j. \quad (5.6)$$

The elasticity $\tilde{\theta}$ is relevant for the welfare gains from trade calculations, for example. Since $\tilde{X}_{i,j} = (1 + \tau_{i,j})X_{i,j}$ and $\phi_{i,j} = \kappa_{i,j} \cdot (1 + \tau_{i,j})$, we can rewrite (5.6) in terms of trade flows exclusive of tariff payments $X_{i,j}$, which are reported in our data:²²

$$X_{i,j} \propto \kappa_{i,j}^{\tilde{\theta}} (1 + \tau_{i,j})^{\tilde{\theta}-1} \cdot S_i \cdot D_j. \quad (5.7)$$

Comparing (5.7) to (5.2), the two elasticities have the following relationship: $\tilde{\theta} = \theta + 1$. As an example, in an Armington setting $\tilde{\theta}$ corresponds to $1 - \sigma$, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods coming from different origins. In that case, $\theta = -\sigma$. In an Eaton-Kortum setting, $\tilde{\theta}$ is the Frechet dispersion parameter. In that case, it can be recovered by adding 1 to our θ estimates.


Welfare gains from trade As is well known from [Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare \(2012\)](#), the gains from trade relative to autarky in many quantitative trade models can be expressed as a function of the trade elasticity and the domestic absorption share: $1 - \lambda_{jj}^{1/\tilde{\theta}}$, with λ_{jj} the share of spending on domestically-produced goods in total spending. As detailed above, we can obtain $\tilde{\theta}$ from our estimates by first computing θ^h from the ε^h and β_τ^h 's as in (5.5). This calculation gives us $\theta^{10} = -1.589$. Treating this as our best estimate of the long-run tariff-exclusive trade elasticity θ , we conclude that the welfare-relevant elasticity $\tilde{\theta}$ is -0.942 .

Figure 6 displays the gains from trade as a function of λ_{jj} , under our value of $\tilde{\theta}$ and under an elasticity of -5 considered by [Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare \(2012\)](#). As expected, the gains from trade are substantially larger with our elasticity. For the US, gains from trade are 5.61% for $\tilde{\theta} = -0.942$, compared to 1.0% for $\tilde{\theta} = -5$. The median welfare gain is 24.5% in the sample 64 countries, compared to 4.2% implied by $\tilde{\theta} = -5$.²³ Table A11 reports the gains from trade under

²²This calculation assumes that $X_{i,j}$ is recorded as c.i.f. The relationship between $\tilde{\theta}$ and θ is the same if $X_{i,j}$ is f.o.b., since the iceberg costs $\kappa_{i,j}$ are log-additive and make up the error term in our estimation.

²³We use data from the OECD IO tables for 64 countries for the year 2006, the midpoint of our trade and tariff sample. We compute import penetration by dividing imports by gross output as in [Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare \(2012\)](#).

FIGURE 6: Gains from Trade



Notes: This figure displays the gains from trade as a function of the domestic absorption ratio λ_{jj} under our baseline welfare-relevant elasticity of -0.942 (red dashed line) and a comparison elasticity of -5 (solid blue line). “World Median” denotes the median domestic absorption ratio of the 64 countries in the OECD world input-output tables in 2006.

$\tilde{\theta} = -0.942, -5, \text{ and } -10$ for selected countries in the sample.

5.2 Dynamics of Trade Elasticities

We next present a simple model that is qualitatively consistent with our estimated elasticities over different horizons. The recent literature on trade dynamics is rich in both substantive mechanisms and quantification (see, among many others, [Costantini and Melitz, 2007](#); [Ruhl, 2008](#); [Burstein and Melitz, 2013](#); [Drozd and Nosal, 2012](#); [Alessandria and Choi, 2014](#); [Alessandria, Choi, and Ruhl, 2014](#); [Ruhl and Willis, 2017](#); [Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi, 2017](#)). The goal of this section is not to revisit all of the proposed mechanisms for gradual adjustment of trade to trade cost shocks. Rather, we set up the simplest possible model of sluggish adjustment, to illustrate the basic mechanics and quantify the parameters governing it. The model is a dynamic extension of the [Arkolakis \(2010\)](#) market penetration framework, where the number of customers of a firm adjusts gradually and plays the role similar to the firm’s capital stock. The key difference to the capital stock is that the number of customers is specific to a foreign market.

Firm's problem Consider a representative firm with a constant marginal cost c , selling its good domestically and abroad. The firm's problem is separable by market, and thus without loss of generality we only model exports to a single foreign country. Since there is only one source and one destination, we drop the i, j subscripts to economize on notation. As in [Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo \(2003\)](#) and others, sales in a foreign country require local distribution services, that are combined in fixed proportions with the exported good.

The foreign consumer pays the price

$$p_t^c = p_t^x (1 + \tau_t) + d,$$

where p_t^x denotes the exporter's *FOB* price, τ_t the ad-valorem tariff, and d the per unit cost of local distribution services.

The firm commands monopoly power, and foreign demand exhibits a constant elasticity σ . Normalizing the aggregate foreign demand shifters to unity, the firm faces the demand curve

$$q_t = n_t (p_t^c)^{-\sigma},$$

where n_t is the mass of foreign consumers the firm reaches. The firm's optimal price is

$$p_t^x = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} c + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \frac{d}{1 + \tau_t}. \quad (5.8)$$

The price received by the producer is decreasing in tariffs, because higher tariffs increase the costs of foregone sales at the margin. This feature of the model is consistent with the unit value response documented in [Table 3](#), and implies that the tariff passthrough to the consumer is incomplete. The exporter price is also greater than the price in the absence of distribution costs, because the monopolist does not internalize foregone sales by the distribution sector. The firm's flow profits from exporting are $n_t \pi(\tau_t)$, where $\pi(\cdot)$ is a decreasing function in tariffs.

As in [Arkolakis \(2010\)](#), the firm incurs costs to reach foreign consumers. The mass of foreign consumers available for the firm to sell to evolves according to the accumulation equation

$$n_{t+1} = n_t (1 - \delta) + a_t, \quad (5.9)$$

where a_t is the mass of newly added customers in the foreign country. We assume that adding a new customers requires a payment of $f(a)$, where $f' > 0$ and $f'' > 0$, and that the existing mass of consumers already reached by the firm depreciates at rate δ .

