Estimating The Return to Education When It Varies Among Individuals

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In response to increases in the measured economic return to higher education, there has been substantial interest in estimating the “true” rate of return. In approaching this empirical measurement problem, two fundamentally different views of the labor market have been taken. These two views lead to different econometric estimation strategies.

The first view, associated with Griliches (1977), adopts an efficiency units view of the labor market. Human capital is homogeneous but people possess different amounts of it. This literature focuses on ability bias and measurement error as the central problems in estimating “the” return to schooling. Unmeasured or erroneously measured human capital components summarized by “ability” play a central role and the econometric problem is one of omitted variable bias in an earnings equation. The favored estimator in this literature is the method of instrumental variables.

The second view, associated with Roy (1951), Willis and Rosen (1979) and Willis (1986), focuses more explicitly on the choice of schooling and emphasizes comparative advantage in a labor market with heterogeneous human capital as a guiding principle. This viewpoint is at odds with an efficiency units point of view. Formally, the econometric model is one of a correlated random coefficient model. Econometric models of self selection of the type originally used to model the choice of labor supply and wages are typically applied to estimate this model.

The recent literature on estimating the return to schooling favors instrumental variables estimators over selection models on the grounds that instrumental variables estimators are more robust (Moffitt, 1999; Krueger, 2000). While robust methods are always preferred to

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2See Sattinger, 1993 for a survey of the evidence on comparative advantage in the labor market.

3Thus Krueger writes: “The econometric methods and strategies commonly employed in labor economics research have changed.... Based on his survey of econometric techniques used in articles on labor
non-robust methods, the recent literature emphasizes properties of estimators rather than the economic content of what is being estimated. It neglects a crucial feature of models of comparative advantage when some components of gains are observed by the agents being studied but not by the econometrician studying them. In such models there is a distribution of rates of return that cannot, in general, be summarized by a single parameter. There is no single average rate of return that qualifies as “the” rate of return, and different estimators and instruments define different parameters.

This paper seeks to redress the balance in the literature. In it, we define and estimate parameters that answer well posed economic questions. We compare the economically motivated parameters with the estimands produced by instrumental variable estimators and find that conventional IV does not, in general, answer well posed economic questions, although by accident it may sometimes do so.

Specifically, this paper makes six main points.

- In the presence of heterogeneous responses to schooling on which individuals act (select into schooling) a variety of “effects” of schooling can be defined and conventional intuitions about instrumental variables estimators break down.

- The empirical evidence from several data sets in the U.S. suggests that heterogeneity in the response to schooling on which individuals act is a central feature of the data.

**economics published in eight leading economics journals in 1985-87 and 1995-97, Robert Moffitt (1999) writes, “Selection bias methods of all types have shown a marked decline over the period. This includes the two-step methods as well as full-information maximum likelihood methods....Moving in the opposite direction are methods using IV [instrumental variables] or two-stage least squares (2SLS), which have grown enormously.” He interprets these trends as evidence that econometric practice in labor economics is shifting toward techniques that are, or at least can be argued to be, less restrictive and more robust than some of those used in the past.” Krueger (2000)**
This evidence challenges the validity of conventional instrumental variable methods for providing the estimates required to answer well posed policy evaluation problems.

- The contrast often made in the empirical literature between IV and selection models is a false one. Recently developed IV methods are special cases of nonparametric selection models.

- The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) introduced in Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) provides a link between the two literatures.

- Evidence that instrumenting schooling raises the coefficient on schooling above the value produced by OLS says nothing about credit constraints governing schooling decisions. Rather, it just reveals that IV weights the MTE differently than OLS.

- The evidence from several data sets using robust semiparametric methods suggests that there is comparative advantage in the labor market and that selection bias is empirically important in estimating the economic returns to schooling.

The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the two basic models of schooling that are used in the current literature: a common coefficient model and a random coefficient model. Section 2 presents the policy parameters of interest studied in this paper. Section 3 characterizes two approaches to estimating the random coefficient schooling model the classical parametric approach and a nonparametric approach developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001a, 2002). Section 4 presents the policy relevant treatment effect introduced in Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b) that is the central object of attention.
in this paper. Section 5 asks and answers the question “What Does The Instrumental Variable Estimator Estimate?”. Section 6 shows how to estimate the marginal treatment effect (MTE) which is the building block for all of our analyses. Section 7 presents our estimates. Section 8 compares our analysis and estimates with those reported in the recent literature. Section 9 concludes.

1 Models with Heterogeneous Returns to Schooling

Consider the familiar semilog specification of the earnings equation popularized by Mincer (1958; 1974):

\[ \ln Y = \alpha + \beta S + U \quad E(U) = 0. \]

For much of this paper, \( S \) will be binary corresponding to two schooling levels \( (S = 0 \text{ or } S = 1) \) to simplify the exposition and connect to the empirical work reported in Section 7. For simplicity we suppress explicit notation for dependence on the covariates \( X \) unless it is helpful to make this dependence explicit. Under special conditions explicitly discussed in Willis (1986) and Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001), \( \beta \) estimates the rate of return to schooling.\footnote{Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001) demonstrate that these conditions applied in U.S. data for the period 1940-1970 but no longer apply.}

When \( \beta \) is a constant for all persons (conditional on \( X \)), we obtain the efficiency units model of Griliches (1977). In his paper, measured \( S \) may be correlated with unmeasured \( U \) because of omitted ability factors and because of measurement error in \( S \). He advocates instrumental variable estimators for \( \beta \) to alleviate these problems. In his framework, because \( \beta \) is a constant, there is a unique effect of schooling (“the” effect of schooling).
In terms of a model of counterfactual states or potential outcomes, we have two potential outcomes \((\ln Y_0, \ln Y_1)\):

\[
\ln Y_0 = \alpha + U, \quad \ln Y_1 = \alpha + \beta + U
\]

and \(\ln Y_1 - \ln Y_0 = \beta\) a constant common effect, conditional on \(X\).

>From its inception, the modern literature on the returns to schooling has recognized that returns may vary across schooling levels and across persons of the same schooling level. Variation in returns to schooling are used to partially account for variation over time in aggregate inequality.\(^5\)

The early literature was not clear about the sources of variation in \(\beta\). The Roy model, as applied by Willis and Rosen (1979), gives a more precise notion of why \(\beta\) varies and how it is dependent on \(S\). In that framework, the potential outcomes are generated by two random variables \((U_0, U_1)\) instead of one as in the common coefficient model:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(2a)} & \quad \ln Y_0 = \alpha + U_0 \\
\text{(2b)} & \quad \ln Y_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1
\end{align*}
\]

where \(E(U_0) = 0\) and \(E(U_1) = 0\) so \(\alpha\) and \(\alpha + \bar{\beta}\) are the mean potential outcomes for \(\ln Y_0\) and \(\ln Y_1\) respectively. The causal effect of education is

\[
\beta = \ln Y_1 - \ln Y_0 = \bar{\beta} + U_1 - U_0
\]

and we may write observed income as

\[
\ln Y = S \ln Y_1 + (1 - S) \ln Y_0 = \alpha + \beta S + U_0
\]
\[
= \alpha + \beta S + \{U_0 + S(U_1 - U_0)\}
\]

In the Roy framework, the choice of schooling is explicitly modeled. In its simplest form

\[
S = 1 \text{ if } \ln Y_1 \geq \ln Y_0 \iff \beta \geq 0
\]
\[
= 0 \text{ otherwise.}
\]

If agents know or can partially predict $\beta$ at the time they make schooling decisions, there is dependence between $\beta$ and $S$ in equation (3).

In this setup there are three sources of potential econometric problems: (a) $S$ is correlated with $U_0$; (b) $\beta$ is correlated with $S$; (c) $\beta$ is correlated with $U_0$. Source (a) arises in ability bias or measurement error models. Source (b) arises if agents partially anticipate $\beta$ when making schooling decisions. Thus $\Pr(S = 1 \mid X, \beta) \neq \Pr(S = 1 \mid X)$.

