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Fields of Concentration:

Primary Field: Industrial Organization

Secondary Field: Economics of Education, Labor Economics, Applied Market Design

Desired Teaching:

Industrial Organization

Econometrics

Microeconomics

Comprehensive Examinations Completed:

2017 (Oral): Industrial Organization (*with distinction*), Labor Economics

2016 (Written): Microeconomics, Macroeconomics

Dissertation Title: *Essays in Industrial Organization and Economics of Education*

Committee:

Professor Steven Berry (Co-Chair)

Professor Philip A. Haile (Co-Chair)

Professor Yusuke Narita

Expected Completion Date: May 2021

Degrees:

Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2021 (expected)

M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2018

M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2017

B.A., Economics, *Summa Cum Laude*, Seoul National University, 2013

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

University Dissertation Fellowship, Yale University, 2019–2020

Charles V. Hickox Fellowship, 2016-2019

Cowles Foundation and Economic Growth Center Fellowship, 2015-2019
Yale University Fellowship, 2015-2021
Doctoral Study Abroad Scholarship, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies, 2015-2020
Invited Participant, 5th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meetings on Economic Sciences, 2014
National Research Fellowship for Humanities and Social Sciences, Korea Student Aid Foundation, 2014
Brain Korea 21 Research Assistant Scholarship, National Research Foundation of Korea, 2014
Social Sciences Korea Research Assistant Scholarship, National Research Foundation of Korea, 2013-2014
Superior Academic Performance Scholarship, Seoul National University, 2012
First Place, Albert A. Bennett Calculus Prize Exam, University of Texas at Austin, 2010
Superior Academic Performance Scholarship (partial coverage), Seoul National University, 2010, 2007

Teaching Experience:

Teaching assistant for undergraduate classes at Yale University
Spring 2019, Econometrics and Data Analysis II, Prof. Yusuke Narita
Fall 2018, Economic Models of New Technology, Prof. Evangelia Chalioti
Fall 2017, Intermediate Microeconomics, Prof. Larry Samuelson

Teaching assistant for undergraduate classes at Seoul National University
Spring 2015, Dynamic Macroeconomics, Prof. Se-Jik Kim

Research and Work Experience:

Research Assistant to Prof. Yusuke Narita, Yale University, 2019-2020
Research Assistant to Prof. Ilse Lindenlaub, Yale University, 2018
Research Assistant to Prof. Se-Jik Kim, Seoul National University, 2013-2014
Military service for Republic of Korea, 2007-2009

Working Papers:

“Distributional Impacts of Centralized School Choice”, (November 2020), *Job Market Paper*

Work In Progress:

“Labor Market Power and Wage Inequality”, with Hyunmin Park
“Choosing the Better Fit? School Choice and Performance Gains” (research proposal under review by the data provider)

Pre-doctoral Publication:

“Parental Wealth, Children’s Ability and Entering Prestigious Colleges” with Se-Jik Kim and Keunkwan Ryu, *Korean Economic Journal* 54.2 (2015): 356-383 (in Korean)

Languages:

English (fluent), Korean (native), Spanish (intermediate - DELE B2)

References:

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Dissertation Abstract

Distributional Impacts of Centralized School Choice [Job Market Paper]

Centralized school choice procedures are gaining wider adoption, based in part on theoretical results promising desirable properties such as matching stability and strategy-proofness. However, these theoretical results are limited in two dimensions. First, they do not directly address distributional outcomes, such as racial integration and equity, that parents and policymakers are often interested in. Second, although they have been argued to indirectly assist in achieving distributional goals, they rely on idealized assumptions regarding the matching mechanism and the sophistication of applicants.

Using administrative data from New York City's centralized high school choice program, I empirically assess school assignment outcomes in terms of integration and equity across different demographic groups. I further analyze the influence of each of the following factors: residential location, student preferences, schools' admission policies, and optimization frictions.

I develop and estimate a model of students' application behavior that allows applicants to consider only a limited set of school options and to have incorrect beliefs about admission chances. To disentangle each factor's contribution, I use the estimated model to simulate the distributional outcomes under counterfactual scenarios where each factor's influence is shut off one by one.

Rich information in students' rank-ordered lists of schools, coupled with certain restrictions, allows me to identify the model. For instance, while a lack of consideration may affect which schools are listed, it cannot affect how the listed schools are ranked. Furthermore, while strategic behavior to shift admission chances may affect the rankings, it cannot affect which schools are listed unless the list length constraint binds. Identification is also aided by an assumption that certain observables, such as the page on which a school is listed in the school directory, can affect the consideration set but not preferences. I formalize these intuitive ideas with sufficient conditions for nonparametric identification.

Results show that, while school choice slightly integrates race and improves welfare across all races, these gains and the stability of the school assignments are compromised by deviations from fully informed behavior. Schools' admission priorities and screening policies contribute to racial segregation and primarily benefit Asian and White students.

Labor Market Power and Wage Inequality, with Hyunmin Park

Using matched employer-employee data from Germany, we quantify market power exerted by employers in the labor market and its contribution to wage inequality. We model job choices using a static nested logit model, where wages may be correlated with unobservable preference shifters that may differ across skill groups. We estimate establishment-level labor supply elasticities for different skill groups. The estimated model allows us to calculate markdown differentials across skill groups and their contribution to wage inequality.