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**CHOICE UNDER PRESSURE
A Dual Preference Model and Its Application**

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CHOICE UNDER PRESSURE

A Dual Preference Model and Its Application

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Abstract

By making a distinction between public and private preferences, the paper presents a dual preference model depicting possible responses (i.e., exit, sincere voice and self-subversion) to social pressures from two opposing pressure groups. Exit is deserting the setting; sincere voice is publicly expressing dissatisfaction and self-subversion is the misrepresentation of one's private preference under social pressures. Exit and sincere voice involve prohibitive costs, making self-subversion the superior option. Massive self-subversion polarizes the society, harboring multiple social equilibria with oscillating public opinion. In an effort to dominate the public discourse, each rival pressure group opts for favorable corner equilibrium. The paper applies the dual preference model to Turkey where two kinds of self-subversion appear in response to competing Islamist and secularist social projects. Islamist pressures lead to pro-Islamist self-subversion, and secularist pressures to pro-secularist self-subversion, resulting in the polarization of the Turkish public opinion along Islamists vs. Secularists. Three field experiments with 450 respondents provide empirical support for the model's conclusions. The paper ends with the discussion of the model's implications for new social equilibrium(s).

JEL: D58, D70, D72, D79, D82, Z12

Keywords: Public preference, private preference, pressure group, exit, sincere voice, self-subversion, multiple equilibria, public opinion, polarization, Islam, secularism, Turkey.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In Turkey, Islamists and secularists have long battled to control public opinion. Secularists have attempted to lock religion into the private sphere. For their part, Islamists have strived for more public visibility. On each side, activists have exerted tremendous pressures on the non-activist majority, trying to make ordinary individuals act as if they are committed to their own position. In order to determine the non-activist majority's responses to Islamist and secularist pressures, we have conducted three identical field experiments over the last decade (1998, 2004, and 2008) as follows: In both experiments, a pair of interviewers carried out interviews in sets of three, administering them identically, except for the types of accessories used by the interviewers. In one interview, the interviewers carried Islamist symbols. In the other, secularist symbols were used. Lastly, in the neutral interview, the interviewers had no symbols at all. While the three hundred participants revealed more or less similar responses to the questions not related to religion, the questions on secularism and Islamism yielded *extremely* significant changes in the participants' revealed preferences at the level of ($p < 0.005$). The field experiments clearly showed that people dissimulated their revealed preferences on controversial issues and taboos in response to perceived pressures. By using Turkey as a case study, this paper presents an improved version of Kuran's (1995) dual preference model depicting all the possible individual responses under social pressures. It also theorizes on the unintended consequences of such responses on the social equilibria both stable and unstable. The model also enables us to contemplate on the future of Turkish society.

2 A DUAL PREFERENCE MODEL

Let us take a hot public issue on which two rival pressure groups (i.e., Islamist and secularists) advocate diametrically opposing policies and campaign to win public opinion to their side as a source of political power: The issue could be veiling, liquor licensing, the prohibition of alcohol, regulation of prostitution in the state designated areas or the ban on interest. Each member in society one way or another has at least some opinion on these topics. Yet, in a charged public environment, especially the moderate members may find it difficult to adhere to their unique position when faced pressures from opposing Islamist and secularist camps.

Before stepping into the public sphere, each individual in the society first must decide by herself on her genuine opinion regarding Islamism and secularism. This constitutes her *private preference* that is only known to her. Then, she must decide which group to support and to what degree,

through speech and action, by declaring a *public preference*. There is no guarantee that an individual will genuinely display her private preferences in public. This forms the basis of the dual preference model in which the individual drives separate utilities from holding private and public preferences.

2.1 Intrinsic Utility

First think of an individual who must make a decision in a secret ballot referendum, e.g., the abolition or strict enforcement of the ban on the veil in schools and public offices. A pious Muslim is likely to vote YES for the abolition whereas a secular citizen may vote NO for the abolition. In a secret ballot, an individual will vote for the option that provides her the greatest intrinsic utility on the issue in question by doing cost-benefit analysis. Independent of what the individual does under social pressure, the intrinsic utility depends on her private preference represented by

$$I = I(x), \tag{1}$$

where x represents her *private preference* towards veiling -- the preference that the individual has in her heart. $I(x)$ is assumed to be concave, and the private preference, x^* maximizes the intrinsic utility when the individual is true to herself. A veiled pious Muslim female derives utmost inner satisfaction as she knows that she is pleasing Allah. An unveiled woman, a strong believer in the secular dress code, enjoys intrinsic utility from being secular. Their values range from 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) to 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled) such that $x^* \in [0, 100]$. Hence, the individual private preferences constitute a continuum between complete veiling of women in both public and private domains on the one extreme and complete unveiling on the other. Intrinsic utility function is, at its maximum, denoted by $I(x^*)$ and is fixed for every individual at \hat{I} such that $\hat{I} = I(x^*=0) = \dots = I(x^*=100)$ for all $x^* \in [0, 100]$. By assumption, each individual preference leans towards either the Islamist side or the secularist side on the issue of veiling along with others such that no neutral person reveals a preference of $x^*=50$. Although private preferences may change over time, the pace of change is very likely to be slow so that we can treat preferences as fixed in the short run.

If the individual derives only intrinsic utility she will clearly set her public and private preferences equal to each other to optimize her happiness. However, in the presence of social pressure, she will have to decide on whether to conform to the social norms of “acceptable” lifestyles, which fits

with the society's choice. This brings us to the other sources of utility for an individual who enters the public realm.

2.2 Reputational Utility

If an individual prefers not to wear socks, her preference is a non-issue since it is considered a matter of personal choice. However, this is not the case for veiling. The activity of veiling itself becomes a political matter if it is a matter of social concern as in Turkey (as well as in Europe and many other Muslim countries) where most Islamists and secularists view the act of veiling as a political statement in the public sphere. As in the act of veiling, we routinely state our opinions about most social issues by making our preferences known to others through actions, words, gestures and even through the way we dress in the public sphere. When a woman steps out of her house veiled, she makes others know her public preference on an Islamic way of life. The preferences we make known to others are our public preferences, y . The net payoff we receive from the various responses to a public preference is our reputational utility - utility from the reputation of signaling that particular preference. To the extent that our public preferences match others' expectations in conformity with the accepted social norms and opinions, we are rewarded by their approval and respect. Hence, the closer our public preferences represented by y^* gets to society's choice, y_H where H stands for "home," the more we feel gratified in the public sphere.

The following function relates reputational utility of an individual to her public preference y capturing the effect of net social rewards or punishments in response to her revealed public preference to determine the net payoff from reputational considerations:

$$R = \rho R(y), \quad (2)$$

where $R(y)$ is concave in y and $y \in [0, 100]$ and ρ is the weighting factor of reputational utility. Public preference y is continuous between 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) and 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled). $R(y)$ is maximized at $y^*=0$ when a completely Islamist society adopts strictly Islamist policies such that $y_H=0$. If the individual exhibits a public preference of $y^*=100$ in a strictly Islamic society where $y_H=0$, her reputational utility will be zero as she will be ostracized by all members of the society or even sentenced to prison if she takes off her veil as in Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other extreme, $R(y)$ is maximized at $y^*=100$ when the society is extremely secularist with $y_H=100$. She will gain acceptance in social circles by unveiling herself in the public. If the individual exhibits a

public preference of $y^*=0$ in a secular society with $y_H=100$, and veils herself, her reputational utility will be zero as she will be banned from work by law in public offices, and be disapproved in social contexts. Note that as long as she strictly pursues a lifestyle in accordance with society's preferences, she will maximize her reputational utility at a particular y^* where $y^*=y_H$ and $R(0)=\dots=R(100)$ at their maximum. As such, $R(y)$ is the reputational utility individual expects to get from pursuing a lifestyle in conformity with the society's preferences and ρ captures how "enthusiastically" the individual tend to advocate her public preference in the public sphere.

The amount of ρ will vary with several factors. Following Bibb Latane's (1981) theory of social impact, ρ can be specified as $[s.i.(n)^t]$, a multiplicative function of the strength (s), immediacy (i), and the number of the people supporting (y). As a superscript, (t) refers to the decreasing marginal effect of increased (y) supporters. Strength (s) captures the net salience, power, importance, or intensity of the pressure group pressuring on individual to side with its worldview. Strength results from such factors as of the group's socio-economic status, ability, or motivation that creates the fear of seclusion for possible deviant members but offers the status for conforming members in a cohesive manner especially a member has a judgment difficulty. It changes $0<s<1$. The more s is close to 1, the more individual feels the strength of the group pressure demanding him to publicly align with the common preference. As s closes to 0 individual perceives the strength of the group on him less highly. Another common factor affecting the level of conformity is immediacy (i) referring to closeness in space and time and lack of intervening obstacles. It also varies $0<i<1$, 0 being away from the pressure group and 1 being very close. The closer the individual to the pressure group is the greater the influence of the group upon the individual (Bibb Latane, 1995). Here the closeness refers not only to strict physical distance but also the social network the individual finds herself (Latane and L'Herrou 1996). The last component, (n), simply shows the number of the people who publicly advocate (y). It is by definition $n>1$. The more members of society approve the individual public preference the more individual will enjoy the reputational utility. However, the superscript (t) as being $t < 1$ implies that the group size will affect the amount of ρ at a decreasing rate. In other words, there is a marginally decreasing effect of increased supplies of (y) advocates, implying social impact will "increase in proportion to some root of the number of the people" (Bibb. Latane, 1981, 344) supporting a particular public preference. In short, as a multiplicative function of strength, immediacy, and the number of the supporters, ρ amounts to the reputational utility an individual will enjoy from revealing a particular public preference. Recall that ρ is a very subjective parameter since its magnitude depends on individual's need for social approval.

Higher ρ means higher reputational benefits from displaying a certain public preference y , identical to the group's preference, y_H .