In this framework, $\beta$ is an ex post causal effect. Ex ante agents may not know $\beta$. In the case where schooling decisions are made in the absence of information about $\beta$, $\beta$ is independent of $S$. ($\beta \perp \perp S$ where “$\perp \perp$” denotes independence). Source (c) arises from the possibility that the gains to schooling ($\beta$) may be dependent on the level of earnings in the unschooled state as in the Roy model. The best unschooled (those with high $U_0$) may have the lowest return to schooling.

When $U_1 - U_0 \neq 0$, so $\beta$ varies in the population, the return to schooling is a random variable and there is a distribution of causal effects. There are various ways to summarize this distribution and, in general, no single statistic will capture all aspects of the distribution.

Economists influenced by the biostatistical literature focus on the population average return:
\[ E(\beta \mid X = x) = E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid X = x) = \bar{\beta}(x) \]

which is the return to a random selection of the population for given characteristics \( X = x \).

This is sometimes called “the” causal effect.\(^6\) Others look at the return for those who attend school:

\[ E(\beta \mid S=1, X = x) = E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid S=1, X = x) = \bar{\beta}(x) + E(U_1-U_0 \mid S=1, X = x).\(^7\) \]

Other parameters can be formulated such as

\[ E(\beta \mid S=0, X = x) = E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid S=0, X = x) = \bar{\beta}(x) + E(U_1-U_0 \mid S=0, X = x). \]

This is the gain that those who do not go to school would experience if they went to school.

Observe that

\[ E(\beta - \bar{\beta} \mid S = 1, X = x) = E(U_1 - U_0 \mid S = 1, X = x) - E(U_1 - U_0 \mid X = x) \] ("Sorting Gain")

is the sorting gain that arises from purposive selection into schooling. In a model based on decision rule (4), this sorting gain is positive. In more general models, it may be of either sign.

Depending on the conditioning sets and the summary statistics desired, one can define a variety of causal “effects”. Different causal effects answer different economic questions. Notice that if

\(^6\)It is the Average Treatment Effect (\(ATE\)) parameter of biostatistics. Card (1999, 2001) defines it as the “true causal effect” of education. See also Angrist and Krueger (2001).

\(^7\)It is the Treatment on the Treated parameter as discussed by Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
I. $U_1 \equiv U_0$ (common effect model)

or

II. $\Pr(S = 1 \mid X = x, \beta) = \Pr(S = 1 \mid X)$ (conditional on $X$, $\beta$ does not affect choices)

all of the mean treatment effects collapse to the same parameter and there is a single “causal effect” of schooling. Otherwise there are many candidates for the title of causal effect and this has produced considerable confusion in the empirical literature as different analysts use different definitions in reporting empirical results so the different estimates are not strictly comparable.\(^8\)

2 Policy Parameters of Interest

Which, if any, of these effects should be designated as “the” causal effect? This question is best answered by stating an economic question and finding the answer to it. Suppose that we adopt a standard welfare framework. Aggregate per capita income under one policy is to be compared with aggregate per capita income under another. One of the policies may be no policy at all. For utility criterion $V(Y)$, a standard welfare analysis compares

$$E(V(Y) \mid \text{Alternative Policy}) - E(V(Y) \mid \text{Baseline Policy}).$$

Adopting the common coefficient view, and a log utility specification ($V(Y) = \ell n Y$) and ignoring general equilibrium effects, the mean change in welfare is

$$E(\ell n Y \mid \text{Alternative Policy}) - E(\ell n Y \mid \text{Baseline Policy}) = \bar{\beta}(\Delta P)$$

\(^8\)Heckman and Robb (1985) noted that Lewis’ survey of the union effects on wages (1986) confused different “effects”. This is especially important in his comparison of cross section and longitudinal estimates.
where $\beta$ is “the” causal effect of schooling and $(\Delta P)$ is the change in the proportion of people induced to attend school by the policy. This can be defined conditional on $X = x$ or overall for the population. This is also the mean change in log income if case II applies. In that case, $\beta$ is distributed independently of $S$ and we obtain a standard random coefficient model of the sort analyzed by Becker and Chiswick (1996) and Mincer (1974).

In the general case, when agents partially anticipate $\beta$, and comparative advantage dictates schooling choices, none of the traditional treatment parameters plays the role of $\beta$ in (5). We present the appropriate parameter and compare it with what IV estimates and the conventional treatment parameters after reviewing some basic results from our previous research that are required to make this comparison. We consider two approaches to estimating the distribution of the returns to schooling, or some features of it.

## 3 Two Approaches to Estimating the Schooling Model

Consider a standard model of schooling. Let $Y_1(t)$ be the earnings of the schooled at experience level $t$ while $Y_0(t)$ is the earnings of the unschooled at experience level $t$. Assuming that schooling takes 1 period, a person takes schooling if

$$\frac{1}{(1+r)} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{Y_1(t)}{(1+r)^t} - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{Y_0(t)}{(1+r)^t} - C^* \geq 0$$

where $C^*$ is direct costs which may include psychic costs, $r$ is the discount rate, and lifetimes are assumed to be infinite to simplify the expressions. Follow Mincer (1974) and assume that earnings profiles in logs are parallel in experience. Thus $Y_1(t) = Y_1 e(t)$ and $Y_0(t) = Y_0 e(t)$.

The agent attends school if
\[
\left( \frac{1}{(1+r)} Y_1 - Y_0 \right) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{e(t)}{(1+r)^t} \geq C^*,
\]

where \(e(t)\) is a post-school experience growth factor. Let \(K = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{e(t)}{(1+r)^t}\) and absorb \(K\) into \(C^*\) so \(C = \frac{C^*}{K}\), and define discount factor \(\gamma = \frac{1}{(1+r)}\). Using growth rate \(g\) to relate potential income in the two schooling choices we may write \(Y_1 = (1+g)Y_0\) where from equation (2), \(\beta = \ln(1+g)\). Thus the decision to attend school \((S = 1)\) is made if

\[
Y_0[\gamma(1+g) - 1] \geq C.
\]

This is equivalent to

\[
\beta \geq \ln(1 + \frac{C}{Y_0}) + \ln(1 + r).
\]

For \(r \approx 0\) and \(\frac{C}{Y_0} \approx 0\), we may write the decision rule for \(S = 1\) as

\[
(6) \quad \beta \geq r + \frac{C}{Y_0}.
\]

Equation (6) generalizes decision rule (4) by adding borrowing and tuition costs as determinants of schooling. Below we introduce variables \(Z\) that shift costs and discount factors \((C = C(Z), r = r(Z))\). Notice that

\[
E(\beta \mid S = 1, r, C_0, Y_0) = E \left( \beta \mid \beta \geq r + \frac{C}{Y_0}, r, C_0, Y_0 \right)
\]

so the average return to schooling conditional on taking schooling is increasing in \(r\) and \(C\) and decreasing in \(Y_0\) if \(\beta\) is independent of these variables.

The conventional approach to estimating selection models postulates normality of \((U_0, U_1)\) in equations 2(a) and 2(b), writes \(\beta(X)\) and \(\alpha(X)\) as linear functions of \(X\) and postulates
independence between $X$ and $(U_0, U_1)$. From estimates of the structural model, it is possible to answer a variety of economic questions and to construct the various treatment parameters and distributions of treatment parameters.\footnote{Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000) derive all of the treatment parameters and distributions of treatment parameters for several parametric models.}

A major advance in the recent literature in econometrics is the development of a framework that relaxes conventional linearity, normality and separability assumptions to estimate various treatment parameters. In this paper, we draw on the framework developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000).

Using their setup we write

\begin{equation}
\ell nY_1 = \mu_1(X, U_1) \text{ and } \ell nY_0 = \mu_0(X, U_0). 
\end{equation}

The treatment effect is $\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 = \beta = \mu_1(X, U_1) - \mu_0(X, U_0)$, which is a general non-separable function of $(U_1, U_0)$. It is not assumed that $X \perp \perp (U_0, U_1)$ so $X$ may be correlated with the unobservables in potential outcomes.

