Econ 423a. Matching and Market Design

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Day / time: 
M/W 9:00 - 10:15 am
Course Type: 
Undergraduate
Course term: 
Fall
Not offered
Year: 
2016

How to match people to other people or goods is an important problem in society. Just think of some examples such as (1) student placement in schools, (2) labor markets where workers and firms are matched, and (3) organ donation, in which patients are matched to potential donors. In this class students will learn the economics of matching and market design by reading and discussing classic and contemporary articles in the research literature. We will also discuss realworld

case studies where economists have used these methods to help (1) NYC and Boston design their school choice programs, (2) medical communities reorganize their hiring procedure, and (3) organize systematic kidney exchange mechanisms to give kidneys to as many patients as possible.

Prerequisites: Intermediate microeconomics is required as is a comfort level with mathematical proofs. Prior exposure to game theory is useful but not required.
Semester offered: 
Not offered
Visiting Instructor(s): 
Takuo Sugaya
Undergrad Course Category: 
Methodology