Hence, while holding a particular private preference on an issue provides intrinsic utility, conforming to group's norms and preferences offer reputational utility for the individual. By veiling herself, a Muslim woman will get the satisfaction of conducting her life in accordance with Islamic teachings, and therefore, she feels in her heart that she is pleasing Allah. This is the basis of her intrinsic utility. Her reputational utility, on the other hand, stems from the rewards and punishments resulting from others' attitude towards her practice of veiling. If her publicly revealed preference, y^* matches the society's choice, y_H , then she will gain the maximum reputational utility. However, as indicated before, an individual's private preference may not match her publicly revealed preference on a given issue. Human beings also value their autonomy and self-assertiveness. The next section incorporates this psychological component into the dual preference model.

2.3 Expressive Utility

We exercise our individual autonomy through expressing ourselves. We derive pleasure from revealing our inner thoughts and enjoy being genuine about our inner preferences in the public domain to protect our individuality, integrity and dignity. We, human beings, have this need for individual autonomy and self-assertiveness, asking for resistance to social pressures. Several towering figures in psychology (Freud, Allport, Fromm, and Maslow) recognized the need for the individual to express himself and the psychic cost the individual incurs when she sacrifices her integrity.

Expressive utility captures the pleasure we derive from being self-assertive as we do when we speak up our minds and the psychic cost we incur when we conform to public pressure. The more we suppress our inner thoughts and beliefs, and yield to social pressures, the greater will be the discrepancy between our private and public preferences such that our x^* will be different from y^* as our public preference y^* gets closer to society's choice y_H . A veiled woman with an Islamist orientation who goes to work in a state institution unveiled to keep her job must also compromise her expressive utility as she is pressured to behave against her own individual preferences in line with Islamic requirements. Thus, individuals yield to public pressure to generate reputational utility at the expense of their expressive utility where the difference between their public and private preferences and hence, the psychic cost incurred is the greatest.

The following function captures this aspect of expressive utility:

$$E = \varepsilon E(100 - |y - x|) \quad (3)$$

where $(100 - |y - x|)$ simply determines the proximity of the individual's public preference to her private preference for a given society's choice, y_H . The function $E(100 - |y - x|)$ is assumed to be increasing in $100 - |y - x|$ and concave over the bounds $[0, E(100)]$. If her public preference y^* and her private preference x^* are identical, she will have the maximum expressive utility from revealing her true self. The individual specific parameter ε captures how much the individual values her drive for self-assertiveness in terms of her lifestyle and political orientation. Being $\varepsilon > 1$, the higher ε means that an individual cares more about expressing her own views. Notice that the drive for genuine self-assertiveness varies greatly across individuals and ε scales the expressive utility upwards or downwards depending on its individual specific value. The expressive utility is maximized when $x^* = y^*$ such that $\hat{E} = \varepsilon E(100)$. This is the case when unveiled women assert their individuality by disregarding the Islamist social pressure. Note also that when the discrepancy between y^* and x^* is at a maximum, then the expressive utility $E = \varepsilon E(0) = 0$ is at a minimum. As an example, a veiled woman compelled to remove her scarf in a university or in the parliament must suffer from a complete loss of her expressive utility by giving in to the rules of the secular state. By contrast, she may assert her individuality and her worldview by attending such public institutions completely veiled.

In every society, there exists a group of individuals with a very high value of ε , who sticks to their genuine private preferences at any cost. For them, ε is so high that their expressive utility overrode their reputational concerns such that $\varepsilon E(100)$ at $x^* = y^*$ exceeded their maximum reputational utility, say, $R(y')$ where y' is any public preference different from private preference x^* but equal to society's choice y_H . I call such people as *activists* who publicly promote their worldviews. Merve Kavakçı, an elected deputy in the 1999 elections, who entered the Turkish Parliament wearing a headscarf despite the strict secular dress code, is a case in point. Another example is Aziz Nesin, a famous self-declared atheist writer who narrowly escaped from burning alive in 1993 when an angry mob arson his hotel, resulting in more than 35 deaths.

Ironically, the chameleon majority adamantly admire the self-assertiveness of the few who resist subordination at *any cost*. Yet, such a trait is the exception, not the rule in human history. For this precise reason, ε , an individual-specific parameter takes a small value for the most people

that. I call *non-activists*. Therefore, non-activist majority are more likely to be susceptible to the social pressures either from activist Islamists or secularists.

Thus, the dual preference model presented here depicts a framework in which an individual has multiple sources of happiness and the total utility of an individual may be represented as the sum of these utilities in the following form:

$$U(x, y) = I(x) + \rho R(y) + \varepsilon E(100 - |y - x|). \tag{4}$$

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Table 1 shows four different cases. In Cases I and II, no difference between public and private preferences exists. In Cases III and IV, however, private preference differs from public preference where the dual preference model helps us analyze three distinct responses, i.e., exit, sincere voice, and self-subversion to opposing group pressures, e.g., Islamists or secularists.

Table 1: Preferences and Groups

PREFERENCE	GROUP	PUBLIC	
		ISLAMIST	SECULARIST
PRIVATE	ISLAMIST	CASE I	CASE III
	SECULARIST	CASE IV	CASE II

Also recall that both public and private preferences, x and y , take on a value between 0 (extreme Islamist) and 100 (extreme secularist) such that x^* and $y^* \in [0, 100]$ on all social issues regarding these contending worldviews and lifestyles.

3.1 Case I

Case I refers to an Islamist setting in which individuals have public and private preferences identical to each other such that $x^* = y^*$ and x^*, y^* and

$y_H \in [0, 50]$ where 50 represents a neutral position relative to both secularist and Islamist worldviews and lifestyles. y_H stands for the society's choice at home. In such a setting, the dual preference model becomes a single preference model in which the individual faces no public pressure to express a preference different than her own genuine private choice. For example, a devout Muslim woman with a private preference of 15 who prefers to veil will experience no public pressure to unveil herself. On the contrary, the public approves her act of veiling as long as society's preference, y_H matches $y^*=15$. This means that in addition to generating a maximum amount of intrinsic utility, she will enjoy the greatest reputational benefits such that $\rho R(15)$ is at its maximum with $y^*=y_H=15$. Furthermore, the individual will experience no emotional strife from being untrue to her inner self and her expressive utilities too will be at a maximum. Thus, her total utility under the "ideal" Islamist world is,

$$\hat{I}(15) + \rho R(15) + \varepsilon E(100), \quad (5)$$

generating the largest utility possible that a practicing Muslim will entertain under Case I. This case also depicts the position of a Muslim living in Iran or Saudi Arabia under the *Shariat* rule or another Muslim society with less extreme Islamist policies provided that individuals' inner preferences match those of the society.

3.2 Case II

The second case refers to a secularist lifestyle in which both public and private preferences coincide such that $x^* = y^*$ and x^*, y^* and $y_H \in (50, 100]$. Since no individual with Islamist preferences exists in this setting, each member of society has both secular private and public preferences. In this setting, no woman is willing to or pressured to veil as there exists no Islamic lifestyles. The individuals' secular private preferences completely match those of the society and hence, they can unhesitatingly be true to themselves in public. Case II also yields the largest possible utility for the individual with a secular private preference of 80 provided that the society's preference, y_H is also 80. In the absence of social pressures, the individual will enjoy the highest reputational utility such that $\rho R(80)$ is at its maximum with $y^*=y_H=80$. Furthermore, no psychic cost will also let her to enjoy the maximum amount of expressive utility at $\varepsilon E(100)$. Hence, her total utility under the "ideal" secular world will be equal to

$$\hat{I}(80) + \rho R(80) + \varepsilon E(100), \quad (6)$$

generating the largest utility possible that a secularist will entertain under Case II.

In both Case I and Case II, the individual does not face opposing group pressures. However, the crux of this paper is to examine the choice under social pressure where individuals continually find themselves in social settings, which contradict their genuine private preferences. Cases III and IV specify two such possible settings. In the coming sections, the dual preference model will help formalize three possible responses: exit, sincere voice, and self-subversion to the opposing pressure groups.¹

3.3 Case III

Case III deals with the responses of a practicing Muslim to secular settings. In conducting her daily life structured by some principles of secularist modernity, a practicing Muslim confronts many obstacles to carrying out the duties that Islam demands from her. Secular principles, norms, and behavioral patterns introduced by the state and adopted by the majority in the public domain put her in a position in which she has to endure several contradictions between her privately held beliefs and behaviors in the public sphere. In deciding whether she has to run her life in accordance with her religious beliefs or to fit into a secularist lifestyle, she chooses one of the following options that generates the highest amount of total utility.

3.3.1 Exit

Exit simply means leaving the secular setting. When she realizes that it is impossible to run her life according to Islamic rules under the secular social structures, a devout Muslim may desert the secular setting. Take the example of a veiled female student attending a state university that imposes a secular dress code with an Islamist private preference of 15 in a secular setting with a public preference of 80 where $y_H=80$. In this setting, neither the veiled female student nor the society is extremist. But the public displays a secularist worldview while tolerating some forms of Islamism and the veiled female student is holding moderate interpretations of Islam. If this student is unwilling to compromise her position only other option for her to get higher education is to migrate to another Islamic country or a pluralistic Western European university which protects her individual liberty to veil. Let us assume that she transfers to a university in an Islamic country where

¹ I was inspired for the first two mechanisms; exit and sincere voice, by Hirschman (1970). The last one, self-subversion originates from what Kuran (1995) calls as preference falsification. The term itself comes from Hirschman (1995).

society's stance, y_E matches her private preference, x^* at 15 such that y_E stands for the society's choice abroad (exit case). In this new setting, she will continue to enjoy her maximum intrinsic utility, i.e., $\hat{I}(15)$ and the highest expressive utility, i.e., $\varepsilon E(100)$. Most importantly, since she reveals Islamic preferences in accordance with that of the society at 15 that also produces reputational benefits. Symbolically, one will exit from Case III to Case I if her total utility from revealing an identical public and private preference of 15 in the foreign country exceeds or is equal to the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society's choice, $y_H=80$ plus the exit cost C such that

$$\hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100-|15-15|) + \rho R_E(15) \geq \hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100-|80-15|) + \rho R_H(80) + C$$

$$\varepsilon E(100) + \rho R_E(15) \geq \varepsilon E(35) + \rho R_H(80) + C$$

$$\text{then } \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\} \geq \rho \{R_H(80) - R_E(15)\} + C. \quad (7)$$

Note that $\rho R_E(15)$ is at maximum when she exits to an Islamic setting abroad and $\rho R_H(80)$ is at maximum when she stays and conforms to the society at $y_H = 80$. Let us assume that $\rho R_H(80) = \rho R_E(15)$ for simplicity. The above condition becomes $\varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\} \geq C$.

