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Fields of Concentration: Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy

Comprehensive Examinations Completed:

2020 (Oral): Microeconomic Theory; Behavioral Economics (*with distinction*)

2019 (Written): Microeconomics; Macroeconomics

Dissertation Title: *Essays in Microeconomic Theory*

Committee:

Professor Larry Samuelson (Chair)

Professor Ryota Iijima

Professor Kai Hao Yang

Education:

Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2025 (expected)

M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2021

M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2020

M.Sc., Economics and Social Sciences, *cum laude*, Bocconi University, 2019

B.Sc., Economics and Social Sciences, *cum laude*, Bocconi University, 2016

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

Dissertation Fellowship, Yale University, 2024

Carl Arvid Anderson Prize Fellowship, Yale University, 2022-2023

Cowles Foundation Fellowship, Yale University, 2019-2024

Graduate School Fellowship, Yale University, 2019-2025

IGIER Visiting Student, Bocconi University, 2017-2018

Teaching Experience:

Yale University

Spring 2023, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Johannes Hörner, Game Theory (graduate)

Fall 2021, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Benjamin Polak, Game Theory (undergraduate)

Research Experience:

Spring and Fall 2022, Research Assistant to Prof. Philipp Strack, Yale University
Spring 2019, Research Assistant to Prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University

Publications:

“Competing to Commit: Markets with Rational Inattention” (2024), with Francesco Fabbri and Ferdinand Pieoth, *American Economic Review*, 114(1): 285-306

Working Papers:

“Redistributive Bargaining under the Shadow of Protests” (Oct 2024), *Job Market Paper*, with Ferdinand Pieoth
“Due Diligence in Common Value Auctions” (Oct 2024), with Ferdinand Pieoth
“Misaligning Incentives in Teams” (July 2024), with Tan Gan and Ferdinand Pieoth

Seminar and Conference Presentations:

2024 Stony Brook International Game Theory Conference
Bargaining: Experiments, Empirics, and Theory (BEET) Workshop
2023 Econometric Society: European Winter Meeting
Bocconi-CCA-Cornell Workshop in Political Economy
Bocconi University Theory Seminar
University of Liverpool Theory Seminar (online)
2022 Stony Brook International Game Theory Conference

Referee Service:

American Economic Review: Insights; Journal of Economic Theory; American Political Science Review

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References:

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Dissertation Abstract

Redistributive Bargaining under the Shadow of Protests [Job Market Paper]

with Ferdinand Pieroth

Bilateral agreements often benefit the bargaining parties at the expense of third parties who are not included in the negotiations. For example, a trade agreement or military alliance between two countries may worsen a neighboring country's economic and political power, and a merger of two companies may lead to worker layoffs. Even though they are not formally involved in the bargaining process, these affected groups can still interfere with the negotiations through non-institutional channels: Countries can wage a preventive war, and workers can strike. How does the possibility of such *protests* affect the bargaining outcome? What strategies can the bargainers employ to limit such impact?

To answer these questions, we consider a redistributive bargaining model with three agents. Two of them – the *bargainers* – bargain sequentially over how to redistribute a finite set of resources between themselves and a third party. The remaining agent – the *third party* – is excluded from the negotiations. Despite the lack of formal representation, the third party can interfere by protesting against any proposal that is currently under review. Protesting is costly and only stochastically successful. If a protest succeeds, negotiations break down immediately and the status quo persists. All agents are impatient expected utility maximizers.

To highlight the redistributive aspect of the model, we first focus on settings where feasible proposals are zero-sum. If the third party's protesting cost is not prohibitively high, two outcomes can arise under stationary equilibria: *Conflict* or *Accommodation*. In both cases, the bargainers do not extract the full surplus: Their joint payoff is strictly smaller than the negative of the third party's min-max payoff. Under Conflict, socially wasteful protests occur on path, implying that the outcome is not Pareto efficient; under Accommodation, the bargainers agree on an offer that leads the third party to earn more than their min-max payoff to discourage protests.

To extract the full surplus, the bargainers need to punish the third party after unsuccessful protests. Under stationarity, this is impossible since the responder's behavior can only depend on the payoff relevant state, namely, the current-period proposal. Without this restriction, the most effective way to punish the third party is through *strategic delay*, i.e., by conditioning the acceptance probability of a proposal on the third party's current-period protesting decision. Our main result shows that such delay is both necessary and sufficient for full surplus extraction. Concretely, strategic delay serves as an endogenous punishment device for protests by postponing with positive probability a harmful agreement for the third party only after acquiescence.

If bargaining is not purely redistributive, i.e., an agreement between the bargainers may produce or destroy social value, strategic delay can still be used to limit the influence of protests as long as the welfare effects of an agreement are not too large.

Due Diligence in Common Value Auctions

with Ferdinand Pieroth

Multiple buyers compete to purchase an indivisible good in an informal common value auction. Buyers are symmetrically uninformed about the good's value but can privately learn it at a cost if the seller grants them access to confidential information. Should the seller grant such access? If so, when? We study the optimal timing of information acquisition that maximizes the seller's payoff guarantee across equilibria. Information acquisition before bidding is dominated by no information access. Instead, for high enough stakes, *due diligence* is optimal: The seller allows the auction winner to acquire information after bidding and possibly renege from the purchase thereafter.

Misaligning Incentives in Teams

with Tan Gan and Ferdinand Pieroth

In a multi-agent setting, we study the optimal design of monitoring and compensation to uniquely implement work under contracting frictions. The principal monitors workers flexibly but is constrained in the number of messages she can use to define performance goals. A contract features aligned incentives if all co-workers agree with a worker's preferences for work. Our main result shows that misaligning workers' incentives is optimal as it decreases the positive externalities they have on each other's remuneration. This allows the principal to extract the full surplus from a team whose size grows exponentially with the number of available messages.

Competing to Commit: Markets with Rational Inattention (2024)

with Francesco Fabbri and Ferdinand Pieroth

American Economic Review, 114(1), pp. 285-306

Two homogeneous-good firms compete for a consumer's unitary demand. The consumer is rationally inattentive and pays entropy costs to process information about firms' offers. Compared to a collusion benchmark, competition produces two effects. As in standard models, competition puts downward pressure on prices. But, additionally, an *attention effect* arises: The consumer engages in trade more often. This alleviates the commitment problem that firms have when facing inattentive consumers and increases trade efficiency. For high enough attention costs, the attention effect dominates the effect on prices: Firms' profits are higher under competition than under collusion.