The firm discounts at interest rate r , correctly predicts the future path of tariffs, and maximizes the

present discounted value of future profits

$$\max_{\{a_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t [n_t \pi(\tau_t) - f(a_t)]$$

subject to the accumulation equation (5.9).

Letting λ_t be the multiplier on the accumulation equation, the firm's first-order conditions are

$$f'(a_t) = \lambda_t, \quad (5.10)$$

$$\lambda_t = \frac{1}{1+r} [\pi(\tau_{t+1}) + (1-\delta)\lambda_{t+1}].$$

The firm chooses its investment into accumulating new consumers such that the marginal benefit λ_t equals the marginal cost $f'(a_t)$. The shadow value λ_t , in turn, is the present discounted value of profits generated by each consumer reached in the foreign market.

Exports, as measured in the data, are $X_t = p_t^x q_t$. The framework is sufficiently simple to analytically characterize the trade elasticity for different time horizons and alternative assumptions on the evolution of tariffs.

The short-run trade elasticity The accumulation equation above assumes that investment into new customers is subject to a 1-period “time-to-build” common in the real business cycle literature since [Kydland and Prescott \(1982\)](#). This implies that the number of customers reachable in the foreign destination, n_t , is constant within the impact period. We thus think of the short-run trade elasticity as the trade elasticity for constant n_t :

$$\theta_{sr} := \left. \frac{d \ln X_t}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} \right|_{n_t=n} = \underbrace{-\frac{1}{\sigma-1} \frac{s_d}{1-s_d}}_{\frac{d \ln p_t^x}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} \text{ (producer price response)}} \underbrace{-\sigma \cdot (1-s_d) \left[1 - \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \frac{s_d}{1-s_d} \right]}_{\frac{d \ln p_t^c}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} \text{ (pass-through into consumer prices)}} \underbrace{\frac{d \ln q_t}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} \Big|_{n_t=n}}_{\text{(short-run quantity response)}} \quad (5.11)$$

where $s_d \equiv \frac{d}{p_t^x(1+\tau_t)+d}$ is the share of local distribution costs in the consumption price.

Both prices and quantities respond to the tariff change. An increase in tariffs reduces the price producers charge (see 5.8), with elasticity $\frac{d \ln p_t^x}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} = -\frac{1}{\sigma-1} \frac{s_d}{1-s_d}$. The (imperfect) passthrough rate into tariff-inclusive prices is thus $1 + \frac{d \ln p_t^x}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} = 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \frac{s_d}{1-s_d}$. Since consumer prices include distribution costs, passthrough into consumer prices is further muted, $\frac{d \ln p_t^c}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} = (1-s_d) \left(1 + \frac{d \ln p_t^x}{d \ln(1+\tau_t)} \right)$. The quantity response to a tariff change is then multiplied by the demand elasticity σ .

The long-run trade elasticity In addition to the short-run changes discussed above, the firm's customer base n_t adjusts in the long run. We think of the long-run trade elasticity as the response of trade in steady state to a change in steady state tariffs. Dropping time subscripts to denote steady state values, the long-run elasticity is:

$$\theta_{lr} := \frac{d \ln X}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} = \theta_{sr} + \underbrace{-\sigma (1 - s_d) \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1}}_{\frac{d \ln n}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} \text{ (response of customer base)}}, \quad (5.12)$$

and thus adds the customer base response to the short-run elasticity. The customer base responds to the tariff change with the same elasticity as investment into new consumers ($\frac{d \ln n}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} = \frac{d \ln a}{d \ln (1 + \tau)}$). Investment into new consumers, in turn, is determined by the curvature of market penetration costs $f(a)$, and the shadow value λ (see equation 5.10). Since the shadow value is determined by the effect of tariffs on per-customer flow profits π , we have $\frac{d \ln a}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} = \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} \frac{d \ln \lambda}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} = \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} \frac{d \ln \pi}{d \ln (1 + \tau)}$. The elasticity of per-customer flow profits to tariffs is $\frac{d \ln \pi}{d \ln (1 + \tau)} = -\sigma (1 - s_d)$. Putting these pieces together delivers (5.12).

Transitional dynamics Consider a tariff change at time t_0 and its effect on exports at time $t_0 + h$. Before t_0 , the dynamic system is assumed to be in steady state. For the dynamic response of trade flows to tariffs, both the history of tariffs between t_0 and $t_0 + h$ and expectations about tariffs beyond horizon $t_0 + h$ matter. More precisely, for an arbitrary sequence of tariff changes relative to the steady state $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0})$, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+1})$, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+2})$, ..., the effect on exports at time $t_0 + h$ is

$$d \ln X_{t_0+h} = -\frac{\sigma (\delta + r) (1 - s_d)}{1 + r} \delta \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} \sum_{\ell=0}^{h-1} (1 - \delta)^{h-(\ell+1)} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{1 + r} \right)^k d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+\ell+k+1}) + \theta_{sr} d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+h}).$$

Since this expression is complicated, we next consider two simpler examples, both reasonably good descriptions of the observed tariff changes in our data.

Example 1: tariff constant after 1 period First, consider a surprise change in the tariff sequence of the form $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0})$, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+1}) = d \ln (1 + \tau_{>t_0})$, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+2}) = d \ln (1 + \tau_{>t_0})$, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+3}) = d \ln (1 + \tau_{>t_0})$, ..., all expressed relative to the initial steady state. That is, the tariff change takes one particular value, $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0})$, in the impact period, and is subsequently constant at $d \ln (1 + \tau_{>t_0})$. Note that this example nests a one-off permanent change in tariffs ($\tau_{t_0} = \tau_{>t_0}$), and is a good approximation of our estimated impulse response function in Figure 3.

The trade elasticity is θ_{sr} in the impact period. At horizon $h \geq 1$ the trade elasticity is

$$\frac{d \ln X_{t_0+h}}{d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+h})} = \frac{d \ln X_{t_0+h}}{d \ln (1 + \tau_{>t_0})} = \theta_{sr} - \sigma (1 - s_d) \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} \left(1 - (1 - \delta)^h \right).$$

This expression makes clear that the trade elasticity geometrically approaches the new steady state. The rate of convergence is $(1 - \delta)$. Convergence occurs in one period if $\delta = 1$ (full customer base depreciation), and becomes slower for smaller δ .