C captures not only the direct cost of financing the exit but also the indirect costs the individual incurs such as loss of jobs, business ties, relationships and social network. Yet, exit may also generate significant benefits in the form of a more desirable lifestyle abroad, escaping social ostracism and even, danger of losing one's life, possibly resulting in a substantially low cost of exit which should be netted out. In this case, exit is even more viable option because low net cost of exit increases the likelihood that the expressive utility exceeds the sum of the reputational gain from conformity and the cost of exit. Therefore, the necessary condition for exit is that the individual has the financial means to afford this option (case where C is positive but small). The sufficient condition for exit is that the fugitive must have a desirable lifestyle abroad (case where C turns negative). Hence, exit option will be chosen by this individual so long as exit cost is less than the net expressive utility where $C \leq \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\}$.

Alternatively, if her total utility of exit and net of exit costs exceed or are equal to her total utility from speaking out against the secular setting with $y_H = 80$, then

$$\hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100-|15-15|) + \rho R_E(15) \geq \hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100-|15-15|) + \rho R_H(15) + C$$

hence, $\rho R_E(15) \geq \rho R_H(15) + C$. (8)

Note that $\rho R_H(15)$ is less than $\rho R_E(15)$ at its maximum. If both of these conditions are satisfied, then the individual will exit the secularist setting rather than speaking out or conforming. One of the famous examples of exit was Mehmet Akif [Ersoy], an ardent Islamist and the poet of the Turkish national anthem. After the Independence War, he despised the Kemalist reforms suppressing Islam. He left for Egypt during the heyday of the Kemalist secularism between 1926 and 1933. He returned to Turkey in 1936 before he died a few months later.

However, severe financial constraints and limited options for immigration makes exit cost prohibitively high for the majority. Hence, for such an individual with a net exit cost of C such that $C > \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\}$ or $\rho R_E(15) < \rho R_H(15) + C$, sincere voice or self-subversion are other possible options.

3.3.2 Sincere Voice

Sincere voice is to express dissatisfaction to secularists by revealing one's Islamist private preferences. As an individual may sincerely voice her opposition to a group from which she would like to detach herself. A female doctor may refuse to examine a male patient, since she believes that Islam forbids her to touch any male other than husband or close kin. A veiled student may join pro-veiling protests, demanding the right to veil on campus.

The individual will resist the secularist pressures if her total utility from sincere voice in which she reveals an identical public and private preference of 15, exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society's secularist setting at 80. Symbolically, the condition for sincere voice in such a secular setting is,

$$\hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100 - |15 - 15|) + \rho R(15) \geq \hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 15|) + \rho R(80)$$

$$\varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\} \geq \rho \{R(80) - R(15)\}. \quad (9)$$

Given that $\rho R_E(15) < \rho R_H(15) + C$ such that sincere voice is also preferred to exit and the condition for sincere voice is satisfied when the sum of the net expressive utility from self-assertiveness and the net intrinsic utility from being true to oneself is large enough to exceed the net reputational utility from conformity and when the total utility of sincere voice exceeds the total utility of exit.

The option of sincere voice covers both the Islamist activists and the non-activists with the large enough expressive utilities to override reputational concerns in a secular setting. But among those who engage in sincere voice, the Islamist activists will fight forcefully against secularist pressures while attempting to exert some pressures on non-activist individuals to join them. These activists have relatively large individual specific parameter ε , which increases the intensity of their desire to defend their private preferences to the point of imposing their own worldview on others while lambasting the secular setting. Jubilantly cherishing their integrity, intellectuals have large ε values corresponding to higher expressive utility. Indeed, many Islamist intellectuals bash secularist pressures by writing articles, making public speeches, organizing protest meetings. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Cemil Meriç and İsmet Özel are among such intellectuals.

3.3.3 Pro-secularist Self-Subversion

Pro-secularist self-subversion occurs when a religious person hides her Islamic preferences and publicly conveys a secularist preference in response to secularist pressures. In other words, pro-secularist self-subversion is an act of misrepresenting one's genuine religious beliefs under the secularist pressures. This is a legitimate option within Islam. The *Shi'ite* doctrine of *taqiya* allows devout Muslims to dissimulate their religious orientations by hiding their particular religious rites and ritual practices. For example, a veiled female student may choose to take off her scarf in order to get admitted to a Turkish university, which imposes a secular dress code.

The condition for pro-secularist self-subversion is satisfied when a female with an Islamist private preference of 15 and a desire to veil takes off her scarf in public in conformity with the secular public setting of 80 to generate reputational gains. Symbolically, the condition for this case follows;

$$\hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100 - |15 - 15|) + \rho R(15) < \hat{I}(15) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 15|) + \rho R(80)$$

$$\text{then } \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\} < \rho \{R(80) - R(15)\} \quad (10)$$

such that conformity in the form of self-subversion is preferred to sincere voice and it is also preferred to exit when $\varepsilon \{E(100) - E(35)\} < C$.

Each ordinary person easily senses that her opinion will have no effect upon the secularist majority since she is only one among many. Rather than going against secularist groups, she may enjoy their approval by pretending

to be secular at the cost of being untrue to herself. Obviously, she values reputational rewards more highly than her integrity. This is the case for the majority in Turkey.

Note that under Case III, considering all three possible choices, (i.e., exit, sincere voice and pro-secularist self-subversion) simultaneously, the individual will choose the option that maximizes her utility.

3.4 Case IV

Case IV frames the responses of a secular citizen to Islamist settings. In conducting her daily life within a Muslim culture, a secular citizen has a difficult time in avoiding the Islamist pressures. Many Islamist social norms and behavioral patterns oblige her to withstand several contradictions. She is continually caught between running her life in accordance with secularist quests and fitting into Muslim culture. She again has the same three options. A secular citizen will choose an option that produces for her the highest total utility, depending upon her individual specific parameters.

3.4.1 Exit

Exit is to leave the Islamist setting. An atheist who can not endure pressures from the Muslim community may settle in a predominantly non-Muslim country. Take an example from the daily life of an ordinary female with a secularist orientation at 80 living in an Islamist setting in Saudi Arabia with a public's preference of 10. She may value her secularist lifestyle which offers her individual liberties such as unveiling and driving a car without a male present in the car much more than conforming to the Islamist worldview which pressures her to veil and suppresses her freedom of action. This female with the financial means and opportunities to make a living abroad can choose to exit from Case IV to Case II if her total utility from revealing an identical public and private preference of 80 net of exit cost C exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society's preference y_H at 10 such that

$$\hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 80|) + \rho R_E(80) \geq \hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |10 - 80|) + \rho R_H(10) + C$$

$$\varepsilon E(100) + \rho R_E(80) \geq \varepsilon E(30) + \rho R_H(10) + C$$

$$\text{then } \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\} \geq \rho \{R_H(10) - R_E(80)\} + C. \quad (11)$$

Again, when we impose that $\rho R_H(10) = \rho R_E(80)$, we can rewrite this condition as $\varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\} \geq C$. Hence, exit is preferred to conformity given this condition. But for exit to be a preferred course of action, her total utility under exit should also be greater than her utility from sincere voice. Thus, individual will choose to exit over sincere voice given the following condition:

$$\hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 80|) + \rho R_E(80) \geq \hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 80|) + \rho R_H(80) + C,$$

$$\text{thus } \rho R_E(80) \geq \rho R_H(80) + C. \quad (12)$$

Note that $R_H(80)$ is less than the maximum value of $\rho R_E(80)$. If (11) and (12) are satisfied, then the individual will exit the Islamist setting rather than speaking out or conforming.

The stricter the penalties on the individual with available means, the more likely an individual will exit as its cost turns negative. For example, Niyazi Berkes, a pro-secularist scholar, after being beaten by pro-Islamist activists, left Turkey in 1949 for Canada, where he was able to resume his career. İlhan Arsel, a self-declared atheist and anti-religious professor of the Ankara School of Law, also decided to live in the United States as a result of several death threats from radical Islamists in Turkey.² Another academician, critical of Islamic economics, received several death threats after a newspaper had popularized his research. He had to withdraw his article from publication in a prestigious Middle Eastern journal. He resigned from his tenured position at a Turkish University and resumed his career in the United States.³ For them, cost of exit must have turned negative as he escaped to another country to save his life or the benefits of exit more than compensated for the direct and indirect costs of exit.

Yet, the majority has no available means to successfully exit. Hence, for such an individual with large exit costs such that $C > \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\}$ or $R_E(80) < R_H(80) + C$, sincere voice or self-subversion remains as a possible course of action.

² For his anti-Islamic writings see Arsel (1977 and 1995).

³ Personal correspondence, 15 October 1999. I keep his name secret to protect his privacy.

3.4.2 Sincere Voice

Sincere voice is the expression of dissatisfaction with the Islamist setting by declaring secular private preferences. A high school student may protest against the Ministry of National Education that compels her to take a religion course each year. A hotel owner will speak out against Islamists who want to close topless beaches to avoid losing customers who enjoy topless sunbathing. The sincere voice option is the case for an individual who refuses to compromise her private preference at 80 in an Islamist setting which rewards her public preference at a maximum if it matches the society's setting, y_H at 10 such that $R(10)$ represents the maximum amount of reputational gains under the Islamic setting. The condition for sincere voice in an Islamist setting emerges when the individual's total utility under sincere voice exceeds her total utility from conforming to the Islamic setting. This can be symbolically written as:

$$\hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 80|) + \rho R(80) \geq \hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |10 - 80|) + \rho R(10)$$

$$\text{then } \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\} \geq \rho \{R(10) - R(80)\} \quad (13)$$

and sincere voice is preferred to conformity, and if $\rho R_E(80) < \rho R_H(80) + C$ is satisfied sincere voice is also preferred to exit.

