Compensation Schemes, Competition, and Gender

Faculty Member: Edward Vytlacil

Proposal Description: Previous laboratory and field experiments have examined gender differences in preferences for compensation scheme, with men tending to have greater preference for winner-take-tall tournament compensation schemes compared to women. The literature has suggested that these gender differences are due to both relative over-confidence among men in their relative abilities, as well as a greater relative taste for competition among men compared to women. This project will design, implement, and analyze new laboratory experiments to gain further insights into these issues, exploiting the recent theoretical development of incentivized selective trials and recent developments in treatment effect econometrics. Research assistance is sought to perform literature reviews, help to design the experimental protocol, and to perform an initial analysis of the resulting data under Dr. Vytlacil’s guidance, along with other tasks that might come up related to this project.

Requisite Skills and Qualifications:

Coursework in econometrics and intermediate microeconomics, a basic knowledge of R (or STATA), attention to detail, ability to work independently.

HSSRO Application Link: HSSRO Application Link
Award:: Walker Mayer
Project Type: HSSRO

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