Parental Wealth and Adult Children's Welfare in Marriage

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Introduction

There have been many studies that have established that parental resources play an important role in determining the level of human capital of children (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001; Cameron and Heckman, 2001), the returns to children's schooling (Altonji and Dunn, 1996) and children's adult earnings (Behrman and Taubman, 1990; Peters, 1992; Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). Considerably less attention has been paid, however, to the role of parental wealth in affecting the welfare of their children as adults conditional on their human capital. Cox and Rank (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) and Altonji et al. (1996) have shown that wealthier parents in the United States are more likely to provide financial transfers to their adult children for given child resources, but the amount of *inter vivos* transfers flowing from parents and in-laws to adult children is relatively small.[1]

The recent literature highlighting decision-making within the context of multi-member households (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori; 1988, 1992) in which individual members differ in their preferences suggests, however, that the actual amount of transfers flowing from parents to their adult children does not fully or appropriately measure the influence of parental wealth on the contemporaneous welfare of adult children. One strand of this literature suggests that differences in partner-specific opportunities outside of the marriage, which do not otherwise affect household resources, have direct effects on resource allocations within marriage. Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) have shown, for example, that cross-state and intertemporal variation in one "extra environmental parameter" (McElroy (1990)), potential AFDC payments, influences the composition of expenditures within (poor) married households, even though AFDC payments only go to poor unmarried women. Within the collective household framework, potential AFDC payments provide income support in the event of a marriage break-up exclusively for women and thus augment women's bargaining power

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[1]There are fewer studies of bequests (Menchik, 1980; Wilhelm, 1996). These have been based on data describing the upper tail of the income distribution.

within marriage. Prior assessments of the AFDC program had focused only on its effects on unmarried women (Currie and Cole, 1992).

Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) have shown that the marital status of adult children also affects the likelihood of parental transfers in ways similar to AFDC payments for all levels of children's resources. The collective household approach thus suggests that the resources of the parents of marital partners may have important effects on the distribution of resources within marriage. If so, then studies of the effects of parental wealth that focus exclusively on human capital development and financial transfers may understate the lifetime advantages for persons born into wealthy households. The resources of parents vary substantially. Given imperfect assortative mating, there is thus variation in the extent to which each partner in a marriage can rely on parental support outside of marriage so that it may be possible to identify parental wealth effects on partner welfare within a joint household.

In this paper, we use newly-available data on parent and parent-in-law characteristics,[2] transfers and bequests and visits by couples with parents and in-laws to assess within the context of a collective household framework whether and how variations in resources across parents and in-laws affect an individual's welfare within marriage. We use information on the bequests made by deceased parents to their adult children to measure the potential for surviving parents and in-laws to provide support to their adult children. We focus on the allocation of time to visiting in-laws and parents for two reasons. First, such visits are an important component of time for most households, with almost no households in which at least one partner has a surviving parent in a "corner solution" in our sample, described below. Indeed, the median number of visits with parents and in-laws per household in the year prior to the survey is 37, with less than 2% of "eligible" households reporting no visits.

The second reason for focusing on parent-child visits is that we believe these goods permit a more credible application of the collective household framework than in previous studies. An important

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[2]Hereafter we use "in-law" as shorthand for "parents-in-law."

empirical challenge for identifying the bargaining advantages for partners in marriage is the identification of goods that unambiguously reflect the preferences of one partner relative to another. For example, it is often assumed that women prefer more resource allocations for children than do men (e.g., Thomas, 1990) or that food expenditures are preferred by women (Rubalcava and Thomas, 2000). In these studies increases in the budget share of child expenditures or food are interpreted as signaling the greater power of women within the joint household, but there is no way to independently verify these assumptions about sex differences in preferences in these studies. We assume only that on average individuals prefer to visit with their parents compared with their in-laws, which we believe to be a less controversial assumption. Applications of the collective framework have also examined the individual labor supply choices of marital partners. Chiappori et al. (2001) estimate a structural model in which, however, identification depends on the assumption that the leisure of the marital partners are separable. We provide evidence that parent and in-law visits are for the most part joint goods so that we do not have to impose structure on the interaction between individual-specific goods in the welfare functions.

Our empirical results are consistent with the collective household framework and suggest that parental wealth continues to play a role in augmenting the welfare of children into adulthood beyond the provision of human capital in the early stages of the life-cycle or of direct financial aid during adulthood. In particular, we find that partners within a marriage spend more time with those sets of parents or in-laws who have the greater capacity to provide support and less time with those with less resources and thus less potential for support outside of marriage. Thus, resource allocations within marriage appear to favor the partner with the wealthier parents. We also find that, among these same couples, who receives a bequest or transfer does not affect the division of the couple's time between visits with parents and in-laws. We also show that parental transfers are significantly greater for unmarried adult children and are both more frequent and of greater magnitude if parents have more bequeathable wealth. Among non-married adult children, however, parent visits are no more frequent when parents have more wealth.

We consider alternative explanations for our results, including parents using potential bequests to induce more attention from their adult children or that adult children prefer to visit more wealthy parents (or in-laws) because of amenities associated with wealth (e.g., nice vacation homes). Our investigations indicate behaviors that are consistent with the model that we propose, but not with these alternatives. Parental wealth thus confers advantages, within marriage, that are not eliminated by the alleviation of borrowing constraints or by restrictions on bequests.

I. A Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework that we adopt assumes a two-person household in which each individual (partner) i, $i=H,W$, maximizes his/her own utility and in which resources are allocated efficiently.[3] Each partner in the marriage consumes a private good C_i and spends time visiting both own parents and his/her partner's parents and working in the labor market at wage rate w_i.[4] We adopt two key assumptions: (i) the couple jointly visits parents and in-laws at least some of the time[5] and (ii) each partner prefers visiting with his or her parents to visiting with in-laws. In particular, the utility functions for the two marital partners are:

(1) $U(C_H, Z_H, Z_W) = \ln(C_H) + \eta_{HH}Z_H + \eta_{HW}Z_W$ and $U(C_W, Z_W, Z_H) = \ln(C_W) + \eta_{WW}Z_W + \eta_{WH}Z_H$

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[3] Our simple model is partial equilibrium in the style of studies such as Chiappori (1988, 1992), Chiappori et al. (2001), Lundberg et al. (1997), Rubalcava and Thomas (2002), Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) in that we focus on allocations within existing households in existing locations. For tractability and simplicity, we also assume that parents do not strategically alter their savings behaviors to strengthen the bargaining positions of their adult children in their marriages and do not alter their location to induce more visits from their adult children. We explore the possibility that distance between the adult children and their parents is endogenous in Table 6.

[4] Almost all respondents and their spouses participated in the labor force in the five years before our survey (most in the year before the survey), including over 90% of the women.