Secularist activists whose expressive satisfaction surpasses the Islamist reputational benefits will, for example, lambast all Islamists. Among those who could afford the exit option, some activist individuals with a large ε may choose to fight against the Islamist worldview to protect their autonomy and those of the non-activists with a secularist orientation. Sincerely speaking up in public can be costly for an individual and might even be fatal. For instance, Bahriye Üçok, Muhammed Aksoy, Uğur Mumcu, Çetin Emeç, and Turan Dursun, all five strongly secularist intellectuals, were probably assassinated by illegal radical Islamist organizations. The case of Turan Dursun was the most striking example. Dursun himself was once an esteemed *mufti*, the highest rank for a provincial *imam*. When he turned into a self-declared atheist, he publicly condemned the Islamist worldview. "I do not want to be squeezed between what I live and what I think," (36) said Dursun (1992) in one of his late interviews. He resigned from his religious post and wrote several books through which he attacked the original texts of Islam. He was one of the most outspoken secularist and anti-Islamist before he was assassinated in 1990.

Although the cases above are extreme, voice may still bring some undesirable consequences. In less dramatic cases, individuals may fear

losing their old business ties, relationships and the social network within which they have lived for years. In addition, they may be fearful of possible social ostracism. Hence, most people are more likely to engage in pro-Islamist self-subversion.

3.4.3 Pro-Islamist Self-Subversion

If one has private preferences supportive of the secularist worldview, but she misrepresents these preferences under Islamist pressures, she engages in pro-Islamist self-subversion. For example, a shopkeeper who decorates his shop with religious symbols falsifies his secular private preferences so as not to be stigmatized as anti-religious; a newcomer to a city who behaves as if he is a devout Muslim to find a job; a student who pretends to practice Islam to stay in a dormitory funded by the Islamists – all succumb to Islamic pressures are falsifying their preferences.

The condition for pro-Islamist self-subversion is that the reputational benefits from behaving as a devout Muslim override one's expressive needs to be secular. Symbolically, the condition for pro-Islamist self-subversion is

$$\hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |80 - 80|) + \rho R_H(80) < \hat{I}(80) + \varepsilon E(100 - |10 - 80|) + \rho R(10)$$

$$\text{then } \varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\} < \rho \{R(10) - R(80)\} \quad (14)$$

such that self-subversion is preferred to sincere voice and recall that it is also preferred to exit when $\varepsilon \{E(100) - E(30)\} < C$.

For many, this appears to be the case. These individuals perceive that their opinion will have no influence upon the setting. Rather than standing up the Islamists, one may enjoy their social approval by pretending to be a pious Muslim at the cost of being untrue to herself. To illustrate, after years of being exposed to secularist ideas during her education in secular schools, a young female student might believe that Islam has no respect for woman's rights and might object to the practice of veiling. Yet, she may feel obliged to wear a headscarf when vacationing in her conservative hometown, fearing her relatives criticize her for disregarding the Islamic dress code.

3.5 Tying It All Together

The following figure summarizes all the possible responses to the collision of Islamism and secularism in Turkey.




Figure 1: Decision Tree

As any individual enters into a new setting she readily observes its general characteristics on its pro-secularist or pro-Islamist orientation. She will notice the others' outfits, especially any religious or secularist symbols. Veiled women, men with silver wedding rings, with distinctive beard styles, or long rosaries are the common signals of Islamist settings. In contrast, presence of M. Kemal Atatürk in the form of pictures, rosettes, or statue generally signals a strong pro-secularist orientation. Certain words also give clues about Islamist or secularist tendencies. If the individual's private preference coincides with the setting, then she will have no difficulty in expressing her own preference on the several controversial issues to the others. In cases where her private preference differs from the others' public preferences she will immediately sense that she will face social pressures that will produce a reputational loss. In short, any individual in Turkey inevitably finds herself either in Case III or Case IV, which leaves individuals with two options: to stay or to move to a setting that matches her private preferences. A devout Muslim may immigrate to another country where she may conduct her life in accordance with Islamic rules. A secular individual may settle in a country where she can avoid Islamist pressures.

Since the exit option is beyond the financial capabilities of many, most individuals would stay. Such individuals have two options: First, she may not hesitate to reveal her private preference despite the social oppositional pressures, and freely speak up her mind. Said-i Nursi criticized secular reforms in Turkey, even though he spent several years in jail. Turan Dursun has written many anti-Islamic books before his assassination in

1990. Thus, sincere voice also involve huge costs. Second, the individual may engage in self-subversion by adapting herself to the social milieu. In order to avoid reputational losses, individuals are likely to engage in pro-Islamist or pro-secularist self-subversion, as the least costly option in response to the collision of Islamism and secularism in Turkey.

3.6 Taking a Side

Islamists and secularists constitute two competing pressure groups in Turkey. Each camp has an inner core of activists with an outer ring of non-activists. By definition, activists do not mind revealing their private preferences in public, deliberately propagating their views in order to win mass support for their particular worldview. Regardless of the social setting, a secularist activist will always support her right to consume alcohol and an Islamist female activist will always refuse to unveil herself. In non-activists' support for their cause, Islamists want more women veiled in the public sphere while secularists demand fewer Islamist symbols. The resulting collectivity, including activists as well as non-activists professing support for a specific cause, forms a pressure group.

The Islamist pressure group is composed of the ardent supporters of Islamism and other practicing Muslims, including the members of the Islamist parties, Nakşibendi religious orders, Islamist Nurcu community and veiled students, all vacuously revealing their Islamist preferences in public. Likewise, the secularist pressure group includes the ardent supporters of secularism such as the members of the Society for Atatürkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) and the Society to Support Modern Life Style (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği). In order to succeed in their common goal, like-minded activists seek support of non-activists. The activists enjoy more power as they increase the number of non-activists supporting their own cause. More veiled women in the public sphere indicate greater Islamization. More protestors against Islamist policies signal the power of the secularist establishment. For this reason, the pressure groups offer substantial benefits to their supporters while imposing considerable penalties on their challengers. As a result, the prevailing reputational incentives play a crucial role in determining non-activists' public preferences.

In a polarized political environment where two pressure groups like Islamists and secularists routinely push non-activists to take a side it is extremely difficult for each non-activist to place herself in a neutral position. The non-activist individual will notice that staying on neutral grounds leads to an isolation from both groups, and prevents her from getting potential benefits, and leaves her vulnerable to reputational loss. Given her weak

expressive needs, a non-activist will incline to one side, depending on her proximity to the pressure group. A new bride will veil herself to get along with her husband's conservative family even if she dislikes Islamist dress. A female freshman will take her veil off when she enrolls into a college. One way or another, each non-activist tries to fit into her social setting.

3.7 Public Opinion versus Private Opinion

Not all public differences will have the same effect in forming public opinion on a specific issue. A public statement of a religious leader or an army general on the veil will probably have a greater impact than the similar declaration by a non-activist. To keep the model simple, let us ignore the differences in personal influence and treat each individual's impact as the same and investigate the distribution of public and private preferences.




Figure 2: Polarized Public Opinion
 Source: Adopted from Kuran (1995; 57, figure 3.1)

In the absence of any pro-secularist and pro-Islamist self-subversion, each individual will place herself somewhere between the spectrum of 0 (i.e., complete Islamization) and 100 (i.e., complete secularization). The very existence of self-subversion makes impossible to know the exact distribution of private preferences along this spectrum. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that many moderate views in the Turkish society with many different interpretations of Islam and secularism along the range of [0, 100]. Moderates may form the majority and the distribution of private preferences would surface as a normal distribution. Even though the normal distribution

would be the closest proximity to the reality, let us assume that private preferences are more or less evenly distributed. Let X be the arithmetic mean of all private preferences. Figure 2 shows the uniform distribution of private preferences between 0 and 100. Note that X appears as 50.

The distribution of public preferences, on the other hand, will depend on the reputational incentives. As explained before, each individual, one way or another, must pick a side between two oppositional pressure groups, namely Islamists and secularists on the issue of veiling and among many others. The percentage of the population supporting a particular side will vary according to relative strength of one group over the other. Depending on the pressure group's control over the public sphere, the number of its supporters will increase. Let Y be the corresponding arithmetic mean of all public preferences. Also assume that secularists offer more reputational benefits. It is expected that non-activists will publicly support secularist causes such as unveiling of the women in the public sphere. Figure 2 shows that 70 percent of the population supports an extreme secularist position at 100, and hence unveiling of all women in all public settings while the remaining 30 percent favor extreme Islamism at 0, and hence veiling.

The distributions of private and public preferences accordingly form private and public opinion. It will be easy to see that reputational concerns lead to a polarized public opinion even if private opinion is not polarized. In this scenario, while private opinion remains hidden, each pressure group will push harder for a favorable public opinion closer to their ultimate position. For this reason, Islamists will offer more reputational benefits for their supporters while imposing more costs on their adversaries. Secularist will do the same. Thus, both opposing sides will battle over public opinion.

4 EQUILIBRIUM

In the battle over public opinion, both Islamists and secularists intend to increase the number of the non-activists professing support for their cause as in the context of veiling issue. Islamists attempt to raise the number of veiled women in the public sphere by offering benefits to those women who are veiled and by imposing costs on those who are not. On the other hand, secularists reward unveiled women in the public spheres and try to keep the number of unveiled women as high as possible. The veiled women will face clear reputational losses from secularists.

A female non-activist has a fixed private preference. This means that she decides based on the nature of her relationship with God. Accordingly, she drives an intrinsic utility, which is also fixed at \hat{I} . As a single member of

Turkish society, she has a trivial ability to influence the collective decisions on Islamism and Turkish secularism. When she steps into the public sphere, assuming her intrinsic utility to be negligibly small, her decision to convey a religious private preference will depend on the tradeoff between her expressive needs and the reputational incentives. Given that it is impractical for her to exit the Turkish public sphere, she has to take a side between 0 i.e., extreme Islamists and 100 i.e., extreme secularists. Her reputational utility depends on favorable public opinion, more precisely the mean of the public opinion, Y which is calculated as $(0.30*0+0.70*100)=70$ as in Figure 2. Suppose her private declaration x^* is close to 0, i.e., Islamists. However, the public opinion Y at 70 is very favorable to 100, i.e., secularists. Under this case, at one point she would better off supporting secularism by unveiling herself due to her reputational gains. The switchover point refers to her political threshold point t which is indicated as 50 in Figure 3.