A latent variable model determines enrollment in schooling (this is the nonparametric analogue to decision rule (6)):

\begin{equation}
S^* = \mu_S(Z) - U_S \\
S = 1 \text{ if } S^* \geq 0.
\end{equation}

A person goes to school $(S = 1)$ if $S^* \geq 0$. Otherwise $S = 0$. In this notation, $(Z, X)$ are observed and $(U_1, U_0, U_S)$ are unobserved. The $Z$ vector may include some or all of the components of $X$.

Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2001) establish that under the following assumptions, it is possible to develop a model that unifies different treatment parameters, that shows how
the conventional IV estimand relates to these parameters and what policy questions IV estimates. Those conditions are

(A-1) \( \mu_S(Z) \) is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on \( X \);

(A-2) \( U_S \) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure;

(A-3) \( (U_0, U_1, U_S) \) is independent of \( Z \) conditional on \( X \);

(A-4) \( \ell nY_1 \) and \( \ell nY_0 \) have finite first moments

and

(A-5) \( 1 > \Pr(S = 1 \mid X) > 0 \).

Assumption (A-1) assumes the existence of an “instrument” - more precisely a variable or set of variables that are in \( Z \) but not in \( X \), and thus shift \( S^* \) but not potential outcomes \( Y_0, Y_1 \). (These are determinants of \( C \) and \( r \) in equation (6)). Assumption (A-2) is made for technical convenience and can be relaxed. Assumption (A-3) allows \( X \) to be arbitrarily dependent on the errors. \( X \) need not be “exogenous” in any conventional definition of that term. However, a no feedback condition is required for interpretability. Defining \( X_s \) as the value of \( X \) if \( S \) set to \( s \), a sufficient condition for interpretability is that \( X_1 = X_0 \) almost everywhere. This ensures that conditioning on \( X \) does not mask the effect of realized \( S \) on outcomes. Assumption (A-4) is necessary for the definition of the mean parameters and assumption (A-5) ensures that in very large samples for each \( X \) there will be people with \( S = 1 \) and other people with \( S = 0 \) (existence of treatments and controls).

Denoting \( P(z) \) as the probability of receiving treatment conditional on \( Z = z \), \( P(z) \equiv \Pr(S = 1 \mid Z = z) = F_{U_S}(\mu_S(z)) \). Without loss of generality we may write \( U_S \sim \text{Unif}[0,1] \)
so \( \mu_S(z) = P(z) \). Thus with no loss of generality if \( S^* = \nu(Z) - V_S \), we can always reparameterize the model so \( \mu_S(Z) = F_V(\nu(Z)) \) and \( U_S = F_V(V) \). Vytlacil (2002) establishes that the model of equations (7), (8) and (A-1) - (A-5) is equivalent to the LATE model of Imbens and Angrist (1994) including for the case of continuous instruments.

This does impose testable restrictions on \((Y, S, Z, X)\). Those are:

(i) Index Sufficiency

\[
\Pr(\ln Y_j \in A \mid Z = z, S = j) = \Pr(\ln Y_j \in A \mid P(Z) = P(z), S = j).
\]

for \(j = 0, 1\). This says that \(Z\) enters the conditional distribution of \(\ln Y_1, \ln Y_0\), only through the index \(P(Z)\).

A second testable implication is a monotonicity condition:

(ii.a) If \(g(\cdot)\) is a function such that \(\Pr[g(\ln Y_0) > 0] = 1\), then

\[E[g(\ln Y_0)(1 - S) \mid X, P(Z) = p]\]

is decreasing in \(p\).

(ii.b) If \(g(\cdot)\) is a function such that \(\Pr[g(\ln Y_1) > 0] = 1\), then

\[E[g(\ln Y_1)S \mid X, P(Z) = p]\]

is increasing in \(p\).

The index structure produced by assumptions (A-1) - (A-5) joined with the model of equations (7) and (8) allows us to define a new treatment effect, the marginal treatment effect (MTE)

\[
\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_S) \equiv E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u_S).
\]
This is the marginal gain to schooling of a person with characteristics $X = x$ just indifferent between taking schooling or not at level of unobservable $U_S = u_S$. It is a willingness to pay measure by people at the margin of indifference for schooling given $X$ and $U_S$.\footnote{Björklund and Moffitt (1987) introduced this parameter in the context of the Roy model.} The \textit{LATE} parameter of Imbens and Angrist (1994) may be written in this framework.

$$\Delta^{LATE}(x, u'_S, u_S) = E(\ln Y \mid X = x, u_S \leq U_S \leq u'_S)$$

where $u_S \neq u'_S$. \textit{MTE} is the limit of \textit{LATE}, if the limit exists.

Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) establish that under assumptions (A-1) - (A-5) all of the conventional treatment parameters are different weighted averages of the \textit{MTE} where the weights integrate to one:

$$\Delta^{ATE}(x) = \int_0^1 E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u)du.$$  

$$\Delta^{TT}(x, P(z), S = 1) = \frac{1}{P(z)} \int_0^{P(z)} E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u)du$$

$$\Delta^{LATE}(x, u_S = P(z), u'_S = P(z')) = \left[ \int_{P(z)}^{P(z')} E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u)du \right] \frac{1}{P(z') - P(z)}$$

$$\Delta^{TT}(x, S = 1) = \int_0^1 E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u)g_x(u)du$$

$$g_x(u) = \frac{1 - F_{P(Z)\mid X}(u \mid x)}{\int_0^1 (1 - F_{P(Z)\mid X}(t \mid x))dt} = \frac{S_{P(Z)}(u \mid x)}{E(P \mid x)}$$

where $S_{P(Z)}(u \mid x)$ is the survivor function for $P(Z)$ given $X$ evaluated at $u$. 

\footnote{Björklund and Moffitt (1987) introduced this parameter in the context of the Roy model.}
Notice that if

1. \( \beta \) is a constant

or

2. \( E(\beta \mid X = x, U_S = u_s) = E(\beta \mid X) \)

(\( \beta \) mean independent of \( U_S \))

then \( MTE = ATE = TT = LATE \). This corresponds to the two cases (I and II) in Section 2 where there is no heterogeneity (\( \beta \) constant, case I) or agents don’t act on it (Case II).\(^{11}\)

Throughout this paper, we assume that \( P(Z) \) has support equal to the full unit interval, [0,1]. This is found in the data used in this paper. Bounds for the parameters and estimands when the support is less than full are presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2001).

### 4 Policy Relevant Treatment Effects

With the framework of Section 3 in hand, we can answer the policy question framed in Section 2 when \( \beta \) is heterogeneous and people act on \( \beta \) in making schooling decisions - the case of a nonconstant \( MTE \). We consider a class of policy interventions that affect \( P \) but not \((\ln Y_1, \ln Y_0)\).

Let \( P \) be the baseline probability of \( S = 1 \) with density \( f_P \). (We keep the conditioning on \( X \) implicit). Define \( P^* \) as the probability produced under an alternative policy regime

\(^{11}\)All of these parameters can be defined even if
(a) \( U_S \perp Z \) or
(b) For \( S = 1(\Omega(Z, U_S) \geq 0) \) there is no additively separable version of \( \Omega \) in terms of \( U_S, Z \) or
(c) \( Z = X \) (no instrument).

However, the conditions presented in the text are required to identify the \( MTE \). See Heckman and Vytlacil (2000).
with density $f_{P^*}$. Then we can write
\[ E(V(Y) \mid \text{Alternative Policy}^*) - E(V(Y) \mid \text{Baseline Policy}) = \int_0^1 \omega(u) \, \text{MTE}(u) \, du \]
where $\omega(u) = F_P(u) - F_{P^*}(u)$ where $F_P$ and $F_{P^*}$ denote the cdf of $P$ and $P^*$, respectively.\(^{12}\)

To define a parameter comparable to $\bar{\beta}$ in equation (7), we normalize the weights by $\Delta P$, the change in the proportion of people induced into the program, conditional on $X = x$. Thus if we use the weights
\[ \tilde{\omega}(u) = (\omega(u))/\Delta P \]
we produce the gain in the outcome for the people induced to change into (or out of) schooling by the policy change.