[5] If we assume instead that each partner exclusively visits his/her own parents but there is a disutility cost born by both partners to the separation, the implications would be similar. Our data does not indicate to what extent visits are joint versus alone, although on average married respondents report visiting in-laws almost as much as their parents. We are able to test whether the wages of both partners affect visits equally as is implied if the visits at the margin are joint visits, and our estimates are consistent with this (Table 5).

where Z_i is the amount of time spent by both partners jointly visiting the parents of partner i and the η_{ik}, i,k=H,W are parameters characterizing the preferences for parent (i=k) and in-law (i≠k) visits. If t_{Hi} and t_{Wi} are the amounts of time spent (jointly with k) by partner i with parents and in-laws, respectively, then $Z_i = t_{Hi} + t_{Wi}$ with $t_{Hi} = t_{Wi}$ and the opportunity cost of a joint visit per unit of time is $\omega = w_H + w_W$.

We can define the allocation of resources at any given point on the household efficiency frontier by the programming problem: partner i, say H, maximizes his utility subject to constraints on the allocation of time of each partner and a money budget, and subject to the requirement that the other partner in the household receives some given "reservation" utility V*, where V* is the outcome of a bargaining game that reflects both partners' opportunities outside of the marriage. With Ω the total amount of time available to the couple and C^*_W the amount of consumption that must be provided to partner W for any given allocation of the Z_i in order to meet the reservation utility requirement, the full-income budget constraint is

(2) $\quad C^*_W(V^*_W, Z_H, Z_W) + C_H + \omega(Z_H + Z_W) + p_{ZW}Z_W + p_{ZH}Z_H = R + \omega(\Omega),$

where R=non-earnings income and the p_{Zi} are parent- and in-law-specific visit costs (e.g., travel costs). Partner H then maximizes (1) subject to (2) and the reservation utility requirement.

To further simplify, we assume that preferences are identical and symmetric across partners, so that $\eta_{WW}=\eta_{HH}=\eta_P$, $\eta_{WH}=\eta_{HW}=\eta_I$, but $\eta_P>\eta_I$. That is, each partner has the same preferences for visiting his\her parents or in-laws as his\her partner, but both prefer visits with own parents over visits with in-laws. There is thus differential valuation across the partners of the two household "public goods." Assuming an interior solution for visits,[6] the necessary first-order conditions for the amount of joint time spent with in-laws and parents are

(3) $\quad \eta_P = \lambda[\omega + p_{ZH} - C^*_W \eta_I]$

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[6]Only 1.3% of the couples with at least one surviving parent and at least one surviving in-law have had no visits with their parents and their in-laws in the year previous to our survey.

(4) $\eta_I = \lambda[\omega + p_{ZW} - C^*_W \eta_P]$

where λ=marginal utility of income. Expressions (3) and (4) indicate that the shadow price of a joint visit by H to parents or in-laws is not just the opportunity cost of the joint time allocated to the visit and travel costs. There is also an offset term that arises from the fact that the partner values the visit as well, albeit differentially, and as a consequence less resources need be allocated to that partner's consumption in order to meet the reservation utility requirement. Given that the partner prefers visiting her parents more than H's parents, this offset or subsidy is greater for visits with H's in-laws than it is for visits with H's parents. Visits by H with in-laws and own parents thus tend to be equalized due to bargaining despite H's preference for visits with his own parents.

The model indicates how visits with in-laws and parents change, at any given point on the household resource frontier, if there is a change in V*. Let B_i be resources, in money units, provided to partner i from outside of the marriage if the marriage is dissolved but that are not available to either partner while married or to i's partner after the dissolution of the marriage. Changes in such resources thus do not shift the Pareto frontier but influence the allocation of resources by changing the bargaining outcome V*. Thus, $\frac{\partial V^*}{\partial B_W}>0$ and $\frac{\partial V^*}{\partial B_H}<0$. Important examples of partner-specific support are governmental assistance plans that provide financial assistance only to non-married mothers (AFDC) and own-parental transfers provided to a divorced child in her/his post-marriage state. An increase in potential post-marriage transfers B_i then increases the post-marriage utility for i, increases i's utility within the marriage, and thus necessarily lowers it for i's mate. This will affect the allocation of resources in the marriage given differential preferences for the joint visit activities. In particular, the effect of an increase in extra-marital resources for W - B_W - leads to more (joint) visits with W's parents, as:

(5) $\quad \frac{\partial Z_W}{\partial B_W} = (\frac{\partial Z_W}{\partial V*})(\frac{\partial V^*}{\partial B_W}) = \frac{C_W(\eta_P-\eta_I)}{\eta_P[C_W(\eta_P-\eta_I) + \omega + p_{ZW}]}$

As long as all individuals prefer visiting their parents to visiting their in-laws ($\eta_P - \eta_I > 0$) the model of

within-marriage allocation yields the result that visits with parents and parental resources potentially

expendable on offspring are positively correlated.[7] Moreover, the collective model also indicates that an

adult child's visits with his/her parents also depends (negatively) on his/her in-law's current resources -

an increase in B_W results in less visits with H's parents[8]:

$$(6) \qquad \frac{\partial Z_H}{\partial B_W} = (\frac{\partial Z_H}{\partial V^*})(\frac{\partial V^*}{\partial B_W}) = - \frac{C_W(\eta_P - \eta_I)}{\eta_P[C_W(\eta_P - \eta_I) + \omega + p_{ZH}]}$$

The allocation of the couple's time to visiting with in-laws and parents thus depends on the

opportunity-time costs of the visits ω, visit-specific costs (e.g., distance), marital resources R, and

parental resources for each partner:

$$(7) \qquad Z_i = Z(\omega, p_{ZW}, p_{ZH}, R, B_W, B_H).$$

The key distinction is between B_i and R. The B_i represent post-marital income prospects that are

not shared by the former spouse unless the parents (in-laws) die while the partners are still married, while

R is income that accrues during the marriage that is likely to be shared post-marriage. Changes in B_i

affect the bargaining positions of the partners, but not overall resources. Changes in R affect the budget

constraint, but not necessarily bargaining positions. For example, bequests made by i's deceased parents

to i increase i's resources. If such bequests are not considered "common property," and are thus not

shared with the spouse after divorce, such bequests also may affect i's bargaining position within

marriage. In contrast, if income from the bequest received prior to divorce is common property it cannot

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[7] A necessary condition for $C_W > 0$ is that $\eta_P \, p_{ZW} > \eta_I \, p_{ZH}$.

[8] The first result concerning own parent visits and wealth is also implied by the Bernheim, *et al.* (1985) sibling competition model. However, that model is silent on the relationship between in-law wealth and own parent visits. We test some additional implications of that model in Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) and below. These tests do not provide support for this alternative model.

affect the relative bargaining position of the marital partners.[9] Thus, the amount of resources transferred by parents to married offspring overstates the contribution of such transfers to their adult children's welfare in marriage. However, the magnitude of such *inter vivos* transfers understates the role of parental wealth in augmenting children's welfare within the joint household.

The model thus implies that how well an individual fares in a marriage depends at any moment in time on his or her parent's contemporaneous resources and inversely on those of his/her spouse's parents in addition to own and spouse's income. The model also implies that parents, while alive, transfer resources in support of non-married offspring - positive relationships between the likelihood (and amount) of *inter vivos* parental transfers to i, the wealth of i's parents and whether i is single.