Figure 3: The individual's Political Threshold
 Source: Adopted from Kuran (1995: 64, figure 4.1)

She will support secularism if the mean of the public opinion is greater than her threshold, i.e., $Y > t=50$. Otherwise, if the mean of the public opinion is less than her threshold, i.e., $Y < t=50$, she would support Islamism.

It is very reasonable to expect that there are a variety of private preferences between Islamism and secularism as well as between veiling and unveiling among the Turkish people. Also, political thresholds vary across individuals stemming from different personality characteristics. Thus, there can be a variety of different distributions of thresholds among the public, and hence different cumulative distributions of thresholds. Plotting a cumulative distribution of thresholds for each Y between 0, i.e., Islamism (veiling) and 100, i.e., secularism (unveiling), gives a curve that shows the propagation of self-subversion. In short, Kuran calls such curves propagation curves. Each member of the Turkish society will form some expectations about the future mean public opinion on the issue of veiling as a result of the interplay of Islamism and secularism in the Turkish society. Let Y^e be the expected public opinion which is same for everyone; the prevailing propagation curve will result in a realization of public opinion.

In Figure 4, the expected public opinion between Islamism (veiling) and secularism (unveiling) is situated on the horizontal lower axis Y^e and the realization of public opinion is placed on the left vertical axis Y . Figure 4 depicts the position of propagation curve with respect to Y^e and Y . Figure 4 also entails 45° line that displays all possible equilibrium points where $Y^e = Y$. Suppose that expected public opinion is at 50 where the individual is at an equal distance from both Islamism and secularism. The propagation curve shows that 55 percent of the population with a threshold at or below 50 supports 100, i.e., secularism and the remaining 45 percent gives its public support to 0, i.e., Islamism. This means that an expectation of 50 yields public opinion of 55 in favor of secularism. Yet, this underestimated initial expectation of 50 will soon be revised and any expectation below 90 will generate further revision until the expected public opinion will be self-fulfilling and self-reproducing at 90. A unique equilibrium will occur where the propagation curve intersects the 45° line (the diagonal) where the expected public opinion is simply realized at 90, i.e., $Y^e = Y = 90$. At this point, there exists a single self-fulfilling expectation. In other words, the actual public opinion will match individuals' expectations only when they are correct in predicting where the actual public opinion stands on the issue of veiling.

Note that in Figure 4, 10 percent of the population has a political threshold of 0 such that for any public opinion greater than 0, $Y > t = 0$, these individuals will support secularism. I call these people hardcore secularists, or secularist activists. On the other hand, 5 percent of the population has a political threshold of 100 such that for any public opinion up to 100, these individuals will support Islamism. I call these people hardcore Islamists, or Islamist activists. The remaining 85 percent of the population are non-activists with thresholds between 0 and 100 that may lean towards either side, depending upon the strength of the pressure groups, and the stance of public opinion. The threshold of an individual which we take as 50 may change due to several factors: Holding all else constant, a rise in his private preference, say from $x^* = 30$ to 40 towards secularism, will reduce the expressive disadvantage to supporting secularism, thus lowering the threshold. Similarly, if the secularist pressure group becomes more effective in exerting a social impact on nonactivists, then the reputational benefits of supporting secularism for the individual increases, which reduces her threshold. An increase in expressive needs as captured by ε , however, will increase the threshold of the individual, making it less likely to support secularism if her private preference differs from this public preference.




Figure 4: The Propagation Curve with an Interior Equilibrium
 Source: Adopted from Kuran (1995: 64, figure 4.3)

The propagation curve in Figure 4 will clearly shift down when the share of hardcore secularists declines while the share of hardcore Islamists increases, leading to a new interior equilibrium lower than 90. The curve will shift up when the share of secularist core goes up while the share of Islamist core goes down, increasing the interior equilibrium beyond 90. As I explained elsewhere (Self-Reference, 2005), this refers to the heydays of Kemalist secularism in Turkey in the mid-1930s, the secularist core was able to exert immense pressures on the non-activists, raising the reputational benefits from joining the bandwagon of secularism. Consequently, the public opinion shifted increasingly towards support for complete secularization. Not only secularists were increasing in numbers, and as a share of the population but also their social impact as a group, were at a maximum. Panel B of the Figure 4 depicts the topographic metaphor, a valley with a lowest point at 90. A ball placed anywhere in this valley metaphorically shows movements of public opinion. It will roll towards the nadir at 90 and will remain at rest indefinitely, i.e., equilibrium point. Note that this single equilibrium point in Figure 4 lies inside the spectrum of possible expectations. So, it constitutes an interior equilibrium. It clearly states that 90 percent of the population overtly support secularism and

advocate complete unveiling of all women in the public sphere while only 10 percent support Islamism and publicly advocate complete Islamization, including veiling of all women. In the battle over public opinion, this equilibrium is not sufficient enough to serve the ultimate aim of either Islamists or secularists.




Figure 5: Corner Equilibrium
 Source: Adopted from Kuran (1995: 68, figure 4.4)

Both pressure groups work to shift this equilibrium to a new one at which all the individuals publicly support the group's position. Islamists work for complete Islamization and veiling while secularists go for complete secularization and unveiling. Complete Islamization calls for an equilibrium at 0 whereas complete secularization for an equilibrium at 100. An equilibrium that may occur at either extreme refers to a corner equilibrium where the threshold curve meets the diagonal at 0 or 100. Figure 5 illustrates one possible corner equilibrium where any expectation below 100 will produce self-corrections leading to a self-fulfilling and self-producing equilibrium at the upper left corner for the secularist position.

A corner equilibrium indicates the demise of one core of activists. In the context of Turkey, complete secularization means the disappearance of Islamism and all veiled women from the public sphere and complete Islamization calls for the suppression of secularism and unveiled women. Either case will appear as a near-corner equilibrium where only a few activists remain in the opposition. I will discuss such possibilities after examining the consequences of widespread self-subversion.

5. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA

Self-subversion may lead to multiple equilibria, indicating a polarized public opinion between two activists groups: for the Turkish case, secularists versus Islamists and leaving the majority wavering in between. There are several examples from Turkish political scene on this battle to influence the public and win support for either of these worldviews for purpose of their ultimate goals. The unwavering confrontation between Islamists and secularists divided the public opinion leading to dichotomous expectations among the masses with respect to the two camps. It is time to show how the Islamists and the secularists attempt to use social pressures to their advantage resulted in multiple societal equilibria in Turkey.

Assume that there exists a secularist core with a share of 15 percent and an Islamist core with a 10 percent share in the population, each trying to tilt the balance of political power to their side. They would keep trying to drive each other's worldview out of the public realm by forcing non-activist majority to take sides. Such polarization may entail multiple equilibria: one unstable and two stable equilibria. The two stable equilibria, generated at $Y_A = 20$ and $Y_C = 80$, refer to the opposing positions of Islamists and secularists respectively, each insisting on its position with little or no compromise. Islamist equilibrium occurs at 20, where activist Islamists permits only certain women to unveil such as foreign females and female tourists in Turkey. The secularist equilibrium exists at 80, where secularist activists only permit veiling at the religious Imam-Hatip schools. The unstable equilibrium at $Y_B = 70$ implies that even the smallest gains in terms of pressure group efficiency may lead to different expectations that can generate adjustments towards one of the stable equilibria in both directions. This may be taken to represent the current situation in Turkey with 70 percent in favor of the secularists and 30 percent in favor of the Islamists who want to see a more Islamized Turkey. Figure 6 represents such an unstable equilibrium at B.




Figure 6: Multiple Equilibria
 Source: Adopted from Kuran (1995: 70, figure 4.5)

In panel B of Figure 6 there exist two stable interior equilibria: one at 20 i.e., the Islamist equilibrium and the other at 80, i.e., the secularist equilibrium. The existing unstable equilibrium appears at 70 as a hilltop. The ball on the hilltop may eventually move towards either more Islamization (denoted here as 20) or towards more secularization (80) to achieve a single stable equilibrium. The clash between two activist groups puts the majority of people in the middle. Because of the pressures from activists, the wavering non-activist majority continually engages in extensive self-subversion. Among Islamists, a non-activist bystander will often engage in pro-Islamist self-subversion. Among secularists, he will engage in pro-secularist self-subversion. The next section documents the widespread existence of self-subversion in Turkey based on the two field experiments, capturing the existing status quo, i.e., multiple societal equilibria.

5.1 The Polarized Public Opinion in Turkey

In December 24, 1995 elections, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, an openly Islamist party emerged as the leading political institution. Following the elections, the coalition between the openly Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and the True Path party (TPP), with the WP as the senior partner, obtained a vote of confidence from the newly elected parliament. It was shocking for the secularist establishment to see Necmettin Erbakan, the WP's leader, as the first Islamist Premier of the Turkish Republic established on the founding principle of secularism. In response to the new government's Islamization policies, the secularist establishment was quick at organizing a full counterattack under the leadership of the Turkish military, self-proclaimed guardian of Kemalist secularism.

The counterattack reached at its zenith at the National Security Council's (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting on February 28, 1998.⁴ After suppressing all the Islamists within National Security Council (NSC), the Turkish military led the so-called post-modern (soft) coup known as "February 28 process" through which the secularists initiated detailed measures, aiming directly to purge Islamists from the public sphere. The 18 Directives of the February 28 ranged from general recommendations such as the request to meticulously preserve the principle of secularism to very specific ones like the strict implementation of the prohibition of wearing religious grab in public.⁵ Some "19 newspapers, 20 television stations, 51 radio stations, 110 magazines, 800 schools, 1,200 student hostels, and 2,500 associations"⁶ were marked as a part of "fundamentalist" threat to Turkish secularism. The secularist establishment urged the other civil society organizations such as women's associations, trade and business unions "to oppose the sharing of public spaces with the merging Islamic identity and lifestyle."⁷ Facing extreme secularist pressures, Islamist Premier Erbakan first reluctantly approved the February 28 package and five months later in June 1997 resigned from his post. Another coalition of secularly oriented parties soon came to power. In an aura of witch hunt for Islamists, on

⁴ The NSC includes the president, the premier, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs and defense, the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force, the gendarme forces and the secretary-general of the NSC (a high-ranking army officer). Since its decisions are constitutionally binding, it enables the military to monitor the affairs of government and intervene in the democratic process if deemed necessary. After a three-day delay the Islamist Premier Erbakan also signed this package. The Islamist Erbakan himself engaged in pro-secularist self-subversion.

