

Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India*

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Abstract

This paper discusses how preferences for a non-economic characteristic, such as caste, can affect equilibrium patterns of matching in the marriage market, and empirically evaluates this in the context of arranged marriages among middle-class Indians. We develop a model that demonstrates how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether we observe a bias towards one's own group or if there is a preference for “marrying up.” We then estimate actual preferences for caste, education, beauty, and other attributes using a unique data set on individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements in a major newspaper, the responses they received, and how they ranked them. Our key empirical finding is the presence of a strong preference for in-caste marriage. We find that in equilibrium, as predicted by our theoretical framework, these preferences do little to alter the matching patterns on non-caste attributes, and so people do not have to sacrifice much to marry within caste. This allows caste to remain a persistent feature of the Indian marriage market.

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1 Introduction

Marriage is, among other things, an important economic decision. Sorting in families has an impact on child outcomes, accumulation of human capital, and consequently, on long term economic development and inequality (Fernandez and Rogerson 2001, Fernandez 2003). In developing countries, where many women do not work outside their homes, marriage is arguably the single most important determinant of a woman’s economic future.¹ In India, the setting for this study, several studies have shown that marriage is indeed taken as a very serious economic decision, managed by parents more often than by the prospective spouses. For example, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that parents marry their daughters in villages where incomes co-vary less with respect to their own village. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that demand for healthy women in the marriage market influences investments in girls.

Yet, despite the economic importance of this decision, “status”-like attributes, such as caste, continue to play a seemingly crucial role in determining marriage outcomes in India. In a recent opinion poll in India, 74 percent of respondents declared to be opposed to inter-caste marriage.² The institution is so prevalent that matrimonial advertisements (henceforth, ads) in Indian newspapers are classified under caste headings, making it immediately obvious where prospective brides or grooms can find someone from their own caste.

It is well known that these type of non-meritocratic social preferences can impede economic efficiency—a point that is often made in the context of taste for discrimination (Becker 1957). At the same time there is also the view that economic forces will try to undermine institutions/preferences that generate impose large economic costs on people.³ Indeed we do see caste changing with economic growth and the diversification of earnings opportunities in India: The correlation between caste and income in India is significantly lower now, and caste plays much less of a role in determining the job someone has (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). This opens up the possibility that one may be able to secure large economic benefits by consenting to marry out of caste, which could lead people to put less weight on caste in marriage decisions.

However a number of recent attempts to ask the corresponding question, in the relatively high mobility context of the US, finds that there is a strong own-race preference, especially among

¹Even in our sample of highly educated females and males, fewer than 25 % of matched brides were working after marriage.

²We use the word caste in the sense of *jati* (community) as opposed to *varna*. The latter is a broad theoretical system of grouping by occupation (priests, nobility, merchants, and workers). The *jati* is the community within which one is required to be married, and which forms ones social identity.

³In the context of the marriage market, for example, Cole et al. (1992) characterize an “aristocratic equilibrium” which is characterized by low levels of productivity because of the weight people put on status. They go on to show that the aristocratic equilibrium may be broken by increased economic mobility because it leads to the emergence of low status men who are nevertheless high wealth, who may be in a position to attract a high status, low wealth woman.

women. For example, Fisman et al. (2008) find strong same-race preferences among female speed daters that is unrelated to physical attractiveness. Similarly, Hitsch et al. (2009) also find same-race preferences, particularly for women, based on data from online dating. In both these papers, as in ours, the challenge to the estimation of preferences come from the possibility that there are omitted variables correlated with race. To deal with this Fisman et al. (2008) control for assessments of other attributes of potential partners that they get from surveying the participants in the experiment. Hitsch et al. (2009) take advantage of the fact that in the case of online dating the partners choose based on a set of reported attributes that are also observed by the econometrician.⁴

We apply a strategy very similar to that in Hitsch et al. (2009) to a data set of 783 newspaper matrimonial ads in a major Bengali newspaper. Despite the fact that the population being advertised in this newspaper tends to be highly educated—85% have a college degree—and therefore high mobility, we find very strong evidence of an own caste preference. For example, we find in one specification that the bride’s side would be willing to trade off the difference between no education and a master’s degree in the prospective husband to avoid marrying outside their caste. For men seeking brides, the own caste effect is twice the effect of the difference between a self-described “very beautiful” woman and a self-described “decent-looking” one.

Our setting and data is quite different from the setting studied by Hitsch et al. (2009) and Fisman et al. (2008). FOOTNOTE HERE ABOUT FOXFirst, these are ads for arranged marriage in a relatively conservative society where parents and/or elder siblings tend to take the decision and the goal is clearly marriage. The motives of the decision-makers are likely to be much more classically economic than those involved in online dating or speed dating, where there is certainly no commitment to any long-term relationship.⁵

Second, we have much more information about the outcome of the matching process than is available in the case of online/speed dating: in particular we know whether they got married and for a large fraction of the cases, characteristics of the eventual spouse.⁶ This is useful for a

⁴An alternative estimation strategy employed by Park (2008) and Fox (2007) estimates preferences from equilibrium outcomes. The richer data sets used by Fisman et al. (2008) Hitsch et al. (2009), make it possible to separately measure preferences and equilibrium outcomes rather than estimating the former by using the latter.

⁵However there are two papers more or less contemporaneous with ours, which estimate use related methodologies to estimate preferences based on data sets from Korea Lee (2007) and India Dugar et al. (2009) But the Korean data is for online dating, rather than marriage. However the Indian setting is very similar to ours and reassuringly, they also find strong own caste preferences.

⁶We see this also as one of advantages of using “real” data rather than examining reactions to artificially inserted ads as Dugar et al. (2009) do. Since we observe what the decision maker observes, the usual worries about omitted variables that afflict non-experimental estimates (and are absent from experimental estimates) do not arise here. Experimental methods still have the advantage that the variation in the set of choices can be what the experimenter wants to be, but we do observe a fair amount of variation even in our data. One other concern with using experimental data is, as will argue later, that the first response to the ad (which is the response that is studied) is more likely to be strategic.

set of checks on our estimates. In particular, like Hitsch et al. (2009) we can check whether the estimated preferences predict the actual pattern of matches (by using the Gale-Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962) algorithm to generate the stable matches predicted by these preferences and comparing these with the actual matches), but while they only observe the immediate next step in the matching process (which is still at the exploratory stage) we observe the outcome after one year, and the outcome we observe is often the final one, i.e. marriage. We also use the information about the actual matches to carry out a set of additional checks on whether we are actually estimating what we think we are estimating. For example, we may be concerned about signaling: Perhaps there is no real preference for marrying in caste, but because no one actually does it in equilibrium, those who make proposals to non-caste members are treated with suspicion. We argue against this by looking at the actual matches of those who make proposals out of caste.

Third, because of the specific nature of caste, we are able to get some distance towards answering the question, “it is caste/race/ethnicity that people care about or the culture associated with it?” Hindu society is divided into a number of broad castes (*varna*) but each of these castes, in turn, are divided into a number of sub-castes (*jati*). The broad castes tend to be culturally relatively homogeneous, so the fact that it is clearly sub-caste membership that matters for marital preferences, argues against the caste as culture view.

Fourth, we actually have multiple data alternative data sets that we can use for estimating these preferences and they serve as a check on each other. Our main data set consists of information about how the ad-placers chose among the set of respondents to their ad. However we also see how they rank them (which could have been different, if the respondents were strategic). We also observe the set of ads that the ad-placer herself responded to and the universe of ads from which the particular set of ads that we started from were chosen. Each of these is a separate data set with its own advantages and disadvantages which can be used to estimate preferences—we find evidence of strong caste preferences in all of them.

While the fact that we can (and do) carry out a number of new robustness checks (and they do check out) is obviously important from the point of view of this entire literature, the most important difference between our paper and the rest of the literature is that we are interested in understanding why such a strong in-group preference has survived in today’s world. Our basic hypothesis is that this is because, as we saw, preferences for caste are primarily “horizontal” in the sense that people prefer to marry their own caste over marrying into any other caste. This goes against the traditional story about the caste system, which emphasizes its hierarchical structure, but is consistent with the sociological evidence on the nature of caste today (REFERENCE). Because caste is horizontal, we argue in the theoretical section, people cannot trade their superior caste for a better match along other dimensions. As a result, the equilibrium

price of caste, which is the opportunity cost of the marriage option that one has to give up to marry in caste tends to be quite low (some other conditions also play a role—they are discussed in theory section). This result would not hold in a world with more “vertical” preferences, where those who choose not to trade in their high caste position for gains along other dimensions would sacrifice quite a bit. The reason why caste persists, therefore, is that it actually does not cost very much to keep caste.

To check that this line of reasoning actually works in the data, we perform several counterfactual exercises to examine how they affect the matching pattern generated by the Gale-Shapley algorithm.

First, we compute the set of stable matches that would arise in our population if preferences were exactly as estimated above except that all caste variables were ignored. Our results indicate that the percentage of intra-caste marriages drops dramatically. This implies that caste is not just a proxy for other characteristics households also care about and that there are several potential matches for each individual, both inside and outside his or her caste. At the same time, we also find that individuals are matched with spouses who are very similar on all non-caste characteristics to the partner they would have selected when caste was included within one’s preferences. This suggests that caste has limited impact on matching patterns in equilibrium.

Second, we estimate the “equilibrium price” of caste in terms of a variety of attributes, defined as the difference between the spouses of two observationally identical individuals, one who is from the same caste and the other who is not. This is done by regressing a spousal characteristic, such as education, on all observable characteristics of the individuals and a dummy for whether the match is “within caste” among the set of simulated matches. There is no characteristic for which this measure of price is significantly positive.⁷

To complete the argument we also estimate the equilibrium price for a vertical attribute, beauty, in terms of education. As our theory would predict, we see a non-zero price in this case.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 first sketches a model where caste and other attributes interact on the marriage market. Section 3 presents the data while Section 4 elaborates on the methodology and the results of preference estimation. Section 5 highlights the results of the stable matches and Section 6 uses these results to derive conclusions regarding the equilibrium. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Model

In this section we develop a simple model of marriage. The model introduces caste-based preferences in an otherwise standard model of marriage (Becker 1973). It is related to Anderson

⁷We demonstrate the power of this method by estimating positive “price” for other attributes, e.g. education.

(2003) model of caste-based preferences. The novelty is we allow both horizontal and vertical caste-based preferences (as opposed to just vertical preferences), and our goal is to derive how these types of preferences differentially affect marriage market outcomes. We identify some useful properties of the choice problem faced by decision-makers in the marriage market as well as the equilibrium matching pattern, in a world where people care about the caste of their partners, as well as some standard characteristics (e.g. education, beauty). These will motivate our empirical analysis and help us interpret some of the results.

2.1 Set up

Men and women are differentiated by “caste.” The caste of an individual is $i \in \{1, 2\}$. They are ranked in descending order: $i = 1$ is the highest caste, followed by $i = 2$.

Men and women are also differentiated according to a “vertical” characteristic that affects their attractiveness to a potential partner. The characteristic of men will be denoted by $x \in [H, L]$ and the characteristic of women will be denoted by $y \in [H, L]$. We can think of these as education levels of men and women, or, income and beauty.

We denote the total number of women of type x who belong to caste i by μ_{xi} , where $x = H, L$ and $i = 1, 2$. The corresponding number of men is denoted by ψ_{xi} . We then impose the assumption both castes and both types are **balanced** in terms of gender: $\mu_{H1} + \mu_{H2} = \psi_{H1} + \psi_{H2}, \mu_{L1} + \mu_{L2} = \psi_{L1} + \psi_{L2}, \mu_{H1} + \mu_{L1} = \psi_{H1} + \psi_{L1}, \mu_{H2} + \mu_{L2} = \psi_{H2} + \psi_{L2}$.

This last assumption is important and it is worth explaining what it means. In part it is just an assumption about demographics: the fraction of men and women within a caste should be the same, though as is well-known, the sex-ratio in South Asia tends to be skewed in favor of men. However, as Rao (XXXX) has shown, the gap between the normal age at marriage between men and women, combined with the fact that the population is growing, counteracts this effect and almost all men do manage to find spouses. The assumption about the distribution of “quality” within genders, is actually less stringent than it looks. Take the case where both x and y are perfectly ordered within the set of men and women. Then there is exactly one highest type man and one highest type woman and exactly one second highest type man and exactly one second highest type woman and so on. The assumption that the number of man of any given type is equal to the number of women of the corresponding type is automatically satisfied in this case if we define type to be their rank in the set of men (for men) or women (for women). Note that this argument does not rely on men and women caring about the same characteristic for the opposite sex—men could care only about education of their spouses and women could only care about the height of those they marry. Of course things are not quite so simple if people cannot be strictly ordered.

The payoffs of men and women are both governed by the quality of the match. We assume

that in a union where the man's quality is given by x and that of the woman's by y this has two (multiplicatively) separable elements, one governed by the vertical characteristics, $f(x, y)$, and the other by caste, $A(i, j)$ where the latter is the payoff of someone who is of caste i and who is matched with someone of caste j .

We assume that the function $f(x, y) > 0$ is increasing with respect to both arguments and, for ease of exposition, symmetric. Thus, other things constant, everyone prefers a higher attribute partner.

The function $A(i, j)$ is defined as follows:

$$A(i, j) = 1 + \alpha\{\beta(2 - j) - \gamma(i - j)^2\}$$

where $\alpha \geq 0, \beta \geq 0, \gamma \geq 0$. It is readily verified that $A(i, j) > 0$ as long as $\alpha\gamma < 1$ (which we assume) and as long as $\gamma > 0$ the function displays strict complementarity with respect to caste: $\frac{\partial^2 A(i, j)}{\partial i \partial j} > 0$.

This caste-based match quality function is flexible. It allows a vertical as well as a horizontal component to caste. For example, if $\beta = 0$ then caste is purely horizontal: people want to match within their caste. Otherwise, the higher the caste of the partner (lower is j) the higher the match specific gain to an individual of caste i . On the other hand, if $\gamma = 0$ then caste is purely vertical with everyone preferring a higher caste partner, as in Anderson (2003).⁸

We also assume that a non-zero number of the population, drawing from each caste-type pair, have caste-neutral (**CN**) preferences, $\alpha = 0$. These individuals put no weight on the caste of a potential partner, i.e., for them $A(i, j) = 1$ for all $i = 1, 2$ and $j = 1, 2$. Those who are caste-conscious value a caste-neutral individual of caste i ($i = 1, 2$) in the same way as they would a caste-conscious (**CC**) individual of caste i ($i = 1, 2$).

Given these two elements governing the quality of a match, we assume that the payoff of an individual of gender G , of caste i who is matched with someone of caste j in a union where the man's quality is given by x and that of the woman's by y is given by:

$$u^G(i, j, x, y) = A(i, j)f(x, y) \text{ for } G = M, W$$

We have imposed a lot of symmetry here: For example a man of type 1 of caste 1 marrying a woman of type 2 of caste 2 gets the same payoff that a woman of caste 1 of type 1 would get from marrying a man of caste 2 of type 2. This is convenient for stating the results in a more compact form but by no means essential.

We also assume that the utility of not being matched is zero. Since because both $f(x, y)$

⁸In the marriage literature, a high β will be viewed as leading to hypergamy and a high γ will be viewed as leading to endogamy.

and $A(i, j)$ are positive, the utility of being matched with anyone is always better than that of remaining single. Since the total number of men and women are the same, everyone should match in equilibrium.

Finally we assume that matching is governed by these preferences—in particular there are no transfers, so that we have what in the literature is called non-transferable utility (NTU) matching (as in recent studies of the United States matching market by Hitsch et al. 2009, Fisman et al. 2006 and Fisman et al. 2008).

2.2 Adding unobserved characteristics: Dowry, etc.

Our empirical work makes use of the fact that we, the econometricians, observe exactly what the the decision makers observe. However unobservables can still play a role—exactly as they would even if we had an experiment where the observed characteristics were randomized—if the decision-makers have in mind some correlation between the observables and what they do not observe in making their decision. A key example of such an unobservable is dowry: Our assumption of an NTU environment rules out dowries, which fit into transferable utility (TU) environment more traditional in the literature (e.g., Becker 1973, Lam 1988).

This may appear surprising in India, a setting where the practice of dowry exists. However, dowries are frowned upon given the prevailing social norms in this group, i.e., middle-class, educated, urban Bengalis. They are also illegal, which made it impossible for us to collect reliable data on them: in our data set no one is observed asking for a dowry or offering one. While it is hard to deny that the practice exists, it is generally assumed that dowries are not particularly important in this population.⁹ This inclines us toward the NTU approach.

However, the TU environment can be relevant even in the absence of dowries or brideprice, so long as there is some other “currency” which can be used to make ex ante transfers (e.g., the decision about where the couple should live, how much should be spent on the wedding, gifts etc.). Furthermore dowries or other financial transfers may still exist even if they are not observed.

To not entirely foreclose the possibility of transfers, we make use of the fact that dowries, like many characteristics of the potential bride or groom that are currently unobserved, will get revealed in a future round of the negotiations. Some will then demand dowries while others will not: a not insignificant part of our sample actually spend money in the form of ad space to

⁹We have so far failed to locate a study on dowry in this population that would throw light on its extent. However, we note that while Kolkata has 12 percent of the population of the largest metropolitan cities in India, it has only 1.9 percent of the so-called “dowry deaths” in these cities (about 6,000 in a year, India-wide), which are episodes where a bride is killed or driven to commit suicide by her in-laws following negotiation failure about the dowry. To the extent that the prevalence of dowry death partly reflects the prevalence of dowry, it suggests that they are less prevalent in Kolkata than in other major cities in India.

explicitly mention that they do *not* want a dowry. As long as this is the case, it makes sense to first short-list every prospect worth exploring *ignoring the possibility of their asking for a dowry or offering one*, and to actually find out whether or not they want a dowry (or want to offer one) by contacting them. They can then discard the ones who ask for too much or offer too little based on better information. Obviously this logic only works if the cost of contacting an additional person is small which, given the large numbers people contact, seems plausible.

Proposition 5 in the appendix formally states this argument for the case where there is one unobservable variable (e.g., propensity to ask for a dowry) that will be eventually observed and is potentially correlated with the observables.¹⁰ The result extends trivially to the case where there are n such unobserved attributes that will be eventually observed. Assuming that the conditions of this proposition hold (namely, the exploration costs are not too high), it tells us what we observe in the data is people’s true ordering between those whom they consider and those whom they reject, even if dowry and other still to be revealed attributes will eventually be an important consideration in the decision. Based on this ranking we infer people’s preferences over a range of attributes. We will however come back to discuss some direct tests of the no-dowry assumption.

None of this helps us with the possibility that there are unobserved attributes that will never be observed, but may yet be driving the decisions because of their correlations (actual or hypothesized) with the observables. We do try to test of some specific hypotheses of this class (is caste really a proxy for “culture) using ancillary data, but at one level this is an impossible quest, since we can always attribute the causal effect of any variable to something else that we never observe that we assert is correlated with it.

2.3 Stable matching patterns

To start with observe that if everyone were **CN** all H types would want to match with H types and since there are the same number of H type men and women, this is indeed what would happen—people would match **assortatively**. There may be out of caste matches, but those who match out of caste will have the same quality of matches as those who marry in caste. We formalize this idea by introducing the concept of a **average price of caste**.

Average price of caste (APC): The average price of caste for women (men) is difference in terms of the vertical characteristic of the matches of type H women (men) who marry in caste

¹⁰The assumption in this Proposition is that the unobserved attribute has a fixed value. It is more like something like attractiveness than like a demand for dowry, which is something that might adjust to exactly compensate for differences in other attributes. Nevertheless as long as each set of candidates with the same observable characteristics contains a sufficiently large subset which is on average identical to the rest of the group in everything except for the fact it will not accept a dowry, and as long as it is not possible to predict this in advance (dowry demands or offer are not made in writing), it makes sense to rank everyone as if no one wants a dowry, as long as the cost of search is not too large.

relative to those who marry out of caste.

APC is zero in the case where everyone matches assortatively as in the case where everyone is **CN**. With caste preferences, there is a potential trade off between marrying assortatively and marrying based on caste preferences and therefore **APC** need not be zero (for example, consider a configuration where the only out of caste match is between high types of caste 2 and low types of caste 1, where the price of caste will be positive because those H types who match in caste get a higher quality match). However assortative matching is still an equilibrium as long as the temptation of matching with the high caste (the vertical dimension) is not too strong and a particular population condition, which we call **strong balance**, holds.

Strong Balance (B): A population is said to satisfy strong balance if $\mu_{xi} = \psi_{xi}$, where $x = H, L$ and $i = 1, 2$.