Example 2: AR(1) Second, consider a first order autoregressive process for tariffs so that $d \ln (1 + \tau_{t+1}) = \rho \cdot d \ln (1 + \tau_t)$. Then


$$\frac{d \ln X_{t_0+h}}{d \ln (1 + \tau_{t_0+h})} = \theta_{sr} - \sigma (1 - s_d) \left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} \frac{(\delta + r) \delta}{[1 + r - (1 - \delta) \rho] \left(1 - \frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)^h \right).$$

Note the following. First, since the tariff change approaches zero, the elasticity is not well defined in the limit. Both the tariff change and exports will return to the initial steady state. Second, for finite h , the dynamics are governed by $1 - \left(\frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)^h$, which is very similar to the above example, but now the AR(1) coefficient ρ plays a role. Third, the term $\frac{(\delta + r) \delta}{[1 + r - (1 - \delta) \rho] \left(1 - \frac{1 - \delta}{\rho} \right)}$ enters the expression, driving a wedge between the long-run trade elasticity and the horizon-invariant part the above expression. Depending on parameter values, this expression can be greater or smaller than one. A value of greater than one implies that the trade elasticity at long but finite horizons can exceed the long-run elasticity.

Quantification To illustrate the quantitative properties of the model, we subject it to the two tariff shocks in the examples above. We let the elasticity of demand be $\sigma = 1.5$, and the share of local distribution services $s_d = 0.2$. The latter is comparatively low by the standards of the literature, but these two values in combination deliver the unit value response reported in Table 3. These two parameters are all that is needed to pin down the short-run trade elasticity θ_{sr} . The curvature in the adjustment cost $\left(\frac{f''(a) a}{f'(a)} \right)^{-1} = 1.71$ is then entirely pinned down by the difference between the long- and short-run elasticities (5.12). The depreciation rate is set to $\delta = 0.2$ to roughly match the rate of convergence to the long run. These are all the parameters needed to implement Example 1. For Example 2, we also need the interest rate and the AR(1) coefficient. We set these to $r = 0.03$ and $\rho = 0.965$.

The left panel of Figure 7 plots the paths of tariffs. The red line is Example 1, where tariffs increase by one unit in the impact period, and then stay at 0.8 starting in period 1 onwards. The blue line is the AR(1) path of tariffs following an impulse of size 1. The green line plots the impulse response of tariffs estimated in the data, which is quite similar to the two model experiments.

FIGURE 7: Time Path of Elasticities in the Dynamic Model



Notes: This figure illustrates the trade elasticities as implied by the model.

The right panel of Figure 7 depicts the trade elasticities. The green line is the econometric estimates. Because the data are annual, and it is unlikely that all tariff changes went into effect on January 1, the year-zero trade elasticity is most likely subject to partial-year effects. Thus, for the purposes of comparing to the model, we consider the $h = 1$ empirical estimate to be the impact elasticity θ_{sr} . The red and blue lines depict the model trade elasticity in the two experiments. They are nearly indistinguishable from each other.

The model succeeds in delivering a smooth path of adjustment that lasts a decade. The key parameter for the speed of adjustment is the depreciation rate δ . The slow adjustment observed in the data implies that δ is substantially below 1. The main shortcoming of the model is its overshooting of the short-run elasticity, which in the data is about 0.7. The model short-run elasticity is governed by only two parameters, σ and s_d (see 5.11). The former has to be above 1 to be consistent with monopolistic competition; the latter has to lie between 0 and 1. It turns out that there exists no combination of σ and s_d satisfying these restrictions that delivers $\theta_{sr} < 1$.

6 Conclusion

We develop a novel method to estimate the trade elasticity, a key parameter in virtually all models in international economics. To tackle the endogeneity problem that tariffs might be lower in products

where countries expect the largest trade flows, we develop an instrument that relies on the WTO's MFN principle. We estimate trade elasticities at different horizons, and find short-run values of about -0.7 , and long-run values close to -1.75 . Our estimates are robust to alternative specifications of the instrument and controls, and uniformly larger than OLS. Our estimates are also not specific to a particular model framework, and apply to all models that have a gravity specification for trade flows in the long run.

Our long-run estimates imply the welfare-relevant trade elasticity is around 1 in absolute value. This is significantly smaller than conventional wisdom in the literature, suggesting the welfare gains from trade are larger than previously thought. Our finding that the trade elasticity differs by horizon and only converges to the "long-run" after about 7-10 years implies substantial adjustment costs to changing trade volumes.

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Appendix A Additional Theory

This appendix provides an example of a model of exporting that delivers the trade elasticity estimating equation. We stress that this is only one possible model that can deliver our estimating equation. We omit the product subscript to economize on notation. A firm of measure 1 from country i selling to country j has time t sales equal to:

$$x_{ijt} = \frac{p_{ijt}^{1-\sigma}}{P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}} X_{jt},$$

where X_{jt} is aggregate expenditure in j , P_{jt} is the price index, and p_{ijt} is the price charged by the firm. The firm is monopolistically competitive, and thus its price is a constant markup over marginal cost: $p_{ijt} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \phi_{ijt} c_{it}^{1-\sigma}$, where ϕ_{ijt} is the iceberg trade cost at time t , and c_{it} is the unit cost of production. Then, its sales can be written as a product of bilateral, source, and destination components:

$$x_{ijt} = \phi_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it} \tilde{D}_{jt},$$

where $\tilde{S}_{it} \equiv c_{it}^{1-\sigma}$ and $\tilde{D}_{jt} \equiv \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} X_{jt}/P_{jt}^{1-\sigma}$. Period variable profits are a constant fraction of sales:

$$\pi_{ijt} = \frac{1}{\sigma} x_{ijt}.$$

There is a mass M_{ijt} of firms selling from i to j at time t . Then total trade flows from i to j are:

$$\begin{aligned} X_{ijt} &= M_{ijt} x_{ijt} \\ &= M_{ijt} \phi_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it} \tilde{D}_{jt}. \end{aligned}$$