⁵ For a full list of all the 18 Directives in English, see Appendix in Yavuz, (2003).

⁶ Şevket Kazan, (2001) quoted in M. Hakan Yavuz (2003).

⁷ Yavuz (2003:245).

January 1998 the following experiment was conducted to determine the revealed preferences of the Turkish people on Islamism and secularism.

A pair of interviewers (a male and a female) carried out interviews in sets of three (50 participants in each case) administering them identically, except for the type of the accessories used by the interviewers. In one condition the interviewers carried widely known Islamic symbols. The male interviewer had a silver engagement ring while the female interviewer was veiled. In another condition both interviewers carried Kemalist and anti-religious symbols: a button of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on each one's jacket. Lastly, in the neutral interview, the interviewers had no symbols at all.⁸ The target sample size of 150 respondents was drawn from the population of İzmir, Ankara and İstanbul with quotas based on location. The locations selected in each city were the centers of the cities around which the possible participants constituted a good representation of the population. In each location respondents were picked in accordance with stratified sampling i.e., every third person that passed a previously marked point. The single independent variable, type of outfit, had three levels, secularist, neutral and Islamist. The dependent measures were as follows: Authority, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety, and secularity.

An English translation of the designated questionnaire appears in Appendix A. It contained two sets of items. The first set includes standard background questions regarding age, sex, place of origin (i.e., the type of environment in which the respondent was raised such as metropolitan, provincial city, town or village), occupation, education and monthly household income. The second set included seven Likert-scaled items to determine five attributes: authority, dependence, and religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. The first two items were designed as the indicators of authoritarianism; the third as the indicator of dependence; the fourth and fifth as the indicators of religiosity, the sixth as the indicator of Islamic piety, and the last one as the indicator of secularity.⁹ The procedure of the 1998, 2004 and 2008 was identical to each other.

First I have checked whether the respondents correctly identified the Islamist and secularist symbols and recognized the neutral condition.

⁸ The interviewers did not make any claims about their personal preferences. It was up to respondents to draw inferences from the appearance of the interviewers. It was impossible to make the interviewers blind to experimental conditions. For this reason, the trained interviewers carried out a rigorous experiment in a nonpartisan manner. The male interviewer asked the questions in Turkish while the female one recorded the answers.

⁹ The first five questions out of seven were the same questions Bianchi used in his 1973 questionnaire in Turkey. Robert Bianchi (1984).

Manipulation check showed that participants perceived the interviewers in each condition as intended in all the 1998, 2004 and 2008 experiments. In order to ensure that respondents in the three conditions were quite identical with regard to major background factors, the three experimental conditions against place of origin, occupation, education and income, as well as age and sex were cross tabulated. No statistical difference among the groups was found in all the three experiments.

The seven items in the second part of the questionnaire help us to determine participants' revealed preferences under perceived social pressure about authoritarianism, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. The first two items labeled as Authority I and Authority II, respectively, were taken as the indicators of authoritarianism. Similarly, the third item was labeled as Dependence and taken as the indicator of dependence. The fourth and fifth named as Religiosity I and Religiosity II, respectively, were the indicators of religiosity. Religiosity I inquired about participants' level of personal attitudes towards religion while Religiosity II measured participants' level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force. The sixth, called here Islamic piety, aimed at how participants identified themselves in each experimental condition, while the seventh item referred to below as Secularity determines participants' revealed preferences towards secularism.

Table 2 shows the responses in the 1998 experiment that produced the key results on whether the experimental conditions i.e., the type of the accessories used by the interviewers, had a significant effect on participants' responses with regard to authority, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity. The results indicated that the experimental condition i.e., the manipulation of the interviewers' outfits produced a significant effect on participants' revealed preferences about religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity while the outfits had no significant effect on authority and dependence.¹⁰

¹⁰ The level of Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, $F(2, 148) = 3.10, p < .05$. According to Tukey- α test, participants' level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$). The effect of outfit type on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity yielded more statistically significant results at the alpha level of $p < .0001$. Specifically, for Religiosity I, the type of outfit led to significant difference, $F(2, 147) = 11.13, p < .0001$. Tukey α tests also showed that participants' level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$). For Religiosity II, an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit again was significant, $F(2, 144) = 14.28, p < .0001$. The level of endorsing religion as a social stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist conditions ($p < .05$). The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, $F(2, 146) = 15.84, p < .0001$. Participants' level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$).

Table 2: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of Type of Outfit

	<i>Condition</i>		
	"Islamist"	"Neutral"	"Secularist"
1. AUTHORITY I			
<u>M</u>	1.98	2.04	2.10
<u>SD</u>	0.38	0.67	0.54
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
2. AUTHORITY II			
<u>M</u>	2.65	2.64	2.74
<u>SD</u>	0.56	0.63	0.60
<u>n</u>	49	50	50
3. DEPENDENCE			
<u>M</u>	1.94	2.04	1.92
<u>SD</u>	0.59	0.49	0.70
<u>n</u>	49	50	50
4. RELIGIOSITY I			
<u>M</u>	2.61 _a	2.04 _b	2.16 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.67	0.60	0.62
<u>n</u>	49	50	49
5. RELIGIOSITY II			
<u>M</u>	1.87 _a	2.41 _b	2.49 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.61	0.64	0.58
<u>n</u>	47	50	49
6. DEVOTED MUSLIM			
<u>M</u>	1.86 _a	2.10 _b	2.12 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.58	0.58	0.59
<u>n</u>	49	50	50
7. SECULARITY			
<u>M</u>	2.30 _a	1.82 _b	1.70 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.66	0.52	0.46
<u>n</u>	47	50	50

Note: A four-point scale was used. Means that do not share a common subscript within a column reliably ($p < .05$) differ from each other. Higher scores indicate high authority, high dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity.

Thus, the key result was that while there was no group difference under the secularist, neutral, and Islamist conditions for Authority I, Authority II and Dependence, the significant group differences emerged under the three experimental conditions with regard to Religiosity I, Religiosity II, Devout Muslimness (Islamic Piety) and Secularity. The significance levels also produced a remarkable result: There is only less than 0.01 percent chance that a randomly selected individual would not change his view in accordance with the experimental conditions. The field experiment clearly revealed the tremendous self-subversion in the public sphere in response to social pressures, leading to the polarization of Turkish society during the late 1990s: secularists versus Islamists. Being aware of such polarization, participants obviously had an idea about the

characteristics of public opinion, and in particular, the degree to which it favors secularism or Islamism. The polarization of Turkish society along the spectrum of secularism and Islamism inevitably put individuals in a difficult position, demanding from them to align with one side, depending upon the social context. In particular, both secularist and Islamist activists pressure by-standers to align with their side so that they can claim public opinion strengthens their position on such controversial issues as veiling, religious schools, etc. The alignment of the neutral condition with the secularist condition made it clear that participants had clearly identified the prevailing public opinion as secularist before the JDP came to power. In other words, if an individual is in a particular setting, asking him to take a side about an issue that Islamists and secularists have opposing views, and if there is not enough clue to clearly read the setting as either Islamist or secularist, chances are that the setting is secular rather than Islamist. The secularist establishment had enjoyed the prevailing secularist public opinion until the November 3, 2002 elections.

In spite of the dominant secularist public discourse in Turkey, in the November 2002 elections, free of intimidations, the silent majority, encompassing huge self-subversion, rewarded the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (JDP) with a decisive victory. The election results reflected the grievances of the Turkish society, in particular, its disillusionment and frustration with the secularist politicians in ending poverty, corruption and the economic crisis of 2001. The astonishing rise of JDP to power highlighted the growing influence of Islam on the Turkish society through its claim to be the legitimate representative of the disadvantaged despite the secularist establishment that fought hard to keep the political Islam out of the public realm.

In order to appease the secularist establishment, especially the Turkish military that might initiate another coup, in the very first public speech after the elections, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, JDP's leader, stressed that "We will not interfere with anyone else's lifestyle,"¹¹ pointing out that the JDP will not attempt to institute an Islamic state. Staring from its establishment, the JDP presented an image of moderation, (along with efficiency, transparency, and accountability), while distancing itself from its predecessor, the boldly pro-Islamist RP. Noticing this deviation, many secularists have claimed that the JDP including its leader Erdoğan himself engages in self-subversion, recalling his previous statements such as "My point of reference is Islam. Democracy is not a goal but a means [to it]"¹² Tayyip Erdoğan later

¹¹ *Hürriyet*, 4 November 2002.

¹² See Derya Sazak, "Din ve Siyaset [Religion and Politics]," *Milliyet*, 2 February 2000.

publicly denounced his previous statements by saying: “I certainly internalized democracy.” Despite the JDP’s rhetoric of change and moderation, the secularist establishment, specifically the army, is still suspicious of its “genuine” agenda. With no change in their own publicly stated goals, the secularist establishment is determined to keep the Islamists symbols out of the public sphere. The generals have already audaciously announced that: “We don’t believe that [the JDP] changed. The process of February 28 will last at least another thousand years,”¹³ pointing to the possibility of another army takeover in case of a perceived challenge to Kemalist secularism. After the JDP become the first Islamist party to form a government without a coalition partner, the contention between Islamists and secularist one way or another would occupy the public opinion.

The veiling controversy quickly ignited, however, after the newly elected Islamist President of the Parliament, Bülent Arınç, attended a state ceremony to meet the President of Turkey, Ahmet Sezer with his veiled wife.¹⁴ Sezer politely kept calm during the ceremony but two days later he publicly stated: “Veiling cannot be permitted in the public sphere.”¹⁵ The reason why President Sezer did not react right away was that his quarrel with the Premier Bülent Ecevit in a NSC meeting revealed the level of political instability, sparking the worst economic crises in the history of the Turkish Republic in February 2001. The financial crisis had already shifted the public opinion on how to alleviate the repercussions of the economic decay, putting the existing controversies between secularists and Islamists off the public agenda, at least for a while.