Moreover if an additional condition which limits the fraction of **CN** people in the population holds, then pure assortative matching cannot be an equilibrium when the vertical dimension of preferences is strong enough.

Limited Caste Neutrality (LCN): The number of **CN** men of type H in caste 1 is less than the number of caste conscious women of type H in caste 2, and the number of **CN** women of type H in caste 1 is less than the number of caste conscious men of type H in caste 2.

Clearly this cannot hold unless **CN** people are a sufficiently small fraction of the population.

Proposition 1 *Suppose the population satisfies **SB**. Then an equilibrium where all matches are assortative and the entire caste conscious population is matched within caste, exists if $\beta_0 = \frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\frac{f(H,H)}{f(H,L)} + \alpha\gamma - 1 \right) \geq \beta$. Conversely, if $\beta > \beta_0$, all equilibria must have some non-assortative matching as long as condition **LCN** holds. Moreover if $\beta > \beta_0$, if there is any non-assortative out-of-caste matching, it must involve a L type person of caste 1 matching with an H type of caste 2.*

Proof.

Because there are as many type H males as there are females in each caste and likewise for type L, such a matching is feasible. For the **CN** H types, assortative matching guarantees them their preferred match, so they have no reason to deviate. **CC** H types of caste 1 are matched with H types in caste 1 and therefore have no reason to deviate. L types of caste 2, **CC** or not, cannot deviate because no one would want to give up their current match to pair with them. The only possible deviation therefore is that a **CC** type H of caste 2 might want to match with a type L of caste 1. There is always at least one L type of caste 1 who is **CN**, by our assumption about the population. This person will always accept an offer from a type H. A type H of caste 2 will want to make him/her an offer if

$$f(H, H) > (1 + \alpha(\beta - \gamma))f(H, L)$$

which reduces to $\beta > \beta_0$. In other words, this particular equilibrium exists as long as $\beta \leq \beta_0$.

On the other hand, if this condition is violated, then, starting from an assortative match, a caste conscious H type of caste 2 will always want to match with a L type of caste 1 unless she is already matched with a type H of caste 1, and any caste-neutral L type of caste 1 would accept her offer. Therefore the only way there can be an assortative equilibrium is if all **CC** H types of caste 2 are matched with H types from caste 1. But if there are two **CC** H type people of opposite sexes from caste 1 who are each matched to an H type of caste 2, they would want to deviate and match with each other. Therefore it must be the case that either the number of **CN** men of type H in caste 1 is at least as large as the number of **CC** women of type H in caste 2, or the number of **CN** women of type H in caste 1 is at least as large as the number of **CC** men of type H in caste 2. This cannot be true if condition **LCN** holds.

To complete the proof observe that there are only two types of out-of-caste non-assortative matches: a type H of caste 2 matches with type L of caste 1 or the other way around. Take the second case first: suppose a type H man of caste 1 matches with a type L woman of caste 2. Then there must be another pair where a type H woman matches with a type L man. If this type H woman is from caste 1, she would always want to switch to the type H man from caste 1 and so would he. Therefore the type H woman must be from caste 2. If her match were from caste 1, she would once again strictly prefer to match with type H man from caste 1 and so would he. Therefore her match must be an L type from caste 2 and moreover she must be **CC**. When would a **CC** type H woman from caste 2 prefer a type L man from caste 2 to a type H man from caste 1? The condition is

$$f(H, H)(1 + \alpha(\beta - \gamma)) \leq f(H, L),$$

which can never hold when $\beta > \beta_0$. Hence the only possible kind of out-of-caste non-assortative match is one where a type H of caste 2 matches with type L of caste 1.

■

Of course, this does not guarantee that assortative matching is the only possible configuration even if $\beta < \beta_0$. Moreover **SB** is a strong assumption. If we both drop **SB** and require that the equilibrium be unique, we do get a condition under which assortative matching is the equilibrium, but the conditions are more stringent. Before we come that, it is worth defining two cut off values of β , along the lines of β_0 . Let

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_2 &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\frac{f(H, H)}{f(H, L)} (1 - \alpha\gamma) - 1 \right) \\ \beta_3 &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \left(\frac{f(H, L)}{f(H, H)} + \alpha\gamma - 1 \right) \end{aligned}$$

It is easily checked that, $\beta_0 \geq \beta_2$ and $\beta_0 \geq \beta_3$.

Proposition 2 (i) *When β is on the range ($\beta_2 \geq \beta \geq \beta_3$), all possible stable matching will display perfectly assortative matching. Caste preferences will not alter the pattern of matching on non-caste attributes and **APC** will be zero.*

(ii) *If β is outside the range $\beta_2 \geq \beta \geq \beta_3$, it is always possible to construct stable matching patterns where at least some pairs will match non-assortatively.*

Proof. Define H1 as being a H-type from the high caste, H2 to be a H-type of the low caste, L1, a low type of the high caste and L2, a L-type of the low caste. Furthermore, if X-Y are a match, X is the type and caste of the female and Y is that of the male. By our assumption about the population being balanced, if we observe one non-assortative match, we will observe a second. There are ten logical possibilities for pairs of non-assortative matches (we are treating the identical matches with the man and the woman's roles reversed as the same match):(i) H1-L1 and L1-H1; (ii) H1-L1 and L1-H2; (iii) H1-L1 and L2-H1; (iv) H1-L1 and L2-H2; (v) H1-L2 and L2-H1; (vi) H1-L2 and L1-H2; (vii) H1-L2 and L2-H2; (viii) H2-L1 and L1-H2; (ix) H2-L1 and L2-H2; (x) H2-L2 and L2-H2. Of these (i), (iii), (v), (vi), and (x) are clearly unstable since they offer no caste matching advantages to the H types as compensation for the failure to match assortatively.

However the five pairs that are left can each be a part of a stable match under suitable conditions. Let us take these one by one.

(ii): A population consisting only of pairs of this type cannot satisfy the weak balance property that is part of the setup. However if we add a pair H2-H1 to it, balance would be satisfied if there is one pair of each of the three types. Moreover if both members of the pair H2-H1 are **CN**, then their presence does not expand the set of potential deviations in this population. The only deviation that we need to consider is H1 deviating to match with H2. He will not want to deviate iff $(1 + \alpha\beta) f(H, L) > (1 - \alpha\gamma) f(H, H)$, or $\beta > \beta_2$. Therefore as long as $\beta < \beta_2$, there cannot be any equilibrium where the pairs H1-L1 and L1-H2 co-exist. Conversely, if $\beta \geq \beta_2$, an equilibrium with the pairings H1-L1 and L1-H2 exists.

(iv): This case directly satisfies the balance condition if there is one pair of each type. The only possible deviation from this pair is for H1 and H2 to match with each other. If both are **CN** then this will always happen. H1 will be willing to switch partners if $(1 - \alpha\gamma) f(H, H) > (1 + \alpha\beta) f(H, L)$, which translates into $\beta < \beta_2$. If H1 is willing to switch, H2 will always be willing to switch since he gains caste. Therefore if $\beta < \beta_2$, there cannot be any equilibrium where the pairs H1-L1 and L2-H2 co-exist. Conversely if $\beta \geq \beta_2$ an equilibrium with such a pairing always exists.

(vii): We can generate a population that satisfies the balance condition if we take one couple

of each of the two types, add one pair H2-H1 and assume that they are both caste-neutral. The presence of this pair does not change the set of deviations possible. The only possible deviation is that H2 deviates and makes an offer to H1 (who will always accept it). This will be optimal for H2 when $(1 - \alpha\gamma + \alpha\beta) f(H, H) > f(H, L)$ or $\beta > \beta_3$. Therefore there cannot be any equilibrium where pairs of H1-L2 and L2-H2 coexist when $\beta > \beta_3$. Conversely when $\beta \leq \beta_3$, such an equilibrium always exists.

(viii) This case directly satisfies the balance condition if there is one pair of each type. The condition that the H2s deviate is that $f(H, H) > (1 - \alpha\gamma + \alpha\beta) f(H, L)$, or $\beta < \beta_0$ and hence for $\beta \leq \beta_2$. Conversely the condition that an equilibrium with this pair of couples exists is $\beta \geq \beta_0$.

(ix) To generate a population that satisfies the balance condition we add to this pair one H1-H2 pair of **CN** people. These people can never be tempted to leave their pairing and hence the addition of this pair does not change the set of deviations we have to consider. The only deviation possible is that the female H2 prefers to switch partners and pair up with the male H2, who is clearly willing (since he prefers H2 to L2). This deviation will be strictly optimal if $f(H, H) > (1 - \alpha\gamma + \alpha\beta) f(H, L)$ or $\beta < \beta_0$ and hence for $\beta \leq \beta_2$. Conversely when $\beta \geq \beta_0$, an equilibrium that includes this pair of couples always exists. ■

The concern with this result is that the $[\beta_3, \beta_2]$ range may be very small or even non-existent. To get a stronger result we need an additional property, **caste neutral balance**:

Caste Neutral Balance (CNB): A population is said to satisfy caste neutral balance if the number of **CN** men and women are the same within each caste-type pair.

In other words, there are the same number of caste-neutral high caste H type women as there are men, and the same number of caste-neutral high caste L type women as there are men, etc.

Proposition 3 *Suppose the population satisfies **SB** and **CNB**. Then only assortative matching is stable as long as $\beta_0 > \beta$.*

Proof.

The proof of the previous proposition lays out the 5 possible non-assortative out-of-caste pairs of matches that remain possible unless β is in the $[\beta_3, \beta_2]$ range. Start with the H1-L1/L1-H2 pair. Clearly H1 must be **CC**. Or he would deviated and matched with H2. But by **SB** and **CNB**, there must be another **CC** H1 of the opposite sex who is in a X-H1 pair, where $X \neq H1$. But then two H1s should deviate and match with each other. This pair cannot be a part of a stable match.

Next take the pair H2-L2/L1-H1; for this to be a stable match, one among H1 and H2 must be **CC**. Say H1 is **CC**. Then by **SB** and **CNB** there must exist another pair where a **CC** H1 who is in a H1-X pair where $X \neq H1$. This is not possible since the **CC** H1s would deviate

and match. Now say the H2 is **CC** and H1 is not, then H2 must prefer matching with a L2 to matching with a H1 (who would be willing to match with her). But there must be another **CC** H2 who is in a H2-X match $X \neq H2$. But suppose $X = L2$. Then the two **CC** H2s should deviate and match. But now suppose X is someone H2 likes less than L2—clearly once again the two **CC** H2s should deviate and match.

Finally take the pair H1-L2/L2-H2; Clearly the H2 must be **CC** and **CC** H2s must prefer matching with L2s to matching with a H1 (and hence an L1). Therefore a **CC** H2 must prefer matching with another H2 to matching with anyone else. By **SB** and **CNB**, there must exist another **CC** H2 who is in a X-H2 match $X \neq H2$. But a **CC** H2 who is matched with someone other than a H2 will always deviate and match with the other **CC** H2. Therefore this cannot be a part of a stable match either.

This leaves us two possible combinations: H2-L1/L1-H2 and H2-L1/L2-H2. However it can be checked from the proof of the previous result that a necessary condition for either of these to be a part of a stable match is that $\beta \geq \beta_0$. ■

Under **SB** and **CNB**, there is only assortative matching when caste preferences are sufficiently horizontal. When they are more vertical i.e. $\beta \geq \beta_0$, two types of paired non-assortative matches are possible: H2-L1/L1-H2 and H2-L1/L2-H2. Start with the first. Suppose other than this there are no other assortative matches. Then all H1s who match in caste get a type H match. Those H2s who match in caste also get a type H match. Some of those who match out of caste, on the other hand, match with an L type (though others may match with an H1). Therefore **APC** is positive for both men and women.

Now take the other case. Suppose H2-L1/L2-H2 is the only type of non-assortative match. In this case, however both in caste and out of caste matches involve matches between H types and L types. In this case **APC** is actually positive for women (because H2 women who match in caste always get an H type and those who marry out of caste get an L1) but negative for men (since H2 men who match in caste may match with a L2, while those who match out of caste only get H1). Of course we could also have the reverse case H2-L2/L1-H2. In this case women will have a negative **APC** and men will have a negative **APC**.

What is important however is that two possible H2-L1/L2-H2 pairs (with the gender roles changed) cannot co-exist. This is because H2-L2 pairs cannot co-exist with L2-H2 pairs. Therefore even if this pair arises in equilibrium, at least one of the men's and women's **APCs** must be positive, though the other may be negative. Of course both may be positive, for example because the two sets of pairs (H2-L1/L1-H2 and H2-L1/L2-H2) are combined.

Finally we recall from proposition 1 that if $\beta \geq \beta_0$, some H2s must match with L1s. Putting all this together, we get that

Proposition 4 *Suppose the population satisfies **SB** and **CNB**. Then **APC** is zero $\beta_0 > \beta$. For*

$\beta \geq \beta_0$ at least one of the genders **APC** must be positive.

To sum up, our model suggests that the impact of caste preferences on equilibrium outcomes depends crucially on whether these preferences are vertical or horizontal. When preferences are mostly horizontal, out-of-caste matches will look like in-caste matches on non-caste attributes, will be assortative. Furthermore, little would change in matching patterns on non-caste attributes if caste preferences were to be ignored. On the other hand, when preferences are strongly vertical, some fraction of out-of-caste matches would be non-assortative and we will see a “price of caste”.

Given these theoretical predictions, the empirical sections that follow will focus on estimating the magnitude of the caste preferences in our sample and determining whether they are mostly horizontal or vertical. Then, using these estimates, we will explore empirically the equilibrium consequences that these caste preferences generate for marital pairing and highlight their resemblances to the theoretical predictions generated here.

3 Setting and data

3.1 Setting: the search process

Our starting point is the set of all matrimonial ads placed in the Sunday edition of the main Bengali newspaper, the *Anandabazar Patrika* (ABP) from October 2002 to March 2003. With a circulation of 1.2 million, ABP is the largest single edition newspaper in India and it runs a popular special matrimonial section every Sunday. The search process works as follows.

First, the parents or relatives of a prospective bride or groom place an ad in the newspaper. Each ad indicates a PO box (provided by the newspaper), and sometimes a phone number, for interested parties to reply. They then get responses over the next few months (by mail or by phone), and elect whether or not to follow up with a particular response. While ads are placed by both sides of the market, “groom wanted” ads represent almost 63 percent of all ads placed.¹¹ One can both post and ad and reply to one, as our interviews revealed.

When both parties are interested, the set of parents meet, then the prospective brides and grooms meet. The process takes time: in our sample, within a year of placing an ad, 44 percent of our sample of ad-placers whom we interviewed, were married or engaged although most had placed only a single ad. Of those who got married, 65 percent met through an ad, the rest met through relatives or, in 20 percent of the cases, on their own (which are referred to as “love marriages”).

¹¹This is driven by two distinct phenomena. First, there may be a shortage of marriageable age men of good economic status in this population. Secondly, men are much more likely to write letter than to post an ad.

3.2 Sample and data collection

We first coded the information in all the ads published in the Sunday edition over this time period. We excluded ads placed under the heading “Christian” or “Muslims” in the newspaper given our focus on caste, which is primarily (though not exclusively) a phenomenon among Hindus. The details on the information provided and the way it was coded are provided below. We refer to this data set of 22,210 ads as the “ad-placer sample.”

We further restricted our attention to ads that did not mention a phone number, and requested all responses to be sent at the newspaper PO Box or to a personal mailing address.¹² This restriction was necessary to make sure that what the ad-placer knows about his/her respondents is fully captured by the letters. About 43 percent of the ad-placer sample included a phone number (sometimes in addition to a PO Box and sometimes as the only way to contact the ad-placer). We find little differences between the characteristics of the ads that included a phone number and those that did not, except in terms of geographical location: fewer ad placers with phone numbers were from Kolkata.

After excluding these ads from the ad-placer sample, we randomly sampled 784 ads. With ABP’s authorization, respondents were approached and asked whether they would agree to be interviewed when they came to collect the answers to their ads at the newspaper PO Box. Only one sampled respondent refused to be interviewed. The ads placed by the 783 individuals who completed the survey form the “interview sample.”

The interview was conducted in the ad-placer’s home after a few days with the person in charge of the search, usually the parent, uncle or older brother of the prospective groom or bride. Detailed information was collected on the prospective groom or bride, his family and the search process for a marriage partner.¹³ In particular, ad-placers were asked whether they also replied to other ads and, when they did, to identify the ads they had responded to among the ads published in the past few weeks. Ad placers were also asked how many letters they received in response to their ad (on average 83 for bride-wanted and 23 for groom-wanted ad placers), and to identify the letters they were planning to follow up with (the “considered” letters). We then randomly sampled five letters from the set of “considered” letters (or took the entire set if they had less than five in this category), and ten (or all of them if they had less than ten in this category) from the set of the “non-considered” letters, and requested authorization to photocopy them. The information in these letters was subsequently coded, using the procedure outlined below. We refer to this data set as the “letter data set.”

Finally, a year after the first visit, this original interview-sample was re-interviewed, and we

¹²Only a small fraction of ads included only a personal mailing address (namely, 4 percent of our interview-sample, and 8 percent of the ad placer sample).

¹³The questionnaire is available online at <http://www.econ.umd.edu/Lafortune/Questionnaire/>.

collected information regarding their current marital status and their partner’s choice. Only 33 ad-placers out of the entire sample could not be contacted. Out of those we reached, 346 were married or engaged, and 289 of those agreed to a follow-up interview and gave us detailed information regarding their selected spouse, the date of the marriage and their overall search process including the number of ads posted and the way the match was made. Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2 compares ad-placers found and not found and those who agreed or refused to answer the follow up questions. There appears to be little systematic differences between the two groups.

3.3 Variable construction

Ads and letters provide very rich and mostly qualitative information. A data appendix describes the coding process. In this subsection, we mainly discuss the coding process for the caste information.

If caste was explicitly mentioned in the ad or letter, we used that information as the caste of the person. Caste is often not explicitly mentioned in the ad because the ad is usually placed underneath a particular heading in the newspaper corresponding to a caste. If caste is not directly mentioned in the ad, the heading is used for this classification. The information on caste is readily available, directly or indirectly, in the overwhelming majority of ads (98 percent). In the letters, caste is explicitly mentioned in about 70 percent of the cases.

As already mentioned, Hindu society is divided into a number of broad castes (*varnas*) but each of these castes, in turn, are divided into a number of sub-castes (*jatis*). Ad-placers or letters can be more or less specific in identifying themselves. Historically there was a more or less clear hierarchy among the broad caste groups, but within each broad group, there was no clear ordering. We therefore grouped castes into eight ordered broad-caste groups, based on the classifications in Risley (1981) and Bose (1958), with Brahmin at the top (with the rank of 8, and various schedule castes at the bottom, with the rank of 1). Appendix Table C.3 presents the classification.

To determine whether a letter writer and an ad-placer are from the same caste, we attributed to each letter or ad the specific sub-caste mentioned in the ad. If the ad-placer or letter writer only mentioned a broad group, he or she is assumed to be from any of the specific sub-castes. For example, a self-identified Kulin Brahmin is considered to be from a different caste as a self-identified Nath Brahmin (though the vertical distance between them is set to zero), but is considered to be of the same caste as someone who simply identified himself as a Brahmin.

Another relevant piece of information is the stated preferences regarding caste. Among the sampled ads, more than 30 percent of individuals specify their preference for marrying within their caste (using phrases such as “Brahmin bride wanted”). Another 20 to 30 percent explicitly

specify their willingness to unions outside their own caste by the use of phrases such as “caste no bar.” The remaining 40 to 50 percent do not make any mention of preferences regarding caste.

The remaining variables coded were: education (in 7 categories), earnings and occupation for men (we construct an occupational score, referred to as “wage” in what follows), family origin, physical characteristics, and some more rarely mentioned traits (astrological signs, blood types, etc.). The data appendix provides more details on the coding.

3.4 Summary statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for both our interview sample and the full set of ads. The two samples look quite similar, except that the interview sample is more likely to live in Kolkata (the Kolkata sample was less likely to provide a phone number).

Our sample is drawn mostly from the Bengali middle class, as evidenced both by the prevalence of higher caste individuals (a quarter of the sample are Brahmin), and educational achievement. Education levels are mentioned in the ad by 90 percent of women and 80 percent of men. Almost all men and women (90 percent) have at least a bachelor’s degree. Women rarely mention their occupation. When they do, their occupational score WHERE DO WE DEFIN THIS? (5.54 for the ad-placer sample and 5.55 among the interview sample) is similar to that of men (5.20 for the ad-placer sample and 5.60 for the interview sample) and significantly higher than the median urban formal sector occupational score (from Bargain et al. 2007 and Glinskaya and Lokshin 2005). This group enters the marriage market after they have completed their education and (at least for men) found a job: the average age is 27 for women, and 32 for men. Around 50 percent of the sample lives or works in Kolkata and slightly less than half consider their family as originating from West Bengal.