Let a fraction δ of last year's firms survive into this year, and let m_{ijt} be the new measure of firms appearing between $t-1$ and t . This formulation nests extensive margin (where m_{ijt} is the mass of new firm entrants as in [Melitz, 2003](#)), and customer base (where m_{ijt} is the mass of new customers added by the firm as in [Arkolakis, 2010](#), and Section 5.2). The accounting equation for the mass of firms is:

$$M_{ijt} = M_{ijt-1}(1-\delta) + m_{ijt}.$$

Iterating backward:

$$M_{ijt} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-\delta)^k m_{ijt-k}.$$

Suppose for simplicity that there are no per period fixed costs of exporting, so that all firms who ever started exporting continue until experiencing the exogenous death shock. Each year a mass 1 of firms is born, or equivalently receives a potential opportunity to export to j . These firms face a

stochastic sunk cost ε_{ij} to enter market j . They enter if the NPV of profits exceeds the sunk cost:

$$E \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\beta^k}{\sigma} \phi_{ijt+k}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it+k} \tilde{D}_{jt+k} \mid \phi_{ijt}, \tilde{S}_{it}, \tilde{D}_{jt} \right] > \varepsilon_{ij}.$$

Here, the expectation is evaluated conditional on the information set at time t , which amounts to the assumption that the processes for ϕ_{ijt} , \tilde{S}_{it} , and \tilde{D}_{jt} are Markov. Adding dependence on past history of ϕ_{ijt} , \tilde{S}_{it} , and \tilde{D}_{jt} will make the mass of entrants at t a function of the history of ϕ_{ijt} , \tilde{S}_{it} , and \tilde{D}_{jt} up to time t . Integrating over the distribution of sunk costs, the mass of entrants at time t is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} m_{ijt} &= \mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon_{ij}} \left(E \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\beta^k}{\sigma} \phi_{ijt+k}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it+k} \tilde{D}_{jt+k} \mid \phi_{ijt}, \tilde{S}_{it}, \tilde{D}_{jt} \right] \right) \\ &= m(\phi_{ijt}, \tilde{S}_{it}, \tilde{D}_{jt}) \end{aligned}$$

To say more about the shape of the $m(\cdot)$ function would require taking a stand on the stochastic processes governing ϕ_{ijt} , \tilde{S}_{it} , and \tilde{D}_{jt} and the cdf $\mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon_{ij}}$.

Trade flows are now:

$$\begin{aligned} X_{ijt} &= M_{ijt} \phi_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it} \tilde{D}_{jt} \\ &= \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-\delta)^k m_{ijt-k} \right) \phi_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it} \tilde{D}_{jt} \\ &= \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-\delta)^k m(\phi_{ijt-k}, \tilde{S}_{it-k}, \tilde{D}_{jt-k}) \right) \phi_{ijt}^{1-\sigma} \tilde{S}_{it} \tilde{D}_{jt}. \end{aligned}$$


Log bilateral ij flows can be taken as a first-order approximation around the cross-sectional mean trade flow \bar{X}_t :

$$\ln X_{ijt} \approx (1-\sigma) \ln \phi_{ijt} + \underbrace{\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} s_k \theta \ln \phi_{ijt-k} + \ln \tilde{S}_{it} + \theta^S \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} s_k \ln \tilde{S}_{it-k}}_{S_{it}} + \underbrace{\ln \tilde{D}_{jt} + \theta^D \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} s_k \ln \tilde{D}_{jt-k}}_{D_{jt}} + const,$$

where s_k is the average share of firms that entered k periods ago in the total mass of firms at time t , and θ is the elasticity of the mass of entrants k periods ago with respect to trade costs k periods ago. Exponentiating leads to equation (5.1) in Section 5, which provides the mapping from it to the estimating equations (2.2)-(2.4). Note that multilateral resistance terms S_{it} and D_{jt} are now functions of not just current but past destination demand shifters and source unit costs. Nonetheless, they can be controlled for in estimation by importer- and exporter-time effects.


Appendix B Data

FIGURE A1: Fraction of World Imports (Average, %)




Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of world trade flows by importer in our sample.

FIGURE A2: Fraction of World Imports: MFN vs. non-MFN (%)



Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of world trade that is subject to MFN tariffs and non-MFN tariffs by decade in our sample.

FIGURE A3: Fraction of World Imports by HS Section (Average, %)



Notes: This figure shows the average fraction of trade that is in each HS Section in our sample.

TABLE A1: HS Codes Mapping Across Revisions

Mapped from:	Mapped to:				
	HS-92	HS-96	HS-02	HS-07	HS-12
HS-96	89.38				
HS-02	81.55	90.81			
HS-07	73.34	80.74	88.48		
HS-12	68.17	74.91	81.81	91.93	
HS-17	61.85	67.92	73.62	81.99	88.05

Notes: This table presents the fraction of HS codes that can be mapped uniquely from as HS revision in the “Mapped from” row to an HS revision in a “Mapped to” column. All numbers are in percentages.

