Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.
We quantify how pollution affects aggregate productivity and welfare in spatial equilibrium. We show that skilled workers in China emigrate away from polluted cities. These patterns are evident under various empirical specifications, such as when instrumenting for pollution using upwind power plants, or thermal inversions. Pollution changes the spatial distribution of skilled and unskilled workers, and wage returns by location. We quantify the loss in aggregate productivity due to this re-sorting by estimating a spatial equilibrium model. Counterfactual simulations show that reducing pollution increases productivity through spatial re-sorting by approximately as much as the direct health benefits of clean air.
We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral-constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire-sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance–sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies between insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recognition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.
While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation (LYFT). We examine the role of choice in increasing LYFT and compare realized assignments to benchmarks that remove choice. Our model combines choices and outcomes in order to study how selection affects LYFT. We show how to identify and estimate the model using instruments derived from the mechanism. The estimates suggest that the design in use selects patients with better post-transplant survival prospects and matches them well, resulting in an average LYFT of 9.29, which is 1.75 years more than a random assignment. However, the maximum aggregate LYFT is 14.08. Realizing the majority of the gains requires transplanting relatively healthy patients, who would have longer life expectancies even without a transplant. Therefore, a policymaker faces a dilemma between transplanting patients who are sicker and those for whom life will be extended the longest.
Caregiving is a service provided for children with the primary objective of taking care of them and ensuring that they are safe and have opportunities to learn and develop positive relationships with their caregivers and peers while their parents are away. Caregiving takes the forms of home-based care, centre-based care, school-based care, family child care and family, friend, and neighbour (FFN) care. The paper utilises preliminary findings on school attendance from a randomised controlled trial on the effects of a preschool intervention on child learning and women’s economic empowerment in Tharaka Nithi County in school-based care. The research sought to test whether a preschool-based intervention in a rural setting in Kenya influences child development and women’s labour market participation in a cost-effective manner. The project examines the impact of allowing three-year-old children to attend preschool versus the regular pre-primary education programming, which allows children aged 4 years and above to attend preschool. Implementation of the intervention started in January 2024 in 60 intervention schools where five three-year-old children were admitted to a playgroup (PG) in the pre-primary one (PP1) class. Twelve mentors and sixty caregivers were recruited and trained alongside sixty PP1 teachers from the sampled preschools to implement an adapted PP1 curriculum. The twelve mentors coached teachers weekly on the implementation of the curriculum in the five schools assigned to them. This paper presents preliminary findings on preschool attendance for the PG and PP1 children based on weekly attendance data from term one and term two of the 2024 school calendar year on the day the mentors visited the school. Findings reveal that school attendance was low during school openings, midterm breaks, and the last weeks before the schools closed. Public holidays, as well as extracurricular activities coupled with children being sent home for school levies, also contributed to children not attending school regularly. The findings further show that the attendance rate in term one was slightly higher than in term two.
We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1−β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.
We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently concluded incentive auction that repurposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the United States. We document significant multilicense ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multilicense owners have an inventive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by between 13.5 percent and 42.4 percent.
We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing its bond market by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalizes China's strategy as trying to build credibility as a safe issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We use our framework to shed light on China's response to episodes of capital outflows.
We test whether payments for ecosystem services (PES) can curb the highly polluting practice of crop residue burning in India. Standard PES contracts pay participants after verification that they met a proenvironment condition (clearing fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money up front and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract's effectiveness. Incorporating partial up-front payment into the contract increases compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated by satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved is $3,600–$5,400. The standard PES contract has no effect on burning.
Welfare depends on the quantity, quality, and range of goods consumed. We use trade data, which report the quantities and prices of the individual goods that countries exchange, to learn about how the gains from trade and growth break down into these different margins. Our general equilibrium model, in which both quality and quantity contribute to consumption and to production, captures (i) how prices increase with importer and exporter per capita income, (ii) how the range of goods traded rises with importer and exporter size, and (iii) how products traveling longer distances have higher prices. Our framework can deliver a standard gravity formulation for total trade flows and for the gains from trade. We find that growth in the extensive margin contributes to about half of overall gains. Quality plays a larger role in the welfare gains from international trade than from economic growth due to selection.