Physical characteristics clearly play an important role in the marriage market. Height is mentioned in the ad by 96 percent of the women and 90 percent of the men. Skin tone is mentioned in 75 percent of the cases, beauty, in over 70 percent of the ads. There does not appear to be much boasting about physical appearance, however. More ads describe the bride as being “decent-looking” than either “beautiful” or “very beautiful.”

Table 2 presents similar statistics for two different samples: the sample of people who wrote a letter in response to an ad (“the letter writers”) and the sample of actual spouses, collected from interviews with the ad-placer.¹⁴ A few prospective grooms (7 percent) explicitly mention that they will not demand a dowry. No one mentions that they want a dowry.

This table also shows comparisons between the ad-placers and the letters they have received, as well as with their eventual spouses. In this table, as well as in the remainder of the paper, all

¹⁴Few families could show us the original ad or letter of the spouse.

differences are presented in terms of the difference between the characteristics of the man and the characteristics of the woman.¹⁵

Two-thirds of the letters that mention caste are from someone from the same caste as the ad-placer. The fraction of within-caste marriages among actual matches is a little higher than the fraction of letters that come from within one’s caste: 72 percent of the prospective grooms and 68 percent of the prospective brides who are married after a year have married within their own narrow caste. This fraction increases to 76 percent and 72 percent respectively if we use the broad classification in terms of caste. Men who marry outside of caste tend to marry women from a lower caste while women who marry outside of caste tend to marry someone from a higher caste. Women tend to marry grooms who have either the same education (42 percent) or who are more educated than them (45 percent). Men are more likely to marry similarly or more educated women than themselves and 72 percent to 75 percent of the brides and grooms are from the same family origin (i.e., West or East Bengal).

4 Estimating preferences

Using this data, we now estimate the preferences over various characteristics, exploiting the choices made by ad-placers and people who replied to their ads. We first discuss our basic empirical strategy and present the results. We then empirically examine various concerns about why the coefficients we observe may not actually represent household’s preferences.

4.1 Basic empirical strategy

The first goal of this section is to estimate relative preferences for various attributes in a prospective spouse.

We assume that the value of a spouse j to a particular individual i can be described by the following function:

$$U(X_j, X_i) = \alpha X_j + \beta f(X_i, X_j) + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where α captures the effect of the characteristics of person j , β specifies how this effect might be different depending on person’s i own characteristics and μ_i represents ad-placer fixed effects.

We have in our data several indications of individual’s revealed preference for one potential spouse over another that can allow us to estimate the parameters of equation (1).

First, we know whether an ad-placer is following up with a particular letter writer or not. We thus have information that he preferred this letter to the letters he did not consider. Second, the ad-placers also provided us with their ranking of each letter we sampled. In addition, for

¹⁵Since the sampling was stratified with unequal weights, each letter is weighted by the inverse of its probability of selection.

ad-placers who have themselves replied to ads, we know which ads they decided to reply to (and we also know the universe of ads they could have replied to on that particular date). Furthermore, we know that a letter writer decided to reply to an ad. Finally, we also know how many responses an ad received.

We focus on the decision of the ad-placer to respond to a particular letter. First, as we will explain later, the results using the ranking or the binary decision of replying to a letter are extremely similar. Second, whether an ad-placer responds to a letter has two advantages over the three last options. First, we can be sure that the ad-placers have read all the letters they have received, so the set over which choices are made is well-defined. Second, strategic behavior is *a priori* less likely in this sample since the letter writer has already expressed interest in the ad-placer. The results from these other strategies will be presented in the appendix. The results are very consistent, but we will highlight the main differences below.

The regressions we estimate thus take the following form:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha X_j + \beta f(X_i, X_j) + v_i + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (2)$$

where y_{ij} is a dummy equal to 1 if ad-placer i replied to letter j .¹⁶ In the empirical analysis, we specify $f(X_i, X_j)$ to include dummies for whether the value of some elements of the X vector are equal for i and j (for education, caste, location), the difference between the value of the elements of the vector for some attributes (always normalized such that we take out the average difference between men and women), and its square.¹⁷ We estimate equation (2) using a conditional logit with fixed-effects for each person i , and OLS with fixed effects.¹⁸ Note that for characteristics of ad-placers, we could use either the information provided in their ad or their response to our interview questions. In order to use these estimates in the stable matching exercises that follow, the former was employed. However, very similar results were obtained when using the interview data.

4.2 Results

Table 3 presents the results of fixed-effects and conditional logit regressions, where the binary decision of whether or not an ad-placer i responded to a letter j is regressed on a set of characteristics of the letter, and its interactions with those of the ad.

Columns 1 to 5 present the specifications for groom-wanted ads, and columns 6 to 10 present

¹⁶This is similar to the regression framework of Hitsch et al. (2009).

¹⁷For linear variables, such as age or height, we include only the difference between the value of the variable for the man and the woman and its square, not the level of age or height for the letter writer: this is because once we include a fixed effect for the ad-placer, the age of the letter writer and the difference in age are co-linear.

¹⁸The exact likelihood is not a logit because of the sampling procedure described above. However, it is reassuring that the results are roughly the same between the OLS and logit estimators.

the specifications for bride-wanted ads. Recall that in both cases, differences are presented in terms of the difference between the characteristics of the man and the characteristics of the woman. A positive difference in education for example, means that the prospective groom is more educated than the prospective bride. Also a positive difference between the man’s and woman’s caste indicates that the man is of a higher caste. A variable is set to zero if the letter did not mention that characteristic, and we include a dummy variable to indicate a missing characteristic.¹⁹

Most attributes have the expected signs in the utility function: both women and men prefer more educated spouses; science and commerce are the preferred fields. Women prefer men with higher incomes. Men prefer younger women, and women prefer men their own age. Both dislike large differences in age. As Hitsch et al. (2009), we find that looks matter: men prefer women who describe themselves as beautiful or very beautiful, and seem to have a strong preference for lighter-skinned brides. For example, the OLS estimate suggests that the probability to be called back would be higher for a very light-skinned woman without an education than for a dark-skinned woman with a college degree. Both men and women prefer a spouse who lives in Kolkata (recall that a majority of our families are from Kolkata), and with similar family origin (i.e., East or West Bengal).

Caste plays a very prominent role. In particular, both men and women seem to have a very strong preference for marrying within the same caste. The OLS estimates indicate that a woman is 13 percentage points more likely to call back a prospective groom if he is from the same caste, controlling for all other attributes. A man is 17 percentage points more likely to call back a woman from his caste. These are large differences, considering that the average call back rate is about 28 percent. These results also indicate a high preference for caste relative to other attributes. For example, in the bride-wanted ad the probability to be called back is the same for a man from the same caste and no education as that for a man from a different caste with a master’s degree. Men are willing to sacrifice three shade of skin tones to marry someone within their caste (column 6). Comparing the trade-offs implied by the coefficients on caste and other characteristics in the OLS and logit specification, we find them to be very similar.

Given our theoretical framework, an important issue is whether preference for caste is horizontal or vertical. Conditional on marrying out of their caste, women prefer men who are as close to their caste as possible, while among men, those from relatively high castes want women from a very similar caste, while men from a relatively low caste prefer women from the highest available caste. The magnitudes of the coefficient on the difference in caste, however, are much smaller than those for being of the same caste.

¹⁹All models were estimated with and without including a series of additional covariates (for example, how “cultured” the family is, its wealth level, astrological sign). To save space we focus on the more parsimonious specification in the tables; the results are extremely similar when these additional controls are included.

One possibility is that several of the variables in these regressions are co-linear proxies for the same underlying attribute. Specifically, the basic specification includes income (when reported), education, type of degree, and occupational score (when reported). This may artificially depress the coefficient of these variables relative to the caste variable. To investigate this possibility, we estimate in columns (4) and (9) a more parsimonious specification. We first regressed the log income of the letter writer (when reported) on all the education variables and the occupational score (including dummies when not reported). We then constructed for each ad-placer and letter writer a “predicted income” measure using the coefficients of that regression, and included this variable instead of all the education, income, and wage variables adjusting the standard errors for the fact that this regressor is generated by using the method suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985). Predicted income has a strong and significant impact on the probability of call back, but this does not shrink the relative importance of caste. A woman from a given caste would be as likely to contact a male from her own caste with a given predicted income level than a male from a different caste who is predicted to earn 50 percent more.

To display graphically the trade-off between caste and other attributes, Figures ?? and ?? show indifference curves, drawn using the conditional logit estimates.²⁰ They display the age difference, height difference, education, and income a prospective spouse needs to have to keep the ad-placer indifferent when his or her caste changes, expressed in standard deviations.

In both cases, the demand price for caste is quite substantial. To remain indifferent between two prospective brides, one of the same caste and one from a caste one notch below, the second one must have 3 standard deviations more education, must be 5 standard deviations more closer in age or earn 6 standard deviations more income. The differences are slightly less marked for preferences of women but still very marked for same caste. For both genders, a smaller penalty is attached to marrying individuals of a higher caste than of a lower one, in addition to the penalty of marrying outside one’s caste. This is related to the findings of Fisman et al. (2008) who find strong same-race preferences among female speed daters that is unrelated to physical attractiveness. Similarly, Hitsch et al. (2009) also find same-race preferences, particularly for women.

Appendix Table C.4 presents similar regressions, using the ranking of the ad provided by the ad-placers as the dependent variable.²¹ The results from these regressions are virtually identical to the ones presented in the previous table, as displayed graphically in Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2.

Appendix Tables C.7 and C.8 present similar regressions but this time exploring the determinants of which ad is selected by a letter writer or by another ad-placer or of the number

²⁰The displayed graphs were generated for a Kayashta individual with a bachelor’s degree, who is of average height and age. Similar conclusions would emerge from different assumptions.

²¹The sample size is a bit smaller due to missing observations (e.g., some ad-placers refused to provide ranking).

of letters received by an ad-placer. In all these specifications, the importance of caste in the choice is at least as important as in the main specification. There are nevertheless interesting differences between these specifications and the ones presented here as far as the other variables are concerned, which we discuss in greater detail below.

4.3 Heterogeneity in preferences

The previous analysis suggests a strong horizontal preference for caste. The results presented in Appendix Table C.6 suggest that the preference for in-caste matching is not especially marked among the top 4 castes. Similar patterns were obtained when excluding the top 3 castes from the analysis. Thus, the estimates we presented above are not driven by a particular caste’s desire for matching within their own group.

To further explore whether there is a lot of heterogeneity among ad-placers, a hierarchical binary logit model, as suggested by Rossi et al. (2006), was estimated using the parsimonious regression model above. This estimation method allows for the coefficients of our binary choice model equation to differ across individuals but imposes a normal distribution of heterogeneity. We allow the heterogeneity to depend on a few characteristics of the ad-placer, namely his or her caste, age, height and predicted income and the default prior suggested by Rossi et al. (2006). Figure 3 presents the results of this estimation for the preference for marrying within caste obtained using 20000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo draws.²²

The results suggest variations in this horizontal preference (over and above the preferences explicitly mentioned in the ads). Around one-third of the sample appears to have no preference for marrying within caste, a figure that is only slightly larger than the fraction of actual out-of-caste matches. As in the regressions presented above, the preference for in-caste matching is more marked among male than among female ad-placers, a group for which 40 percent do not have preference for marrying within caste. The mean preference for caste matching is only slightly smaller than the logit estimates found in Table 3, suggesting that being of the same caste increases the probability of responding to a letter by 15 percent, on average.

Furthermore, very similar results were obtained when we estimated the parsimonious regression using a OLS model but letting every single ad-placer have his or her own coefficient for the variable “same caste.” This suggests that we have, as in the theoretical model above, a certain fraction of the population that appears to value endogamous matching much less than others.

²²The remaining estimates are available from the authors upon request.

4.4 Do these coefficients really reflect preferences?

We argue that these estimates provide us with information on the relative preferences for different attributes. There are two main objections to this interpretation which we examine here in detail.

4.4.1 Strategic behavior

A first concern is that ad-placers may behave strategically when they choose to which letters they will respond. For example, they may prefer not replying to a letter that appears to be “too good” because they think there is little chance of that relationship progressing. As we mentioned above, this is unlikely to be happening in this setting since the fact that the respondent has sent a letter to the ad-placer already signals his potential interest. Nevertheless, the issue is further investigated here.

We first compute an absolute measure of “quality” of the letter. To do so, we regress the probability that a letter in our sample is considered, without any interactions with characteristics of the ad-placer who received the letter. In other words, for P_{ij} a dummy indicating whether letter j is considered by ad-placer i , we estimate the equation $P_{ij} = X_j\beta + \epsilon_{ij}$ without any fixed effect for the ad-placer.

We form two versions of this indicator: with and without including the caste of the letter writer. The results presented here use those without caste but similar results were obtained with the caste variables included. The quality indicator is then given by $Q_j = X_j\hat{\beta}$. We also predict the quality of the ad-placer, using the same coefficients $Q_i = X_i\hat{\beta}$.

Figures 1 and 2 plot the probability of considering a letter based on the quality of the ad-placer and that of the letter. If the responses displayed strategic behavior, we would expect that low quality ad-placers would be less likely to consider high quality letters. In fact, Figures 1 and 2 show little difference in the relative probability of considering letters of different quality by the quantile of quality of the ad-placer, although higher quality ad-placers appear to consider on average a smaller fraction of letters of all quality levels. If anything, lower quality ad placers seem to respond to a higher fraction of higher quality respondents. Combining this with information about the letters received by each ad-placer’s quality, this implies that the eventual number of letters considered are about evenly distributed across quality levels for ad-placers of the lowest quality and then become more and more skewed toward higher quality respondents for higher quality ad-placers.

Further evidence is provided by Appendix Table C.5 where similar regressions as the ones presented above are presented but this time restricting the sample to letters where the quality of the ad-placers and the quality of the letter writers are relatively close. The behavior of the ad-

placer seems to be fairly similar when looking at the overall sample compared to this relatively lower quality sample, either in terms of considering letters or ranking them.

Interestingly, the decision to respond to an ad (reported in the appendix tables) seems to reflect more strategic behavior than the choice of whether to respond to a letter an ad-placer received. For example, in the decision of whether an ad-placer replies to another ad, and in the decision of whether a letter writer replies to another ad (Appendix Table C.7 and C.8), education loses its previous importance and appears to potentially decrease one’s attractiveness. Finally, when we regress the number of responses received on a polynomial function of our measure quality Q_i (computed as before), we find that the best fit between quality of an ad and the overall number of responses is an inverse-U shaped curve. This may indicate that, at the ad stage, higher quality ads are only replied to by people who stand a chance.

Thus, there is evidence that families behave strategically when they respond to ads but much less so subsequently. This is perhaps not surprising, as they have to choose between a very large number of ads. While the average person sees more than 800 ads every Sunday over the 12 months they spend on the market before getting married, they only respond to on average 16 of these for females and 35 for males. In contrast, it appears that each ad-placer considers each of the 40 letters received during their search as a potential prospect, and therefore do not behave strategically about whom to respond to (ad-placers respond to about 30 percent of the letters they receive).²³

4.4.2 What does caste signal?

One of our main empirical results is the fact that families (ad-placers as well as people who write to them) are much more likely to write to, and to follow up with, people from their own caste. Caste preferences thus display a strong horizontal component. Does this reflect a preference for caste in itself, or does caste signal something else?

We first explore the possibility that caste is a shortcut for many variables, perhaps unobserved by the ad-placer and us, but reflecting a prospective spouse’s background and culture. People would then match within their caste to marry people like them. However, the strong preference for caste does not seem to be affected by controlling for a host of variables including cultural variables (e.g., ability to sing, which is often mentioned in the ads as a desirable characteristic of women) and it remains very strong in regressions restricted to the four highest castes, who are culturally and economically more homogenous than the rest (Appendix Table C.6). It therefore does not appear that caste is just a proxy for cultural similarity. Furthermore, columns (3) and (8) of Table 3 also include a dummy variable for being from the same broad caste group. The

²³This is less costly than an equilibrium where letter writers would send a message to most ads and would leave the ad-placers to strategically consider (or not) the letters received.

results suggest that it is the narrow caste that matters for preference. If caste was a proxy for cultural identity, broad caste groupings should be stronger than smaller groups.

A second possibility is the preference of ad-placers for letter writers who are from the same caste as themselves reflects the fact that, in equilibrium, only people with some bad unobservable characteristics write to people who are not in their castes (or who are above them or below them). Writing “out of caste” would then be a signal of bad quality.

We first look at whether people who write to, or receive letters from, people belonging to other castes are observationally different from those who do not. In columns 1 and 3 of Panel A in Table 4, we show the average quality index Q for ad placers who told us that they have responded to at least one letter from a caste that is below or above them, compared to the quality of those who only responded to people from their caste. Each cell is the difference in mean quality between those who satisfy the condition and those who do not. This table indicates that there does not seem to be significant observable differences between people who write to someone from a different caste and people who do not. There is also no difference between the people who receive letters from other castes, and those who don’t (panel B).

This still leaves open the possibility that these individuals are different along unobservable dimensions. However, we have an excellent measure of the unobservable (at the time of ad placing or letter writing) quality of people: we know their eventual outcome. We compute our quality index for each ad-placer’s future spouse, and we contrast the eventual marriage outcomes of those who have written to at least one person from another caste to that of people who have only written to people within their caste. In an alternative specification, we also regress the quality of the eventual mate of an ad-placer on the share of ads they replied to that were not from the same caste. The results (presented in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4) suggest that the ultimate marriage outcome of those who write out of caste are no different than those who do not (panel A). Likewise, those who get letters from other castes eventually marry people of the same observable quality (panel B). This is a strong indication that writing out of caste does not send the signal that something is “wrong” with the ad-placer.

These results therefore suggest that the fact that ad-placers are more likely to follow up with people from their own caste reflects a true preference for eventually marrying within the same caste. This preference seems to be related to caste itself, rather than characteristics caste could be a proxy for. Compared to the other attributes, this preference also appears to be extremely strong: it appears that the parents of prospective grooms or brides would be willing to give up a lot to ensure that their child marries within their caste. Furthermore, the preference for caste appears to be strongly “horizontal” rather than “vertical,” as defined above in the theoretical section.

4.5 Do these preferences reflect dowry?

We have so far ignored dowries. We argued in the theory section that even if some people do eventually ask for dowries, the decision of who to write back to will be based on people’s true (i.e. not dowry-based) preferences, as long as the cost of pursuing the option until the information on dowry –or other unobservable variable– is revealed, is not too high. One way to check the validity of this argument is to test one of its implications: those who either say that they do not want dowry should be treated the same as others. To verify this conjecture in the data we re-estimate the preferences in the sample of letters that explicitly mention not wanting a dowry. In Table 5 we interact not wanting a dowry with each characteristic of the letter. The full specification is presented in columns (1) and (2), and the parsimonious specification is presented in columns (3) and (4).²⁴ The even columns correspond to the interaction terms and the odd columns to the main effect. The results are noisier for the interactions than for the main effects given the sample size, but, overall, we cannot reject that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.

Interestingly, caste plays an even bigger role for this sample (the coefficient of the interaction between not wanting a dowry and being of the same caste is positive, although it is not significant), while the role of predicted income does not change. This suggests an even larger marginal rate of substitution between caste and income, which is the opposite of what would have been predicted if rich grooms were also thought to require higher dowries. In that case, for grooms who state they will not demand a dowry, income would become more valuable while we find the opposite pattern to hold.

In addition, we find that ad-placers who either announce that they will not offer a dowry or state that they will not demand one do not receive systematically different numbers of letters, and their attributes as mentioned in the letter are valued similarly. Also the quality of their responses and their eventual match is not significantly different than others, except for female ad-placers who receive slightly worse applicants when they announce that they would not offer a dowry. The results are not reported to save space, but are available from the authors.

All these results, in themselves, cannot eliminate the possibility that our estimated preferences include other (non-dowry) transfers between spouses but our data simply does not allow us to study these exchanges.

²⁴We present these results only for the “bride-wanted” sample since only prospective grooms specify whether or not they will accept a dowry. No prospective bride is advertised as refusing to pay a dowry in the letters and a very small proportion do so in the ads.