TABLE A2: Instrument – Illustration

Importer	MFN Trade Partners		Major Trade Partners Aggregate		Major Trade Partners HS 6403		Treatment	Control	Excluded
	2005 (1)	2006 (2)	2005 (3)	2006 (4)	2005 (5)	2006 (6)			
<u>Panel A: Germany</u>									
	USA	USA	FRA	FRA	ITA	ITA	HKG	ITA	CHN
	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	KOR	VNM	IND
	JPN	JPN	NLD	NLD	VNM	VNM	SGP	PRT	USA
	KOR	KOR	ITA	ITA	PRT	PRT	NZL	AUT	JPN
	IND	IND	USA	USA	AUT	AUT	CAN	NLD	
	CAN	CAN	GBR	GBR	IND	IND	AUS	SVK	
	HKG	HKG	BEL	BEL	NLD	NLD	PRK	IDN	
	SGP	RUS	AUT	AUT	SVK	SVK		ESP	
	BRA	SGP	CHE	CHE	ESP	IDN		GBR	
	RUS	BRA	JPN	JPN	ROU	ROU		FRA	
<u>Panel B: Japan</u>									
	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	CHN	GBR	KHM	CHN
	USA	USA	USA	USA	ITA	ITA	PRT	MMR	ITA
	KOR	KOR	AUS	SAU	KHM	KHM	BRA	BGD	VNM
	AUS	AUS	IDN	ARE	VNM	VNM	MAR	MEX	IDN
	ITA	ITA	KOR	AUS	IDN	IDN	IND	LAO	ESP
	CAN	FRA	DEU	IDN	MMR	MMR	CHE	NPL	FRA
	DEU	CAN	THA	KOR	BGD	BGD	HUN	LBN	DEU
	FRA	DEU	MYS	QAT	ESP	ESP	SVK		THA
	VNM	VNM	ARE	DEU	FRA	FRA	LKA		USA
	DNK	DNK	SAU	THA	DEU	DEU	AUT		KOR
<u>Panel C: USA</u>									
	CHN	CHN	CAN	CAN	CHN	CHN	PRT	MEX	CHN
	JPN	JPN	CHN	CHN	ITA	ITA	SVK	CAN	ITA
	DEU	DEU	MEX	MEX	BRA	BRA	POL	DOM	BRA
	KOR	KOR	JPN	JPN	VNM	VNM	HKG	ISR	VNM
	ITA	ITA	DEU	DEU	IDN	IDN	HUN	MAR	IDN
	GBR	GBR	KOR	KOR	THA	THA	CHE	COL	THA
	FRA	FRA	GBR	VEN	MEX	MEX	ALB	SLV	ESP
	IND	IND	FRA	GBR	ESP	ESP	BGR	AUS	IND
	HKG	HKG	ITA	FRA	IND	IND	DNK	ZAF	FRA
	VNM	VNM	MYS	MYS	DOM	DOM	AUT	PER	DEU

Notes: This table illustrates the construction of our instrument, using as an example product code 6403 “Footwear; with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather” in 2006. Columns 1-2 list the top exporters to three importing countries – USA, Germany and Japan – exporting under the MFN regime in periods $t = 2006$ and $t - 1 = 2005$. Columns 3-4 list the importing countries’ major aggregate trading partners in these periods. Columns 5-6 list the major trading partners in product 6403. Columns 7-9 then list the main countries in the treatment, control and excluded group for imports of product 6403 to the three importing countries.

TABLE A3: HS Sections

Code	Name
7	PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF
8	RAW HIDES AND SKINS, LEATHER, FURSKINS AND ARTICLES THEREOF; SADDLERY AND HARNESS; TRAVEL GOODS,
9	WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL; CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK; MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND WICKERWORK
10	PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS CELLULOSIC MATERIAL; RECOVERED (WASTE AND SCRAP) PAPER OR PAPERBOARD; PAPER AND PAPERBOARD AND ARTICLES THEREOF
11	TEXTILES AND TEXTILE ARTICLES
13	ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, ASBESTOS, MICA OR SIMILAR MATERIALS;
15	BASE METALS AND ARTICLES OF BASE METAL CERAMIC PRODUCTS; GLASS AND GLASSWARE
16	MACHINERY AND MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT; PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, TELEVISION IMAGE AND SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF SUCH ARTICLES
18	ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS; ARTICLES OF HUMAN HAIR OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC, MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, MEDICAL OR SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS; CLOCKS AND WATCHES; MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF
20	MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES
Aggregated	
1	LIVE ANIMALS; ANIMAL PRODUCTS
2	VEGETABLE PRODUCTS
3	ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR CONTAINERS; ARTICLES OF ANIMAL GUT (OTHER THAN SILK-WORM GUT)
4	PREPARED EDIBLE FATS; ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE WAXES PREPARED FOODSTUFFS;
5	BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR; TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUBSTITUTES
6	MINERAL PRODUCTS
12	PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL OR ALLIED INDUSTRIES FOOTWEAR, HEADGEAR, UMBRELLAS, SUN UMBRELLAS, WALKING-STICKS, SEAT-STICKS, WHIPS, RIDING-CROPS AND PARTS THEREOF; PREPARED FEATHERS AND ARTICLES MADE THEREWITH;
14	NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS, METALS CLAD WITH PRECIOUS METAL AND ARTICLES THEREOF; IMITATION JEWELLERY; COIN
17	VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, VESSELS AND ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
19	ARMS AND AMMUNITION; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES THEREOF
21	WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES AND ANTIQUES

Notes: This table describes the 21 internationally compatible HS "Sections", which are groupings of HS product codes. We also list the 9 HS Sections that we aggregate in the main text into a Section 'aggregate', as there is insufficient variation in either tariffs or trade flows or both in these sections to estimate the elasticity. [A5](#) summarizes the estimates for all sections without aggregation.