II. Data

a. The Minnesota Twins Survey

Section I suggests that as assessment of the effects of parental wealth on the welfare of adult children in a collective household can be usefully carried out by looking at the time allocated by couples to visits with parents and in-laws. Such tests, however, require information not only on intergenerational personal contacts but on intergenerational financial flows and on the characteristics and location of the parents of each marital partner. We use data from a new survey of a subset of twins from the Minnesota Twin Registry (MTR) based on a survey instrument designed by Paul Taubman and us in collaboration with the Temple University Institute of Survey Research. The MTR is the largest birth-record-based twins registry in the United States, assembled over the 1983-90 period starting with birth records on all twins (both monozygotic and dizygotic) born in Minnesota in 1936-55. Details of the MTR are in Lykken, *et al*. (1990).

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[9] Given that many U.S. states have laws that tend to equalize the post-marriage resources of marital partners (Grey, 1998), including the states in which most of the respondents that we use for our empirical tests reside, tests of income pooling will not be conclusive about the nature of household decision-making, and efforts to influence household resource allocations by altering the identity of the recipients of transfers will be ineffective, compared with changing relative post-marriage alternatives.

The survey instrument was mailed out in May 1994 to the 5862 members of same-sex pairs for whom the MTR had current addresses. An additional 776 members of same-sex pairs for whom updated addresses had been located between May and September 1994 were sent questionnaires in November 1994. 3682 twins returned a completed questionnaire, for a response rate of surviving twins of over 60%.[10]

b. Couples with Surviving Parents and In-laws

The estimates in this paper are based principally on a subset of the returned questionnaires describing 710 married couples for which each partner had at least at least one surviving parent at the time of the survey.[11] Key information provided in the data describing couples with surviving parents and in-laws for the purpose of examining couple interactions and visits with parents include (i) the numbers of days in the past year each respondent spent at least some time with parents and with in-laws, (ii) past bequests and contemporaneous financial transfers to individual respondents and spouses from both parents and in-laws, (iii) the earnings, schooling, and non-earnings income (by source) of individual respondents and spouses, and (iv) characteristics of respondents, their spouses, their parents and their in-laws, including their location (town and state). The location information reported for each parent and in-law and for each couple were used to compute the time-minimizing driving distance between every couple and each of the sets of parents of the two partners using software that provides distances between any two locations in the continental United States based on geo-coded road maps.[12]

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[10] The item response on returned questionnaires is very high, exceeding that on recent Current Population Surveys and the 1990 Census. For example, only 9% of ever employed workers in our sample did not answer the questions on earnings or self employment income; on the CPS more than 20% do not.

[11] 12 couples were also excluded because either the in-laws or parents resided outside the United States.

[12] Distances between parents and offspring in the data set used by Perozek (1998) to test the Bernheim, *et al.* (1985) model are based on estimates by respondents. It is not known how accurately individuals are able to gage distances or whether such accuracy depends on the number of visits. The software we used is Street Atlas USA by Delorme, Version 5.0. The program also computes travel time.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 710 married couples with at least one surviving parent and in-law. Although our primary reason for examining visits-with-parents and visits-with-in-laws behavior is that such visits provide a way to assess household decision-making with respect to joint activities, the data reveal that visits with parents and visits with in-laws are not a trivial component of family resource use. The average number of days in which the respondent visited with either parents or in-laws, excluding those respondents who worked on a regular basis with their parents or in-laws, was 66,[13] with the average couple residing about 280 miles from parents and in-laws. Almost half of the sample respondents lived less than one hour's driving time from parents.[14] The data also indicate that approximately half of the sample respondents or spouses with at least one surviving parent had already lost a parent, and 9.9% of the couples had already received a bequest. Interestingly, about 7-12% of the value of parental bequests are provided directly to daughters-in-law or sons-in-law.

c. The Orphan Sample: Bequests

A shortcoming of the data set is that there is no information on the contemporaneous wealth position of surviving parents or in-laws, a variable that could be a significant determinant of post-marital assistance for each marital partner and thus according to the model a key determinant of resource distribution in marriage in the model. However, we use the information on parental bequests from the subsample of twins both of whose parents had died to estimate the relationship between parental characteristics and bequests. These estimates from the "orphan" twins sample are used to characterize the

Distance and travel time are highly correlated (r>.97) and our results using distances are not changed when travel times between couples' and parents', or in-laws' residences are used instead.

[13] As noted, only 1.3% of the couples with at least one surviving parent and at least one surviving in-law had zero visits. The distribution of visits is somewhat skewed, with a median of 37 days of visits. For that reason we also have undertaken the estimates with log visits as the dependent variable below. The implications of the estimates are the same as we discuss below.

[14] 35.5% of the couples lived in the same town or city as either the parents or in-laws. Few couples lived in the same town with both, however. Five of the couples co-resided with parents or in-laws. They are excluded from the sample.

capacity of surviving parents of any given age to provide support, if needed, to an individual son or daughter based on information on the surviving parents' and in-laws' schooling, age and principal occupation. In particular, the estimates are used to predict the amount of the per-child bequest from each surviving set of parents and in-laws if that bequest were made at the time of the survey. This predicted bequest variable represents each child's expectation of his/her parent's contemporaneous bequeathable wealth position that we show below is an important determinant of each individual's welfare outside the marriage.

820 twins reported that both parents had already died by the time of the survey with 758 providing information on their inheritance and the dates of death for each parent. Table 2 provides information on the inheritances for all orphan twins reporting inheritances (including 35% who reported receiving no bequest). All bequest amounts were converted to 1993 dollars based on the date of death of the last surviving parent. The data indicate that the average inheritance reported by the orphaned twins was $17,314 1993 dollars, about one-half of current full-time earnings, and was received on average at age 42 by these twins.

III. Bequests, Parental Wealth and Parental Assistance

To characterize the contemporaneous capacity of surviving parents to provide financial assistance to their adult offspring at any given life-cycle point, we use information on the bequests made by parents at death and their socioeconomic characteristics to estimate the determinants of bequests. Bequest reports from both twins in an intact twin pair essentially provide one observation per twin's family on per-child parental bequests.[15] There is also survey information, however, on bequests made by spouses' parents to spouses. Assuming that parental bequest behavior does not differ for parents of twins and non-twins, we can stack single observations from twin pairs (averaging the reports on bequests) and

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[15]Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), using self- and cross-reported information on 1,060 bequests made to twins, show that a statistical model in which each twin receives the same true bequest but reports his/her own bequest and that of his/her twin with (correlated) errors cannot be rejected.

observations on spouses both of whose parents had died to obtain an augmented sample of orphans. This results in a sample of 596 potential bequest beneficiaries, including 547 individuals who are also married partners, for which we have information on the dates of birth and death of the last surviving parent and on parental occupation and schooling.