5 Stable matching estimates

Having established that strong horizontal caste preferences in our sample exist, we compute the set of stable matches implied by the preferences estimated to further study the role of caste in equilibrium. A stable match is defined, following Gale and Shapley (1962), as a pairing where nobody who is matched would rather be with another partner who would also prefer being with them (see Hitsch et al. 2009 and Lee 2007 for other applications of this method to the marriage market). These simulated matches will then be used to answer questions regarding the equilibrium role of caste.

5.1 Empirical strategy

The pool of men and women attempting to match within this market is defined as the entire set of ads posted during the period of the survey, from October 2002 to March 2003 (most individuals on the market usually place one and only one ad, which makes this approximation acceptable).

We want to construct ordinal preferences over the entire set of bride (groom) wanted ads for each man (woman), in the sample. To do so we use the estimated parameters in equation (1) to construct the predicted “utility” that each man i in the sample (the set of ads) would get from matching with woman j (and vice versa for women) using the following equations.²⁵

$$U_{ij}^k = \hat{\alpha}_k X_i + \hat{\beta}_k f(X_i, X_j) \text{ for } k = m, f \quad (3)$$

Functions U^m and U^f are then transformed into ordinal ranking such that

$$R_{ij}^k = n \quad \text{if} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} U_{ij'}^k > U_{ij}^k > U_{i\tilde{j}}^k \\ \text{and } R_{ij'}^k = n - 1 \quad \text{and } R_{i\tilde{j}}^k = n + 1 \end{array} \right\} \text{ for } k = m, f.$$

The preference estimates for the results presented below were all obtained from the linear specification as presented in columns (1) and (6) of Table 3. However, extremely similar results were obtained using the logit specification or the ranking estimates as presented in Appendix Table C.4. Applying this methodology for all males and females in the sample, this generates a full set of ordinal preferences for each ad-placer with respect to all ad placers of the opposite gender. We continue to assume, as we did in the model, that remaining single is a worse option than being married to any spouse.

²⁵The input required by the stable matching algorithm is a measure of ordinal and not cardinal utility, so fixed effects can be ignored. This is because the fixed-effect of male i , for example, simply affects the overall preference of person i towards all potential mates and not the relative ranking of each mate within his set of preferences.

The Gale-Shapley algorithm can be computed in many ways. In most of the results presented in this section, we assume that men make an offer to women. We later explore how the results change when women propose to men instead. When men propose to women, the algorithm works as follows. All men first propose to their most highly-ranked women. Women consider all the offers they receive and select the best one (staying single is considered to be a worse option than any marriage). All men who haven't been retained then select their second choice. If a woman receives a new offer that is preferable to the one she is currently holding, she releases the old offer and this man must then propose to the next woman on his list. This continues until all men have been matched. Since they are the long side of the market, some women will remain single. Ties are broken randomly, without loss of generality in this setting (unlike the example discussed by Erdil and Ergin 2008).

In order to obtain confidence intervals for the results of the matching algorithm, 1000 estimates of the parameter estimates of equation (2), α and β were obtained by bootstrapping the above estimation procedure.²⁶ Then, using each of the 1000 sets of parameters, the matching algorithm was separately run. This resulted in 1000 stable matches that define the range of outcomes that could stem from the distribution of preference parameters. All the stable matching results will present the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of each characteristic of interest to bound the range of results obtained.²⁷

One may worry that the assumption of frictionless matching, implied by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, is inappropriate. To explore this issue, we introduce search frictions in the following way. First, we constrain males to contact individuals close to their unconstrained optimal choice (within 1000 ranks). This is a proxy for the value of their outside option as we now allow individuals to prefer remaining single than to marry a choice that is much below their reference point. Second, at every offer period, a man may be unable to offer to a particular woman with 75 percent probability and may thus be constrained to skip this woman and offer to the next preferred candidate. With search frictions, some males remain unmatched but without all find a spouse because they are on the short-side of the market. While this may appear ad-hoc, other versions were explored and none significantly changed our results.

Finally, to compare the results of the algorithm to those observed in the data, the summary statistics for the algorithm results are computed only for the individuals in our original interview-sample, though using the ad-placer samples gives very similar results.

²⁶This was done using a "block bootstrap" by ad-placer, that is, either all letters in response to an ad are randomly selected into the sample or they are all excluded.

²⁷On the other hand, we did not use the variation stemming from our estimated residuals. This would have clearly widened the confidence intervals we present here and thus increased the quality of the fit with the actual data.

5.2 Results

This section presents the stable matches estimated with the algorithm as described above. We ask two distinct questions: who finds a spouse, and who marries whom. We then compare the simulated outcomes to the actual ones.

5.2.1 Who stays single?

In Table 6 we show the mean differences in the value of key attributes between single and married females in the simulations and in the observed data, that is, the difference between the characteristics of single women and those who are married. Columns 1 and 2 show the 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent of the distribution of these differences within the algorithm. Column 3 presents the mean differences in the actual sample with the 95 percent confidence interval around that mean shown in columns 4 and 5.

In most cases, the differences between those who get married and those who stay single observed in the stable matching have the same signs as the actual differences. Older, shorter, darker skinned, less beautiful and less educated women are more likely to be single in both the stable matches and the actual data. Commerce graduates are also less likely to be single. Some attributes had no effect on the probability of being married or single, including being from West Bengal, being beautiful or very beautiful, and occupational wage and income reported in the ad. For seven out of the sixteen variables, the actual difference between single and married in our data lies within the confidence interval of the stable matches. In five more cases, the confidence intervals overlap.²⁸

There are two variables for which the stable matching algorithm gets the sign wrong. The most important one is the role of caste.²⁹ While we predict that the singles would be of a lower caste than those who are married, it is not true in the real data, where the singles are, if anything, of slightly higher castes.

In most cases where the point estimate of the difference in the actual data does not lie within the bounds of the stable matches estimate, the stable matches overestimate the differences between the variable. This probably reflects the fact that factors other than these attributes eventually determine whether or not people decide to marry: this will thus dampen the role of the variable in the case of actual matches.

As a first pass to investigate this possibility, panel B introduces search frictions. They do not appear to affect the results very much. The resulting characteristics of married and single

²⁸However, because some characteristics are clearly outside the overlapping region, a chi-square test of equivalence of the moments of the algorithm with the mean values observed in the actual match data rejected their equivalence.

²⁹The other one being whether a woman has a science degree.

females are quite similar in both scenarios, and the fit with the real matches is not improved much.

Panel C repeats the exercise for males. Since men are on the short side of the market, without any search frictions, all men will be married. The algorithm results are thus only presented in the case of search frictions. The signs are now congruent for all the variables, and the observed mean differences between those who stay single and those who get married fits within the 95 percent predicted by the stable matching algorithm in eight out of thirteen characteristics (although it is to be acknowledged the algorithm does not produce very tight predictions). Moreover the main characteristics have the expected effect on the probability of being married: men who are more educated, have a science degree, and report higher income or wages, are less likely to remain single, both in reality and in the results of the matching algorithm.

5.2.2 Who marries whom?

We now compare the characteristics of the couples in the stable matches and in our actual sample. Table 7 displays the main results. Columns 1 and 2 present the lower and upper bound for the stable matches, using the “considered” response to estimate the preferences while columns 3 to 5 present the actual comparison between ad-placers and the letters they consider. Columns 6 to 8 compares the ad-placers and their actual matches. All the differences are expressed in terms of the difference between the husband and the wife.

The stable matching algorithm predicts the characteristics of the couples reasonably well. For all the statistics we look at, the sample equivalent in the actual marriages fits within the range of the stable matches estimate in 14 cases out of 21, and the confidence intervals overlap in 15 cases, even though for many variables, the bounds on the stable matches are quite tight.³⁰

Not surprisingly, a dominant feature is the tendency to marry within one’s caste. The stable matching predicts that 87 to 97 percent of the couples will have the same caste. In practice, a lower share (almost 70 percent) of the couples are from the same caste.

Turning to other characteristics, the prediction regarding age are roughly similar in the simulations and in the data. Husbands are almost six years older than their wives on average. Height differences are slightly underestimated but we predict too much assortative matching by height as given by the spousal heights correlation. Both the data and the simulations suggest that husbands are 10 to 12 centimeters taller than their wives.

For education, we correctly predict the fraction of couples with the same education level and the correlation between the education of the spouses, although we tend to predict that husbands

³⁰However, because the stable matching differs greatly from the actual matches in a few instances, a chi-square test of the algorithm moments and the mean values for either considered or match individual rejected the hypothesis of their equality.

will be less educated than their wives, and the opposite is true in the data. This is surprising, and probably comes from the fact that men from the top of the educational distribution may be less likely to report their education than females as they can signal that quality using their wage/occupation.

Comparing our indices of quality, we find that males have higher indices than their spouses though this measure is slightly overestimated compared to the observed data.³¹ These indices are also positively correlated according to the algorithm and in reality.

The algorithm does not have much to say on predicted wage and income differences. This appears to stem from the fact that few women report their wage and income and that these variables are not part of the estimated preferences for males. Finally, we seem to severely overestimate the correlation in family origins.

Introducing search frictions slightly improves the fit of the algorithm result. Although the results are not altered greatly, they are modified in a way that generally increases their resemblance to the observed data. The education and wage differences become more positive with search frictions than without them. Height differences are now including the observed data in the case where considered probabilities are used as preference parameters. Family origin matching is still overestimated when compared to the observed matches. Still, the imposition of these fairly substantial search frictions has limited impact on the results.

We also computed the equilibrium under two variants, presented in Table C.9. First, we computed the equilibrium under the assumption that women propose rather than men. The equilibrium we obtain is very similar in terms of who marries whom. Actually, less than 2 percent of the matches differ between the two algorithms.³² Furthermore, while not shown, the characteristics of who remains single and who finds a match are almost identical when women propose and a very small number of women (less than 0.025 percent) are single when they propose and find a spouse when men propose. This suggests an almost unique stable matching. Finally, we also imposed a balanced sex ratio by randomly selecting a subset of females equal to the number of male ads in the sample. While this creates some differences in the algorithm, the results are still fairly similar to the ones presented in the main tables.

³¹This is driven by two elements. First, male letter writers have higher response rates and thus the indices are larger for males than for females in general. Second, since women with lower quality indices are remaining single, the matches are such that there is an even larger difference between spouses.

³²This is similar to findings by Roth and Peranson (1999) in the context of medical residency matching and by Pathak and Sönmez (2008) in the context of Boston public school matching.

6 The role of caste preferences in equilibrium

6.1 Model Predictions

In Section 2, the theoretical model emphasized that the equilibrium role of caste crucially depends on whether preferences for caste are horizontal or vertical. Section 4 has then argued that the estimation of preferences suggests that the preference for caste is horizontal rather than vertical.

The theoretical model discussed above also suggests that the impact of caste preferences also depends on whether the distribution of male and female “quality” is balanced across castes. In our sample, we know that there is a surplus of females given that more ad-placers are looking for a groom. However, is there evidence of a difference in the quality distribution across castes that differ by gender? To evaluate this question, we used the “quality” measure defined above (without any caste parameter) and compared the overall distribution of quality by caste for males and females among the interview sample. We find that the distributions are fairly balanced for all major caste groups (Brahmin, Kayastha, Baisya and Sagdope), but are less similar for caste groups with fewer observations. These results hold whether one compares the distribution in quality among the interview sample or the letter sample. The fact that the share of couples that are caste-matched varies little when we introduce search frictions is also an indication that characteristics appear to be relatively balanced. If they weren’t, we would expect that being randomly forced to ignore one’s preferred options would lead individuals to eventually have to match out of caste, which is not something we observed as detailed in the previous section.

Given this evidence, we should expect a relatively low impact of caste on the pattern of matches along other dimensions.

Finally, horizontal caste preferences, no matter their strength, would also be irrelevant to equilibrium matching patterns if types were perfectly segregated by caste, that is if all type H are of caste 1 and all type L of caste 2. However, our population does not appear to be stratified in this fashion. While it is true that, in general, lower ranked castes have worse characteristics, there is a large amount of overlap. About 40 percent of individuals of the lowest ranked caste are more educated than the median Brahmin (among those reporting their education level). Similar statistics are obtained when looking at income, occupational scores and skin tones. There is thus little evidence, in this population, that caste is a perfect proxy for other attractive attributes of individuals.

6.2 Simulations

What do the algorithm results tell us about the actual role of caste in the matching equilibrium? Table 8 takes one cut at this issue. The first columns of panel A of Table 8 reproduce

columns 1 and 2 of the first panel of Table 7. The second panel constrains all marriages to take place within one’s caste. Panel C entirely ignores caste when computing the preference of each ad-placer for each prospective bride or groom.

The striking result in this table is that neither of these manipulations greatly affects how matches look like along non-caste dimensions. As expected, the correlations in age, height and education increase as the preferences for caste diminishes (they are the highest when matches are restricted to be within caste, and the lowest when preferences for caste is “shut down”), but the gradient is fairly low, and very few of the other variables are affected.

Moreover, the proportion of within-caste marriage falls by a large fraction when preferences are caste-blind. This suggests that caste does not proxy for other attributes. There are many potential matches for each person, both within and outside his or her caste.

Columns (3) to (10) present the algorithm results by key caste groups. These results suggest that the conclusions drawn above are fairly similar across caste groups, despite the fact that the sub-castes within the Baisyas and the Sadgopes are relatively smaller than those within the Brahmins. However, imposing caste-blindness appears to more importantly affect smaller castes than Brahmins or Kayashtas. Some correlations among the Sagdopes, in particular age and education correlations, appear to fall once one imposes within-caste matching.

Overall it seems that once the algorithm imposes caste-blindness, the individuals marry almost identical individuals but from another caste. This would suggest that the equilibrium price of caste ought to be low. To further study this pattern, we look at the actual matching patterns of our sample. We found no evidence that men or women who marry outside their caste sacrifice “quality” measured in a variety of ways. However, this could be due to selection. That is, individuals who have less of a preference for caste would select to marry outside their caste. Since their “cost” of caste matching is lower, this is what we would measure in equilibrium.

Therefore, we turn to the results of the algorithm to attempt to alleviate this concern since in this context there are no unobservable determinants of taste. The conceptual exercise here consists in comparing the spouses of two observationally equivalent individuals where one is matched within his or her caste and the other is not. To do this, a regression controlling for all of the ad-placer’s characteristics correlated various measures of quality of the match with an indicator of whether the match is within or outside one’s caste. Such regressions were run for each iteration of the algorithm, and Table 9 presents the mean and the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile of the distribution of the coefficients on whether or not the couple was within the same caste. These results suggest that prices of matching within caste are small, insignificant, and often in the wrong direction. For example, individuals who marry within their own caste are also more likely to marry more educated individuals.

On the other hand, our theory would make us expect that vertical characteristics, such as

education, should have a positive price; if we did not find this, the evidence on the low price of caste would be less compelling. We therefore compute the equilibrium price of education in a similar fashion. The left hand panel of Table 9 suggests that as opposed to caste, individuals are forced to choose between, for example, beauty and the educational level of a woman. A man who marries a woman who has more education also marries one who is older, less beautiful and darker-skinned. Little correlation is found between a prospective groom’s education and other qualities.

We thus find that the equilibrium price of caste is very small and that altering the way caste is perceived by individuals does not transform the overall matching equilibrium significantly. This is consistent with our theoretical model and the estimated preferences we obtained in the context where preferences for caste are horizontal.

7 Conclusion

Our results indicate that while caste is highly valued in terms of preferences, it does not require a very high price in equilibrium. This is consistent with assuming that preferences are relatively horizontal and that the populations are close to being balanced. Both these conditions appear to hold in the data we collected for arranged marriages in West Bengal.

A number of conclusions follow from this. First, there is no reason to expect that economic growth by itself will undermine caste-based preferences in marriage. Second, caste-based preferences in marriage are unlikely to be a major constraint on growth. Finally, one might worry that if caste becomes less important inequality might increase along other dimensions as we will see more assortative matching. Given that the matching is already close to being assortative this is probably not an important concern.

While these conclusions are particularly important in the context of India, they are also more broadly relevant for any setting where we may observe strong in-group preferences in a matching context. Our theoretical conclusions, in particular, suggest that these preferences will be more important in equilibrium whenever they display a “vertical” nature. Racial preferences for spouses, for example, may not have large equilibrium consequences if groups have a preference for marrying someone of their own race rather than hoping to marry a particularly favored racial group.³³

However, there are trends that suggest that caste-based preferences might be changing. Despite the value placed on caste and its low equilibrium price, 30 percent of people in our sample *do not* marry within their caste. In part, this is due to heterogeneity in caste preferences, with

³³Preferences for social status (e.g., marrying into aristocracy) might be more vertical in this respect, unless it merely proxies wealth.

some people having caste-neutral preferences. But there is something else. About 40 percent of the sons and daughters of our respondents eventually marry through a channel other than the ads (e.g., through friends and family networks), and 20 percent enter into a “love marriage.” This suggests that while economic forces have not been able to undermine the role of caste-based preferences on marriage market outcomes, these preferences themselves might be undergoing changes. What drives this is an interesting topic of future research.

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8 Tables and figures

Table 1: Summary statistics:Ad-placers

Variable	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Full set (N=14172)		Interviewed (N=506)		Full set (N=8038)		Interviewed (N=277)	
	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.
Number of responses			22.67	19.84			82.71	76.10
Caste								
Brahmin	0.26	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.27	0.44	0.25	0.44
Baidya	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.18	0.05	0.21
Kshatriya	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.13	0.01	0.12
Kayastha	0.30	0.46	0.35	0.48	0.29	0.45	0.32	0.47
Baisya and others	0.18	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38
Sagdope and others	0.13	0.34	0.10	0.30	0.13	0.34	0.12	0.33
Other castes	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.16
Scheduled castes	0.06	0.23	0.03	0.16	0.05	0.21	0.04	0.20
Physical characteristics								
Age	26.68	3.90	26.59	3.65	31.58	4.31	32.14	4.45
Height (meters)	1.56	0.04	1.58	0.04	1.68	0.06	1.70	0.06
Skin tone	2.36	0.84	2.30	0.80				
Very beautiful	0.06	0.24	0.08	0.27				
Beautiful	0.56	0.50	0.44	0.50				
Education and Income								
Less than high school	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.08
High school	0.06	0.23	0.08	0.28	0.07	0.25	0.08	0.27
Post-secondary	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.20
College	0.46	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.36	0.48	0.35	0.48
Master's	0.29	0.45	0.26	0.44	0.17	0.37	0.15	0.36
PhD	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.22	0.13	0.34	0.18	0.39
Other degree	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.10
Humanities/Arts	0.66	0.47	0.58	0.49	0.12	0.33	0.05	0.21
Commerce	0.11	0.31	0.12	0.33	0.37	0.48	0.40	0.49
Science	0.28	0.45	0.30	0.46	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.50
Other field	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00
Log wage	5.55	0.36	5.54	0.35	5.20	0.79	5.61	0.53
Log income	9.22	0.83	8.75	0.77	9.46	0.75	9.44	0.67
Geography								
Living in Calcutta	0.51	0.50	0.80	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.76	0.43
Family from West Bengal	0.44	0.50	0.39	0.49	0.45	0.50	0.39	0.49
Demands mentioned								
Only within caste	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.28
Caste no bar	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.47	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43
No dowry demanded	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.12	0.12	0.32	0.10	0.31
Ads which omit...								
Caste	0.02	0.13	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.08
Age	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.13	0.04	0.20
Height	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.19	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.31
Education	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.18	0.39
Field	0.27	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.39	0.49	0.30	0.46
Residence	0.86	0.35	0.84	0.37	0.70	0.46	0.52	0.50
Family origin	0.29	0.45	0.23	0.42	0.32	0.47	0.29	0.45
Wage	0.83	0.38	0.84	0.37	0.25	0.43	0.57	0.50
Income	0.98	0.13	0.97	0.16	0.78	0.41	0.74	0.44
Skin tone	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41				
Beauty	0.25	0.43	0.27	0.44				

Statistics are computed only among individuals reporting a given characteristic

Table 2: Summary statistics: Letters and matches

Variables	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Letters (N=5630)		Matches (N=158)		Letters (N=3944)		Matches (N=131)	
	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.	Mean	Sd. Dev.
Considered	0.34	0.47			0.28	0.45		
Caste								
Brahmin	0.23	0.42	0.27	0.45	0.21	0.41	0.24	0.42
Baidya	0.03	0.17	0.04	0.19	0.04	0.19	0.05	0.23
Kshatriya	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.17
Kayastha	0.38	0.48	0.43	0.50	0.36	0.48	0.37	0.49
Baisya and others	0.20	0.40	0.15	0.36	0.20	0.40	0.16	0.37
Sagdope and others	0.12	0.32	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.31
Other castes	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.11	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.09
Scheduled castes	0.04	0.19	0.02	0.14	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.17
Same caste	0.66	0.47	0.68	0.47	0.64	0.48	0.72	0.45
Difference in caste	-0.17	1.37	0.10	1.43	-0.04	1.23	-0.11	1.08
Physical Characteristics								
Age	32.60	4.37	32.49	3.67	26.34	3.96	27.33	3.67
Age difference	6.25	2.92	6.61	2.95	5.93	2.65	4.60	2.84
Height (meters)	1.70	0.06	1.71	0.08	1.58	0.04	1.59	0.05
Height difference (m)	0.12	0.06	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.06
Skin tone					1.41	0.77		
Very beautiful					0.10	0.31		
Beautiful					0.51	0.50		
Education and Income								
Less than high school	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.09
High school	0.08	0.27	0.06	0.22	0.16	0.37	0.08	0.28
Post-secondary	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.12
College	0.51	0.50	0.35	0.48	0.58	0.49	0.44	0.50
Master's	0.21	0.41	0.25	0.44	0.18	0.39	0.34	0.48
PhD	0.13	0.33	0.32	0.47	0.02	0.13	0.11	0.32
Other degree	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.19	0.00	0.00
Same education level	0.44	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.37	0.48	0.46	0.50
Male is more educated	0.28	0.45	0.45	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.23	0.42
Humanities/Arts	0.13	0.33	0.52	0.50	0.63	0.48	0.79	0.41
Commerce	0.34	0.47			0.11	0.31		
Science	0.51	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.25	0.43	0.21	0.41
Other field	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.00
Log wage	5.47	0.59	5.53	0.57	5.50	0.35	5.46	0.36
Log income	9.31	0.73	9.47	0.79	8.85	0.68	1.75	3.54
Geography								
Living in Calcutta	0.55	0.50	0.59	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.53	0.50
Same residence	0.50	0.50	0.64	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.42	0.50
Family from West Bengal	0.39	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.42	0.50
Same family origin	0.75	0.43	0.75	0.43	0.71	0.46	0.72	0.45
Demands mentioned								
No dowry demanded	0.07	0.26	0.00	0.00				
Letters which omit								
Caste	0.30	0.46	0.01	0.11	0.28	0.45	0.02	0.12
Age	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.17	0.00	0.00
Height	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.27	0.00	0.00
Education	0.08	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.19	0.00	0.00
Field	0.20	0.40	0.39	0.49	0.25	0.43	0.22	0.42
Residence	0.15	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.40	0.00	0.00
Family origin	0.31	0.46	0.03	0.18	0.27	0.44	0.00	0.00
Wage	0.44	0.50	0.08	0.28	0.86	0.35	0.79	0.41
Income	0.66	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.98	0.14	0.04	0.19
Skin tone					0.14	0.35	1.00	0.00
Beauty					0.36	0.48	1.00	0.00

Statistics are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Statistics are computed only among individuals reporting a given characteristic. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females): the first four columns refer to prospective and actual grooms, the last four to prospective and actual brides.