Appendix C Robustness

TABLE A4: Robustness: Local Projections

	Panel A: Tariffs			Panel B: Trade		
	Baseline (1)	Zero Lag (2)	Five Lags (3)	Baseline (4)	Zero Lag (5)	Five Lags (6)
$t - 6$	-0.099*** (0.006)	-0.090*** (0.005)	-0.102*** (0.007)	0.097 (0.130)	0.028 (0.110)	0.305* (0.165)
$t - 5$	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.004)	.	0.217 (0.121)	0.275*** (0.105)	.
$t - 4$	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.004)	.	0.004 (0.111)	-0.055 (0.093)	.
$t - 3$	-0.053*** (0.005)	-0.088*** (0.004)	.	0.075 (0.102)	-0.018 (0.087)	.
$t - 2$	-0.133*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	.	0.242*** (0.089)	0.128 (0.089)	.
$t - 1$.	-0.309*** (0.004)	.	.	0.149** (0.072)	.
t	.	.	.	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)
$t + 1$	0.890*** (0.004)	0.851*** (0.003)	0.842*** (0.006)	-0.673*** (0.096)	-0.535*** (0.069)	-0.109 (0.175)
$t + 2$	0.846*** (0.005)	0.830*** (0.003)	0.788*** (0.007)	-0.716*** (0.109)	-0.588*** (0.079)	-0.129 (0.206)
$t + 3$	0.831*** (0.005)	0.818*** (0.004)	0.769*** (0.008)	-0.851*** (0.122)	-0.758*** (0.086)	-0.481** (0.242)
$t + 4$	0.821*** (0.006)	0.813*** (0.004)	0.747*** (0.009)	-0.835*** (0.132)	-0.747*** (0.094)	-0.214 (0.271)
$t + 5$	0.807*** (0.005)	0.823*** (0.004)	0.718*** (0.010)	-0.998*** (0.149)	-0.915*** (0.102)	-0.823*** (0.308)
$t + 6$	0.776*** (0.006)	0.786*** (0.004)	0.663*** (0.011)	-1.006*** (0.152)	-0.875*** (0.101)	-0.496** (0.320)
$t + 7$	0.694*** (0.006)	0.754*** (0.004)	0.594*** (0.011)	-1.425*** (0.162)	-1.146*** (0.110)	-1.383*** (0.352)
$t + 8$	0.668*** (0.007)	0.716*** (0.005)	0.552*** (0.012)	-1.269*** (0.169)	-1.145*** (0.117)	-0.932** (0.391)
$t + 9$	0.699*** (0.007)	0.733*** (0.005)	0.634*** (0.015)	-1.351*** (0.198)	-0.990*** (0.120)	-1.366*** (0.513)
$t + 10$	0.715*** (0.008)	0.720*** (0.005)	0.641*** (0.018)	-1.517*** (0.232)	-1.054*** (0.139)	-1.635** (0.649)

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the local projections equations (2.3) (Panel A) and (2.2) (Panel B). The first column in each panel presents the baseline local projects results, while the second and third columns in each panel present results with 2 and 5 lags of tariffs and trade as pre-trend controls respectively. Standard errors clustered by country-pair-product are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels.

TABLE A5: Trade Elasticity: Sectoral Heterogeneity

	Mean (1)	Median (2)	25 percentile (3)	75 percentile (4)
t	-0.396	-0.407	-0.670	-0.117
$t + 1$	-0.851	-0.710	-1.116	-0.563
$t + 2$	-1.041	-0.798	-1.601	-0.465
$t + 3$	-1.381	-1.220	-2.044	-0.791
$t + 4$	-1.171	-1.100	-1.619	-0.710
$t + 5$	-1.683	-1.698	-2.060	-1.062
$t + 6$	-1.747	-1.651	-2.478	-0.887
$t + 7$	-3.082	-1.959	-3.731	-1.469
$t + 8$	-3.518	-2.324	-4.164	-1.218
$t + 9$	-3.352	-2.195	-3.248	-1.522
$t + 10$	-2.804	-2.794	-3.448	-1.906

Notes: This table presents results from estimating equation (2.4) at the HS Section-level for every horizon. We include estimates for 11 HS Sections here, including one aggregated super-section as described in the text. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects.

TABLE A6: Elasticity Estimates, “Traditional Gravity,” Levels

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Panel A: Log-levels, OLS</u>						
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-3.696*** (0.020)	-4.468*** (0.019)	-6.696*** (0.046)	-2.734*** (0.014)	-1.040*** (0.022)	-0.892*** (0.020)
R^2	0.013	0.341	0.383	0.530	0.571	0.837
Obs	107.09	107.07	106.24	105.73	104.91	98.45
<u>Panel B: Log-levels, OLS, Balanced Panel</u>						
$\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-7.005*** (0.048)	-8.527*** (0.058)	-11.262*** (0.106)	-3.137*** (0.033)	-0.951*** (0.051)	-1.154*** (0.048)
R^2	0.021	0.362	0.419	0.550	0.593	0.887
Obs	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	19.35
<u>Fixed effects</u>						
importer x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
exporter x hs4	no	yes	no	no	no	no
importer x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
exporter x hs4 x year	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
importer x exporter x hs4	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
imp x hs6 x year, exp x hs6 x year, imp x exp x h6	no	no	no	no	no	yes

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the trade elasticity at a single horizon. The dependent variable is the log of trade value. Panel A is the log-levels specification, and Panel B is a balanced panel log-levels specification. Column 1 reports the results with no fixed effects. Column 2 adds importer-product and exporter-product fixed effects, Column 3 interacts these fixed effects with years, column 4 includes country-pair-product fixed effects and column 5 includes our baseline fixed effects. Column 6 uses HS6 product level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Number of observations reported in millions. For the balanced panel in Column 6, the number of reported observations is lower as HS6 fixed effects drop additional singleton clusters, but the underlying panel is the same.

TABLE A7: Elasticity Estimates, “Traditional Gravity,” Differences

	<u>OLS</u>			<u>2SLS using all 1 year Tariff Changes</u>			<u>Baseline IV</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<u>Panel A: 3-year log-differences</u>									
$\Delta_3\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.069*** (0.012)	-0.482*** (0.016)	-0.393*** (0.017)	-0.774*** (0.015)	-0.397*** (0.024)	-0.343*** (0.026)	-2.011*** (0.053)	-1.001*** (0.093)	-0.926*** (0.105)
R^2	0.038	0.149	0.210						
Observations	47.04	46.60	46.26	47.04	46.60	46.26	26.84	26.44	26.16
<u>Panel B: 7-year log-differences</u>									
$\Delta_7\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-2.343*** (0.017)	-0.858*** (0.024)	-0.621*** (0.024)	-0.965*** (0.022)	-0.553*** (0.035)	-0.468*** (0.037)	-2.489*** (0.073)	-1.535*** (0.130)	-1.521*** (0.145)
R^2	0.097	0.209	0.315						
Observations	31.06	30.75	30.44	31.06	30.75	30.44	17.47	17.19	16.95
<u>Panel C: 5-year log-differences, Balanced Panel</u>									
$\Delta_5\tau_{i,j,p,t}$	-1.638*** (0.021)	-0.772*** (0.033)	-0.634*** (0.033)	-0.788*** (0.024)	-0.402*** (0.041)	-0.438*** (0.044)	-2.238*** (0.064)	-1.177*** (0.115)	-1.112*** (0.124)
R^2	0.065	0.185	0.277						
Observations	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13	21.13
<u>Fixed Effects</u>									
Imp-HS4	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Exp-HS4	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Imp-HS4-Year	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Exp-HS4-Year	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Imp-Exp-HS4	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents the results from estimating the trade elasticity at a single horizon. The dependent variable is the log-difference in trade value, over 3 years (Panel A), 7 years (Panel B), and 5 years, balancing the panel (Panel C). Columns 1-3 report the OLS results, columns 4-6 2SLS instrumenting with the 1-year tariff changes, and columns 7-9 instrumenting with the baseline instrument. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. Number of observations reported in millions. All first-stage F statistics are greater than 10000.