To convert the occupation information for respondent and spouse fathers into a singulate measure of lifetime earnings, we used information from the 6% (5%+1%) sample from the 1990 Census on all men aged 40 through 59 who worked in 1989 and resided in the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin, reflecting the principal residence states of the parents.[16] The occupational earnings equation we estimated (N=19,183) was of the following form:

(8) $\quad\quad\quad\quad \ln y_{ik} = \beta_{ok} + \Sigma_k \beta_{1k} O_k + \Sigma_k \beta_{2k} O_k age_i + \beta_{3k} age_i + \beta_{4k} schooling_i$,

where $\ln y_{ik}$=wage and salary plus self-employment earnings for individual i in occupation k and O_k=indicator for occupation k. Based on these estimates and the information on the principal occupation and schooling attainment of each father or father-in-law available in the data, we computed the occupational earnings of each male parent (or in-law) at age 50.[17]

The estimates of the determinants of per-child bequest estimates obtained from the sample of eligible recipients of bequests (orphaned respondents and orphaned spouses) are presented in Table 3. The specifications also include as regressors the father's occupational earnings, a dummy for whether or not the father was a farmer, the father's potential years in the labor force (age at death - number of years of completed schooling - 6), and the mother's schooling. Both generalized least squares and random-effects Tobit estimators were employed to take into account any common error term among couples and the censoring of bequests at zero. For both estimation procedures we include alternative estimates with

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[16]74.9% of the surviving parents of the respondents resided in Minnesota and Wisconsin at the time of the survey. The next most represented state (California) was the residence of only 3.2% of parents.

[17]The estimates are available on request from the authors.

birth year used instead of potential experience, which increases the sample from 596 to 657 but does not substantially affect the estimates. As can be seen, both estimation procedures yield similar results (less than 30% of potential beneficiaries did not receive a bequest in this sample) and the couple-specific error component (σ_u^2) is not statistically significant. We discuss the GLS results, which are simpler to interpret.

The GLS estimates indicate that the set of parental characteristics explains almost 20% of the variation in per-child bequests across families, with each parental characteristic statistically significant. The point estimates in the first column indicate that a dollar increase in annual occupational earnings leads to a $1.64 increase in the per-child bequest, while each grade of maternal schooling adds almost $2,700 to the bequest amount. If the father is a farmer, bequests on average increase by almost $44,000. Additional years of potential work experience by the father due to longevity also add to bequest amounts, up to almost 60 years of work experience. Given that the average schooling attainment for the fathers in the sample was 13 years, this suggests that on average bequests are reduced if fathers live beyond age 79.

The GLS estimates reported in Table 3 were used to compute for each sample respondent or spouse with a surviving parent the expected bequest that could be provided to the respondent or spouse from his or her parents at the time of the survey - a measure of "capacity to provide bequests" or current parental bequeathable wealth per child.[18] As noted, an important reason why parental resources affect intramarriage distributions for adult offspring is that such resources affect the support an individual receives if the marriage dissolves. The bequest capacity variable, reflecting the parents' current bequeatheable wealth position, does appear to be an important predictor of the amount and incidence of financial assistance provided by parents to their adult children while they are alive - parental bequeathable wealth affects both what children may expect to receive when parents die as well as what

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[18]It is possible that the sample of orphaned twin is selective with respect to the health of the parents. To assess this we restricted the sample to twins and spouses of parents who had died at age 70 or older. This reduced the sample size by 20% but did not significantly alter the coefficient estimates.

support they may obtain while parents are still living.

The first two columns of Table 4 report random-effects probit and Tobit estimates of the probability of any sample respondent receiving financial assistance from a parent in the year preceding the survey (1993) and the amount of such aid, respectively, as a function of the parental bequest capacity variable, the computed distance of the respondent from his or her parents, the respondent's full time earnings in the past year, a variable indicating whether or not the respondent is married, and respondent age and gender. As 72% of the families have two siblings represented in the sample, the estimation procedure takes into account the potential existence of a family-based error term.

The estimates of the determinants of both parental aid incidence and aid amounts indicate that among adult children with similar earnings and marital status and with at least one surviving parent, those whose parents have a higher expected bequest capacity are significantly more likely to receive financial assistance and to receive more assistance. The point estimate suggests that a $10,000 increase in parental per-child bequeathable wealth increases the probability of financial aid assistance to an adult child at the sample means by 17% and the amount of aid by 20%. The aid estimates in the first two columns also indicate that assistance by parents is significantly higher and more likely for non-married adult children. The estimates reported in columns three and four, based on the sample of non-married respondents, indicate that for this group as well, having parents with higher bequeathable wealth leads to greater financial support, for given respondent earnings. These results thus suggest that parents' capacity to make per-child bequests is a significant determinant of the support adult children can expect to receive when they are not married and while their parents are still alive. Distance to parents (an important determinant of visits), however, has no discernible effect on parent financial support.[19]

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[19]The estimates also suggest that respondents with higher earnings, for given parental resources, are less likely to receive assistance and receive less assistance, although the estimates are not very precise. This finding and the absence of a distance effect would appear not to provide support for models that suggest that transfers from parents to adult children are payments for services associated with visits. These results are also consistent with the finding in Altonji *et al.* (1996) that money transfers are not

IV. Visits with Parents and Visits with In-Laws

We now examine the relationships between the capacities of parents and in-laws to provide support to their adult children and the allocation of a couple's time to visiting with them based on the sample of couples in which each marital partner has at least one surviving parent and for which we have information on both parental and in-law characteristics. The specification we use is a linear approximation to the visits equation (7) from the model. For couple j:

$$(9) \qquad V_{ij} = \gamma_{iB}B_{ij} + \gamma_{kB}B_{kj} + \gamma_{i\omega}\omega_{ij} + \gamma_{k\omega}\omega_{kj} + \gamma_{iR}R_{ij} + \gamma_{kR}R_{kj} + \gamma_{ip}p_{ij} + \gamma_{kp}p_{kj} + u_j + e_{ij},$$

where V_{ij}=visits by partner i in couple j with own parents; B_{ij} and B_{kj}=the expected bequest variables for i's parents and i's spouse's (k's) parents, respectively; ω_{ij} and ω_{kj} and R_{ij} and R_{kj} =the full-time earnings (annual wage) of and actual bequests already made to each marital partner; p_{ij} and p_{kj}= the computed trip distances in miles to each set of parents; u_j=couple-specific error term and e_{ij}=partner-specific error term, and the γ are coefficients to be estimated. In addition, we include in the specification indicator variables for whether any parent had died for each marital partner. The collective household model implies that $\gamma_{iB}>0$ and $\gamma_{kB}<0$, $\gamma_{ip}<0$ and $\gamma_{kp}>0$, $\gamma_{i\omega}=\gamma_{k\omega}<0$ to the extent that visits are jointly made to each set of parents.

Each couple in the sample potentially provides two observations, one for each partner, on visits with own parents, the only distinction being that respondents are twins while almost all spouses are not and the respondent reports the information on spouse characteristics and on visits with both his/her own parents and to in-laws. We tested whether the parameter estimates of the own-parent visit equation differed across respondents and spouses and could not reject the null. The estimates are reported in Appendix Table A1. Accordingly, we stack the spouse and respondent own-parent visit observations to create a set of "child" observations and correct the coefficient standard errors for the presence of the common couple error term u_i.