Table 3: Probability of considering a letter

	Ads placed by females					Ads placed by males				
	Basic (1)	No caste (2)	Main caste (3)	Limited (4)	Logit (5)	Basic (6)	No caste (7)	Main caste (8)	Limited (9)	Logit (10)
Same caste	0.1317*** (0.0329)		0.1347** (0.0425)	0.1395*** (0.0330)	0.8604*** (0.2068)	0.1707*** (0.0351)		0.1769*** (0.0442)	0.1800*** (0.0352)	1.0454*** (0.2052)
Same main caste			0.0273 (0.0485)					-0.0331 (0.0554)		
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male	-0.0119 (0.0151)		-0.0276 (0.0197)	-0.0108 (0.0152)	-0.0788 (0.0928)	-0.0175 (0.0170)		-0.0099 (0.0232)	-0.0138 (0.0171)	-0.1990 (0.1081)
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male	0.0145 (0.0133)		0.0056 (0.0160)	0.0103 (0.0134)	0.1393 (0.0903)	-0.0399* (0.0172)		-0.0301 (0.0220)	-0.0428* (0.0173)	-0.2958** (0.0990)
Same caste*only within	0.0954 (0.1093)		0.0918 (0.1093)	0.0968 (0.1097)	35.1982 (1.288.88)	0.1234 (0.1409)		0.1217 (0.1410)	0.1162 (0.1418)	1.5756 (1.7103)
Diff. in caste*only within	-0.0163 (0.0400)		-0.0158 (0.0400)	-0.0188 (0.0402)	-11.6502 (429.6274)	0.0024 (0.0596)		0.0010 (0.0596)	-0.0056 (0.0597)	0.0674 (0.6857)
Same caste*no bar	-0.0560 (0.0366)		-0.0549 (0.0366)	-0.0563 (0.0367)	-0.4950* (0.2187)	-0.0565 (0.0428)		-0.0574 (0.0429)	-0.0629 (0.0430)	-0.2599 (0.2424)
Diff. in caste*no bar	-0.0084 (0.0121)		-0.0098 (0.0121)	-0.0052 (0.0121)	-0.0528 (0.0786)	0.0121 (0.0151)		0.0118 (0.0152)	0.0115 (0.0152)	0.1194 (0.0880)
Diff. in age	-0.0019 (0.0047)	-0.0035 (0.0047)	-0.0019 (0.0047)	-0.0032 (0.0047)	0.1647*** (0.0458)	0.0443*** (0.0083)	0.0471*** (0.0083)	0.0443*** (0.0083)	0.0394*** (0.0082)	0.2933*** (0.0545)
Squared diff. in age	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0203*** (0.0035)	-0.0023*** (0.0006)	-0.0025*** (0.0006)	-0.0023*** (0.0006)	-0.0023*** (0.0006)	-0.0150*** (0.0038)
Diff. in height	1.2508*** (0.2745)	1.3455*** (0.2754)	1.2490*** (0.2745)	1.3028*** (0.2752)	8.1805*** (1.7128)	0.7228* (0.3329)	0.6829* (0.3348)	0.7153* (0.3331)	0.7585* (0.3339)	10.2634*** (2.6758)
Squared diff. in height	-3.4695*** (0.9692)	-3.8398*** (0.9718)	-3.4465*** (0.9694)	-3.5684*** (0.9709)	-22.4174*** (5.9882)	-6.2532*** (1.2451)	-6.1518*** (1.2522)	-6.2375*** (1.2455)	-6.3265*** (1.2491)	-60.1849*** (10.2198)
High school	0.0732 (0.1097)	0.0907 (0.1102)	0.0751 (0.1097)	0.0751 (0.1097)	0.0770 (0.6478)	0.1043 (0.0623)	0.1133 (0.0628)	0.1038 (0.0624)	0.1122 (0.0628)	0.6122 (0.3896)
Post-secondary	0.1216 (0.1187)	0.1413 (0.1192)	0.1238 (0.1188)	0.1238 (0.1188)	0.3391 (0.6995)	0.0832 (0.1403)	0.0701 (0.1409)	0.0808 (0.1403)	0.0808 (0.1403)	0.5283 (0.8193)
Bachelor's	0.1019 (0.1183)	0.1132 (0.1188)	0.1024 (0.1183)	0.1024 (0.1183)	0.2708 (0.6942)	0.0966 (0.0879)	0.1224 (0.0884)	0.0965 (0.0880)	0.1224 (0.0880)	0.3744 (0.5294)
Master's	0.2242 (0.1219)	0.2330 (0.1224)	0.2245 (0.1219)	0.2245 (0.1219)	0.9356 (0.7154)	0.1679 (0.0913)	0.1928* (0.0918)	0.1678 (0.0914)	0.1928* (0.0918)	0.8527 (0.5464)
PhD	0.2589* (0.1248)	0.2636* (0.1254)	0.2595* (0.1248)	0.2595* (0.1248)	1.1708 (0.7319)	0.2626* (0.1031)	0.2835** (0.1035)	0.2624* (0.1031)	0.2835** (0.1035)	1.6229** (0.6068)
Same education	0.0412 (0.0239)	0.0435 (0.0240)	0.0413 (0.0239)	0.0413 (0.0239)	0.2482 (0.1393)	0.0174 (0.0307)	0.0084 (0.0309)	0.0173 (0.0307)	0.0084 (0.0309)	0.0296 (0.1636)
Male more educated	0.0571 (0.0379)	0.0646 (0.0381)	0.0571 (0.0379)	0.0571 (0.0379)	0.3556 (0.2166)	-0.0057 (0.0419)	-0.0098 (0.0422)	-0.0057 (0.0419)	-0.0098 (0.0422)	-0.1400 (0.2352)
Non-rankable degree	0.2126 (0.1143)	0.2371* (0.1148)	0.2140 (0.1143)	0.2140 (0.1143)	0.8966 (0.6698)	0.2125** (0.0822)	0.2201** (0.0828)	0.2123** (0.0823)	0.2201** (0.0828)	1.2286* (0.4877)

Continued on next page

	Ads placed by females					Ads placed by males				
	Basic (1)	No caste (2)	Main caste (3)	Limited (4)	Logit (5)	Basic (6)	No caste (7)	Main caste (8)	Limited (9)	Logit (10)
Science	0.1002*** (0.0214)	0.0951*** (0.0215)	0.0999*** (0.0214)	0.0757*** (0.0138)	0.5945*** (0.1252)	0.0456* (0.0192)	0.0423* (0.0192)	0.0457* (0.0192)	0.0591** (0.0190)	0.3074** (0.1026)
Commerce	0.0529* (0.0222)	0.0525* (0.0223)	0.0526* (0.0222)	0.0735*** (0.0138)	0.3096* (0.1312)	0.0781** (0.0259)	0.0819** (0.0260)	0.0785** (0.0259)	0.0588** (0.0190)	0.4895*** (0.1379)
Other field	0.0332 (0.0518)	0.0321 (0.0521)	0.0326 (0.0518)	0.0735*** (0.0138)	0.2229 (0.2774)	0.0154 (0.0742)	0.0162 (0.0741)	0.0153 (0.0742)	0.0591** (0.0190)	-0.2174 (0.4218)
Calcutta	0.0734*** (0.0137)	0.0771*** (0.0138)	0.0735*** (0.0138)	0.0757*** (0.0138)	0.4089*** (0.0777)	0.0620** (0.0190)	0.0588** (0.0190)	0.0621** (0.0190)	0.0591** (0.0190)	0.3915*** (0.1064)
Same location	0.0469 (0.0352)	0.0445 (0.0353)	0.0463 (0.0352)	0.0412 (0.0352)	0.2988 (0.2060)	-0.0437 (0.0289)	-0.0455 (0.0290)	-0.0438 (0.0289)	-0.0442 (0.0290)	-0.1492 (0.1593)
Same family origin	0.0348 (0.0194)	0.0513** (0.0194)	0.0351 (0.0194)	0.0363 (0.0194)	0.2641* (0.1127)	0.0926*** (0.0214)	0.1067*** (0.0214)	0.0932*** (0.0214)	0.0977*** (0.0215)	0.6472*** (0.1246)
Log income	0.0995*** (0.0148)	0.0953*** (0.0148)	0.0992*** (0.0148)	0.0992*** (0.0148)	0.6010*** (0.0853)					
Log wage	0.1046*** (0.0144)	0.1093*** (0.0145)	0.1050*** (0.0144)	0.1050*** (0.0144)	0.5581*** (0.0837)					
Skin tone						-0.0506*** (0.0101)	-0.0518*** (0.0102)	-0.0508*** (0.0101)	-0.0534*** (0.0101)	-0.3004*** (0.0595)
Beautiful						0.0071 (0.0190)	0.0100 (0.0191)	0.0071 (0.0190)	0.0043 (0.0191)	0.0920 (0.1035)
Very beautiful						0.0532 (0.0300)	0.0575 (0.0301)	0.0533 (0.0300)	0.0465 (0.0301)	0.3279* (0.1569)
Predicted income				0.3478*** (0.0194)					0.0817*** (0.0229)	
N	5628	5628	5628	5628	5628	3944	3944	3944	3944	3944

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristic, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by errors in parentheses; the first five columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last five to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table 4: **Quality indices by caste categories**

	Ads placed by females			Ads placed by males		
	Own (1)	Match (2)	Share	Own (3)	Match (4)	Share
Panel A: By letters written by ad placers						
Any letter to caste above	0.0067 (0.0147)	-0.0118 (0.0413)	0.2558	-0.0360 (0.0365)	-0.0122 (0.0139)	0.3673
Any letter to caste below	-0.0072 (0.0155)	-0.0526 (0.0382)	0.3101	-0.0110 (0.0369)	-0.0049 (0.0207)	0.3673
N	123	37		41	23	
Panel B: By letters received by ad placers						
Any letter from caste above	-0.0101 (0.0066)	0.0073 (0.0191)	0.3981	0.0160 (0.0111)	0.0255 (0.0197)	0.5158
Any letter from caste below	0.0001 (0.0065)	-0.0138* (0.0066)	0.5771	0.0163 (0.0113)	0.0029 (0.0067)	0.5860
N	285	158		526	131	

All cells correspond to a univariate regression of quality on a dummy variable indicating caste relationship. Standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3) refer to the quality of the ad-placer and columns (2) and (4) to the quality of the eventual match. Males (females) who place ads eventually marry females (males). Columns (2) and (3) are thus referring to quality of males while columns (1), (4) to quality of females.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table 5: Dowries and probability of being considered

	Full Regression		Parsimonious	
	Main effects in sample that does not mention dowries (1)	Interaction of characteristics with no request for dowry (2)	Main effects in sample that does not mention dowries (3)	Interaction of characteristics with no request for dowry (4)
Same caste	0.0836** (0.0264)	0.1363 (0.1080)	0.0887*** (0.0265)	0.1971 (0.1070)
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male	0.0128 (0.0143)	0.0089 (0.0463)	0.0144 (0.0144)	-0.0170 (0.0454)
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male	-0.0258* (0.0124)	0.0801 (0.0458)	-0.0243 (0.0124)	0.1018* (0.0450)
Diff. in age	-0.0025 (0.0049)	0.0031 (0.0190)	-0.0040 (0.0049)	0.0110 (0.0188)
Squared diff. in age	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0014)	-0.0008** (0.0003)	-0.0006 (0.0014)
Diff. in height	1.3842*** (0.2817)	-1.9984 (1.0405)	1.4127*** (0.2822)	-2.1377* (1.0249)
Squared diff. in height	-3.9449*** (0.9871)	6.9149 (3.6745)	-3.9571*** (0.9880)	8.1506* (3.5935)
High school	0.0776 (0.1100)	-0.1167 (0.1386)		
Post-secondary	0.1334 (0.1191)	-0.2867 (0.2939)		
Bachelor's	0.1239 (0.1187)	-0.3886 (0.2535)		
Master's	0.2513* (0.1225)	-0.4281 (0.2641)		
PhD	0.2923* (0.1254)	-0.6111* (0.2697)		
Same education	0.0421 (0.0242)	-0.3778 (0.0638)		
Male more educated	0.0515 (0.0383)	0.0639 (0.0882)		
Non-rankable degree	0.2018 (0.1149)			
Science	0.0961*** (0.0222)	0.0377 (0.0809)		
Commerce	0.0467* (0.0232)	0.0654 (0.0827)		
Other field	0.0232 (0.0526)	0.0253 (0.3418)		
Calcutta	0.0886*** (0.0158)	0.1042* (0.0482)	0.0821*** (0.0143)	-0.0916 (0.0520)
Same location	0.0792*** (0.0143)	-0.0945 (0.0533)	0.0442 (0.0358)	0.0179 (0.0953)
Same family origin	0.0500 (0.0358)	0.0535 (0.0977)	0.0440* (0.0199)	-0.0142* (0.0570)
Log income	0.0422* (0.0198)	-0.1274* (0.0583)		
Log wage	0.1084*** (0.0149)	-0.0160 (0.0565)		
Predicted income			0.3490*** (0.0198)	0.0018 (0.0747)
No dowry	-0.3008 (0.5804)		0.1042 (0.7096)	
F-test: Same coefficients		1.24		1.34
N		5056		5056

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Columns (1) and (2) represent the coefficients of a single regression. Columns (3) and (4) also represent a single regression. The main effects of each characteristics in the sample that does not mention dowries is presented in columns (1) and (3). The coefficients in columns (2) and (4) correspond to the coefficient of the interaction term between the letter stating that it has no dowry demand and each characteristic. Ads placed by females received letters by males: this table refers to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms. Standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table 6: Difference in individuals' characteristics by marital status

	Simulated		Mean	Observed	
	2.5 ptile (1)	97.5 ptile (2)		2.5 ptile (4)	97.5 ptile (5)
Panel A: Women, without search frictions					
Age	0.8759	2.6992	0.9215	0.2566	1.5865
Height	<i>-0.0246</i>	<i>-0.0063</i>	-0.0035	-0.0119	0.0049
Caste	<i>0.1842</i>	<i>1.0929</i>	-0.0772	-0.4235	0.2691
Education level	-1.0987	-0.6624	-0.1486	-0.3630	0.0658
Arts and Social Science	0.1242	0.3326	0.0148	-0.0899	0.1195
Commerce	<i>-0.1693</i>	<i>-0.0849</i>	-0.0416	-0.1118	0.0285
Science	<i>-0.2599</i>	<i>-0.0151</i>	0.0292	-0.0677	0.1260
Other field	-0.0146	0.0318	-0.0023	-0.0180	0.0133
From West Bengal	-0.1472	0.0299	0.0090	-0.1115	0.0935
Kolkata	<i>-0.5348</i>	<i>-0.1621</i>	-0.0290	-0.2126	0.1546
Skin rank	0.4877	0.8295	0.0214	-0.1407	0.1835
Very beautiful	-0.0858	0.0059	-0.0141	-0.0707	0.0425
Beautiful	-0.2190	0.0428	-0.0188	-0.1248	0.0873
Income	-11265	3915	-6267	-11449	-1084
Log wage	-0.0770	0.0860	0.0065	-0.1470	0.1599
“Quality”	-0.1134	-0.0838	-0.0050	-0.0088	0.0187
Panel B: Women, with search frictions					
Age	0.4462	2.1565	0.9215	0.2566	1.5865
Height	<i>-0.0240</i>	<i>-0.0079</i>	-0.0035	-0.0119	0.0049
Caste	<i>0.1853</i>	<i>0.9895</i>	-0.0772	-0.4235	0.2691
Education level	-1.0220	-0.6292	-0.1486	-0.3630	0.0658
Arts and Social Science	0.1341	0.3701	0.0148	-0.0899	0.1195
Commerce	<i>-0.2080</i>	<i>-0.0937</i>	-0.0416	-0.1118	0.0285
Science	<i>-0.2660</i>	<i>-0.0049</i>	0.0292	-0.0677	0.1260
Other field	-0.0190	0.0294	-0.0023	-0.0180	0.0133
From West Bengal	-0.1417	0.0363	0.0090	-0.1115	0.0935
Kolkata	<i>-0.4092</i>	<i>-0.1001</i>	-0.0290	-0.2126	0.1546
Skin rank	0.4921	0.7767	0.0214	-0.1407	0.1835
Very beautiful	-0.1042	0.0016	-0.0141	-0.0707	0.0425
Beautiful	-0.2086	0.0773	-0.0188	-0.1248	0.0873
Income	<i>-1347</i>	<i>3853</i>	-6267	-11449	-1084
Log wage	-0.1301	0.0820	0.0065	-0.1470	0.1599
“Quality”	-0.1081	-0.0809	-0.0050	-0.0088	0.0187
Panel C: Men, with search frictions					
Age	-1.0919	0.5233	0.4175	-0.6997	1.5346
Height	-0.0179	0.0125	-0.0040	-0.0206	0.0126
Caste	-0.1533	2.0519	0.1195	-0.3815	0.6205
Education level	<i>-1.2680</i>	<i>-0.5757</i>	-0.2399	-0.6066	0.1268
Arts and Social Science	-0.0738	0.0811	-0.0696	-0.1308	-0.0084
Commerce	0.1040	0.4386	0.1201	-0.0281	0.2683
Science	-0.5674	-0.2112	-0.0505	-0.2014	0.1004
Other field	-0.0149	0.0224	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Family origin	-0.2584	0.1309	0.0197	-0.1223	0.1617
Calcutta	-0.5658	0.2069	0.0363	-0.1122	0.1847
Income	<i>-8887</i>	<i>-2954</i>	-13560	-42033	14912
Log wage	-0.9925	-0.4129	-0.1141	-0.3196	0.0915
“Quality”	-0.1306	-0.0583	-0.0193	-0.0427	0.0041

Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the estimated confidence interval. Entries in italic have overlapping confidence intervals with the observed distribution.