Notice that these weights differ from the weights on the conventional treatment parameters. Knowing $TT$ or $ATE$ does not answer a well posed policy question except in extreme cases (Heckman and Smith, 1998). We next show that in the general case where $\beta$ varies among individuals conditional on $X$ and people make schooling decisions based on it, $IV$ weights $MTE$ differently than is required for policy analysis or is required to generate the conventional treatment parameters.

\(^{12}\) Keeping the conditioning on $X$ implicit, we have
\[ E(V(Y) \mid \text{baseline}) = \int_0^1 E(V(Y) \mid P(Z) = p) dF_P(p) = \int_0^1 \int_0^1 \{1_{[0,p]}(u) E(V(Y_1) \mid U = u) + 1_{[p,1]}(u) E(V(Y_0) \mid U = u)\} dF_P \]
\[ = \int_0^1 [F_P(u) E(V(Y_1) \mid U = u) + (1 - F_P(u)) E(V(Y_0) \mid U = u)] du \]
where $1_A(u)$ is an indicator function for the event $u \in A$. Thus comparing the baseline to the new regime $E_{P^*}(V(Y)) - E_P(V(Y))$
\[ = \int_0^1 E(\Delta V \mid U = u) (F_P(u) - F_{P^*}(u)) du. \]
5 What Does The Instrumental Variable Estimator Estimate?

The intuition underlying the application of instrumental variables to the common coefficient model is well understood. It is also misleading in the more general case where $\beta$ varies among the population and schooling choices are made on the basis of it.

In the common coefficient model (1) the econometric problem is that $\text{Cov}(U, S) \neq 0$. If there is an instrument $Z$ with the properties (a) $\text{Cov}(U, Z) = 0$ and (b) $\text{Cov}(Z, S) \neq 0$ then we may identify (consistently estimate) $\beta$ by IV even though OLS is biased and inconsistent. Thus

$$\text{plim} \hat{\beta}_{IV} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, \ell nY)}{\text{Cov}(Z, S)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z, S)} = \beta.$$

This intuition breaks down in the more general case of equation (3):

$$\ell nY = \alpha + \beta S + \{U_1 - U_0\}S + U_0.$$

Finding an instrument $Z$ correlated with $S$ but not $U_0$ or $U_1 - U_0$ is not enough to identify $\beta$ or $\beta + E(U_1 - U_0 | S = 1)$ or other conventional treatment parameters. Simple algebra reveals that

$$\text{plim} \hat{\beta}_{IV} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, \ell nY)}{\text{Cov}(Z, S)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, U_0)}{\text{Cov}(Z, S)} + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, S(U_1 - U_0))}{\text{Cov}(Z, S)}.$$

By the standard argument, the second term vanishes ($\text{Cov}(Z, U_0) = 0$). But in general the third term does not:

---

13 We keep the conditioning on $X$ implicit.
\[
\frac{\text{Cov}(Z,S(U_1-U_0))}{\text{Cov}(Z,S)} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z,U_1-U_0 \mid S = 1)}{\text{Cov}(Z,S)} \neq 0
\]

where \( P = \Pr(S = 1) \). If \( U_1 - U_0 \equiv 0 \) (common coefficient model) or if \( U_1 - U_0 \) is independent of \( S \) and \( Z \) this term vanishes.\(^{14}\) But in general \( U_1 - U_0 \) is dependent on \( S \) and the term does not vanish.\(^{15}\)

To see why, consider the schooling choice model of equation (6) when \( C = 0 \) and \( r \) depends on \( Z \) \((r = Z\gamma)\). Then

\[
S = 1 \iff \beta + U_1 - U_0 \geq Z\gamma,
\]

and \( \text{Cov}(Z,U_1-U_0 \mid S = 1) = \text{Cov}(Z,U_1-U_0 \mid \beta + U_1 - U_0 \geq Z\gamma) \). Even if \( Z \perp (U_1-U_0) \), \( Z \) is not independent of \( U_1 - U_0 \) conditional on \( S = 1 \).

Another way to make this general point is to explore what an instrument based on compulsory schooling estimates. Compulsory schooling is sometimes viewed as an ideal instrument. But when returns are heterogeneous, and agents act on that heterogeneity in making schooling decisions, compulsory schooling as instrument identifies only one of many possible treatment parameters. Define \( P(x) = \Pr(S = 1 \mid X = x) \) as the probability of attending school conditional on \( X = x \) if there is no compulsion. Let \( T = 1 \) if the individual is in the with compulsion regime, and \( T = 0 \) otherwise. We assume that \( T \) is exogenous, in particular, that \( T \perp (U_S,U_0,U_1) \mid X \).

Compulsory schooling selects at random persons who ordinarily would not be schooled \((S = 0)\) at random and forces him/her to be schooled. Observed earnings for individuals in the compulsory schooling regime conditional on \( X \) are:

\(^{14}\)If \( U_1 - U_0 \) is independent of \( Z \), we have that \( U_1 - U_0 \) will be independent of \((S,Z)\) if \( U_1 - U_0 \) does not determine \( S \) conditional on \( Z \).

\(^{15}\)This point was first made by Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986) and Heckman (1997).
\[ E(\ell nY \mid X = x, T = 1) = E(\ell nY_1 \mid X = x) = E(\ell nY_1 \mid X = x, S = 1)P(x) \]
\[ + E(\ell nY_1 \mid X = x, S = 0)(1 - P(x)), \]
and for individuals in the regime with no compulsion
\[ E(\ell nY \mid X = x, T = 0) = E(\ell nY_1 \mid X = x, S = 1)P(x) \]
\[ + E(\ell nY_0 \mid X = x, S = 0)(1 - P(x)). \]

> From the difference in conditional means we can identify:
\[ E(\ell nY \mid X=x, T=1)-E(\ell nY \mid X=x, T=0) = (1 - P(x))E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid X=x, S=0). \]

Since in a non-compulsory schooling regime we identify \( P(x) \), we can identify treatment on the untreated:
\[ E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid X = x, S = 0) = E(\beta \mid X = x, S = 0) \]
but not \( ATE = E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0) = \bar{\beta} \) or treatment on the treated
\[ TT = E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid X = x, S = 1) = E(\beta \mid X = x, S = 1). \]

However under cases I and II of Section 2 we identify all three treatment parameters because \( E(\ell nY_0 \mid X = x, S = 0) = \alpha, E(\ell nY_1 \mid X = x, S = 0) = \alpha(x) + \beta(x) \) and
\[ TT = ATE = MTE = LATE \text{ because } \Delta^{MTE}(x, u) \text{ does not vary with } u. \]

Treatment on the untreated answers an interesting policy question. It is informative about the income gains for a policy directed toward those who ordinarily would not attend schooling and who are selected into schooling at random from this pool. However, it does not in general identify the effect of other policies (e.g. tuition subsidies directed toward the very poor within the pool).

So what exactly does linear IV estimate? Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) establish that linear IV using \( P(z) \) as an instrument identifies a weighted average of \( MTE \) parameters.
\[
\text{plim } \hat{\beta}_{IV} = \Delta IV = \int_0^1 \Delta^{MTE}(x, u)h_x(u)du
\]

where

\[
h_x(u) = \frac{(E(P(Z) - E(P(Z)) \mid P(Z) \geq u, X = x)) \Pr(P(Z) \geq u, X = x)}{\text{Var}(P(Z) \mid X = x)}
\]

and \(\int_0^1 h_x(u)du = 1\). These weights do not, in general, coincide with the policy weights of Section 4 or the weights for the treatment parameters defined in Section 3.

