

Martin Mattsson

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Citizenship: Sweden; F-1 visa

Fields of Concentration:

Development Economics
Political Economy
Public Economics

Desired Teaching:

Development Economics, Political Economy, Public Economics, Microeconomics

Comprehensive Examinations Completed:

2016 (Orals): Development Economics
Political Economy and Public Economics
2015 (Written): Microeconomics, Macroeconomics

Dissertation Title: *Essays on the Effects of Institutional Change*

Committee:

Professor Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (Chair)
Professor Rohini Pande
Professor Mark Rosenzweig

Expected Completion Date: May 2021

Degrees:

Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2021 (expected)
Master of Public Administration / International Development, Harvard Kennedy School, 2014
B.A. (Hons) Economics and Management (1st Class), University of Oxford, 2011

Fellowships, Honors, and Awards:

The Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship, 2016
Fulbright Scholarship for studies at Harvard University, 2012
Fitzgerald Prize for outstanding performance in final examinations, 2011 (Exeter College, Oxford)
Waugh Scholarship for academic excellence, 2010 (Exeter College, Oxford)

Research Grants:

Economic Growth Center (Yale) Grant, 2018. Project: "Corruption, Delays, and Monitoring of Bureaucrats". Amount: \$20,780

J-PAL Governance Initiative Grant, 2018. Project: "Performance Scorecards and Government Service Delivery". Amount: \$48,190

International Growth Centre Grant, 2018. Project: "Performance Scorecards and Government Service Delivery". Amount: ~\$25,000 (£19,898)

MacMillan International Dissertation Research Fellowships (Yale University), 2018, Amount: \$17,000

Weiss Family Fund, 2017, Amount: \$3,915

3ie Development Priorities Window, 2016. Project: "Rural Institutional Innovation: Can Village Courts in Bangladesh Accelerate Access to Justice and Improve Socio-Economic Outcomes?" (with Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak), Amount: \$430,000

Teaching Experience:**Teaching Fellow at Yale University:**

Advanced Development Economics, Spring 2019, with Prof. Michael Boozer

Advanced Development Economics, Spring 2018, with Prof. Dan Keniston

Macroeconomics and Growth, Fall 2017, with Prof. Fabrizio Zilibotti

Advanced Development Economics, Spring 2017, with Prof. Michael Boozer

Microeconomics, Fall 2016, with Prof. Michael Boozer

Economics of Poverty Alleviation, Fall 2015, with Prof. Dean Karlan

Other:

J-PAL Executive Education, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2017

Research and Work Experience:

Visiting Scholar, Populations Studies and Training Center, Brown University, 2019-2020

Research Assistant to Profs. Raj Chetty, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak and Monica Singhal, Harvard University and Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2013

Research Assistant to Prof. Dina Pomeranz, Harvard Business School, 2012-2014

Analyst, Investment Banking Division, Nomura Securities, New York, 2011-2012

Research Assistant for Prof. Robert W. Hahn, Smith School, University of Oxford, 2010-2011

Working Papers:

"Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service", *Job market paper*

"The Effects of Social Movements: Evidence from #MeToo", with Ro'ee Levy

Work in Progress:

"Can New Judicial Institutions Spur Development? Experimental Evidence from Village Courts in Bangladesh", with Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak

Seminar and Conference Presentations:

ASSA Annual Meeting (Development Issues on Bangladesh), 2021

ASSA Annual Meeting (New Media and Political Behavior), 2021

NEUDC, Dartmouth College, 2020
NBER Summer Institute (Gender in the Economy), 2020
Young Economists Symposium, University of Pennsylvania, 2020
Young Economists Symposium, Columbia University, 2019
Bangladesh Development Initiative Conference, 2019
IGC-BIGD Bangladesh Development Economics Conference, 2018

Languages:

Swedish (native), English (fluent), Bengali (intermediate), Spanish (intermediate)

References

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Dissertation Abstract

Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service [Job Market Paper]

Delays in paperwork processing can reduce citizens' ability to engage in economic activities, which may exacerbate economic inefficiencies. A classic example is insecure property rights for the poor created by delays in the processing of land titles. Can an information system – which provides information about bureaucrats' performance in terms of delays to the bureaucrats and their superiors – reduce delays? A common reason for corruption is that citizens pay bribes for faster service delivery. This raises a second question: can improved processing times reduce bribe payments?

To answer these questions, I conduct a large-scale field experiment across 311 land offices in Bangladesh. Using data from an e-governance system for processing land record changes, I generate monthly office-level scorecards that provide information on how well the office adheres to an official time limit of 45 working days for processing these applications. Working with the

Government, I send these scorecards both to the bureaucrats responsible for application processing in the 155 offices selected for treatment and to their supervisors.

The scorecards increased the share of applications processed within the time limit by 6 percentage points or 11%, relative to control offices. The treatment effect persists throughout the 16 months of the experiment and is driven by offices with a performance below the median at baseline.

I survey applicants 6 to 12 months after the treatment was rolled out. Using two different survey questions about bribe payments, I show that the scorecards did not decrease the average amount of bribes paid. Instead, the scorecards *increased* reported bribes in the subset of offices performing above the median at baseline.

Finally, I show that these findings can be explained by a model of bureaucrats who care both about bribes *and* their reputations. Both delays and bribe-taking worsen reputation. The scorecards increase the visibility of delays. Reputation concerns cause treated officials in low performing offices to exert more effort and reduce delays. The predicted effects on bribes for them is ambiguous. In contrast, treated officials in high performing offices respond to the reputation gains from greater visibility of their good performance by increasing bribe-taking. For them, the effect on delays is ambiguous – increased visibility increases incentives to avoid delays (substitution effect), but increased reputation has made the marginal importance of reputation smaller (income effect).

This paper shows that leveraging e-governance systems to create better information flows within bureaucracies can improve bureaucratic performance, even when there are no explicit incentives tied to that performance. However, differences in bureaucrat performance can cause heterogeneous effects of increased information. In particular, if better performing bureaucrats can leverage the new information to extract private rents, then citizens may see limited benefits.

The Effects of Social Movements: Evidence from #MeToo, joint with Ro'ee Levy

Social movements are associated with large societal changes, but evidence on their causal effects is limited. We study the effect of the MeToo movement on a high-stakes decision—reporting a sexual crime to the police. We construct a new dataset of sexual and non-sexual crimes reported in 30 OECD countries, covering 88% of the OECD population. We analyze the effect of the MeToo movement by employing a triple-difference strategy over time, between countries that had strong and weak MeToo movements, and between crime types. The movements increased reporting of sexual crimes by 10% during the first six months. The effect is persistent and lasts at least 15 months. Because we find a strong effect on reporting before any major changes to laws or policy took place, we attribute the effect to a change in social norms or information. Using more detailed US data, we show that the movement also increased arrests for sexual crimes in the long run. In contrast to a common criticism of the movement, we do not find evidence for large differences in the effect across racial and socioeconomic groups. Our results suggest that social movements can rapidly change high-stakes personal decisions.