Table 7: Couples' characteristics, simulated and observed

	Simulated		Observed-considered			Observed-matched		
	2.5 ptile (1)	97.5 ptile (2)	Mean (3)	2.5 ptile (4)	97.5 ptile (5)	Mean (6)	2.5 ptile (7)	97.5 ptile (8)
Panel A: Without search frictions								
Age diff.	5.3394	6.2323	5.9032	5.8191	5.9873	5.6993	5.3476	6.0510
Age corr.	0.7990	0.9242	0.8331	0.8144	0.8507	0.6521	0.5700	0.7341
Height diff.	0.1043	0.1235	0.1201	0.1178	0.1223	0.1237	0.1146	0.1328
Height corr.	0.8108	0.9085	0.3825	0.3473	0.4188	0.3880	0.2875	0.4886
Same caste	0.8682	0.9732	0.7506	0.7333	0.7679	0.6937	0.6396	0.7478
Caste diff.	0.0444	0.4856	0.0916	0.0504	0.1328	-0.0071	-0.1584	0.1443
Caste corr.	0.6536	0.9600	0.8450	0.8202	0.8682	0.7599	0.6873	0.8324
Same education	0.2529	0.7882	0.4487	0.4299	0.4675	0.4380	0.3778	0.4982
Education diff.	-0.5093	0.0084	0.3385	0.3120	0.3823	0.2902	0.1393	0.4410
Education corr.	0.2368	0.6001	0.4202	0.3778	0.4620	0.3564	0.2383	0.4746
Same family origin	0.9898	1.0000	0.7839	0.7655	0.8024	0.7644	0.7060	0.8229
Family origin diff.	-0.0047	0.0092	0.0054	-0.0154	0.0263	0.0433	-0.0208	0.1073
Family origin corr.	0.9769	1.0000	0.5407	0.4959	0.5814	0.5147	0.3932	0.6361
Same residence	0.0000	1.0000	0.4687	0.4346	0.5028	0.4831	0.3834	0.5829
Location corr.	-1.0000	0.4891	0.0441	-0.0393	0.1195	-0.0566	-0.2246	0.2142
Log wage diff.	-0.4990	-0.0826	0.1375	0.0811	0.1939	0.2462	0.1349	0.3575
Log wage corr.	-0.1670	0.4222	0.0687	-0.0720	0.2017	0.1855	-0.1284	0.4993
Income diff.	-11375	10300	9277	-3842	22397	28374	-16	56764
Income corr.	-0.6231	1.0000	0.5760	0.4923	0.8139	0.4474	0.0837	0.8110
Quality diff.	<i>0.1299</i>	<i>0.1554</i>	0.1026	0.0983	0.1069	0.1202	0.1069	0.1336
Quality corr.	0.0941	0.4640	0.0386	-0.2434	0.3383	0.1950	0.0714	0.3187
Panel B: With search frictions								
Age diff.	5.2017	6.2993	5.9032	5.8191	5.9873	5.6993	5.3476	6.0510
Age corr.	0.7700	0.9167	0.8331	0.8144	0.8507	0.6521	0.5700	0.7341
Height diff.	0.1036	0.1241	0.1201	0.1178	0.1223	0.1237	0.1146	0.1328
Height corr.	0.7833	0.8920	0.3825	0.3473	0.4188	0.3880	0.2875	0.4886
Same caste	0.8869	0.9874	0.7506	0.7333	0.7679	0.6937	0.6396	0.7478
Caste diff.	0.0040	0.4286	0.0916	0.0504	0.1328	-0.0071	-0.1584	0.1443
Caste corr.	0.6889	0.9915	0.8450	0.8202	0.8682	0.7599	0.6873	0.8324
Same education	0.2325	0.7870	0.4487	0.4299	0.4675	0.4380	0.3778	0.4982
Education diff.	<i>-0.4397</i>	<i>0.1527</i>	0.3385	0.3120	0.3823	0.2902	0.1393	0.4410
Education corr.	0.2223	0.6350	0.4202	0.3778	0.4620	0.3564	0.2383	0.4746
Same family origin	0.9799	1.0000	0.7839	0.7655	0.8024	0.7644	0.7060	0.8229
Family origin diff.	-0.0061	0.0149	0.0054	-0.0154	0.0263	0.0433	-0.0208	0.1073
Family origin corr.	0.9524	1.0000	0.5407	0.4959	0.5814	0.5147	0.3932	0.6361
Same residence	0.0000	1.0000	0.4687	0.4346	0.5028	0.4831	0.3834	0.5829
Location corr.	-0.7262	1.0000	0.0441	-0.0393	0.1195	-0.0566	-0.2246	0.2142
Log wage diff.	-0.3845	0.0484	0.1375	0.0811	0.1939	0.2462	0.1349	0.3575
Log wage corr.	-0.1770	0.4803	0.0687	-0.0720	0.2017	0.1855	-0.1284	0.4993
Income diff.	-6000	188000	9277	-3842	22397	28374	-16	56764
Income corr.	-1.0000	1.0000	0.5760	0.4923	0.8139	0.4474	0.0837	0.8110
Quality diff.	<i>0.1310</i>	<i>0.1653</i>	0.1026	0.0983	0.1069	0.1202	0.1069	0.1336
Quality corr.	0.0543	0.4191	0.0386	-0.2434	0.3383	0.1950	0.0714	0.3187

Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the estimated confidence interval. Entries in italic have overlapping confidence intervals with the observed distribution.

Table 8: Couples' characteristics and the impact of caste, by caste

	All castes		Brahmin		Kayastha		Baisya		Sagdope	
	2.5 ptile (1)	97.5 ptile (2)	2.5 ptile (3)	97.5 ptile (4)	2.5 ptile (5)	97.5 ptile (6)	2.5 ptile (7)	97.5 ptile (8)	2.5 ptile (9)	97.5 ptile (10)
Panel A: Without restrictions										
Age diff.	5.3394	6.2323	5.4830	6.3200	5.3668	6.1957	5.5092	6.2090	5.4749	6.1827
Age corr.	0.7990	0.9242	0.8677	0.9515	0.8697	0.9512	0.7453	0.8808	0.8018	0.9160
Height diff.	0.1043	0.1235	0.1086	0.1276	0.1035	0.1227	0.1057	0.1196	0.1065	0.1208
Height corr.	0.8108	0.9085	0.8590	0.9303	0.8466	0.9214	0.7170	0.8425	0.7740	0.8790
Same caste	0.8682	0.9732	0.7340	0.9899	0.9661	0.9991	0.9229	0.9946	0.7696	0.9790
Same education	0.2529	0.7882	0.2187	0.8429	0.2055	0.8016	0.3053	0.7483	0.2652	0.7877
Education diff.	-0.5093	0.0084	-0.5910	0.0262	-0.6129	-0.1270	-0.5431	-0.1430	-0.4906	-0.0257
Education corr.	0.2368	0.6001	0.3086	0.6688	0.2840	0.6453	0.2693	0.5692	0.2372	0.5628
Log wage diff.	-0.4990	-0.0826	-0.3596	-0.1905	-0.3894	-0.2215	-0.5133	-0.2609	-0.3747	-0.1432
Log wage corr.	-0.1670	0.4222	0.0651	0.2787	0.0120	0.2131	-0.0285	0.2019	-0.0442	0.2387
Quality diff.	0.1299	0.1554	0.1286	0.1512	0.1375	0.1513	0.1266	0.1488	0.1203	0.1452
Quality corr.	0.0941	0.4640	0.1419	0.4386	0.1034	0.3954	0.1456	0.3845	0.1365	0.3860
Panel B: With forced caste matching										
Age diff.	5.3814	6.2504	5.3744	6.5029	5.2848	6.2702	5.2521	6.4215	4.9047	6.2835
Age corr.	0.7856	0.9130	0.8176	0.9438	0.8413	0.9483	0.6697	0.8998	0.7200	0.9207
Height diff.	0.1050	0.1237	0.1050	0.1278	0.1033	0.1247	0.1012	0.1254	0.1039	0.1294
Height corr.	0.7998	0.8978	0.8624	0.9426	0.8350	0.9399	0.6714	0.8734	0.6927	0.9031
Same caste	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
Same education	0.2612	0.7835	0.2034	0.8487	0.2127	0.8216	0.2959	0.7273	0.2143	0.8148
Education diff.	-0.4933	-0.0132	-0.6792	0.0508	-0.6028	0.0202	-0.5000	0.0556	-0.3333	0.4037
Education corr.	0.2538	0.6059	0.2106	0.7548	0.1849	0.6601	0.1375	0.5903	-0.1395	0.7290
Log wage diff.	-0.5338	-0.0920	-0.6701	0.0481	-0.7318	0.4171	-0.8300	-0.1611	-0.7702	0.3437
Log wage corr.	-0.1424	0.4106	-0.4029	0.4733	-0.8488	0.8865	-0.1616	0.9073	-0.9447	0.9537
Quality diff.	0.1297	0.1562	0.1218	0.1702	0.1118	0.1514	0.1286	0.1719	0.1040	0.1671
Quality corr.	0.0980	0.4547	0.0327	0.5188	0.0353	0.4921	0.0893	0.4734	-0.0952	0.5946
Panel C: Caste-blinded										
Age diff.	5.3867	6.2850	5.2343	6.2655	5.4810	6.4838	5.2844	6.3530	5.2500	6.3714
Age corr.	0.8818	0.9611	0.8382	0.9536	0.8706	0.9624	0.8910	0.9714	0.8947	0.9741
Height diff.	0.1039	0.1234	0.1031	0.1245	0.1037	0.1235	0.1004	0.1225	0.1026	0.1280
Height corr.	0.8937	0.9529	0.8887	0.9605	0.8849	0.9573	0.8900	0.9630	0.8797	0.9658
Same caste	0.1552	0.2357	0.1829	0.3690	0.2165	0.3904	0.0000	0.0862	0.0000	0.1622
Same education	0.2019	0.8503	0.2047	0.8731	0.2043	0.8507	0.2222	0.8969	0.1430	0.8846
Education diff.	-0.5890	0.0268	-0.6240	0.0842	-0.6621	0.0299	-0.5911	0.1031	-0.5963	0.3513
Education corr.	0.2913	0.6902	0.2479	0.7807	0.2161	0.7153	0.2584	0.7994	-0.0391	0.7909
Log wage diff.	-0.4723	-0.0717	-0.6604	0.0217	-0.6750	0.3825	-0.7236	-0.0225	-0.6789	0.4324
Log wage corr.	-0.1366	0.4105	-0.3681	0.5017	-0.6788	0.8421	-0.2646	0.7928	-0.8874	0.8542
Quality diff.	0.1284	0.1562	0.1315	0.1780	0.1091	0.1529	0.1304	0.1775	0.0834	0.1501
Quality corr.	0.0888	0.5048	0.0301	0.5254	0.0588	0.5425	0.0929	0.5813	-0.0936	0.6616

Table 9: Distribution of costs of...

	Marrying a higher caste		Marrying within caste		Education	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Education	0.0391 [-1.8389, 2.0799]	-0.0328 [-1.2239, 1.2373]	-0.0477 [-1.6650, 2.0358]	0.0204 [-0.6152, 0.6446]		
Height difference	-0.0080 [-0.0695, 0.0492]	-0.0034 [-0.0472, 0.0280]	0.0015 [-0.0564, 0.0560]	-0.0010 [-0.0219, 0.0186]	0.1488 [-5.2043, 5.2367]	2.7930 [-1.9975, 7.2504]
Age difference	-0.1215 [-3.1331, 3.1956]	-0.0299 [-2.6872, 2.0798]	-0.2120 [-3.4667, 2.8050]	0.1990 [-0.9037, 1.5148]	-0.0667 [-0.1803, 0.0396]	-0.1878 [-0.25566, -0.1158]
Income	3686.1 [-57128.7, 83787.8]		-296.5 [-62762.3, 60562.1]		-0.0025 [-0.0181, 0.0108]	
Wage	0.1886 [-0.8073, 1.3467]	-0.0104 [-0.8306, 0.6815]	0.0259 [-0.8765, 1.0712]	0.0835 [-0.7427, 0.9072]	0.2847 [-0.0602, 0.6329]	
Very beautiful		-0.0144 [-0.4330, 0.8875]		-0.0048 [-0.3082, 0.1824]		-0.3645 [-0.5998, -0.1351]
Beautiful		0.1067 [-0.6710, 0.9613]		0.0918 [-0.4038, 0.5374]		-0.1266 [-0.3220, 0.0495]
Skin tone		-0.1190 [-1.2863, 0.8318]		-0.0873 [-0.8960, 0.5528]		0.1472 [-0.0042, 0.3224]

The 2.5 and 97.5 percentile of the distribution of coefficients is presented in brackets. Bold entries mark significance at 5% or more. The reference category for the first 4 columns is marrying someone of a lower caste.

Figure 1: Proportion of considered letters by quality of the letter and ad placer, ads placed by females




Figure 2: Proportion of considered letters by quality of the letter and ad placer, ads placed by males





Figure 3: Distribution of preferences for own caste



A Theoretical Appendix: Adding unobserved characteristics

This section proves that if exploration is not too costly, what individuals choose to be the set of options they explore reflects their true ordering over observables, even in the presence of an unobservable characteristic they may also care about.

Formally, we assume that in addition to the two characteristics already in our model, x and y , there is another (payoff-relevant) characteristic z (such as demand for dowry) not observed by the respondent that may be correlated with x . Is it a problem for our empirical analysis that the decision-maker can make inferences about z from their observation of x ? The short answer, which this section briefly explains, is no, as long as the cost of exploration (upon which z is revealed) is low enough.

Suppose $z \in \{H, L\}$ with $H > L$ (say, the man is attractive or not). Let us modify the payoff of a woman of caste j and type y who is matched with a man of caste i and type (x, z) to $u^W(i, j, x, y) = A(j, i)f(x, y)z$. Let the conditional probability of z upon observing x , is denoted by $p(z|x)$. Given z is binary, $p(H|x) + p(L|x) = 1$. In that case, the expected payoff of this woman is:

$$A(j, i)f(x, y)p(H|x)H + A(j, i)f(x, y)p(L|x)L.$$

Suppose the choice is between two men of caste i whose characteristics are x' and x'' with $x'' > x'$. If x and z are independent (i.e., $p(z|x) = p(z)$ for $z = H, L$ for all x), or, x and z are positively correlated, then clearly the choice will be x'' . Similarly, if it is costless to contact someone with type x'' and find out about z (both in terms of any direct cost, as well as indirect cost of losing out on the option x') the choice, once again, will be x'' independent of how (negatively) correlated x and z are.

More formally, for this simple case, suppose we allow x and z to be correlated in the following way: $p(H|x'') = p\mu, p(L|x'') = 1 - p\mu, p(H|x') = p$, and $p(L|x') = 1 - p$. If $\mu > 1$ we have positive correlation between z and x , if $\mu < 1$ we have negative correlation, and if $\mu = 1$, x and z are independent. Suppose exploring a single option costs c . Let us assume that $Hf(x', y) > Lf(x'', y)$ – otherwise, it is a dominant strategy to explore x'' only.

We consider two strategies. One is to explore only one of the two options and stick with the choice independent of the realization of z . The other is to explore both the options at first, and discard one of them later.

If the decision-maker explores both options, the choice will be x'' if either the z associated with it is H or if both x'' and x' have $z = L$ associated with them. Otherwise, the choice will be x' . The *ex ante* expected payoff from this strategy is

$$p\mu Hf(x'', y) + (1 - p\mu)[(1 - p)Lf(x'', y) + p Hf(x', y)] - 2c.$$

This is obviously more than what he gets by exploring either one alone (namely, $f(x', y)\{pH + (1 - p)L\} - c$ or $f(x'', y)\{p\mu H + (1 - p\mu)L\} - c$) as long as c is small enough for any fixed value of $\mu > 0$.

Proposition 5 *For any fixed value of $\mu > 0$, so long as the exploration cost c is small enough, x'' will be chosen at the exploration stage whenever x' is chosen.*

In other words, as long as exploration is not too costly, what people choose to be the set of options to explore reflects their true ordering over the observables. In other words the indifference curve we infer from the “up or out” choices reflects their true preferences over the set of observables.

B Data Appendix

Ads and letters provided very rich qualitative information that had to be coded to make the data analysis possible. We first coded caste, using the process described in the text.

Second, we coded information provided on education levels. Educational attainment was classified into seven categories: less than high school, high school completion, non-university post-secondary, bachelor’s, master’s, PhD or professional degree and non-classifiable degree.³⁴ In addition, we also coded, when available, the field in which the degree was obtained. We sorted these into four groups: humanities and social sciences (B.A, B.Ed, M.A, etc.), commerce (B.Com, MBA), science (B.Sc., B.Eng, M.Sc., etc.) and other fields (law, religion, etc.).

Third, we coded the available information on earning levels. When provided in the ad, self-reported earnings were converted into a monthly figure. This value will be referred to as “income.” In addition, when the ad-placer or the letter writer provided his or her occupation, we used the National Sample Survey of India to construct an occupational score for the occupation (we refer to this below as “wage”). Note that prospective brides almost never report this information, and it will therefore be used only for the letters and ads from prospective grooms.

Fourth, we coded information on the origin of the family (East or West Bengal) and the current location of the prospective bride or groom under the following categories: Kolkata, Mumbai, other West Bengal, or other (mainly, abroad).³⁵

Fifth, a very large fraction of ads from prospective brides specify physical characteristics of the women, using fairly uniform language and the same broad characteristics. Skin color was

³⁴This last group mostly includes degrees in computer science from private institutions that were difficult to place within the existing ranking.

³⁵At the time of Independence, the state of Bengal was partitioned into two states, one that remained in India, West Bengal, and the other that joined Pakistan, East Pakistan (which later became Bangladesh) . Many Hindus migrated from East to West Bengal. There are some variations in terms of dialect, cultural and social norms among Bengalis depending on their family origin. This has some relevance in the arranged marriage market.

coded into four categories (from “extremely fair” to “dark”) and we associate each category with a number from 1 to 4, with higher numbers representing darker skins. General beauty was divided into three categories (“very beautiful,” “beautiful” and “decent-looking”).

Finally, ads occasionally mention a multitude of other characteristics, such as “gotras” (a subgroup within one’s caste based on lineage such that inter-marriages are ruled out under exogamy), astrological signs, blood type, family characteristics, personality traits, previous marital history, and specific demands. These were coded as well. However, each of these is rarely mentioned and so including or excluding them does not affect our results.

C Appendix tables

Table C.1: Characteristics of ads by attrition status in second round interviews

Variable	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Means		Difference		Means		Difference	
	Found	Not found	Mean	Sd. Error	Found	Not found	Mean	Sd. Error
Number of responses	23.004	18.000	5.00	4.65	79.874	89.071	-9.20	19.88
Caste								
Brahmin	0.27	0.21	0.06	0.10	0.25	0.29	-0.03	0.12
Baidya	0.04	0.16	-0.12	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.06
Kshatriya	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03
Kayastha	0.35	0.21	0.14	0.11	0.31	0.36	-0.04	0.13
Baisya and others	0.19	0.21	-0.03	0.09	0.18	0.14	0.04	0.11
Sagdope and others	0.10	0.16	-0.06	0.07	0.12	0.14	-0.02	0.09
Other castes	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.07	-0.05	0.04
Scheduled castes	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.06
Physical characteristics								
Age	26.55	27.67	-1.12	0.88	32.17	31.50	0.67	1.32
Height (meters)	1.58	1.59	-0.01	0.01	1.70	1.68	0.03	0.02
Skin tone	2.30	2.36	-0.06	0.22				
Very beautiful	0.08	0.20	<i>-0.12</i>	<i>0.07</i>				
Beautiful	0.44	0.53	-0.09	0.13				
Education and Income								
Less than high school	0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03
High school	0.09	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.10	0.08
Post-secondary	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.06
College	0.53	0.50	0.03	0.12	0.42	0.46	-0.04	0.14
Master's	0.28	0.33	-0.05	0.11	0.18	0.23	-0.05	0.11
PhD	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.22	0.31	-0.09	0.12
Other degree	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03
Humanities/Arts	0.57	0.75	-0.18	0.13	0.04	0.09	-0.05	0.07
Commerce	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.41	0.27	0.14	0.15
Science	0.30	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.55	0.64	-0.09	0.16
Other field	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log wage	5.56	5.41	0.15	0.14	5.61	5.61	0.00	0.21
Log income	8.68	9.16	-0.48	0.60	9.45	9.22	0.23	0.39
Location								
Calcutta	0.82	0.60	0.22	0.18	0.78	0.40	<i>0.38</i>	<i>0.19</i>
West Bengali	0.39	0.40	-0.01	0.13	0.38	0.56	-0.17	0.17
Demands mentioned								
Only within caste	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.02	0.08
Caste no bar	0.32	0.42	-0.10	0.11	0.24	0.29	-0.05	0.12
No dowry demanded	0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.03	0.10	0.14	-0.04	0.08
Ads which omit...								
Caste	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Age	0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.03	0.03	0.14	-0.11	0.05
Height	0.03	0.11	-0.07	0.04	0.11	0.14	-0.04	0.09
Education	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.19	0.07	0.12	0.11
Field	0.25	0.16	0.10	0.10	0.30	0.21	0.09	0.13
Residence	0.84	0.74	0.11	0.09	0.51	0.64	-0.13	0.14
Family origin	0.23	0.21	0.02	0.10	0.28	0.36	-0.08	0.12
Wage	0.85	0.63	0.22	0.09	0.57	0.50	0.07	0.14
Income	0.98	0.89	0.08	0.04	0.73	0.79	-0.05	0.12
Skin tone	0.21	0.26	-0.06	0.10				
Beauty	0.27	0.21	0.06	0.10				

Differences in italics are significant at 10%, those in bold, at 5%.