A closer look at these weights reveals that

\[
h_x(u) = \frac{\int_u^1 (p - E(P(Z) \mid X = x))f(p \mid X = x)dp}{\text{Var}(P \mid X)}
\]

where \(h_x(u) \geq 0\) which achieve a maximum value at \(u = E(P(Z) \mid X = x)\) and \(h_x(0) = h_x(1) = 0\) and

\[
\int_0^1 h_x(u)du = 1.
\]

The weights center at the mean of the \(P\) data: \(h_x(P^{Max}) = 0 = h_x(P^{Min})\) and

\[
h_x(p) = 0 \quad p \leq P^{Min} \quad p \geq P^{Max}.
\]

For proofs, see Heckman and Vytlacil (2000).\(^{16}\)

The idea of interpreting \(IV\) as a weighted average of the limit of \(LATE\) can also be found in Card (1999, 2000) (weighted average of the distribution of return to schooling),

\(^{16}\)Take a more general instrument \(J\), assuming we recenter \(J\) so that \(E(J) = 0\). Keeping conditioning on \(X\) implicit, \(\hat{\beta}_{IV} = \frac{E(JY)}{E(JS)}\) where \(\hat{\beta}_{IV}(J) = \int \text{MTE}(u)h(u; J)du\) and \(h(u; J) = \frac{E(J \mid P(Z) \geq u) \Pr(P(z) \geq u)}{E(JP)} \int_0^1 h(u; J)du = 1\). We have the following properties: (i) \(h(u; J)\) non-negative iff \(E(J \mid P \geq p)\) weakly increasing in \(p\), (ii) Support \(h(u; P) = [\underline{p}, \bar{p}]\) (Support of \(P\)); (iii) defining \(T(p) = E(J \mid P = p)\), we have \(h(u; J) = h(u; T(P))\). (See Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000).

Summarizing the paper thus far, under assumptions (A-1) - (A-5) and the model of equations (7) and (8), the IV estimand, the policy relevant treatment effect, and the conventional treatment parameters all are weighted averages of the $MTE$. Thus we unify the estimation, treatment effect and policy evaluation literatures as generating parameters or estimands as integrals of $MTE$ using different weights:

$$\text{Estimand } j \text{ or parameter } j = \int_0^1 \Delta^{MTE}(x, u_S) \omega_j(x, u_S) du_S \text{ given } X$$

where different estimands or different treatment parameters correspond to different weights $\omega_j(x, u_S)$.

We can also fit $OLS$ into this framework. It is straightforward to show that conditional on $X = x$

$$\text{plim } \hat{\beta}_{OLS} = \bar{\beta}(x) + E(U_1 \mid X = x, S = 1) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 0)$$
$$= [\bar{\beta}(x) + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid X = x, S = 1)]$$
$$+ E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 1) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 0)$$
$$= TT(x) + E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 1) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 0).$$

So we may write

$$\hat{\beta}_{OLS} = \int_0^1 \Delta^{MTE}(x, u_S) h_{OLS}(x, u_S) du_S$$

where

$$h_{OLS}(x, u_S) = 1 + \frac{E(U_1 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S) h_1(x, u_S) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S) h_0(x, u_S)}{MTE(x, u_S)}$$

and under our assumptions,
\[
E(U_1 \mid X = x, S = 1) = \int_0^1 E(U_1 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S)h_1(x, u_S)du_S
\]
\[
h_1(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{u_S}^1 f(p \mid X = x)dp \right] \frac{1}{E(P \mid X = x)}
\]
\[
E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 0) = \int_0^1 E(U_0 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S)h_0(x, u_S)du_S
\]
\[
h_0(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_0^{u_S} f(p \mid X = x)dp \right] \frac{1}{E((1 \mid P) \mid X = x)}.
\]

The OLS weights are not guaranteed to be positive or to integrate up to one.\(^{17}\)

Table 1 summarizes the central results of this paper and the various weights for the different estimands and parameters. The treatment effect parameters weight MTE differently than what is required to produce the policy relevant treatment effect. Thus the conventional treatment parameters do not, in general, coincide with the policy relevant parameters. The weighting for the OLS or IV estimand do not correspond to the weights required to generate the policy relevant treatment parameters.

Figure 1A plots the \(MTE\) and the weights used to form \(ATE\), \(TT\) and \(TUT\) for the Roy model with the parameter values displayed at the base of Table 2.\(^{18}\) \(TT\) overweights the \(MTE\) for persons with low values of \(U_S\) who, \(ceteris paribus\), are more likely to attend school. (See equation (8)). \(TUT\) overweights the \(MTE\) for persons with high values of \(U_S\) who are less likely to attend school. \(ATE\) weights \(MTE\) evenly. The decline in \(MTE\) reveals that the gross return (\(\beta\)) declines with \(U_S\). Those more likely to attend school (based on \(U_S\)) have higher gross returns. Not surprisingly, in light of the shape of \(MTE\) and the shape of the weights, \(TT > ATE > TUT\). See Table 2. There is a positive sorting

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\(^{17}\)They are also not defined for values of \(u_S\) where \(MTE(x, u_S) = 0\).

\(^{18}\)The form of the Roy model we use assumes additive separability and generates \(U_0, U_1\) and \(U_S\) from a common unobservable \(\varepsilon\). Thus the distribution of \(U_1 - U_0\) given \(U_S\) is degenerate.
gain \((E(U_1 - U_0 \mid X = x, S = 1))\) and a negative selection bias \((E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 1) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, S = 0))\).

Figure 1B displays the \(MTE\) and the \(OLS\) and \(IV\) weights using \(P(Z)\) as the instrument. \(IV\) weights the \(MTE\) more symmetrically and in a different fashion than \(ATE\), \(TUT\) or \(TT\). \(OLS\) weights \(MTE\) very differently. The weights are negative and do not necessarily integrate to one. The \(IV\) estimate is higher than \(OLS\) estimate even though the marginal persons attracted into schooling by a subsidy have a lower gross return than those who attend school.

The most direct way to produce the policy relevant treatment parameters is to estimate \(MTE\) directly and then generate all of the treatment effect parameters using the \(h_{PRT}\) weights. We turn to this topic next.

6 Using Local Instrumental Variables to Estimate the MTE

Using equation (3) the conditional expectation of \(\log Y\) given \(Z\) is

\[
E(\ell nY \mid Z = z) = E(\ell nY_0 \mid Z = z) + E(\ell nY_1 - \ell nY_0 \mid Z = z, S = 1) \Pr(S = 1 \mid Z = z)
\]

where we keep the conditioning on \(X\) implicit. By the exclusion condition for \(Z\), (A-1), and the index sufficiency assumption embodied in (8), we may write this expectation as

\[
E(\ell nY \mid Z = z) = E(\ell nY_0) + E(\beta \mid P(z) \geq U_S, P(Z) = P(z))P(z).
\]

Recall that \(Z\) enters the model only through \(P(z)\) so we use \(P(z)\) as the instrument:

\[
E(\ell nY \mid Z = z) = E(\ell nY \mid P(Z) = P(z)).
\]
Applying the Wald estimator for two different values of \(Z, z\) and \(z'\) assuming \(P(z) \neq P(z')\), we obtain the IV formula:

\[
\frac{E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z)) - E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z'))}{P(z) - P(z')}
\]

\[
= \bar{\beta} + \frac{E(U_1-U_0 \mid P(z) \geq U_S)P(z) - E(U_1-U_0 \mid P(z') \geq U_S)P(z')}{P(z) - P(z')}
\]

\[
= \Delta^{LATE}(x, P(z), P(z')),
\]

where \(\Delta^{LATE}\) was defined above in section 3. When \(U_1 \equiv U_0\) or \((U_1 - U_0) \perp U_S\), corresponding to cases I and II of Section 2 respectively, IV based on \(P(Z)\) estimates \(ATE = \bar{\beta}\) because the second term on the right hand side of this expression vanishes. Otherwise IV estimates a difficult to interpret combination of \(MTE\) parameters as discussed in the last section.

Another representation of \(E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z))\) that reveals the index structure more explicitly writes

\[
(9) \quad E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z)) = \alpha + \bar{\beta}P(z) + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{P(z)} (U_1-U_0)f(U_1-U_0 \mid U_S = u_S)dud(U_1-U_0).
\]

We can differentiate with respect to \(P(z)\) and obtain \(MTE\):

\[
\frac{\partial E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z))}{\partial P(z)} = \bar{\beta} + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (U_1-U_0)f(U_1-U_0 \mid U_S = P(z))d(U_1-U_0) = MTE.
\]

IV estimates \(\bar{\beta}\) if \(\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_s)\) does not vary with \(s\), and \(\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_s)\) not varying with \(s\) implies that \(E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = p)\) is a linear function of \(P(Z)\). Thus, given that our model and assumptions are correct, a test of the linearity of the conditional expectation of log \(Y\) in \(P(Z)\) is a test of the validity of linear IV for \(\bar{\beta}\). More generally, a test of the linearity of \(E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = p)\) in \(P(Z)\) is a test of whether or not the data are consistent with a correlated random coefficient model. Nonlinearity in \(P(Z)\) is consistent with comparative advantage in the labor market for educated labor (\(i.e.\) it is a test of the null hypothesis that Case I or Case II of Section 2 describe the data).
It is straightforward to estimate the levels and derivatives of $E(\ln Y \mid P(Z) = P(z))$ and standard errors using the methods surveyed in Ichimura and Todd (2002). The derivative estimator of $MTE$ is the local instrumental variable ($LIV$) estimator of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000).