The JDP government also recognized the urgency to stabilize economy and refrained from tackling any controversial issues such as veiling that might create political uncertainty, prolonging the economic crisis. Putting their promises to their Islamist supports aside, the JDP has implemented a successful economic stabilization policy, decreasing the inflation rate from 100 percent to around 10 percent within a year. The JDP’s accomplishment in eradicating the economic crisis increased its prestige among the Turkish people, especially in the eyes of the conservatives. The JDP’s success, especially in economic stabilization secured its place in Turkish politics. In the local elections of the March 28, 2004, the JDP expanded its legitimacy by receiving 42 percent of the entire

¹³ *Radikal*, 24 April 2002.

¹⁴ *Milliyet*, 20 November 2002.

¹⁵ *Zaman*, 25 November 2002.

vote cast.¹⁶ The local elections brought nearly 55 percent of all cities, including 57 of 81 provinces, under the leadership of mayors from the JDP.

Envyng JDP's popularity, the secularist watchdog groups have continued to scrutinize the government's every decision that possibly challenges the dominant secularist public discourse. In response, the JDP's party leadership has tried very hard to prevent its supporters from engaging in confrontational dialogue with the secularists in the public opinion. This does mean that the secularism and Islamism in Turkey is passé. The veiling controversy, for one, simmers on the sidelines of political and social debate. As the potential frictions between Islamists and secularists and the postponed adjustments for such frictions stayed off the public agenda, the secularist and Islamists currently seemed to reach a stalemate. In an aura of standstill between Islamists and secularists and renewed economic optimism with a falling inflation rate and rising per capita income we conducted another field experiment in July-August 2004 to determine whether there is a change in the public opinion regarding Islamism and secularism.

Table 3 summarizes some findings of the 2004 study. The experimental conditions: Islamist, secularist or neutral, produced no significant statistical effect on authority, dependence. This was consistent with the 1998 study's results on dependence and authority. With regard to religiosity and secularity, the 2004 study also produced similar results with a little difference.¹⁷

¹⁶ For election results, see *Yenişafak*, 30 March 2004.

¹⁷ Recall that the effect of outfit type in the 1998 study produced extremely significant results on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of $p < .001$. In the 2004 field experiment, the effect of outfit type on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity also yielded statistically significant results at the alpha level of $p < .002$ for Religiosity I, $p < .001$ for Religiosity II, $p < .001$ for Secularity. Specifically, for Religiosity I, the type of outfit led to significant difference, $F(2,147) = 6.43$, $p < .002$. Tukey q tests also showed that participants' level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$). For Religiosity II, an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit again was significant, $F(2,147) = 7.93$, $p < .001$. The level of endorsing religion as a social stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist conditions ($p < .05$). The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, $F(2,147) = 7.10$, $p < .001$. Participants' level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$).

Table 3: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of Type of Outfit

	<i>Condition</i>		
	"Islamist"	"Neutral"	"Secularist"
1. AUTHORITY I			
<u>M</u>	2.00	1.96	2.00
<u>SD</u>	0.63	0.57	0.63
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
2. AUTHORITY II			
<u>M</u>	2.70	2.60	2.66
<u>SD</u>	0.54	.57	0.62
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
3. DEPENDENCE			
<u>M</u>	2.10	2.06	2.00
<u>SD</u>	0.58	0.68	0.53
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
4. RELIGIOSITY I			
<u>M</u>	2.74 _a	2.54 _b	2.22 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.69	0.78	0.70
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
5. RELIGIOSITY II			
<u>M</u>	2.00 _a	2.18 _b	2.56 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.72	0.69	0.73
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
6. DEVOTED MUSLIM			
<u>M</u>	1.96	2.10	2.24
<u>SD</u>	0.66	0.70	0.74
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
7. SECULARITY			
<u>M</u>	2.26 _a	1.84 _b	1.88 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.66	0.50	0.65
<u>n</u>	50	50	50

Note: A four-point scale was used. Means that do not share a common subscript within a column reliably ($p < .05$) differ from each other. Higher scores indicate high authority, high dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity.

Exposed to perceived pressures from the interviewers, the respondents in the later study are a little more forthcoming in revealing a different opinion, signaling an opening in the Turkish public sphere. The major difference between two studies was on the devout Muslimness. In the 1998 study, when asked whether the respondents are devout Muslims or not, they tailored their public preferences according to the type of the interviewers' outfit and in the neutral condition, they aligned with the secularist condition. Contrary to the 1998 study, when asked the same question, the respondents

would not hesitate to reveal their Muslim selves in public under any conditions and there was no group difference.¹⁸ In other words, under both secularist condition and neutral condition, they did not hesitate to profess their faith in public.

This was a clear sign of emerging Islamic political identity in the public sphere in Turkey. The incorporation of Islamic preferences into the public sphere was consistent with what Yavuz (2003) identified earlier: Private Muslim identity is “going public” as a result of increasing “opportunity spaces” in Turkey, i.e., the forms of social interaction introducing new possibilities of networking, resulting from shared meaning and associational life. Yavuz (2003) also noted: “Islamic social movements represent the “coming out” of private Muslim identity in the public spaces” (24). However, the respondents’ answers to Religiosity I and Religiosity II and Secularity make it clear that many would not publicly support such movements when faced with pressures from the secularist establishment, at least in the current state of Turkish democracy. The new developments bolster this assertion.

The clash between Islamists and secularists was about to explode in the search for a candidate for the presidential elections in 2007. The JDP had enough votes in the parliament to elect its leader Erdoğan as the new president but the secularist establishment, especially the army has strong objections for Erdoğan and his veiled wife to represent the Turkish state founded on the principle of strict secularism. In order to secured its place into core of the Turkish politics the JDP called for an early elections. After receiving an overwhelming majority (47 percent) of the votes in the early election of July 22, 2007,¹⁹ The JDP even won a bigger majority of the seats in the parliament. Yet, rather than endorsing its leader Erdoğan as the next president the JDP elected its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül as the new president of the Turkish Republic whose wife is also veiled. With an assured confidence, the JDP attempted to resolve the veiling controversy through a constitutional amendment that allows female students to veil themselves in universities. The secularist establishment was quick at

¹⁸ In the 1998 study, as previously stated, the level of Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, $F(2, 148) = 3.10$, $p < .05$. According to Tukey- α test, participants’ level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$). In the 2004 study, the level of Islamic piety did not differ as a function of type of outfit, $F(2, 147) = 1.959$, $p > .10$. According to Tukey- α test, contrary to the 1998 results, in the 2004 field experiment, participants’ level of Islamic piety was not lower under the secularist, neutral and Islamist condition ($p > .05$).

¹⁹ *Milliyet*, 23 July 2007.

reacting in opposing the amendment. Even though the JDP successfully passed the constitutional amendment from the parliament with an additional support from the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP), the Constitutional Court nullified the constitutional change, pleasing the secularist pressure groups.²⁰ Unable to carry out one of its main campaign promises, the JDP kept shying away from the controversial issues regarding secularism, repositioning itself as a conservative party with religious sensitivities. And hence, JDP's new stand slowed down the pace of the Islamist movement in Turkey. In fact, the 2008 experiment confirmed that the public support for a strong Islamist movement among the masses even declined.

Table 4 compiles the result of the 2008 experiment. As expected, there were no group differences with regard to authority, dependence. In all the experiments, regardless of the experimental conditions, the participants revealed authoritarian preferences, confirming this particular characteristic of Turkish culture. With regard to religiosity and secularity, the 2008 study yielded similar results to those of the previous studies with some subtle, yet important, differences.²¹ In terms of religiosity and secularity, the experimental condition resulted in statically significant group differences: In neutral condition, the participants aligned with those in secularist condition against the ones facing Islamist pressure, depicting a decade-long polarization in Turkish public opinion. Devout Muslimness again was the major difference among all the studies. More than a decade ago, in 1998, the Islamist and secularist symbols produced a significant effect on the participants' response to the question of their devout Muslimness.

²⁰ *Hürriyet*, 13 June 2008.

²¹ Recall that the effect of outfit type in both 1998 and 2004 studies produced extremely significant results on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of $p < .001$ with the exception that the alpha level for Religiosity I was $p < .002$. The 2008 study showed similar trends: the effect of outfit type produced extremely significant results on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of not $p < .001$ but $p < .01$. Note that the significance levels in all the corresponding tests except for Tukey's *a*'s are *always* lower than $p < .01$. The specific tests results are as follows: an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit again was significant for Religiosity I, $F(2,148) = 5.14$, $p < .01$. Tukey *a* tests also showed that participants' level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$). For Religiosity II, the type of outfit led to significant difference, $F(2,148) = 5.89$, $p < .01$. The level of endorsing religion as a social stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist conditions ($p < .05$). The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, $F(2,148) = 5.41$, $p < .01$. Participants' level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$).

Table 4: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of Type of Outfit

	"Islamist"	<u>Condition</u> "Neutral"	"Secularist"
1. AUTHORITY I			
<u>M</u>	1.98	1.98	1.92
<u>SD</u>	0.55	0.65	0.56
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
2. AUTHORITY II			
<u>M</u>	2.80	2.82	2.62
<u>SD</u>	0.53	0.52	0.73
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
3. DEPENDENCE			
<u>M</u>	2.22	1.96	1.96
<u>SD</u>	0.61	0.56	0.66
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
4. RELIGIOSITY I			
<u>M</u>	2.70 _a	2.28 _b	2.26 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.78	0.67	0.85
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
5. RELIGIOSITY II			
<u>M</u>	2.16 _a	2.34 _b	2.40 _b
<u>SD</u>	1.54	0.71	0.83
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
6. DEVOTED MUSLIM			
<u>M</u>	1.92 _a	2.08	2.38 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.60	0.63	0.80
<u>n</u>	50	50	50
7. SECULARITY			
<u>M</u>	2.30 _a	1.80 _b	1.90 _b
<u>SD</u>	0.61	1.04	0.67
<u>n</u>	50	50	50

Note: A four-point scale was used. Means that do not share a common subscript within a column reliably ($p < .05$) differ from each other. Higher scores indicate high authority, high dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity.