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payments for time transfers.

The estimates of the own-parent visit equation are reported in Table 5. In the first-column specification, both the partner's wages are entered separately along with the parental and in-law bequeathable wealth variables. The estimates are in accord with the reservation-utility model of partially selfish couple decisions, with own-parental and in-law variables having statistically significant and opposite effects on the amount of visits by each child with own parents. The set of in-law and the set of own-parent variables are each jointly significant - $F(3, 695)=5.87$ for the set of own-parent variables and $F(3, 695)=2.36$ for the in-law variables. The estimates indicate in particular that visits by a child with his or her own parents are increased if the parents have greater expected spendable wealth, while visits with own parents are lower if in-laws' wealth is greater, for given parental capacity to provide support. The coefficients of the expected own-parent and in-law support variables, γ_{iB} and γ_{kB}, are also statistically significantly different ($F(1, 695)=10.7$). The point estimates suggest that a \$10,000 increase in expected capacity of parents to provide aid increases visits with own parents by 2.25 days, or 5%. A similar increase in the in-laws capacity to provide support reduces the couple's visits with the parents by 0.86 days. Distance to parents and in-laws also matter, with an increase of 100 miles in own-parent-couple distance reducing visits with the child's own parents by 2.3 days and a similar increase in distance to in-laws increasing visits with own parents by 0.5 days.

In contrast to the opposite-sign effects of the own-parent and in-law expected support variables, increases in either partner's wage lowers visits with the child's parents, with the coefficients of the partner wages, $\gamma_{i\omega}$ and $\gamma_{k\omega}$, not statistically significantly different from each other ($F(1, 695)=0.25$). In the second column of Table 5 we report estimates of the visit equation with the partner wages combined. The point estimate indicates that an increase in either partner's annual wage by \$10,000 lowers joint visits with parents (in-laws) by 0.54 days, a figure lower in absolute value than a similar change in the expected capacity to provide aid of either parents or in-laws. The negative sign for the summed wage variable is consistent with an interpretation of that variable as the opportunity cost of the couple's time.

That the partner wage effects are not different is further consistent with visits with parents and visits with in-laws being made jointly by the partners – a maintained assumption in Section I -- and with partner income being pooled.

We further test whether parental wealth and parental bequests have distinct effects on visit behavior, making use of the information on actual bequests made by surviving parents and in-laws to the marital partner. As noted, almost 10 percent of the couples in the sample in which each partner has at least one surviving parent received a bequest from a parent or in-law, and the survey provides information on both the source of the bequest (parent or in-law) and on its assignment to each of the partners. The third column of Table 5 reports estimates of the visits-with-parents equation that include the partner-specific bequest variables. In contrast to the parental wealth effects, the bequest coefficients have the same sign and the coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other ($F(1, 695)=0.59$). This, again, is consistent with pooling of resources that come into the household. In the fourth column, we report the statistically-preferred estimates in which bequests are summed. The point estimate of the in-marriage bequest variable indicates that a \$10,000 increase in bequests made to the couple while married, for given capacities of the couple's surviving parents and in-laws to provide future support, reduces the time spent visiting with parents by about half a day, suggesting that visits with parents are an inferior good.

To further test the hypothesis that differences in partner-specific opportunities for support outside marriage affect couple behavior, while differences in partner-specific incomes, earnings and other characteristics do not, we estimate the visit equation (9) using a within-couple estimator, differencing the respondent and spouse variables for all couples with complete information for each partner. The advantages of this procedure are that any couple-specific unobservables impounded in u_j that jointly affect visits with parents and visits with in-laws, such as a joint preference for family activities, and that may be correlated with the observed variables are swept out and partner-specific coefficient

differences are directly estimated. The differenced form of (9) is:

$$(10) \qquad \Delta V_j = (\gamma_{iB} - \gamma_{kB})\Delta B_j + (\gamma_{i\omega} - \gamma_{k\omega}) \Delta \omega_j + (\gamma_{iR} - \gamma_{kR})\Delta R_j + (\gamma_{ip} - \gamma_{kp})\Delta p_j + \Delta e_{ij},$$

where $\Delta x_j = x_{ij} - x_{kj}$. The model implies that $\gamma_{iB} - \gamma_{kB} > 0$, $\gamma_{ip} - \gamma_{kp} < 0$, and $\gamma_{i\omega} - \gamma_{k\omega} = 0$.

The first three columns of Table 6 report the estimates of variants of (10), with the addition of the parental survival control variable. In the first column we omit all of the differenced couple variables that the estimates in Table 5 suggest have no effect on the difference between joint visits with parents and visits with in-laws. The estimates are consistent with those of Table 5 and support the hypothesis that parental wealth affects the reservation utility of a married adult child - an increase in the relative wealth position of partner i's parents compared with that of his/her in-laws increases the couple's visits with his/her parents relative to the couple's visits with in-laws. In addition, increases in the distance to parents relative to in-laws decreases visits with parents relative to visits with in-laws. However, as indicated in column two, neither differences in the partners' schooling attainment, in full-time earnings or in partner-specific bequests received, jointly[20] or individually, affect the differences between joint visits with parents and with in-laws.

Finally, we have treated distance to parents and in-laws as an exogenous variable in our analysis. If location decisions were solely made to minimize visit costs, then we would expect that the location of a couple relative to the set of partner parents would also reflect the relative wealth position of the parents, with the couple locating more proximately to the parents with greater wealth. However, location decisions of parents and adult children reflect many factors besides visit costs, such as climate, job prospects and proximity to children and siblings. It is not clear that the spouse with greater outside-marriage opportunities would prefer to exploit his superior bargaining position to be closer to his/her parents, despite the relatively higher frequency of visits to those parents.

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[20]The joint F-statistic for the set of partner-specific coefficient differences is $F(3, 1222) = 0.77$ (P=.51).

The last two columns of Table 6 use the within-couple estimator to examine whether differences in spouse characteristics and parental wealth positions also affect couples' proximity to parents and in-laws. The results are clear - none of the variables affect the distance between married couples and their parents. In particular, couples do not choose to reside nearer to the wealthier set of parents, although, as indicated in column 3, even gross of differentials in distances to parents and in-laws, couples visit the set of parents with the greater wealth more often.

V. Alternative Interpretations

We have used information on visits with parents and visits with in-laws as a method of drawing inferences about the nature of household decisions and how they respond to the relative wealth of parents and in-laws. The two main findings are that (i) the resources of parents and in-laws affect the distribution of visits between the parents of the marital partners, consistent with a model in which parental and in-law resources affect the reservation utilities of the two partners and thus affect the relative welfare positions of the marital partners and (ii) any transfers to each partner that occur while the partners are married have distinctly different effects on visit behavior than do changes in parents' and in-laws' wealth positions. In this section we consider two alternative interpretations of our finding that couples spend more time with the set of parents having greater resources.