7 Estimating the MTE and Comparing Treatment Parameters, Policy Relevant Parameters and IV Estimands

In this section we estimate the returns to college. We estimate the $MTE$ using the PSID data described in Appendix A. We obtain comparable results for adjacent years of the data and many, but not all, of our qualitative conclusions also hold up when we estimate models based on the NLSY. The role of the instrument $Z$ is played by family background and tuition variables. We impose a probit model for the determination of $D$,

$$S = 1[Z\gamma - U_S \geq 0]$$

with $U_S$ independent of $Z$ and distributed standard normal. See Appendix Table B-1 for the estimates of the $\gamma$ vector. The support of the estimated $P(Z)$ is basically the full unit interval.\footnote{The estimated support of $P(Z)$ is $[0.03, 1]$.} See Figure B-1.

We impose a linear equation for the outcome equation

$$Y = X\alpha + \beta S + \{U_0 + S(U_1 - U_0)\}$$

with $(U_0, U_1, U_S) \perp \perp (X, Z)$. Combining with the model for $S$ with the model for $Y$ implies
a partially linear model for the conditional expectation of $Y$:

$$E(Y|X, Z, S) = X\alpha + \beta S + (1 - S)K_0(P(Z)) + SK_1(P(Z))$$

where

$$K_0(P(Z)) = E(U_0|P(Z), D = 0) = E(U_0|\Phi(U_S) \leq P(Z))$$

$$K_1(P(Z)) = E(U_1|P(Z), D = 1) = E(U_1|\Phi(U_S) > P(Z))$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal cdf. No parametric assumption is imposed on the distribution of $(U_0, U_1)$, and thus $K_1(\cdot)$ and $K_0(\cdot)$ are unknown functions that must be estimated nonparametrically. This semiparametric, partially linear form for the conditional expectation has several advantages for empirical work.\(^{20}\) It imposes a dimension reduction compared to a fully nonparametric model, while not restricting the form of the $g_0$ and $g_1$ functions and thus allowing greater flexibility than traditional parametric approaches. In addition, imposing the partially linear model weakens the support condition that otherwise would be required on $P(Z)$. In particular, fully nonparametric analysis of all treatment parameters and policy counterfactuals would require the condition that the support of $P(Z)$ conditional on $X$ to be the full unit interval. In contrast, the analysis with the partially linear model requires that $X$ be full rank conditional on $P(Z)$ and that $P(Z)$ have support the full unit interval, without requiring that $P(Z)$ conditional on $X$ have support the full unit interval. We estimate the partially linear model using a double residual regression procedure using local linear regression for the requisite nonparametric regression steps, following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998).

\(^{20}\)The partially linear model was introduced by Robinson (1988) in the context of a seemingly unrelated regression framework.
Figure 2 plots the estimated $E(\ell n Y \mid X, P(Z) = p)$ as a function of $p$. The coefficients of the linear terms of the partially linear are presented in Appendix B. (See Table B-2). All regressors enter linearly except the control function terms $(K_1(p) = E(U_1 \mid P(Z) = p, S = 1)$ and $K_0(p) = E(U_0 \mid P(Z) = p, S = 0))$ which are nonparametric functions of $P(Z)$. The tests for index sufficiency and monotonicity described in Section 3 are passed. The index model describes the data and the monotonicity tests are satisfied for thresholds above the minimum wage. See Appendix Tables B-3 and B-4 and Figures B-2 and B-3.

Observe that $E(\ell n Y \mid X, P(Z) = p)$ is nonlinear in $P(Z)$. Formal tests for linearity reject the null hypothesis of no linearity. As noted in the preceding section, nonlinearity in $P(Z)$ implies that the $MTE$ is not constant in $U_S$ and that $IV$ does not estimate $\beta(x) = ATE$. Thus the data are consistent with comparative advantage in the labor market.

Figure 3 plots the $MTE$ derived from Figure 2 using the formula of equation (9). The mean gross return ($E(\beta \mid U_S = u_S)$) is declining in $u_S$. The most college worthy persons in the sense of having high gross returns are more likely to go to college. Figure 4 plots the $MTE$ weight for $IV$ and the $MTE$ weight for $OLS$ on the same scale. Because of the large negative components of the $OLS$ weight, it is not surprising that the $OLS$ estimate is lower than $IV$ even though people induced into schooling by changes in $Z$ have lower gross returns to schooling. (Compare the $OLS$ estimate in Table 3 with the $IV$ estimate in that table). Figure 5 plots the $MTE$ weights for $TT$, $IV$ and $ATE$ and also displays the $MTE$.

It is not surprising, in view of the pattern of these weights, to find that $TT = E(\beta |$
\[ S = 1 ) = R + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid S = 1) > ATE = R > OLS. \] There is a positive sorting gain 
\[ (E(U_1 - U_0 \mid S = 1) \) of .058 log points. At the same time there is negative selection bias 
\[ (E(U_0 \mid S = 1) - E(U_0 \mid S = 0) = OLS - TT). \] The story that emerges in these data is 
one of comparative advantage in the labor market. The unobservables in the no schooling 
state for those who go to school are dramatically lower than the unobservables in the no 
schooling state for those who do not go to school. This is the story of Willis and Rosen 
(1979) which holds up in our semiparametric setting. Notice that IV underestimates TT 
and ATE.

Figure 6 plots the weight for MTE for the policy relevant treatment effect corresponding 
to the partial equilibrium policy of reducing tuition by $500, and for the sake of comparison 
reproduces the weight for IV. The two systems of weights are roughly comparable but by 
no means identical. The IV estimand understates - by 0.58 log points - the policy relevant 
treatment effect. The marginal person attracted into schooling has a gross return very close 
to the policy relevant treatment effect.23 The rough agreement between the IV weights 
and the weights for the tuition reduction policy does not hold up for other policies. See 
Figure 7. Only by accident does IV identify policy relevant treatment effects when the 
MTE is not constant in \( U_S \).

The picture of the labor market for educated workers that emerges from our analysis is 
one of comparative advantage and not the conventional model of efficiency units that guides 
much of the recent research on the economics of education. Not only is there comparative 
advantage ex post but ex ante agents select into schooling based on the comparative ad-

\[ ^{23} \text{The marginal person is defined by the limit of the policy relevant treatment effect as the policy change becomes arbitrarily small.} \]

28
vantage. (Recall our substantial estimated sorting effect of almost six log points). This evidence is in agreement with a broad body of evidence on comparative advantage in the labor market summarized by Sattinger (1993).