TABLE A8: Trade Elasticity, Every Horizon:, Robustness: Pre-Trends, Alternative Clustering, Alternative Samples

	Baseline	Zero Lag	Five Lags	FE50	Two-way Clustering	Balanced Panel	Alternative Control Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.147*** (0.054)	0.166 (0.138)	-0.232** (0.094)	-0.262*** (0.096)	-0.592** (0.290)	-0.187** (0.077)
obs	31.66	41.46	14.58	17.62	31.66	5.04	27.33
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.628*** (0.081)	-0.129 (0.208)	-0.599*** (0.133)	-0.756*** (0.141)	-0.098 (0.380)	-0.490*** (0.117)
obs	26.18	32.85	12.52	15.19	26.18	5.04	22.63
$t + 2$	-0.846*** (0.129)	-0.708*** (0.095)	-0.164 (0.262)	-0.724*** (0.156)	-0.846*** (0.189)	-0.755* (0.444)	-0.449*** (0.141)
obs	23.27	29.21	11.09	13.77	23.27	5.04	20.05
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.926*** (0.105)	-0.625** (0.315)	-0.865*** (0.173)	-1.024*** (0.195)	-0.895* (0.472)	-0.743*** (0.160)
obs	20.8	26.16	9.76	12.48	20.8	5.04	17.86
$t + 4$	-1.017*** (0.161)	-0.918*** (0.115)	-0.287 (0.362)	-0.784*** (0.187)	-1.017*** (0.232)	-0.769 (0.480)	-0.613*** (0.171)
obs	18.67	23.49	8.53	11.33	18.67	5.04	16
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-1.112*** (0.124)	-1.146*** (0.429)	-1.012*** (0.215)	-1.237*** (0.253)	-0.916** (0.437)	-0.792*** (0.201)
obs	16.69	21.13	7.3	10.22	16.69	5.04	14.27
$t + 6$	-1.296*** (0.196)	-1.113*** (0.129)	-0.747 (0.482)	-1.051*** (0.231)	-1.296*** (0.274)	-0.532 (0.463)	-0.570*** (0.216)
obs	14.92	18.9	6.17	9.2	14.92	5.04	12.62
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-1.521*** (0.145)	-2.330*** (0.595)	-1.853*** (0.270)	-2.055*** (0.357)	-0.990** (0.489)	-1.383*** (0.251)
obs	13.22	16.95	5.25	8.2	13.22	5.04	11.12
$t + 8$	-1.901*** (0.253)	-1.599*** (0.163)	-1.690** (0.709)	-1.888*** (0.289)	-1.901*** (0.465)	-1.094** (0.510)	-1.079*** (0.275)
obs	11.53	15.02	4.42	7.19	11.53	5.04	9.63
$t + 9$	-1.934*** (0.283)	-1.351*** (0.164)	-2.155*** (0.812)	-1.781*** (0.323)	-1.934*** (0.500)	-1.600*** (0.551)	-1.087*** (0.306)
obs	9.85	13.11	3.79	6.19	9.85	5.04	8.2
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-1.463*** (0.194)	-2.550** (1.016)	-1.760 (0.374)	-2.122*** (0.332)	-1.818*** (0.544)	-1.600*** (0.379)
obs	8.31	11.25	3.21	5.25	8.31	5.04	6.84

Notes: This table presents robustness exercises for the results from estimating equation (2.4). All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 vary the pretrend controls (including alternatively two lags or five lags of import growth and tariff changes). Column 4 reports the results when the sample is restricted to fixed-effects clusters with a minimum of 50 observations. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level, except in Column 5 where they are additionally clustered by year. Column 6 restricts the sample to a balanced panel. Column 7 reports results where the control group only contains observations with zero tariff changes. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

TABLE A9: Trade Elasticity, Every Horizon, Robustness: Alternative Instruments, Outcomes, Fixed Effects, and Samples