Our result with respect to a positive association between adult child visits and parental wealth, consistent with the model of collective intracouple decision-making, is also consistent with the Bernheim, *et al.* (1985) model of intergenerational strategic bequests in which parents use the promise of bequests to manipulate offspring attention.[21] An implication of this model of competition among siblings for parental bequests, and a potential source of misspecification error for our results, is that an adult child's parental visit behavior should depend on the visit behavior of his siblings. If visits with parents

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[21] The Bernheim *et al.* model, however, does not predict a negative relation between visits with one's parents and one's in-laws' wealth that is consistent with intra-couple rivalry and that we find empirically.

are a rivalrous game among siblings, then the characteristics of siblings should be included in any equation describing the visits of any one sibling with his/her parents.[22]

We can exploit the sibling (twin)-based sampling frame of the survey to test the hypothesis that siblings interact importantly in parental visit decisions. We specify a reduced-form visit equation for a sibling as a function of his/her own household characteristics, his/her parents' household characteristics, and his/her twin's household characteristics. The first column of Table 7 reports estimates of the determinants of visits with parents for all twins in intact twin-pairs with at least one surviving parent based on a specification including household characteristics for the parents and the twin. In this specification, the set of twin-specific characteristics - own schooling, own distance from parents, own number of children, total annual household earnings, and marital status - and the set of parental characteristics - father's and mother's schooling levels, total number of children of the parents, and survival status - are each jointly statistically significant determinants of visits of each twin with parents. In the second column, estimates are reported from the specification that adds the household characteristics of the twin sibling. The set of "cross" effects associated with the sibling's characteristics is not statistically significant, while both the own and parental characteristics retain their statistical significance. There does not appear to be any significant interaction between siblings in observed parental visit behavior as implied by the inter-sibling model of strategic bequests.[23, 24]

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[22]Perozek's test (1998) of the Bernheim, *et al.* model based on data from the adult-children sample in the National Survey of Families and Households fails to include the characteristics of siblings in the specification of the visits-with-parents equations. The data used by Bernheim *et al.* did not include any information on siblings.

[23]Another way to specify this test is to estimate directly the effects of a twin's sibling's visits with the parents on the amount of his/her own visits using the twin's siblings unique characteristics as instruments. Not surprisingly, given the estimates in Table 7, the two-stage least squares estimate of the cross-sibling visit effect is not statistically significant.

[24] In Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) we also use the sibling feature of our data to explore whether the "rewards" for visits with parents assumed in that model - parental bequests - differ significantly among siblings despite significant inter-sibling visit differentials. We find that they do not.

A second alternative interpretation of the finding that parental wealth and in-law wealth affect the relative visits of couples with parents and in-laws is that such wealth is correlated with goods or assets that make visits more pleasant, such as a vacation home, with jointly-maximizing couples simply visiting more often the set of parents with the superior consumption bundle. There are two implications of a framework in which parental resources simply reflect the quality or desirability of visits with parents. The first is that an increase in the resources of any set of parents would then increase total visits with parents and visits with in-laws (consumption of the parent goods), since it increases the relative attractiveness of visits or average visit quality.[25] In the model here in which parental or in-law resources only affect the reservation utility of each partner, however, the effect of an increase in either parental or in-law resources on total joint visits with in-laws and parents is, on average, zero, as can be seen by adding expressions (6) and (7) with the direct costs of visits equal for parents and in-laws.

Summing equation (10) over the two partners yields a specification for total visit time in terms of the sums of partner characteristics. Table 8 reports estimates of the determinants of the total number of days visiting with parents and with in-laws for the married couples with at least one surviving in-law and parent based on the summed specification. As can be seen, increases in the opportunity cost of visits, as measured by the sum of the partners annual wages and the sum of the distances between the couple and the in-laws and the parents, reduce the total time spent by the couple with their parents and in-laws, as do increases in the total of actual bequests they have received. However, an increase in the total bequeathable resources of parents and in-laws has no statistically significant effect on the total amount of time a couple spends with parents and in-laws. This latter result is inconsistent with a model in which parental resources are measures of the quality of visit goods and thus shift the Pareto frontier for the couple. The set of results, however, is consistent with the model in which the resources of parents are

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[25]This is equivalent in the model to an increase for both marital partners in preferences η_k for visits with the parents of k or to a decrease in the price of visits p_k.

determinants of the individual welfare of the marital partners outside the marriage and thus only their relative position inside the marriage.

Another reason that bequeathable wealth may direct affect visits is that higher parental wealth and age are positive related, and aged parents are less healthy and thus require more care by offspring. Although we do not have information on the health of respondent and spouse parents, an additional test of the possibility that parental wealth or its correlates - parental amenities, health - directly determine visits is provided by the visit pattern of non-married offspring. According to the collective approach, parental wealth should only confer benefits on individuals in joint households, given actual transfers and bequests. Table 9 presents estimates of visits for non-married respondents that are parallel to the estimates in Table 8, but with the bequeathable wealth, actual bequests and distance variables referring only to their parents. In this sample as in the sample of married couples, both distance to parents and annualized earnings are significantly negative, again suggesting the importance of costs of such visits. But the coefficient on parental bequeathable wealth is very small and not significant, as in Table 8. Parental wealth thus benefits non-married offspring only to the extent that wealth is intergenerationally transferred; parental wealth benefits married offspring, net of any transfers, because it represents the potential to provide support outside of marriage.[26]

Another implication of the alternative view that parental resources represent the quality of visits with parents so that each partner benefits from either parental set having more resources is that an increase in the resources of either set of parents would make marital break-up less likely. That is, having wealthier in-laws or parents and thus more pleasant visits increases marital surplus. If, however, as highlighted in our analysis, parental resources reflect the capacity of parents to provide a post-marriage

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[26]We also checked if parental age, net of bequeathble wealth, has a direct effect on visits by adding the difference in the average age of surviving in-laws and parents in the differenced visits specification. The coefficient on parental (in-law) age was positive, but with a t-ratio of 1.01. The positive coefficient on heritable wealth was reduced by only 5% and retained its statistical significance.

income cushion - an improved non-marital alternative - for one partner only, then an important additional implication of the model that emphasizes the role of parental resources in affecting reservation utilities is that increases in parental resources should increase the probability of marital break-up. It is easy to show that with unanticipated stochastic shocks to the gains from marriage, those individuals with better non-marital alternatives should be more likely to leave their marriages when subject to adverse marriage-specific shocks. We have seen in Table 4 that higher levels of parental bequeathable wealth are positively associated with transfers to adult children who are unmarried. We now inquire as to whether there is a higher incidence of marital break-up among the children of parents with higher levels of bequeathable resources.