8 Relationship of our Work To The Current Literature

In his chapter in the Handbook of Labor Economics, Card (1999), provides a survey of the recent literature on the estimation of returns to schooling. He starts with studies that use instrumental variables based on institutional features of the school system. His favored instruments are compulsory schooling laws, distance to the nearest college and tuition. A general pattern emerges in all of these studies: IV estimates tend to be larger than OLS estimates of the return to schooling. This is true across studies that use different data sets (different cohorts, different countries) and different instruments. By going from OLS to IV the estimates often increase by more than 30% and in some cases by close to 100%. Card proposes different explanations for this phenomenon. The principal parameter to which estimates are compared is ATE. And it is supposed that we should expect that OLS is upward biased for ATE. Based on this, one explanation, suggested by Bound and Jaeger (1996), is that IV estimates are even further upward biased for ATE than are OLS estimates. Unobserved differences between the treatment and comparison groups implicit in the use of IV may be accentuating the bias instead of attenuating it. As Card (2000)

24 Another pattern is that IV estimates are also more imprecise than OLS estimates of the return to schooling.

25 Across these studies OLS estimates are between 0.05 and 0.09 and IV estimates between 0.06 and 0.15.
puts it, this is analogous to comparing a micro level regression to a grouped regression (where there are only two groups). A second explanation, attributed to Griliches (1977) and Angrist and Krueger (1991), is that OLS is biased downwards relative to $ATE$ due to measurement error. $IV$ exceeds $OLS$ just because of measurement error. The third explanation is by Ashenfelter, Harmon and Oorstebeek (1999) and is one of publication bias that leads to a positive $OLS-IV$ gap. Finally there is Card’s favored explanation for the phenomenon which is as follows. In a correlated random coefficients model, $IV$ estimates the average return to schooling for individuals induced to go to school by the policy. The individuals induced to go to school by supply side interventions (the source of variation in his instruments) are also individuals with little schooling. And because $IV > OLS$ and $OLS > ATE$, $IV > ATE$, we can also conclude that these are individuals with high returns to schooling. The reason they are not going to school has to be that they are facing high costs of schooling since they have relatively high returns compared to those who go to school without the intervention. A related paper by Kling (2000) states the same idea. He also finds that $IV$ exceeds $OLS$ and his interpretation of this result is similar to Card’s. Cameron and Taber (2000) argue that the evidence that $IV$ exceeds $OLS$ should not be interpreted as evidence for borrowing constraints. They point out that $IV$ standard errors are large so the evidence for $IV > OLS$ is weak. They also argue that if one includes a local income variable in a regression that uses distance to college as an instrument for schooling $IV$ does not exceed $OLS$.

Card also surveys studies that use family background as an instrument. And in these studies $IV$ also tends to exceed $OLS$, often by 30% or more. Card argues that these are not valid instruments because they proxy for ability and that is the main reason $IV$ estimates
based on them exceed \( OLS \).

Finally Card also presents some estimates of the returns to schooling based on studies with twins. Again in those studies \( IV \) estimates tend to exceed \( OLS \), although in some studies \( IV \) estimates are lower than \( OLS \) or not much different than \( OLS \).

In summary, Card presents the following argument for explaining why \( IV \) estimates are generally higher than \( OLS \) estimates:

- \( OLS > \bar{\beta} \) (= “True Causal Effect”);
- Instruments (supply side interventions) affect people with small amounts of schooling;
- \( IV > OLS \)
  (This has been found in many studies since Griliches, 1977).
- \( IV \) estimates the return for people who change in response to the \( IV \)
  (This has been established in Section 3 and in the previous literature)
- \( \therefore IV > OLS > \bar{\beta} \)
  (People who would have not gone to school without the intervention have higher rates of returns than those who go. Therefore they have high costs of schooling which is evidence of credit constraints)

This paper establishes that, contrary to the presumption in the literature,

- \( \bar{\beta} > OLS \).
- Instruments affect people everywhere in the distribution of \( U_S \), but oversample persons with middle to high \( U_S \) values
• $IV > OLS$

• IV is an average of many Wald estimators, all of the which are returns to schooling for people who change.

• $\bar{\beta} > IV > OLS$

But this says nothing whatsoever about credit constraints.

9 Summary and Conclusions

This paper presents a framework for uniting the literatures on policy evaluation, treatment effects and instrumental variable estimation. Different parameters and estimands are weighted averages of the marginal treatment effect ($MTE$). We show how to identify and estimate the $MTE$ using a robust nonparametric selection model.

Using this framework we estimate the returns to college using a sample of white males extracted from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). We propose and implement a test for the presence of a correlated random coefficient model of schooling - i.e. a test for comparative advantage in the labor market.

The data suggest that comparative advantage is an empirically important phenomenon governing schooling choices and that naive efficiency units models of the labor market are empirically inappropriate. Individuals sort into schooling on the basis of both observed and unobserved gains where the observer is the economist analyzing the data. Instrumental variables estimate policy relevant treatment effects only by accident. Different instruments estimate different parameters. Evidence that $IV$ estimates exceed $OLS$ estimates says nothing about the empirical importance of credit constraints and is consistent with the view
that persons induced into schooling by a change in the instrument have, on average, lower gross returns to schooling than those who would attend school without the intervention characterized by the instrument.
References


Appendix A

This paper uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). For our analysis we restricted the sample to 743 white males who are either high school graduates or have one or more year of college completed and receive a positive wage in 1991. We only use heads of households. We exclude GED recipients from the sample.

The variables we use as follows:

Definitions of Variables - PSID91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Residence when Growing Up</td>
<td>=1 if the respondent grew up in the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Home</td>
<td>=1 if the respondent lived with both natural parents most of the time until age 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Residence When Growing Up</td>
<td>=1 if the respondent did not grew up in a farm, rural area or in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td>Number of brothers and sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Grade Completed of Mother</td>
<td>Highest grade completed by mother (in years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Grade Completed of Father</td>
<td>Highest grade completed by father (in years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income at Age 17</td>
<td>Family income measured at age 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition for 4-Year College</td>
<td>Four-year college tuition for in-state students in the individual’s state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Birth Dummies College</td>
<td>=1 if the respondent was born in a given year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>=1 if the respondent completed one or more years of college</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Individuals who have attended some college have on average higher wages and less experience than high school graduates. They come from more advantaged backgrounds as measured from parental education and family income at age 17 (measured in 1983 dollars). When we look at the probits we estimate, along with number of siblings, these are the most important predictors of the decision of going to college. For the individual with the average demographics in our sample an increase in one year of education for either of her parents is associated with an increase in the probability of going to college of 4 to 5 percentage points. All the variables except the indicator for growing up in a southern region have the expected sign in the probit, although some of them are not significantly different from zero. Year of birth effects are in general not important except for being born in 1958 which has a positive and significant coefficient in the probit.
Table 1A

Treatment Effects and Estimands as Weighted Averages of the MTE

\[ ATE(x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) du_S \]

\[ TT(x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) h_{TT}(x, u_S) du_S \]

\[ TUT(x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) h_{TUT}(x, u_S) du_S \]

\[ IV(x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) h_{IV}(x, u_S) du_S \]

\[ OLS(x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) h_{OLS}(x, u_S) du_S \]

Policy Relevant Treatment Effect \( (x) = \int_0^1 MTE(x, u_S) h_{PRT}(x, u_S) du_S \)
Table 1B

Weights

\[ h_{ATE}(x, u_S) = 1 \]

\[ h_{TT}(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{u_S}^{1} f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \frac{1}{E(P \mid X = x)} \]

\[ h_{IV}(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{u_S}^{1} (p-E(P \mid X = x))f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \frac{1}{\text{Var}(P \mid X = x)} \]

\[ h_{TUT}(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{0}^{u_S} f(p \mid X) dp \right] \frac{1}{E((1-P) \mid X = x)} \]

\[ h_{OLS} = \frac{E(U_1 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S)h_1(x, u_S) - E(U_0 \mid X = x, U_S = u_S)h_0(x, u_S)}{\text{MTE}(x, u_S)} \]

\[ h_1(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{u_S}^{1} f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \left[ \frac{1}{E(P \mid X = x)} \right] \]

\[ h_0(x, u_S) = \left[ \int_{0}^{u_S} f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \frac{1}{E((1-P) \mid X = x)} \]

\[ h_{PRT}(x, u_S) = \left[ \frac{F_{P_x}(u_S) - F_{P_x}(u_S)}{\Delta P} \right] \]
Table 2
Roy Example

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>0.2442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUT</td>
<td>0.1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATE</td>
<td>0.2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorting Gain(^1)</td>
<td>0.0402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection Bias(^2)</td>
<td>-0.0708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear IV(^3)</td>
<td>0.2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) \(E[U_1 - U_0|D = 1] = TT - ATE\)

\(^2\) \(E[U_0|D = 1] - E[U_0|D = 0] = OLS - TT\)

