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ANNA SANKTJOHANSER

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EMPLOYMENT

Postdoctoral Fellow 2018 – *present*
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Postdoctoral Fellow 2017 – 2018
Toulouse School of Economics

Visiting Postdoctoral Researcher 09/2017 – 11/2017
Columbia University, Department of Economics

OTHER AFFILIATIONS

Associate Researcher 2018 – *present*
Toulouse School of Economics

CESifo Affiliate 2018 – *present*

EDUCATION

University of Oxford, Department of Economics 2013 – 2017
D.Phil. (Ph.D.) in Economics Oxford, United Kingdom

Toulouse School of Economics 09/2016 – 06/2017
Visiting Ph.D. student Toulouse, France

Yale University, Department of Economics 01/2016 – 04/2016
Visiting Assistant in Research New Haven, United States

University of Oxford, Department of Economics 2011 – 2013
M.Phil. in Economics Oxford, United Kingdom

University of Oxford 2007 – 2010
B.A. in Politics, Philosophy and Economics Oxford, United Kingdom

WORKING PAPERS

Optimally Stubborn (2017). I consider a bargaining game with two types of players - rational and stubborn. Rational players choose demands at each point in time. Stubborn players are restricted to choose from the set of "insistent" strategies that always make the same demand and never accept anything less. However, their initial choice of demand is unrestricted. I characterize the equilibria in this game, showing how the flexibility of the stubborn type changes equilibrium predictions. Relative to the case with exogenous behavioral types, strong behavioral predictions emerge: in the limit, players randomize over at most two demands. However, unlike with exogenous types, there is Folk theorem like payoff multiplicity.

Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game (2016). *R&R, American Economic Review.* I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to monitoring firms' actions and sends a public message to firms. The monitor makes a TIOI offer to firms specifying the monitoring intensity and the per-period fee to be paid. I show that provided the cost of monitoring is sufficiently low, fully collusive equilibria exist. In the set of fully collusive equilibria that maximize the monitor's payoff, firms' payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor.

The Incentive Effect of Prison on Criminal Asset Recovery (2016). Using administrative, cross-sectional data on confiscation orders in the United Kingdom, I estimate the effect of longer prison sentences on criminal asset recovery. Confiscation orders request convicted offenders to pay the value of their criminal assets, and specify a prison sentence to be served in the case of non-payment. Using a fuzzy RDD, I exploit discontinuous changes in the legal maximum of this prison sentence which depend on the value of the confiscation order. I find that there is evidence that longer prison sentences incentivize offenders to satisfy their order.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Repeated Partnership Game (2016). I consider a repeated partnership game with imperfect public monitoring, in which the standard sufficient conditions for the Folk Theorem fail. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the only equilibrium in public strategies is perpetual defection, independent of the discount factor.

SCHOLARSHIPS AND PRIZES

CESifo Young Affiliate Award in Applied Microeconomics	2018
Edgeworth Prize for Outstanding Thesis University of Oxford, Department of Economics	2018
Economic and Social Research Council Studentship Government-funded scholarship for M.Phil. and D.Phil. at the University of Oxford	2012 – 2016
Light Senior Scholarship Scholarship awarded by St Catherine's College, University of Oxford	2012 – 2013
Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Foundation of German Business) Government-funded scholarship	2009 – 2013

TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2018: Birkbeck; Paris School of Economics: TOM Seminar; CESifo Conference on Applied Microeconomics; University of Bergen; NHH Bergen; Bilkent University; Game Theory Seminar IHP Paris; Cerge-ei Prague; SAET Conference in Taipei; Kyoto; PSU; Urbana-Champaign; University of Edinburgh.

2017: University of Oxford, Toulouse School of Economics, Columbia University, Yale University, Princeton University, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in St Louis, SAET Conference in Faro, Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, NSF/NBER/CEME Mathematical Economics Conference UT Austin, Bonn Junior Day, Oslo University.

2016: Yale University, York Game Theory Symposium, SAET Conference in Rio de Janeiro, University of Oxford.

2015: University of Oxford.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government Seminar Leader for the Master of Public Policy	10/2016 – 01/2017 Oxford, United Kingdom
University of Oxford, Jesus College College Lecturer in Economics for Undergraduates	10/2013 – 06/2016 Oxford, United Kingdom
Home Office, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Research Team Research Officer	03/2014 – 09/2016 London, United Kingdom

REFERENCES

Dr. Péter Esö
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