Table C.2: Characteristics of ads who agreed and refused second round interview

Variable	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Means		Difference		Means		Difference	
	Agreed	Refused	Mean	Sd. Error	Agreed	Refused	Mean	Sd. Error
Number of responses	25.643	18.844	<i>6.80</i>	<i>3.51</i>	85.551	71.217	14.33	17.17
Caste								
Brahmin	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.08	0.23	0.36	-0.13	0.09
Baidya	0.04	0.06	-0.02	0.04	0.06	0.08	-0.02	0.05
Kshatriya	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03
Kayastha	0.39	0.31	0.08	0.09	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.10
Baisya and others	0.18	0.16	0.03	0.07	0.21	0.12	0.09	0.09
Sagdope and others	0.07	0.16	-0.09	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.09	0.07
Other castes	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03
Scheduled castes	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.12	-0.10	0.04
Physical characteristics								
Age	25.88	26.53	-0.65	0.60	31.92	32.45	-0.53	0.98
Height (meters)	1.58	1.59	-0.01	0.01	1.71	1.70	0.01	0.02
Skin tone	2.30	2.23	0.07	0.16				
Very beautiful	0.10	0.00	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.06</i>				
Beautiful	0.42	0.58	-0.15	0.11				
Education and Income								
Less than high school	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
High school	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.07
Post-secondary	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.05
College	0.51	0.53	-0.02	0.10	0.42	0.37	0.05	0.12
Master's	0.29	0.37	-0.08	0.09	0.22	0.16	0.07	0.10
PhD	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.20	0.37	<i>-0.17</i>	<i>0.10</i>
Other degree	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Humanities/Arts	0.59	0.42	0.17	0.11	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.07
Commerce	0.13	0.27	<i>-0.14</i>	<i>0.08</i>	0.38	0.28	0.10	0.12
Science	0.28	0.31	-0.03	0.10	0.55	0.67	-0.12	0.13
Other field	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log wage	5.53	5.73	<i>-0.21</i>	<i>0.12</i>	5.66	5.57	0.09	0.15
Log income	9.39	8.52	<i>0.87</i>	<i>0.28</i>	9.52	9.49	0.04	0.33
Location								
Calcutta	0.88	0.60	0.28	0.18	0.78	0.64	0.14	0.14
West Bengali	0.42	0.30	0.11	0.11	0.40	0.26	0.13	0.12
Demands mentioned								
Only within caste	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.06
Caste no bar	0.34	0.31	0.02	0.09	0.27	0.08	0.19	0.09
No dowry demanded	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.08	0.02	0.06
Ads which omit...								
Caste	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02
Age	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.12	-0.10	0.04
Height	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.11	0.20	-0.09	0.07
Education	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.15	0.24	-0.09	0.08
Field	0.25	0.19	0.06	0.08	0.26	0.28	-0.02	0.10
Residence	0.84	0.84	0.00	0.07	0.51	0.56	-0.05	0.11
Family origin	0.24	0.28	-0.04	0.08	0.31	0.24	0.07	0.10
Wage	0.83	0.88	-0.05	0.07	0.54	0.44	0.10	0.11
Income	0.97	0.97	0.01	0.03	0.74	0.72	0.02	0.10
Skin tone	0.22	0.06	0.16	0.08				
Beauty	0.27	0.19	0.08	0.08				

Differences in italics are significant at 10%, those in bold, at 5%

Table C.3: Caste groupings

1. Brahmin		
Brahmin	Kshatriya Brahmin	Rudraja Brahmin*
Kulin Brahmin	Nath Brahmin	Baishnab Brahmin*
Sabitri Brahmin	Rajput Brahmin	Baishnab*
Debnath Brahmin	Gouriya Baishnab*	Nath*
Kanya Kubja Brahmin		
2. Baidya		
Baidya	Lata Baidya	Kulin Baidya
Rajasree Baidya		
3. Kshatriya		
Kshatriya	Ugra Kshatriya	Rajput (Solanki) Kshatriya
Poundra Kshatriya	Malla Kshatriya	Jana Kshatriya
Rajput Kshatriya	Barga Kshatriya	
4. Kayastha		
Kayastha	Rajput Kayastha	Kayastha Karmakar
Kulin Kayastha	Pura Kayastha	Karmakar
Kshatriya Kayastha	Mitra Mustafi	Mitra Barujibi
Kshatriya Karmakar		
5. Baisya and others		
Baisya	Suri	Teli
Baisya Saha	Suri Saha	Ekadash Teli
Baisya Ray	Rudra Paul	Dadash Teli
Baisya Kapali	Modak	Tili
Baisya Teli	Modak Moyra	Ekadash Tili
Rajasthani Baisya	Banik	Dsadah Tili
Barujibi	Gandha Banik	Marwari
Baisya Barujibi	Kangsha Banik	Malakar
Sutradhar	Khandagrami Subarna Banik	Tambuli
Baisya Sutradhar	Subarna Banik	Rajak
Tantubai	Shankha Banik	Kasari
Baisya Tantubai	Swarnakar	Baisya Tambuli
6. Sadgope and others		
Sadgope	Yadav	Mahishya
Kulin Sadgope	Yadav Ghosh	Kumbhakar
Kshatriya Sadgope	Goyala	Satchasi
Yadav (Gope)	Gope	
7. Other (mostly) non-scheduled castes		
Kaibarta	Rajak	Paramanik
Jele	Bauri	Jelia Kaibarta
Napit		
8. (mostly) Scheduled castes		
Rajbanshi	Namasudra	Karan
Rajbanshi Kshatriya	Sagari	SC
Malo	Sudra	OBC
Mathra	Baisya Rajbanshi	

Table C.4: Rank of the letter

	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males					
	Basic (1)	No caste (2)	Main caste (3)	Limited (4)	Logit (5)	Basic (6)	No caste (7)	Main caste (8)	Limited (9)	Logit (10)
Same caste	1.2797*** (0.2933)		1.1275** (0.3821)	1.3320*** (0.4171)	0.4314*** (0.0928)	1.2591*** (0.3458)		1.5022*** (0.4292)	1.4068*** (0.4153)	0.3595*** (0.0928)
Same main caste			0.2377 (0.3825)					-0.4295 (0.4490)		
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male	-0.0500 (0.1341)		-0.0179 (0.1437)	-0.0176 (0.1615)	-0.0034 (0.0418)	-0.4707** (0.1699)		-0.5472** (0.1878)	-0.3732 (0.2379)	-0.1421** (0.0461)
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male	0.1070 (0.1183)		0.0767 (0.1280)	0.0784 (0.1742)	0.0281 (0.0372)	-0.3310 (0.1705)		-0.2548 (0.1882)	-0.3634 (0.2093)	-0.0976* (0.0458)
Same caste*only within	1.1726 (0.9116)		1.1737 (0.9117)	1.1669 (1.0856)	0.2128 (0.2848)	2.1112 (1.3256)		2.0985 (1.3257)	2.1664 (1.4721)	0.7029 (0.3674)
Diff. in caste*only within	-0.4459 (0.3334)		-0.4471 (0.3334)	-0.4554 (0.4955)	-0.1670 (0.1117)	0.0183 (0.5781)		0.0094 (0.5782)	-0.1336 (0.6173)	0.0874 (0.1582)
Same caste*no bar	-0.8681** (0.3258)		-0.8678** (0.3258)	-0.8606* (0.3821)	-0.2911** (0.1028)	-0.8599* (0.4315)		-0.8912* (0.4328)	-0.9364 (0.5233)	-0.2521* (0.1156)
Diff. in caste*no bar	-0.1021 (0.1071)		-0.1041 (0.1072)	-0.0832 (0.1240)	-0.0247 (0.0342)	0.2092 (0.1521)		0.2020 (0.1523)	0.1752 (0.2094)	0.0734 (0.0409)
Diff. in age	0.0345 (0.0405)	0.0255 (0.0405)	0.0348 (0.0405)	0.0217 (0.0856)	0.0053 (0.0127)	0.5215*** (0.0816)	0.5411*** (0.0820)	0.5205*** (0.0816)	0.4459* (0.1978)	0.1457*** (0.0218)
Squared diff. in age	-0.0114*** (0.0023)	-0.0115*** (0.0023)	-0.0114*** (0.0023)	-0.0110* (0.0054)	-0.0031*** (0.0007)	-0.0284*** (0.0057)	-0.0291*** (0.0057)	-0.0282*** (0.0057)	-0.0263* (0.0117)	-0.0079*** (0.0015)
Diff. in height	9.5137*** (2.5694)	9.8711*** (2.5757)	9.4794*** (2.5701)	9.8330*** (3.3196)	3.5492*** (0.8651)	7.2790* (3.2304)	6.8472* (3.2517)	7.2231* (3.2309)	7.6700* (3.5366)	1.9194* (0.8796)
Squared diff. in height	-24.5037** (9.2415)	-26.3139** (9.2562)	-24.4011** (9.2436)	-25.3370 (13.7834)	-9.5136** (3.2019)	-69.0103*** (12.3135)	-68.9625*** (12.3931)	-68.8785*** (12.3145)	-70.3327*** (13.6789)	-18.7289*** (3.3576)
High school	0.6719 (0.9403)	0.9189 (0.9438)	0.6811 (0.9405)		0.3796 (0.3366)	1.7107** (0.6092)	1.7634** (0.6140)	1.7049** (0.6092)		0.4798** (0.1709)
Post-secondary	1.3963 (1.0262)	1.7144 (1.0290)	1.4059 (1.0264)		0.5588 (0.3629)	2.5003 (1.4645)	2.3729 (1.4709)	2.4921 (1.4645)		0.6638 (0.3922)
Bachelor's	1.4920 (1.0213)	1.7376 (1.0243)	1.4965 (1.0214)		0.6384 (0.3635)	2.7817** (0.8894)	2.9152** (0.8959)	2.7961** (0.8896)		0.7474** (0.2434)
Master's	2.3654* (1.0533)	2.6088* (1.0564)	2.3650* (1.0534)		0.9383* (0.3739)	3.9425*** (0.9236)	4.0203*** (0.9303)	3.9590*** (0.9237)		1.0457*** (0.2527)

Continued on next page

	Ads placed by females					Ads placed by males				
	Basic (1)	No caste (2)	Main caste (3)	Limited (4)	Logit (5)	Basic (6)	No caste (7)	Main caste (8)	Limited (9)	Logit (10)
PhD	2.6963* (1.0810)	2.9129** (1.0842)	2.6967* (1.0811)		1.0487** (0.3828)	4.2363*** (1.0650)	4.2562*** (1.0720)	4.2333*** (1.0650)		1.2354*** (0.2918)
Same education	0.5329* (0.2091)	0.5361* (0.2100)	0.5340* (0.2092)		0.1369* (0.0662)	0.2423 (0.2995)	0.1380 (0.3013)	0.2433 (0.2995)		0.0577 (0.0803)
Male more educated	0.8218* (0.3315)	0.8550* (0.3327)	0.8256* (0.3316)		0.2317* (0.1065)	0.3416 (0.4169)	0.2331 (0.4194)	0.3442 (0.4169)		0.0886 (0.1120)
Non-rankable degree	1.8538 (0.9855)	2.1751* (0.9886)	1.8618 (0.9857)		0.7512* (0.3497)	2.6315** (0.8065)	2.6192** (0.8122)	2.6275** (0.8065)		0.7227** (0.2225)
Science	1.0444*** (0.1882)	0.9810*** (0.1887)	1.0454*** (0.1882)		0.3522*** (0.0600)	0.7039*** (0.1928)	0.6512*** (0.1931)	0.7092*** (0.1929)		0.2050*** (0.0516)
Commerce	0.3640 (0.1948)	0.3573 (0.1956)	0.3646 (0.1948)		0.1096 (0.0622)	1.1107*** (0.2600)	1.1203*** (0.2612)	1.1076*** (0.2600)		0.3257*** (0.0698)
Other field	0.1361 (0.4631)	0.1378 (0.4654)	0.1388 (0.4632)		0.0921 (0.1476)	1.1653 (0.7950)	1.2332 (0.7994)	1.1686 (0.7950)		0.3351 (0.2213)
Calcutta	0.4690*** (0.1204)	0.4953*** (0.1206)	0.4703*** (0.1205)	0.4923** (0.1744)	0.1738*** (0.0383)	0.6515*** (0.1891)	0.6240** (0.1897)	0.6501*** (0.1891)	0.6288** (0.2223)	0.1741*** (0.0509)
Same location	0.4846 (0.3086)	0.4160 (0.3097)	0.4831 (0.3086)	0.4059 (0.3802)	0.1181 (0.0959)	-0.1912 (0.2876)	-0.2096 (0.2893)	-0.1944 (0.2877)	-0.2074 (0.3468)	-0.0551 (0.0777)
Same family origin	0.2665 (0.1710)	0.3861* (0.1710)	0.2770 (0.1710)	0.2767 (0.1963)	0.0712 (0.0538)	0.7190*** (0.2156)	0.8573*** (0.2163)	0.7150*** (0.2156)	0.8038** (0.2646)	0.1903** (0.0580)
Log income	0.8761*** (0.1310)	0.8254*** (0.1308)	0.8782*** (0.1310)		0.2906*** (0.0431)					
Log wage	0.9205*** (0.1258)	0.9451*** (0.1262)	0.9221*** (0.1259)		0.2988*** (0.0397)					
Skin tone						-0.4585*** (0.1005)	-0.4657*** (0.1012)	-0.4581*** (0.1005)	-0.4994*** (0.1531)	-0.1292*** (0.0271)
Beautiful						0.2045 (0.1885)	0.2127 (0.1893)	0.2095 (0.1885)	0.1766 (0.2272)	0.0404 (0.0505)
Very beautiful						0.5376 (0.2934)	0.5587 (0.2951)	0.5363 (0.2934)	0.4247 (0.3056)	0.1614* (0.0787)
Predicted income				3.2509* (1.3526)					0.8807 (2.2178)	
N	5094	5094	5094	5094	5094	3520	3520	3520	3520	3520

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females); the first five columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last five to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides. Standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table C.5: Responses to “not too good” letters

	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Considered		Rank		Considered		Rank	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Same caste	0.1073* (0.0451)	0.1134** (0.0364)	1.0817* (0.4438)	1.2763*** (0.3404)	0.0884 (0.0489)	0.1498*** (0.0418)	1.2144* (0.5085)	1.4484*** (0.4270)
Diff. in caste*	0.0464* (0.0197)	0.0253 (0.0166)	0.2376 (0.1888)	0.0389 (0.1524)	0.0570* (0.0243)	0.0186 (0.0203)	0.7497** (0.2536)	0.4847* (0.2100)
Higher caste male	0.0027 (0.0175)	-0.0058 (0.0146)	-0.0291 (0.1714)	-0.1165 (0.1356)	0.0373 (0.0233)	0.0431* (0.0200)	0.6135* (0.2464)	0.5529** (0.2060)
Diff. in caste*	-0.0906 (0.1408)	-0.0344 (0.1273)	-1.0448 (1.2780)	-0.6513 (1.1149)	0.1245 (0.1851)	0.1138 (0.1679)	0.4840 (1.8022)	0.6478 (1.6123)
Same caste*only within	0.0036 (0.0492)	0.0062 (0.0473)	0.3854 (0.4439)	0.5496 (0.4123)	0.0096 (0.0797)	0.0088 (0.0751)	0.5102 (0.7765)	0.6311 (0.7210)
Diff. in caste*only within	-0.0733 (0.0508)	-0.0527 (0.0415)	-0.9739* (0.4908)	-1.0054** (0.3853)	0.0027 (0.0574)	-0.0206 (0.0499)	-0.4229 (0.6295)	-0.9570 (0.5286)
Same caste*no bar	0.0031 (0.0163)	0.0069 (0.0135)	0.1017 (0.1559)	0.1457 (0.1243)	-0.0265 (0.0206)	-0.0066 (0.0175)	-0.5458* (0.2236)	-0.3208 (0.1847)
Diff. in caste*no bar	0.0058 (0.0060)	0.0053 (0.0051)	0.0372 (0.0560)	0.0696 (0.0459)	0.0435*** (0.0120)	0.0436*** (0.0105)	0.5121*** (0.1297)	0.4841*** (0.1103)
Diff. in age	-0.0008* (0.0003)	-0.0009** (0.0003)	-0.0097*** (0.0028)	-0.0117*** (0.0025)	-0.0023* (0.0009)	-0.0021** (0.0008)	-0.0270* (0.0105)	-0.0245** (0.0085)
Squared diff. in age	0.9198* (0.4189)	0.7934* (0.3334)	9.2645* (4.1113)	6.8037* (3.2594)	0.7503 (0.4284)	0.9038* (0.3641)	6.2082 (4.3149)	7.4802* (3.5929)
Diff. in height	-3.2350 (1.7081)	-2.0427 (1.2791)	-25.9230 (16.7790)	-13.3929 (12.7629)	-6.1195*** (1.4949)	-6.0644*** (1.3248)	-66.2058*** (15.1818)	-65.7108*** (13.3146)
Squared diff. in height	-0.0930 (0.2237)	-0.0507 (0.1441)	-0.0679 (2.0167)	0.3281 (1.2549)	0.1697 (0.1245)	0.1437 (0.0766)	2.9543* (1.2073)	2.0051** (0.7601)
High school	0.0173 (0.2323)	0.0473 (0.1522)	1.0474 (2.1097)	1.2573 (1.3380)	0.3295 (0.2200)	0.2195 (0.1573)	4.5315* (2.2618)	2.4932 (1.6627)
Post-secondary	-0.0341 (0.2323)	0.0017 (0.1523)	1.3182 (2.1078)	1.2914 (1.3368)	0.1965 (0.1488)	0.1959 (0.1041)	4.4956** (1.4671)	2.9271** (1.0621)
Bachelor’s	0.0745 (0.2374)	0.1415 (0.1559)	2.1164 (2.1598)	2.3877 (1.3715)	0.3004* (0.1530)	0.2742* (0.1080)	5.8510*** (1.5109)	4.1727*** (1.1016)
Master’s	0.1705 (0.2413)	0.1858 (0.1597)	3.2869 (2.1997)	2.9018* (1.4062)	0.3640 (0.1920)	0.3425** (0.1321)	6.2600** (1.9928)	5.9120*** (1.4177)
PhD	0.0579 (0.0342)	0.0432 (0.0273)	0.3489 (0.3252)	0.5761* (0.2501)	-0.0065 (0.0496)	0.0194 (0.0373)	0.1562 (0.5013)	0.3351 (0.3735)
Same education	0.0488 (0.0564)	0.0224 (0.0448)	0.2172 (0.5369)	0.5776 (0.4083)	0.0116 (0.0611)	0.0001 (0.0491)	0.4938 (0.6235)	0.5975 (0.5000)
Male more educated	0.0831 (0.2284)	0.0986 (0.1482)	1.3728 (2.0635)	1.6644 (1.2959)	0.2916* (0.1482)	0.2564* (0.0999)	3.5910* (1.4593)	2.9083** (0.9985)
Non-rankable degree	0.0574* (0.0281)	0.0727** (0.0234)	0.9701*** (0.2711)	0.9189*** (0.2158)	0.0444 (0.0236)	0.0406 (0.0209)	0.5336* (0.2476)	0.7062** (0.2152)
Science	0.0558* (0.0279)	0.0535* (0.0238)	0.4692 (0.2654)	0.3747 (0.2190)	0.0074 (0.0466)	0.0618 (0.0356)	0.5900 (0.5229)	1.2313** (0.3771)
Commerce	0.0839 (0.0881)	0.0639 (0.0684)	0.1661 (0.8389)	0.4733 (0.6334)	-0.2849 (0.2053)	-0.0266 (0.1164)	0.6582 (2.3068)	1.8935 (1.2467)
Other field	0.0441* (0.0205)	0.0601*** (0.0160)	0.5010* (0.1957)	0.5145*** (0.1468)	0.0626* (0.0287)	0.0605** (0.0232)	0.9589** (0.3092)	0.6954** (0.2414)
Calcutta	0.0715 (0.0468)	0.0400 (0.0387)	0.2603 (0.4501)	0.3765 (0.3577)	-0.0179 (0.0389)	-0.0207 (0.0331)	-0.0462 (0.4131)	-0.1084 (0.3410)
Same location	0.0336 (0.0265)	0.0349 (0.0218)	0.4720 (0.2558)	0.1820 (0.2019)	0.0913** (0.0309)	0.0691** (0.0249)	0.5997 (0.3307)	0.6442* (0.2602)
Same family origin	0.1641*** (0.0281)	0.1494*** (0.0222)	1.3992*** (0.2655)	1.2974*** (0.2022)				
Log income	0.0951*** (0.0212)	0.0860*** (0.0168)	0.8867*** (0.2037)	0.8047*** (0.1536)				
Log wage								