\(^3\) Using Propensity Score as the instrument
Table 3
Local Linear Regression
PSID91, White Males
Bootstrapped
Baseline Model Without Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.0981</td>
<td>(0.0156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>0.2738</td>
<td>(0.0808)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATE</td>
<td>0.2156</td>
<td>(0.0619)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorting Gain1</td>
<td>0.0582</td>
<td>(0.0307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection Bias2</td>
<td>-0.1757</td>
<td>(0.0757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear IV3</td>
<td>0.1932</td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy III4</td>
<td>0.2005</td>
<td>(0.0557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Person</td>
<td>0.2002</td>
<td>(0.0575)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 $E[U_1 - U_0|S = 1] = TT - ATE$
2 $E[U_0|S = 1] - E[U_0|S = 0] = OLS - TT$
3 Using Propensity Score as the instrument
4 Tuition Subsidy = $500
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>College</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Wage</td>
<td>2.2735</td>
<td>2.6102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.5583)</td>
<td>(.6036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Work Experience</td>
<td>6.8621</td>
<td>5.1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.2476)</td>
<td>(3.5008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Work Experience Squared</td>
<td>57.6019</td>
<td>39.1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(48.3230)</td>
<td>(45.6022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in South</td>
<td>.0846</td>
<td>.0920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2788)</td>
<td>(.2893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in Urban Area</td>
<td>.7931</td>
<td>.8986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.4057)</td>
<td>(.3022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Family</td>
<td>.1536</td>
<td>.1274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3611)</td>
<td>(.3338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td>3.1129</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0109)</td>
<td>(1.8499)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education</td>
<td>11.7492</td>
<td>13.2193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.9441)</td>
<td>(2.2081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td>11.3573</td>
<td>13.5236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5124)</td>
<td>(2.7598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>20188.61</td>
<td>28015.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13751.1)</td>
<td>(21055.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition for 4-Year College</td>
<td>17.5765</td>
<td>17.8199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(5.3649)</td>
<td>(5.0104)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in 1956</td>
<td>.1160</td>
<td>.1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3207)</td>
<td>(.3284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1957</td>
<td>.1223</td>
<td>.0967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3281)</td>
<td>(.2959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1958</td>
<td>.0502</td>
<td>.1179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2186)</td>
<td>(.3229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1959</td>
<td>.1129</td>
<td>.0967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3169)</td>
<td>(.2959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1960</td>
<td>.1160</td>
<td>.1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3207)</td>
<td>(.3257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1961</td>
<td>.0878</td>
<td>.1108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2834)</td>
<td>(.3143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1962</td>
<td>.0940</td>
<td>.0825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2923)</td>
<td>(.2755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1963</td>
<td>.0909</td>
<td>.0731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2879)</td>
<td>(.2606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1964</td>
<td>.0784</td>
<td>.0825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2692)</td>
<td>(.2755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1965</td>
<td>.0721</td>
<td>.0495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.2591)</td>
<td>(.2172)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 319 424

*Standard deviations in parentheses
Table B-1
Estimated Marginal Effects from Probit
Dependent Variable $S = 1$, College Attendance
PSID91, White Males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived in South</td>
<td>.0368</td>
<td>.0677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Broken Family</td>
<td>-.0295</td>
<td>.0558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in Urban Area</td>
<td>.1477</td>
<td>.0570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td>-.0166</td>
<td>.0102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education</td>
<td>.0420</td>
<td>.0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td>.0485</td>
<td>.0085</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>.000003</td>
<td>.000001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition for 4-Year College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in 1956</td>
<td>.1135</td>
<td>.0920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1957</td>
<td>.0414</td>
<td>.0990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in 1958</td>
<td>.2529</td>
<td>.0775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1959</td>
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<td>.1027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in 1960</td>
<td>.0692</td>
<td>.0961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1961</td>
<td>.0951</td>
<td>.0953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1962</td>
<td>.0100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in 1963</td>
<td>.0155</td>
<td>.1071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1964</td>
<td>.0826</td>
<td>.1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1965</td>
<td>-.0318</td>
<td>.1162</td>
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</table>
# Table B-2

## Coefficients from Local Linear Regression

**PSID91, White Males**

**Bootstrapped**

**Baseline Model Without Interactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of Work Experience</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
<td>0.0269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Years of Work Experience)$^2$</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in South at Age 14</td>
<td>0.0917</td>
<td>0.0959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in Urban Area at Age 14</td>
<td>0.1689</td>
<td>0.0651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in 1956</td>
<td>0.4981</td>
<td>0.1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.4367</td>
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<td>Born in 1961</td>
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<td>Born in 1962</td>
<td>0.2613</td>
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<td>Born in 1964</td>
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<td>0.1210</td>
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</table>
### Table B-3

**Index Sufficiency Test**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSID91 - From Broken Home</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.771</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.931</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>.948</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>.814</td>
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<td><strong>Joint</strong></td>
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<td>.679</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSID91 - Mother’s Education</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.386</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint</strong></td>
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<td>.998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>PSID91 - Father’s Education</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.386</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.900</td>
<td>.971</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint</strong></td>
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<td>.991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B-4
Monotonicity Test

| P  | $\frac{\partial E(DU|P)}{\partial P}$ | t-statistic |
|----|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| 0.1| 1.5497                              | 1.7725      |
| 0.2| 2.0338                              | 4.2698      |
| 0.3| 2.3733                              | 7.5027      |
| 0.4| 2.5555                              | 10.0992     |
| 0.5| 2.5656                              | 13.6236     |
| 0.6| 2.4756                              | 14.9740     |
| 0.7| 2.3451                              | 10.9541     |
| 0.8| 2.1318                              | 6.5213      |
| 0.9| 1.8654                              | 3.8163      |

Monotonicity Test

| P  | $\frac{\partial E((1-D)U|P)}{\partial P}$ | t-statistic |
|----|------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 0.1| 0.2347                                   | 0.2361      |
| 0.2| -0.7821                                  | -1.5563     |
| 0.3| -1.4030                                  | -4.0743     |
| 0.4| -1.7979                                  | -6.8025     |
| 0.5| -2.0007                                  | -10.4063    |
| 0.6| -2.0456                                  | -13.0357    |
| 0.7| -1.9773                                  | -11.0669    |
| 0.8| -1.8087                                  | -7.4912     |
| 0.9| -1.5506                                  | -4.6676     |
Figure 1A
Weights for MTE for Different Treatment Effects
Roy Example

![Graph A](image)

Figure 1B
Marginal Treatment Effect vs Linear IV and OLS Weights
Roy Example

![Graph B](image)

\[
\begin{align*}
\ln Y_1 &= \alpha + \beta + U_1 \\
\ln Y_0 &= \alpha + U_0 \\
S &= 1 \text{ if } Z - U_g > 0
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
U_1 &= \sigma_{1e} \\
U_0 &= \sigma_{0e} \\
U_g &= \sigma_{ge}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha &= 0.67 \\
\beta &= 0.2 \\
\varepsilon &\sim N(0, 1) \\
Z &\sim N(-0.0025, 0.27) \\
\sigma_1 &= 0.012 \\
\sigma_0 &= -0.05 \\
\sigma_g &= -1
\end{align*}
\]
Figure 2
Local Linear Regression of Log Wage on P
(bootstrapped)
White Males, PSID91, Baseline Model Without Interactions
Figure 3
Marginal Treatment Effect
White Males, PSID91, Baseline Model Without Interactions

MTE vs u_s
Figure 4
Marginal Treatment Effect vs Linear IV and OLS Weights
From PSID 1991
Figure 5
Marginal Treatment Effect vs Linear IV, TT, and ATE Weights
From PSID 1991
Figure 6
Marginal Treatment Effect vs Policy III and Linear IV Weights
From PSID 1991

Policy III: $500 reduction in tuition
Marginal Treatment Effect vs Policy and Linear IV Weights
From PSID 1991

Policy I: Pushing people to extremes of tuition distribution
Policy II: Pushing people to mean of tuition distribution
Policy III: $500 reduction in tuition

Figure 7
Figure B1
Propensity Score Distribution
PSID 91, White Males, Probability of College Attendance
Figure B2
Monotonicity Test
PSID91, White Males
Figure B3
Monotonicity Test
PSID91, White Males