	Baseline (1)	All Partners (2)	Quantities (3)	Unit Values (4)	Extensive (5)	Extensive Sel (6)	DL (7)	SD0 (8)
t	-0.262*** (0.072)	-0.275*** (0.030)	-0.434*** (0.123)	-0.179* (0.093)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.082*** (0.063)	-0.313*** (0.096)
obs	31.66	57.14	29.3	31.66	31.66	131.03	56.35	28.7
$t + 1$	-0.756*** (0.108)	-0.624*** (0.047)	-1.228*** (0.174)	-0.664*** (0.136)	-0.027 (0.080)	-0.484*** (0.063)	-0.805*** (0.089)	-0.889*** (0.142)
obs	26.18	47.19	24.26	26.18	26.18	108.13	49.11	23.76
$t + 2$	-0.846*** (0.129)	-0.647*** (0.053)	-1.550*** (0.213)	-0.663*** (0.162)	-0.139 (0.094)	-0.432*** (0.073)	-0.731*** (0.098)	-0.861*** (0.174)
obs	23.27	42.29	21.42	23.27	23.27	96.99	45.23	21.1
$t + 3$	-1.024*** (0.146)	-0.648*** (0.061)	-1.669*** (0.241)	-.81*** (0.184)	-0.134 (0.104)	-0.590*** (0.084)	-0.955*** (0.107)	-1.228*** (0.200)
obs	20.8	38.16	19.14	20.8	20.8	87.22	41.5	18.86
$t+4$	-1.017*** (0.161)	-0.657*** (0.068)	-1.637*** (0.264)	-0.801*** (0.203)	-0.09 (0.115)	-0.449*** (0.095)	-0.846*** (0.117)	-1.171*** (0.219)
std	18.67	34.39	17.14	18.67	18.67	77.82	37.92	16.92
obs	18.67	34.39	17.14	18.67	18.67	77.82	37.92	16.92
$t + 5$	-1.237*** (0.185)	-0.718*** (0.073)	-1.686*** (0.285)	-1.422*** (0.232)	0.291** (0.128)	-0.730*** (0.100)	-1.183*** (0.122)	-1.180*** (0.253)
obs	16.69	30.89	15.32	16.69	16.69	69.73	34.61	15.12
$t + 6$	-1.296*** (0.196)	-0.781*** (0.078)	-2.477*** (0.296)	-1.374*** (0.244)	0.125 (0.135)	-0.864*** (0.101)	-1.212*** (0.124)	-1.267*** (0.261)
obs	14.92	27.65	13.64	14.92	14.92	62.07	31.34	13.51
$t + 7$	-2.055*** (0.233)	-0.940*** (0.091)	-3.756*** (0.401)	-2.166*** (0.292)	0.162 (0.161)	-0.902*** (0.114)	-1.496*** (0.138)	-1.990*** (0.318)
obs	13.22	24.64	12.06	13.22	13.22	55.24	28.4	11.96
$t + 8$	-1.901*** (0.253)	-1.000*** (0.099)	-3.635*** (0.430)	-2.076*** (0.318)	0.205 (0.173)	-0.688*** (0.130)	-1.429*** (0.157)	-1.955*** (0.352)
obs	11.53	21.67	10.48	11.53	11.53	48.51	25.4	10.44
$t + 9$	-1.934*** (0.283)	-0.970*** (0.109)	-3.149*** (0.451)	-1.656*** (0.353)	-0.180 (0.193)	-1.000*** (0.137)	-1.650*** (0.161)	-2.185*** (0.388)
obs	9.85	18.69	8.8	9.85	9.85	41.82	22.36	8.93
$t + 10$	-2.122*** (0.325)	-0.866*** (0.122)	-1.865*** (0.453)	-1.765*** (0.406)	-0.0780 (0.221)	-0.941*** (0.153)	-1.638*** (0.181)	-2.360*** (0.444)
obs	8.31	15.92	7.54	8.31	8.31	35.09	19.24	7.52

Notes: This table presents alternative estimates for the results from estimating equation (2.4), varying the instrument or outcome variable. Column 2 uses an alternative definition of the instrument where all trade partners subject to the MFN regime are included. Column 4 reports results for quantities, and Column 5 the results for unit values. Column 6 presents results for the intensive and extensive margin combined using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for trade flows with the baseline instrument. Column 7 presents results from a distributed lag model. All specifications include importer-HS4-year, exporter-HS4-year and importer-exporter-HS4 fixed effects, except Column 3 where the product dimension of fixed effects is at the HS6 level. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-exporter-HS4 level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level respectively. Observations are reported in millions.

TABLE A10: Trade Elasticity: Estimates and First Stage F -Statistics

	OLS	Baseline IV	F -stat	All Partners	F -stat	Distributed Lag	SW F -stat
t	-0.126*** (0.011)	-0.262*** (0.072)	91422	-0.275*** (0.030)	366290	-0.413 (0.338)	20536
$t + 1$	-0.275*** (0.019)	-0.756*** (0.108)	42231	-0.624*** (0.047)	132393	-0.523 (0.466)	18831
$t + 2$	-0.306*** (0.024)	-0.846*** (0.129)	36469	-0.647*** (0.053)	123145	-0.920 (0.586)	22499
$t + 3$	-0.343*** (0.026)	-1.024*** (0.146)	28537	-0.648*** (0.061)	102829	-1.578** (0.685)	22570
$t + 4$	-0.414*** (0.029)	-1.017*** (0.161)	23771	-0.657*** (0.068)	85767	-1.598** (0.773)	16227
$t + 5$	-0.448*** (0.030)	-1.237*** (0.185)	22697	-0.718*** (0.073)	81169	-2.097** (0.861)	12463
$t + 6$	-0.468*** (0.033)	-1.296*** (0.196)	19439	-0.781*** (0.078)	61812	-2.185** (0.931)	14722
$t + 7$	-0.468*** (0.037)	-2.055*** (0.233)	15481	-0.940*** (0.091)	48802	-2.710*** (1.016)	13473
$t + 8$	-0.445*** (0.040)	-1.901*** (0.253)	13933	-1.000*** (0.099)	44599	-2.798** (1.109)	13475
$t + 9$	-0.442*** (0.040)	-1.934*** (0.283)	10201	-0.970*** (0.109)	36930	-3.084*** (1.180)	14278
$t + 10$	-0.481*** (0.041)	-2.122*** (0.325)	8252	-0.866*** (0.122)	31174	-3.166** (1.252)	10962

Notes: This table presents the first-stage F -statistics for the main estimates. For the Distributed Lag model we report the Sanderson-Windmeijer F -statistic to test for weak instruments as we have 11 instruments and 11 endogenous variables.

TABLE A11: Gains from Trade

Country	$\tilde{\theta} = -0.942$	$\tilde{\theta} = -5$	$\tilde{\theta} = -10$
<u>G7</u>			
Canada	22.4%	3.9%	1.9%
France	16.7%	3.0%	1.5%
Germany	21.7%	3.8%	1.9%
Italy	14.9%	2.7%	1.3%
Japan	8.2%	1.5%	0.7%
UK	14.8%	2.6%	1.3%
US	5.6%	1.0%	0.5%
<u>Major Emerging Markets</u>			
Brazil	7.9%	1.4%	0.7%
China	11.9%	2.1%	1.1%
India	11.2%	2.0%	1.0%
Mexico	6.5%	1.2%	0.6%
Russia	20.8%	3.6%	1.8%
South Africa	15.0%	2.7%	1.3%
Median, 64 Countries	24.5%	4.2%	2.1%

Notes: Data are from the OECD IO tables for 64 countries in year 2006. Gains from trade relative to autarky are computed using the formula $\lambda_{jj}^{1/\tilde{\theta}}$, where λ_{jj} is 1 minus the import share. The import share is calculated as imports divided by gross output. The numbers for China and Mexico include export-processing activities (China) and global manufacturing activities (Mexico).