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	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Considered		Rank		Considered		Rank	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Skin tone					-0.0529***	-0.0421***	-0.4603**	-0.5388***
					(0.0143)	(0.0118)	(0.1494)	(0.1209)
Beautiful					0.0151	0.0170	0.4348	0.1823
					(0.0262)	(0.0219)	(0.2757)	(0.2241)
Very beautiful					0.0915	0.0855*	0.4869	0.6153
					(0.0505)	(0.0419)	(0.5124)	(0.4259)
Diff. in quality less than ptile	50th	75th	50th	75th	50th	75th	50th	75th
N	2767	4141	2488	3753	2048	2909	1762	2553

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Standard errors in parentheses. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females): the first four columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last four to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table C.6: Responses for letters, top four castes only

	Ads placed by females			Ads placed by males		
	Considered- OLS	Considered- Logit	Rank	Considered- OLS	Considered- Logit	Rank
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Same caste	0.1636*** (0.0408)	0.8372*** (0.2017)	1.6650*** (0.3041)	0.1047* (0.0503)	0.6521** (0.2180)	0.9490* (0.4200)
Diff. in caste	-0.0203 (0.0157)	-0.0389 (0.0862)	-0.2100 (0.1274)	0.0307 (0.0204)	0.1188 (0.0989)	0.6039** (0.1996)
Same caste*only within	0.2760 (0.2504)		4.0097* (1.6520)	0.2206 (0.1946)		2.5592 (1.5047)
Diff. in caste*only within	0.1630 (0.0907)		1.5846** (0.6090)	0.0173 (0.0827)		-0.2654 (0.6165)
Same caste*no bar	-0.1214 (0.0774)		-1.4500** (0.4943)	-0.0283 (0.0868)		-0.4768 (0.7489)
Diff. in caste*no bar	-0.0013 (0.0301)		-0.0133 (0.1612)	-0.0526 (0.0347)		-0.2027 (0.2678)
Diff. in age	0.0086 (0.0115)	0.1785* (0.0824)	0.0384 (0.0551)	0.0424** (0.0138)	0.2239** (0.0783)	0.5249*** (0.0941)
Squared diff. in age	-0.0021** (0.0008)	-0.0237*** (0.0061)	-0.0124*** (0.0034)	-0.0016 (0.0010)	-0.0075 (0.0054)	-0.0296*** (0.0064)
Diff. in height	1.7176*** (0.4304)	11.5875*** (2.7654)	12.8167*** (2.9819)	0.4528 (0.5064)	9.9158* (4.2931)	6.4163 (3.8687)
Squared diff. in height	-4.7533** (1.5071)	-32.3551*** (9.5394)	-36.7084*** (10.5597)	-5.5546** (1.8509)	-57.2542*** (16.0106)	-69.2712*** (14.5440)
High school	0.0893 (0.2058)	-0.3359 (1.0614)	0.3344 (1.0421)	0.1458 (0.1319)	0.6317 (0.8511)	2.3437** (0.7957)
Post-secondary	0.1455 (0.2204)	-0.0292 (1.1724)	0.9657 (1.1656)	1.0020 (0.7954)		2.8634 (1.7153)
Bachelor's	0.0994 (0.2228)	-0.1983 (1.1747)	0.9457 (1.1653)	0.1373 (0.1754)	0.3398 (1.0892)	2.8282* (1.1618)
Master's	0.2457 (0.2286)	0.6397 (1.2091)	1.7441 (1.2018)	0.2074 (0.1799)	0.7712 (1.1094)	3.9660*** (1.1982)
PhD	0.3103 (0.2335)	0.9926 (1.2364)	1.9778 (1.2347)	0.3754* (0.1875)	2.0243 (1.1387)	5.6290*** (1.3764)
Same education	0.0698 (0.0400)	0.3108 (0.2295)	0.5517* (0.2502)	0.0544 (0.0516)	0.2778 (0.2602)	0.1380 (0.3726)
Male more educated	0.0683 (0.0642)	0.3453 (0.3564)	1.1132** (0.3964)	-0.0048 (0.0727)	-0.1850 (0.3859)	0.2927 (0.5242)
Non-rankable degree	0.2176 (0.2114)	0.5038 (1.0908)	1.6034 (1.0982)	0.3889* (0.1595)	1.8667 (0.9668)	3.6022*** (1.0440)
Science	0.1027** (0.0339)	0.6910*** (0.1962)	1.1189*** (0.2215)	0.0266 (0.0320)	0.2026 (0.1624)	0.4503 (0.2406)
Commerce	0.0690 (0.0356)	0.4884* (0.2064)	0.2930 (0.2310)	0.0442 (0.0411)	0.2986 (0.2131)	0.8302* (0.3260)
Other field	-0.0211 (0.0953)	0.2345 (0.5211)	0.1823 (0.5432)	0.0806 (0.1210)	-0.0493 (0.7079)	0.4942 (1.0121)
Calcutta	0.0363 (0.0224)	0.2345 (0.1239)	0.4769*** (0.1432)	0.0472 (0.0318)	0.2776 (0.1689)	0.6114** (0.2353)
Same location	0.1162* (0.0576)	0.7043* (0.3370)	0.9203* (0.3757)	-0.0082 (0.0489)	-0.0137 (0.2607)	-0.1505 (0.3615)

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	Ads placed by females			Ads placed by males		
	Considered- OLS (1)	Considered- Logit (2)	Rank (3)	Considered- OLS (4)	Considered- Logit (5)	Rank (6)
Same family origin	0.0121 (0.0311)	0.1294 (0.1733)	0.1625 (0.2085)	0.0969** (0.0344)	0.6508*** (0.1945)	0.9472*** (0.2728)
Log income	0.1254*** (0.0222)	0.2514* (0.1185)	1.0116*** (0.1564)			
Log wage	0.1176*** (0.0235)	0.4247** (0.1306)	0.9331*** (0.1528)			
Skin tone				-0.0343* (0.0171)	-0.2055* (0.0927)	-0.5198*** (0.1261)
Beautiful				0.0214 (0.0313)	0.1621 (0.1644)	0.0731 (0.2377)
Very beautiful				0.0472 (0.0527)	0.4497 (0.2594)	0.5465 (0.3878)
N	2295	2045	2191	3944	1474	3570

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the letter writer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the letter and a dummy for both the letter writer and the ad placer not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. All regressions are weighted to reflect the relative proportions of considered and unconsidered letters received by an ad placer. Standard errors in parentheses. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females): the first three columns refer to decisions made by females regarding prospective grooms, the last three to decisions made by males regarding prospective brides.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table C.7: Probability of writing to a particular ad

	Ads placed by females				Ads placed by males			
	Ad placer selection		Respondent selection		Ad placer selection		Respondent selection	
	LP (1)	Logit (2)	LP (3)	Logit (4)	LP (5)	Logit (6)	LP (7)	Logit (8)
Same caste	0.0206*** (0.0013)	3.4296*** (0.3504)	0.1080*** (0.0022)	2.1627*** (0.0672)	0.0319*** (0.0014)	2.3853*** (0.2043)	0.1956*** (0.0049)	2.2002*** (0.0895)
Diff. in caste*Higher caste male	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-1.7058 (1.1849)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0609* (0.0308)	-0.0004 (0.0013)	0.2302 (0.3532)	0.0236*** (0.0016)	0.5106*** (0.0353)
Diff. in caste*Lower caste male	-0.0011 (0.0014)	-2.0820 (1.1721)	-0.0092*** (0.0007)	-0.3236*** (0.0254)	-0.0020 (0.0012)	-0.7402* (0.3519)	0.0014 (0.0018)	-0.0809* (0.0380)
Same caste*only within	0.0029 (0.0038)	13.0267 (770.0985)			-0.0059 (0.0033)	14.5443 (984.4139)		
Diff. in caste*only within	0.0004 (0.0008)	-0.0170 (368.9421)			0.0011 (0.0007)	0.2650 (324.9982)		
Same caste*no bar	-0.0046** (0.0015)	-1.4258*** (0.3972)			-0.0010 (0.0016)	-0.4298 (0.2442)		
Diff. in caste*no bar	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.1701 (0.1420)			0.0007 (0.0004)	0.3169** (0.1003)		
Diff. in age	0.0003*** (0.0001)	0.2974*** (0.0562)	0.0042*** (0.0002)	0.4822*** (0.0158)	0.0005*** (0.0002)	0.4746*** (0.0546)	0.0085*** (0.0005)	0.6196*** (0.0228)
Squared diff. in age	-0.0000*** (0.0000)	-0.0234*** (0.0043)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0395*** (0.0011)	-0.0000*** (0.0000)	-0.0398*** (0.0044)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0484*** (0.0017)
Diff. in height	0.0435** (0.0167)	17.6596** (5.9477)	0.3241*** (0.0256)	13.3879*** (1.0314)	0.0452*** (0.0099)	9.7321*** (2.0036)	0.3539*** (0.0413)	6.0564*** (0.8609)
Squared diff. in height	-0.1922*** (0.0528)	-75.6526*** (20.1851)	-1.2001*** (0.0747)	-50.3339*** (3.3084)	-0.2013*** (0.0414)	-43.4930*** (8.3431)	-1.9223*** (0.1723)	-32.4783*** (3.8381)
High school	0.0013 (0.0022)	0.7340 (0.8006)	0.0176*** (0.0040)	0.4294*** (0.1206)	-0.0001 (0.0029)	13.1424 (702.6814)	-0.0135 (0.0098)	-0.1717 (0.2239)
Post-secondary	-0.0010 (0.0035)	0.2473 (1.0634)	-0.0159* (0.0065)	-0.7547** (0.2810)	0.0020 (0.0033)	14.0290 (702.6813)	0.0117 (0.0118)	-0.1526 (0.2490)
Bachelor's	-0.0006 (0.0021)	0.1855 (0.7795)	-0.0115*** (0.0035)	-0.2506* (0.1125)	-0.0017 (0.0029)	13.2529 (702.6813)	-0.0360*** (0.0095)	-0.6465** (0.2180)
Master's	0.0024 (0.0023)	0.8934 (0.8084)	-0.0101* (0.0039)	-0.1507 (0.1256)	0.0034 (0.0033)	13.9488 (702.6813)	-0.0378*** (0.0109)	-0.7335** (0.2379)
PhD	-0.0005 (0.0027)	0.3537 (0.8864)	-0.0151*** (0.0045)	-0.1832 (0.1425)	0.0048 (0.0035)	14.0380 (702.6813)	-0.0229* (0.0111)	-0.5667* (0.2423)
Same education	0.0022 (0.0012)	0.5264 (0.2759)	0.0191*** (0.0019)	0.5524*** (0.0575)	0.0032* (0.0013)	0.7805** (0.2434)	0.0448*** (0.0047)	0.8407*** (0.0864)
Male more educated	0.0016 (0.0016)	0.4578 (0.4240)	0.0014 (0.0030)	0.0406 (0.0915)	0.0021 (0.0020)	0.5918 (0.3213)	0.0324*** (0.0062)	0.7051*** (0.1133)
Non-rankable degree	-0.0031 (0.0131)	-13.2632 (4420.5696)	-0.0242* (0.0098)	-0.5629 (0.4140)	-0.0018 (0.0049)	13.2663 (702.6816)	-0.0534 (0.0281)	-0.5984 (0.4275)
Science	0.0004 (0.0008)	0.0622 (0.1794)	-0.0013 (0.0013)	0.0553 (0.0395)	0.0022 (0.0012)	0.2396 (0.1661)	-0.0084 (0.0055)	-0.0976 (0.0939)
Commerce	0.0009 (0.0012)	0.2188 (0.2561)	0.0013 (0.0018)	0.0450 (0.0539)	-0.0015 (0.0013)	-0.3376 (0.1743)	-0.0186*** (0.0055)	-0.2452** (0.0945)
Other field	0.0013 (0.0035)	0.0839 (0.7779)	-0.0053 (0.0066)	-0.0701 (0.1701)	0.0085** (0.0032)	1.0443** (0.3378)	-0.0602*** (0.0178)	-0.5009 (0.2599)
Calcutta	0.0097*** (0.0017)	1.7482*** (0.4223)	-0.0043 (0.0038)	-0.1346 (0.1150)	0.0097*** (0.0012)	1.1826*** (0.1721)	0.0062 (0.0049)	0.0029 (0.0871)
Same location	-0.0007 (0.0026)	0.0442 (0.5239)	0.0051 (0.0029)	0.2150* (0.0889)	-0.0051 (0.0032)	-0.4259 (0.4468)	0.0088 (0.0046)	0.1428 (0.0822)
Same family origin	0.0053*** (0.0008)	1.3955*** (0.2287)	0.0194*** (0.0012)	0.4990*** (0.0364)	0.0058*** (0.0009)	0.8628*** (0.1545)	0.0259*** (0.0027)	0.3742*** (0.0463)
Log income					0.0024** (0.0009)	0.2556* (0.1187)	0.0044 (0.0037)	-0.0708 (0.0683)
Log wage					0.0041*** (0.0005)	0.8576*** (0.1070)	0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0260 (0.0352)
Skin tone	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.3719** (0.1179)	-0.0033*** (0.0007)	-0.0927*** (0.0219)				
Beautiful	-0.0011 (0.0007)	-0.2338 (0.1671)	0.0016 (0.0012)	0.0264 (0.0369)				
Very beautiful	0.0008 (0.0015)	0.0304 (0.3025)	0.0047 (0.0024)	0.0523 (0.0683)				
N	49025	49025	147546	144543	70337	69617	53043	52407

All regressions include dummies for caste, for being from West Bengal, dummies indicating non-response for each characteristics, age/height of the respondent/ad placer if no age/height was provided by the ad, age/height of the ad placer if no age/height was provided by the respondent/ad placer and a dummy for both individuals not providing caste, age, height, education, location and family origin. Ads placed by females (males) received letters by males (females): the first four columns refer to decisions made by males regarding which ad placed by females they should write to, the last four to decisions made by females regarding which ads placed by males they should contact. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table C.8: Number of responses received to an ad

	Ads placed by females		Ads placed by males	
	OLS (1)	Poisson (2)	OLS (3)	Poisson (4)
Baidya	0.0199 (0.0554)	1.4363 (4.5688)	-0.4018*** (0.0387)	-32.5365 (22.6938)
Kshatriya	-0.3880*** (0.1017)	-6.4094 (7.0018)	-0.4774*** (0.0746)	-32.4609 (38.5897)
Kayastha	0.1941*** (0.0242)	4.8539* (2.2215)	0.1565*** (0.0176)	14.8425 (12.0916)
Baisya	-0.2298*** (0.0313)	-4.2818 (2.5611)	-0.0679** (0.0214)	-6.3319 (13.7648)
Sagdope	-0.0900* (0.0360)	-2.0499 (3.2275)	-0.0344 (0.0253)	-3.5924 (15.8213)
Other non-scheduled castes	-0.5491*** (0.1107)	-8.1897 (7.2236)	-0.6427*** (0.0673)	-28.3260 (30.0856)
Scheduled castes	-0.0659 (0.0670)	-1.2732 (5.5995)	-0.5098*** (0.0421)	-39.0446 (23.3959)
Age	-0.0401*** (0.0031)	-0.8096** (0.2490)	0.0119*** (0.0016)	0.8895 (1.0717)
Height	1.5551*** (0.2196)	35.4319 (19.5507)	-0.4142*** (0.1239)	-17.6774 (79.5235)
High school	-0.1107 (0.0761)	-1.8582 (6.5589)	0.8501*** (0.1762)	19.0770 (55.5553)
Post-secondary	-0.4580 (0.2403)	-10.6578 (20.2488)	1.6886*** (0.1781)	82.9122 (61.3144)
Bachelor's	-0.0769 (0.0774)	-1.2923 (6.7409)	1.5513*** (0.1756)	67.2765 (56.9136)
Master's	-0.1423 (0.0808)	-2.8572 (7.0390)	1.8182*** (0.1768)	89.1902 (58.7970)
PhD/Professional degrees	-0.2741** (0.0926)	-5.4127 (7.8143)	1.7035*** (0.1767)	77.3746 (58.3160)
Non-rankable degree	-1.0200*** (0.1777)	-14.9420 (10.7632)	1.2666*** (0.1896)	40.0588 (69.6573)
Science	0.0463 (0.0253)	1.2457 (2.2666)	0.2546*** (0.0421)	22.4205 (26.3598)
Commerce	-0.0520 (0.0346)	-1.1006 (3.0170)	-0.0265 (0.0433)	-1.1862 (26.8366)
Other field	-0.6742* (0.2846)	-5.9297 (14.3313)		
Calcutta	0.4087*** (0.0684)	8.6102 (5.3780)	0.1608*** (0.0164)	20.7122 (13.4021)
From West Bengal	0.1941*** (0.0228)	4.6963* (2.0787)	0.4275*** (0.0271)	29.7894 (15.4041)
Log income			-0.2129*** (0.0180)	-16.0723 (11.4682)
Log wage			0.0190 (0.0200)	3.6086 (13.2790)
Skin tone	-0.2570*** (0.0166)	-5.1665*** (1.2562)		
Very beautiful	0.2804*** (0.0369)	9.0867* (3.8408)		
Beautiful	0.0147 (0.0243)	0.3033 (2.1623)		
N	5788	5788	4075	4075

Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include dummies indicating non-response for each characteristic. *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%

Table C.9: Couples' characteristics, variances of the algorithm

	Women propose		Balanced sex ratio	
	2.5 ptile (1)	97.5 ptile (2)	2.5 ptile (3)	97.5 ptile (4)
Age difference	5.4765	6.4272	4.5947	5.3435
Age correlations	0.8079	0.9376	0.7370	0.8997
Height difference	0.1049	0.1222	0.1128	0.1297
Height correlations	0.7752	0.8955	0.7536	0.8742
Same caste	0.8439	0.9556	0.8598	0.9631
Caste difference	<i>0.1111</i>	<i>0.6316</i>	-0.0743	0.1620
Caste correlation	0.5680	0.9296	0.5714	0.9756
Same education level	0.2090	0.8019	0.3248	0.7812
Education difference	-0.5250	-0.0098	-0.0656	0.4133
Education correlations	0.2591	0.6586	0.3659	0.7289
Same family origin	0.9893	1.0000	0.9579	1.0000
Family origin difference	-0.0067	0.0064	-0.0064	0.0347
Family origin correlations	0.9766	1.0000	0.9079	1.0000
Same residence	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	1.0000
Location correlations	-0.7986	1.0000	-0.8419	1.0000
Log wage difference	<i>-0.3380</i>	<i>0.0815</i>	-0.4980	-0.0539
Log wage correlations	-0.2233	0.3461	-0.1700	0.3497
Income difference	-491999.30	40416.89	-0.02	14500.29
Income correlations	-1.0000	1.0000	-1.0000	1.0000
Quality difference	0.1566	0.1758	0.1662	0.1887
Quality correlation	0.0785	0.4057	<i>0.2705</i>	<i>0.5355</i>

Entries in bold correspond to characteristics where the observed characteristics fall within the estimated confidence interval. Entries in italic have overlapping confidence intervals with the observed distribution.

Figure C.1: Correlations between coefficients of the considered and rank regressions, ads placed by females




Figure C.2: Correlations between coefficients of the considered and rank regressions, ads placed by males