26.2% of the sample respondents who had ever married (93% of the sample) had divorced at least once by the time of the survey (15.4% of those currently married). Table 10 reports probit and random-effects probit estimates of the determinants of ever-married respondents ever divorcing by the time of the survey as a function of their schooling at the date of their first marriage, their current age and their parents' ages and expected bequeathable wealth-per child when the respondent was age 30. The estimates indicate that those respondents with parents having greater expected capacity to provide intergenerational support were significantly more likely to have divorced. The point estimate indicates that a $10,000 increase in the parental transferrable resources per-child when the child is age 30 increases the likelihood of ever divorcing by 5%. The estimates in Tables 8 and 10, thus, provide no evidence that having wealthier parents or in-laws equally benefits both marital partners, which is consistent with the assumption in the collective household model that contemporaneous parental wealth operates by affecting bargaining power within marriage.

VI. Conclusion

It long has been recognized that parental wealth has economic advantages for children as they become adults. Adult children of wealthier parents tend to have more schooling, higher quality schooling,

connections that lead to better and higher-paying jobs, and better prospects of receiving larger net financial transfers in the forms of *inter vivos* gifts and bequests

In this paper we investigate another potential advantage for adult children of having wealthier parents that has been neglected in the literature on the consequences of parental wealth but that arises from the new literature on collective household decision-making. In particular, we find that a significant set of joint activities over which marital partners plausibly have differing preferences is influenced by the relative wealth standing of parents and in-laws in a way consistent with collective models of the household. Thus, in addition to direct income advantages -- facilitated in part through greater human capital investments -- those who have wealthier parents obtain additional consumption benefits within marriage because they have a stronger fall-back position in the form of parental support should they leave the marriage.

Our results thus suggest that all intergenerational wealth advantages would not be eradicated if either borrowing constraints are removed or bequests prohibited. Our findings imply, however, that public welfare programs that condition on household structure would reduce the intergenerational consequences of wealth inequality that arise in marriage. Our evidence also suggests that the gains to "golddigging" in the marriage market are less than might appear. The risk of marital break-up not only reduces prospects of actually sharing in a rich spouse's bequests, but is the reason why more resources in the marriage must be provided to the richer spouse while his/her parents are alive.

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Table 1

Sample Means and Standard Deviations: Married Couples with at Least One Surviving Parent and Parent In-Law

	Respondent	Spouse
Expected per-child bequeathable wealth of parents in 1993	$18,693 (25,077)	$17,962 (25,260)
Distance in miles between twin and parents' residence (shortest route)	258.6 (479.1)	285.1 (534.5)
Actual bequests to date from parents of respondent, as assigned	$1140 (9,584)	$130.6 (2,437)
Actual bequests to date from in-laws of respondent, as assigned	$71.9 (1703)	$962.9 (9658)
Earnings	$30,196 (21,874)	$36,927 (46,207)
Non-earnings income	$952.3 (3,973)	$1,076 (8,009)
Schooling level in grades completed	14.1 (2.22)	14.0 (2.36)
One parent dead	0.54	0.45
Female	0.61	0.39
Number of households	710	

Standard deviations are in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $ with the CPI used for adjustments for amounts reported for earlier years.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations: Parental Inheritances of Twins for Orphaned Twins

	All Orphaned Sample Twins
Average inheritance	$17,314 (36,125)
Percentage with no inheritance	35.1
Average age in years at death of last surviving parent	75.5 (10.5)
Average age in years of twin at death of last surviving parent	42.0 (9.46)
Average reported inheritance difference between twins	$1,942 (10,623)
Number of twins	758

Samples include only twins both of whose parents had died by the time of the survey. Standard errors are in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $ with the CPI used for adjustments for amounts reported for earlier years.

Table 3
Actual Per-Child Bequests (1993 $) and Parental Characteristics

Variable	GLS		Random-Effects Tobit	
Father's occupational income (1993 $)	1.64	1.58	1.87	1.80
	(3.45)[a]	(3.93)	(12.2)	(12.7)
Father a farmer	43,782	41,209	53,510	48,729
	(3.87)	(4.19)	(6.47)	(6.31)
Mother's schooling in grades	2,663	2,408	3.816	3,350
	(2.94)	(2.92)	(3.15)	(3.12)
Father's potential work experience in years	2,428	-	3,518	-
	(4.38)		(2.55)	
(Father's potential work experience in years)^2	-20.6	-	-29.2	-
	(3.96)		(2.21)	
Father's birth year	-	85,132	-	155,069
		(2.34)		(1.50)
(Father's birth year)^2	-	-22.0	-	-40.8
		(2.35)		(1.50)
Constant	-117423	-8091538	-184232	147455288
	(4.72)	(2.33)	(5.01)	(1.49)
R^2	.191	.194	-	-
σ_v^2	-	-	58388	56623
			(47.6)	(56.9)
σ_u^2	-	-	5839	5662
			(0.41)	(0.41)
Number of potential beneficiaries	596	657	596	657
Number of nuclear families	547	607	547	607

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.

Table 4
Random-Effects Probit and Tobit Estimates: Expected Per-Child Parental Bequeathable Wealth in
1993 and the Probability of Aid Receipt and Amount of Aid in 1993

Sample:	All Respondents		Non-married Respondents	
Variable:	Any Aid	Aid Amount	Any Aid	Aid Amount
Expected parental bequeathable wealth (x10⁻⁴)	.0712 (4.74)[a]	1291 (3.57)	.0593 (1.94)	493 (1.80)
Distance to parent(s) in miles	-.0000362 (0.39)	-.0611 (0.03)	-.000160 (0.78)	-1.39 (0.68)
Respondent's earnings (x10⁻⁴)	-.0453 (1.69)	-743 (1.18)	-.170 (2.31)	-1221 (1.74)
Respondent not married	.485 (4.31)	9269 (3.42)	-	-
Respondent female	-.178 (1.61)	-2758 (1.13)	.0362 (0.19)	-1560 (0.87)
Respondent's age in years	.0259 (2.63)	-510 (2.29)	-.0149 (0.83)	-160 (0.89)
Constant	-.613 (1.38)	-16790 (1.65)	-.359 (0.41)	-1260 (0.15)
σ_v^2	-	24852 (76.1)	-	9614 (5.91)
σ_u^2	-	2379 (0.22)	-	4624 (1.40)
$\sigma_u^2 / (\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2)$	.265 (2.60)	-	.260 (1.35)	-
Number of respondents	2291	2291	446	446
Number of parent households	1469	1469	270	270

All dollar amounts are in 1993 $, with the CPI used to adjust reports from earlier years.
a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.