Recall that participants under the neutral condition had aligned with those under the secularist condition, indicating the dominance of the secularist public opinion. In 2004, the experimental condition yielded no significant effect on the participants' devout Muslimness. This signaled the rising Islamic identity in the Turkish public sphere, a sign of weakening in the prevalence of the secularist dominance in the public discourse. In other words, there was a slight opening in Turkish society with regard to public expression of religious identity, regardless of Islamists and secularist pressures. It indicated a tilted tendency towards a possible peaceful co-existence of Islamism and secularism in Turkey. However, the 2008 study showed the reversal of this trend. The group difference between Islamist and

secularist conditions remerged as the participants tailored their responses under perceived pressures, proving strong evidence on the polarization of the Turkish public opinion: Islamist vs. secularists.²²

The overall response to devoted Muslimness under the neutral condition was interesting. When faced no Islamist or secularist pressures, the participants aligned neither with Islamists nor with secularists, depicting how the Turkish people caught in-between the pressures from Islamists and secularists pressure groups.²³ In expressing their own individual faith in religion, free of (suggestive) perceived pressure, the participants revealed their own individual religious identity. This is one of the indicators of which Turkish Islam is getting secularized at individual level as each day layman in Turkey is trying to cope with the demands of the modern life.

In short, all the field experiments provide very strong evidence that the prevailing public opinion in Turkey is still very much secularist. The three field experiments documented this and showed that the dual preference model has significant relevance for the Turkish case. In the next sections, I will theoretically analyze the possible outcomes for Turkey.

6. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUAL PREFERENCE MODEL

The existence of unstable equilibrium implies that self-subversion may lead to social discontinuities. Once individuals with low thresholds for speaking out against the status quo trigger the others with high thresholds, a social movement may break out leading to a social change. It is important to note that even small events which look trivial on the surface can change the thresholds of individuals, shifting the public opinion in an entirely different direction. As an example from the current Turkish politics, when Prime Minister Ecevit who champions the secularist cause experienced serious health problems in June 2002, the secularist center-left core started to crumble due to the vacuum created in leadership. This created an initial bias in the public opinion in favor of the Islamists, raising the political support for the Islamist-rooted JDP. Prevailing public opinion will eventually play a

²² Like in the 1998 study and unlike in the 2004 study, the 2008 study showed that the level of Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, $F(2, 148) = 5.79$, $p < .05$. According to Tukey- α test, participants' level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist condition than under the Islamist condition ($p < .05$).

²³ According to Tukey- α test, contrary to the 1998 and 2004 results, in the 2008 field experiment, participants' level of Islamic piety was not lower under the neutral than the Islamist and secularist conditions ($p > .05$).

crucial role in unleashing long-term forces that will shape the majority's private preferences. Therefore, it may ultimately determine the future of the co-mingling of Islamism and secularism in Turkey via unanticipated social movements. Other than the persistence of the multiple equilibria in Turkey, there exist three possibilities. The first is the complete domination of secularism over Islamism. The second is the complete domination of Islamism over secularism. The third is their peaceful co-existence. The first possibilities entail a distinct corner equilibrium solution to the ongoing struggle between Islamists and secularists.

6.1 Corner Equilibrium I: Complete Secularization

Pro-secularist self-subversion may result in complete secularization, the ultimate secularist goal, by completely disestablishing Islam. In other words, the secularization thesis may work in practice and all religions, including Islam, may disappear. Within the context of this paper, complete secularization refers to a corner equilibrium.




Figure 7: Corner Equilibrium I

Complete secularization can occur when secularists totally suppress Islamists. In other words, the establishment of a corner equilibrium (i.e., complete secularization) necessitates the demise of the core of Islamist activists. Such equilibrium will be achieved if the propagation curve moves up to 100. As shown in Figure 7, it will destroy the preexisting unstable equilibrium B at 70 and the stable equilibrium A at 20 shown in Figure 6. There is now a unique equilibrium at 100, where widespread pro-secularist self-subversion will sustain the appearance of a unified secular Turkey. If very few Islamist activists still publicly oppose, the equilibrium will be near a corner, accounting for the remaining weak opposition, questioning the legitimacy of Turkish secularism or its implementation.

In its heydays in the early 1930, Kemalist core exerted enormous pressures on masses, increasingly shifting the public opinion towards support for complete secularization. As an example from current Turkish politics, one can speculate that if the Islamists, represented by the Justice and Development Party, attempt to discard the secular constitution after winning the elections held on November 3rd, 2002, the Kemalist military may consider a coup to reinstitute strict Turkish secularism, suppressing the Islamist hard core, and abolishing democratic parliamentary representation. Under a military regime, no Islamist pressure group will be able to openly challenge the secularist position, and its demise may take the form of its hard core activists' going underground.

6.2 Corner Equilibrium II: Complete Islamization

Pro-Islamist self-subversion may result in complete Islamization. A corner equilibrium solution as depicted by Figure 8 indicates such a case where the Islamists one would succeed in their stated goal of suppressing all secularist public opinion, including the secularist hard core represented by 15 percent of the population with thresholds near zero. In this case, the propagation curve will intersect the diagonal at 0 referring to complete Islamization if the propagation curve shifts downward, destroying the existing unstable equilibrium at 70 as well as the equilibrium at 80. Thus, the only remaining public expectation is eventually self-fulfilling unanimous support for complete Islamization. Such corner equilibrium points to a sustained appearance of unified Turkey under the Islamist rule with no representation of Turkish secularism in the public sphere. If very few secularist activists still remain in open opposition the equilibrium will be near corner until the demise of the secularist core.




Figure 8: Corner Equilibrium II

In an Islamist sense, complete Islamization refers to the Islamic principles of *jihad* (holy war), i.e., the domination of *Dar-ul Islam* (House of Islam) over *Dar-ul Harb* (House of War--the non-Islamic world). This radical interpretation of jihad asks for imposition of an Islamic worldview on everybody. An attempt to complete Islamization has taken place in Iran following the revolution of 1979. A newly formed Revolutionary Council, including many *ulema* (learned men of religion) assumed this task in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of life, banning non-religious art, literature, and secular forms of entertainment. The Council for Cultural Revolution established an Islamic University system with new Islamic curricula and textbooks, including the Islamization of economics courses. (Sohrab Behdad, 1995). High-school textbooks were rewritten reflecting an Islamic worldview with the repetitive theme of integrating politics with religion in all social-science and history books, overemphasizing the submission to God's will--the literal meaning of the word *islam* -- to create an "ideal" society interpreted by religious leaders (Siavoshi 1995). Following the Iranian example through democratic means, the Turkish Islamists, led by the Justice and Development Party in power, may attempt to dismantle the secular establishment, suppressing the secularist hard core.

Even under this extreme case, the defeated camp will continue to exist under suppressed conditions by going underground and/or moving out of the country in an attempt to fight for their cause relying on global networks and communication technology.

6.3 Infinite Multiple Equilibria: Peaceful Co-Existence

The disappearance of pro-secularist and pro-Islamist self-subversion presents itself as an “ideal” case in which the expected public opinion totally converges with the actual public opinion. In this ideal case, shown in Figure 9, the propagation curve will overlap with the 45 degree diagonal, producing an infinite number of multiple equilibria. That implies, at any given time, no individual feels pressured to conceal his genuine preferences.




Figure 9: Infinite Multiple Equilibria with Peaceful Coexistence

This is only possible in a pluralistic society where there is a strong social consensus on the role of Islam and secularism in social life. A truly democratic regime with a strong civil society may increase the likelihood of this case. Peaceful coexistence requires established democratic rights. In

order to assure such rights, there must be either institutional guarantees in place for the freedom of speech or the social consensus for expressive diversity with a perfect ethic of tolerance in the society. This, of course, refers to a utopia where even the most democratic countries such as the United States find it difficult to sustain. Turkey's constrained democracy with authoritarian overtones as of 2006 especially makes this possibility less plausible in the near future.

7. CONCLUSION

The dual preference model depicts the possible responses (i.e., exit, sincere voice and self-subversion) to the pressures from two opposing interest groups, pinpointing self-subversion as the superior option. Islamist pressures lead to pro-Islamist self-subversion while secularist pressures induced pro-secularist self-subversion. The model also posits the unintended consequences of self-subversion: Massive self-subversion results in multiple social equilibria with shifting public opinion. The field experiments provided strong evidence for the current polarization of the Turkish public opinion, harboring multiple equilibria, showing how Turkish society got caught in-between as Islamists and secularists have pushed for favorable corner equilibrium to achieve their own distinct goals. Self-subversion conceals the distribution of private preferences, making impossible to predict the future. All that is certain for now is that the Turkish posterity will free itself from the chains of the schizophrenic past to the extent that secularism and Islamism stop creating pressures, generating anxieties, guilt and cognitive dissonances, making self-subversion inconsequential. For this, both Islamists and secularists must realize their peripeteia, releasing Turkish people from being prisoners of themselves.

Appendix: English Translation of Survey Questionnaire*

Part I: Background Questions

Age _____ Profession _____

Sex () Male () Female

Education () None () Primary School () Secondary School
() High School () University () Graduate School

In what type environment did you grow up?

() Village () Town () City () İzmir, Ankara, İstanbul

What is your monthly household income?

(Values were adjusted for the 2004 and 2008 Studies)

() Less than 25 Million TL () B/w 25-50 Million TL
() B/w 100-200 Million TL () Over 200 Million TL

Part II: Do you Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; or, Strongly Disagree with the following questions?

1. Discipline and respect for authority are the most important values a child has to learn.
2. In a heated debate I am generally so preoccupied with what I am going to say next that I forget to listen what others say.
3. If you want something to be done, you should try to do it yourself than waiting for help from others.
4. A person can lead a good life even if he does not have strong religious beliefs.
5. Religion is an indispensable force for stability and social harmony.
6. I consider myself a devout Muslim.
7. I consider myself a secular citizen.

Part III:

What do you think about us?

(a) We are secularists. (b) We are Islamists. (c) No idea.

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Place _____ Date _____

Experimental condition () Secularist () Islamist ()
Neutral

* All the (1998, 2004, and 2008) Questionnaires were more comprehensive than the one given above.

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