Table 5
Family and Household Determinants of Days Visiting with Parents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Expected current per-child parent wealth (x10^{-4})	2.25 (2.56)[a]	2.01 (2.35)	2.01 (2.36)	2.00 (2.35)
Expected current per-child in-law wealth (x10^{-4})	-.860 (1.43)	-.894 (1.52)	-.899 (1.53)	-.896 (1.53)
Distance to parents in miles	-.0232 (8.52)	-.0228 (8.67)	-.0228 (8.67)	-.0228 (8.66)
Distance to in-laws in miles	.00480 (1.45)	.00411 (1.30)	.00412 (1.30)	.00410 (1.29)
One parent dead	8.58 (3.10)	8.01 (2.93)	8.19 (2.98)	8.22 (2.99)
One in-law dead	-4.60 (1.71)	-5.28 (1.98)	-5.03 (1.87)	-5.06 (1.88)
Annualized earnings of child (x10^{-2})	-.00663 (1.41)	-	-	-
Annualized earnings of child's spouse (x10^{-2})	-.00481 (2.01)	-	-	-
Total annualized earnings of couple (x10^{-2})	-	-.00543 (1.88)	-.00526 (1.85)	-.00526 (1.85)
Actual bequest received from parents (x10^{-4})	-	-	-.339 (1.02)	-
Actual bequest received from in-laws (x10^{-4})	-	-	-.719 (1.92)	-
Actual bequests of both spouses combined (x10^{-2})	-	-	-	-.533 (2.09)
Constant	39.4 (9.6)	40.7 (10.4)	40.5 (10.4)	40.5 (10.4)
R^2	.060	.057	.058	.058
Number of observations	1314	1387	1387	1387
Number of households	696	736	736	736

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.

Table 6

Spouse-Difference Estimates: Determinants of Days Visiting with and Distance to Parents

	Days Visiting Parents			Distance to Parents	
ΔExpected current per-child parental wealth (x10⁻⁴)	2.71 (2.84)[a]	2.35 (2.77)	2.40 (2.84)	-.583 (0.07)	-1.61 (0.19)
ΔDistance to parents in miles	-.0270 (5.00)	-.0242 (5.93)	-	-	-
ΔOne parent dead	13.5 (3.88)	9.74 (3.05)	8.74 (2.91)	29.1 (1.07)	22.7 (0.77)
ΔActual bequest (x10⁻⁴)	-	-1.39 (0.71)	-1.71 (0.72)	-	23.3 (0.83)
ΔSchooling level in grades completed	-	1.17 (1.29)	.533 (0.64)	-	9.79 (1.03)
ΔEarnings (x10⁻²)	-	-.00035 (0.11)	-.00052 (0.21)	-	.00360 (0.58)

Number of marital partners=1226. Number of partners who are twins=508. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses.

Table 7
Are Parental Visits a Game Among Siblings?
Own, Parental and Twins' Determinants of Days Visiting with Parents

	(1)	(2)
Own schooling level in grades completed	-4.63	-4.22
	(4.33)[a]	(3.20)
Own distance from parents in miles	-.0368	-.0358
	(11.7)	(10.1)
Total annualized earnings in own family (x10^{-2})	-.00644	-.00818
	(1.67)	(1.96)
Own number of children	-.680	-1.35
	(0.36)	(0.71)
Not married	17.1	13.7
	(1.83)	(1.51)
Age of both twins in years	-14.2	-15.7
	(1.62)	(1.73)
Age squared	.149	.162
	(1.61)	(1.68)
Both twins female	5.51	4.14
	(1.01)	(0.75)
Total number of parents' children	-4.65	-4.65
	(3.04)	(3.05)
Fathers' schooling level in grades completed	2.62	2.65
	(2.52)	(2.49)
Mother's schooling level in grades completed	-.670	-.309
	(0.52)	(0.24)
One parent died	13.4	14.1
	(2.41)	(2.53)
Twin's schooling level in grades completed	-	.0603
		(0.04)
Twin's distance from parents in miles	-	-.00210
		(0.44)
Total annualized earnings in twin's family (x10^{-2})	-	-.00449
		(0.72)
Twin's number of children	-	1.68
		(0.90)
Twin not married	-	.132
		(0.02)

Constant	412.1	437.8
	(1.99)	(2.04)
R^2	.118	.117
F-statistic: own effect (d.f., d.f.)		21.5 (5, 836)
P-value		.0000
F-statistic: parent effect (d.f., d.f.)		3.97 (3, 836)
P-value		.0080
F-statistic: twin (cross) effect (d.f., d.f.)		0.36 (5, 836)
P-value		.877

a. Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.

Table 8

Family and Household Determinants of Total Days Visiting Parents and In-laws

Total current per-child parental and in-law bequeathable wealth ($\times 10^{-4}$)	.209
	(0.28)
Total distance to parents and in-laws in miles)	-.0209
	(7.70)
Total annualized earnings of couple ($\times 10^{-2}$)	-.0118
	(2.32)
Total of actual bequests received from parents and in-laws ($\times 10^{-4}$)	-3.90
	(2.83)
Total number of parents and in-laws dead	9.46
	(2.10)
Constant	85.0
	(11.5)
R^2	.056
Number of observations	956

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.

Table 9

Family and Individual Determinants of Total Days Visiting Parents: Non-married Individuals

	(4)
Current per-child parental bequeathable wealth (x10^{-4})	.301
	(0.33)
Distance to parents in miles	-.0252
	(4.68)
Annualized earnings of individual (x10^{-2})	-.0450
	(2.17)
Respondent is female	-16.3
	(1.93)
One parent died	4.68
	(0.67)
Actual bequests received from parents (x10^{-4})	-.118
	(0.25)
Constant	77.4
	(6.09)
R^2	.071
Number of observations	389

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.

Table 10
Expected Parental Per-Child Bequeathable Wealth When Respondent was Age 30
and the Probability of Ever-Divorcing

	Probit	Random-Effects Probit
Expected parental wealth at age 30 $(\times 10^{-4})$	.0355	.0423
	(2.72)[a]	(2.67)
Age of father in years	-.00461	-.564
	(1.64)	(1.55)
Age of mother in years	-.00338	-.00391
	(1.05)	(0.88)
Respondent's completed grade level at time of first marriage	-.103	-.115
	(6.03)	(5.58)
Age in years	.462	.540
	(4.53)	(4.18)
Age squared	-.00477	-.00557
	(4.43)	(4.08)
Constant	-9.97	-11.7
	(4.20)	(3.93)
$\sigma_u^2 / (\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2)$	-	.280
		(4.81)
Number of respondents	2286	2286
Number of households	1250	1250

a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. Expected parental wealth in 1993 $.

Table A1
Test of Symmetry: Estimates of the Determinants of Visits to In-Laws and Parents

	Days with Parents	Days with In-Laws
Expected current parental wealth $(x10^{-4})$	3.17	-.255
	$(3.39)^a$	(0.34)
Expected current in-law wealth $(x10^{-4})$	-.791	1.35
	(0.90)	(1.92)
Distance to parents in miles	-.0289	.00593
	(5.04)	(1.29)
Distance to in-laws in miles	.00458	-.0175
	(0.92)	(4.36)
One parent dead	12.3	-4.63
	(2.92)	(1.38)
One in-law dead	-3.50	3.16
	(0.82)	(0.92)
Total annualized earnings of couple $(x10^{-2})$	-.00857	-.00338
	(2.04)	(1.07)
Constant	41.8	34.5
	(8.83)	(9.09)
F (d.f., d.f.)	7.66 (8, 645)	3.60 (8, 645)
P-value	.0000	.0008
F (d.f., d.f.) , symmetry test	1.55 (6, 645)	
P-value	.159	

 a. Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses. Number of households=653. All dollar amounts are in 1993 $.