Publications

During adolescence, peer interactions become increasingly central to children’s development, whereas the direct influence of parents wanes. Nevertheless, parents can continue to exert leverage by shaping their children’s peer groups. We construct and estimate a model of parenting with peer and neighborhood effects where parents intervene in peer formation and show that the model captures empirical patterns of skill accumulation, parenting style, and peer characteristics among US high school students. We find that interventions that move children to better neighborhoods lose impact when they are scaled up, because parents’ equilibrium responses push against successful integration with the new peer group.

Many mental health disorders start in adolescence, and appropriate initial treatment may improve trajectories. But what is appropriate treatment? We use a large national database of insurance claims to examine the impact of initial mental health treatment on the outcomes of adolescent children over the next 2 years, where treatment is either consistent with US Food and Drug Administration guidelines, consistent with looser guidelines published by professional societies (gray area prescribing), or inconsistent with any guidelines (red-flag prescribing). We find that red-flag prescribing increases self-harm, use of emergency rooms, and health care costs, suggesting that treatment guidelines effectively scale up good treatment in practice.

We study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry, building on a flexible framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. Assuming exogenous variation in either the number of potential bidders (N) or a continuous instrument (z) shifting opportunity costs of entry, we provide a sharp characterization of the nonparametric restrictions implied by equilibrium bidding. This characterization implies that risk neutrality is nonparametrically testable. In addition, with sufficient variation in both N and z, the AS-RA model primitives are nonparametrically identified (up to a bounded constant) on their equilibrium domains. Finally, we explore new methods for inference in set-identified auction models based on Chen et al. (2018, Econometrica, vol. 86, 1965–2018), as well as novel and fast computational strategies using Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints. Simulation studies reveal the good finite-sample performance of our inference methods, which can readily be adapted to other set-identified flexible equilibrium models with parameter-dependent support.

This paper proposes a framework for the global optimization of possibly multimodal continuous functions on bounded domains. The authors show that global optimization is equivalent to optimal strategy formation in a two-armed decision model with known distributions, based on a strategic law of large numbers. They establish asymptotically optimal strategies and introduce a class of Strategic Monte Carlo Optimization (SMCO) algorithms that rely on sign-based decisions rather than gradient magnitudes. Theoretical results provide local and global convergence guarantees, and extensive numerical experiments demonstrate strong performance of the proposed algorithms in high-dimensional and challenging optimization settings.

Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark-ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities' activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input-output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.

Private information on car quality means the sale price reflects the average quality of cars sold, which can be lower than the average quality in the population. This difference is the lemons penalty imposed on holders of high-quality cars. The authors estimate the evolution of the lemons penalty through an equilibrium model of car ownership with private information using Danish linked registry data on car ownership, income, and wealth. They examine the aggregate implications and distributional consequences of these penalties, finding that the penalty is largest early in ownership, declines with ownership duration, reduces transaction volumes and car turnover, and weakens the self-insurance role of cars, though the market does not collapse because income shocks induce sales.

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents. We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical threshold. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal menu restricts offering to a single item.

Noncarceral conviction is a common outcome of criminal court cases: for every person incarcerated, there are approximately three who were recently convicted but not sentenced to prison or jail. We extend the binary-treatment judge IV framework to settings with multiple treatments and use it to study the consequences of noncarceral conviction. We outline assumptions under which widely used 2SLS regressions recover margin-specific treatment effects, relate these assumptions to models of judge decision-making, and derive an expression that provides intuition about the direction and magnitude of asymptotic bias when a key assumption on judge decision-making is not met. We find that noncarceral conviction (relative to dismissal) leads to a large and long-lasting increase in recidivism for felony defendants in Virginia. In contrast, incarceration (relative to noncarceral conviction) leads to a short-run reduction in recidivism, consistent with incapacitation. Our empirical results suggest that noncarceral felony conviction is an important and overlooked driver of recidivism.

This paper estimates the consumer surplus from using alternative payment methods. We use evidence from Uber rides in Mexico, where riders have the option to use cash or cards to pay for rides. We design and conduct three large-scale field experiments, which involved approximately 400,000 riders. We also build a structural model which, disciplined by our new experimental data, allows us to estimate the loss of private benefits for riders when a ban on cash payments is implemented. We find that Uber riders who use cash as means of payment either sometimes or exclusively suffer an average loss of approximately 40–50% of their total trip expenditures paid in cash before the ban. The magnitude of these estimates reflects the intensity with which cash is used in the application, the shape of the demand curve for Uber rides, and the imperfect substitutability across means of payments. Welfare losses fall mostly on the least-advantaged households, who rely more heavily on the cash payment option.

We exploit a unique event to study the extent to which popular attitudes towards trade are driven by economic fundamentals. In 2007, Costa Rica put a free trade agreement (FTA) to a national referendum. With a single question on the ballot, 59% of Costa Rican adult citizens cast a vote on whether they wanted an FTA with the U.S. to be ratified or not. We merge disaggregated referendum results, which break new ground on anonymity-compatible voting data, with employer–employee, customs, and firm-to-firm transactions data, and data on household composition and expenditures. We document that a firm’s exposure to the FTA, directly and via input–output linkages, significantly influences the voting behaviour of its employees. This effect dominates that of sector-level exposure and is greater for voters aligned with pro-FTA political candidates. We also show that citizens considered the expected decrease in consumer prices when exercising their vote. Overall, economic factors explain 7% of the variation in voting patterns, which cannot be accounted for by non-economic factors such as political ideology, and played a pivotal role in this vote.

Substantial advances toward global decarbonization have been made in areas such as electricity generation and the electrification of building heat and road transport, yet the decarbonization of energy-intensive industries remains a formidable but crucial challenge. Decarbonization of the industrial sector, whose direct emissions account for about 25% of global carbon dioxide, is essential for transitioning the world economy toward a sustainable growth path. With present technologies and policies, such decarbonization appears technically possible, but difficult and costly. Here, we highlight the pressing need for new lines of research on two emerging frontiers. The first quantifies how industrial decarbonization technologies and policies interact with the broader economy. The second builds on growing data availability and policy experience with industrial decarbonization to provide broad-scale ex post quantifications of its impacts as an essential empirical complement to a largely modeling-based literature to date.

We develop a method of solving rational expectations models with dispersed information and dynamic strategic complementarities. In these types of models, the equilibrium outcome hinges on an infinite number of higher-order expectations which require an increasing number of state variables to keep track of. Despite this complication, we prove that the equilibrium outcome always admits a finite-state representation when the signals follow finite ARMA processes. We also show that such a finite-state result may not hold with endogenous information aggregation. We further illustrate how to use the method to derive comparative statics, characterize equilibrium outcomes in HANK-type network games, reconcile with empirical evidence on expectations, and integrate incomplete information with bounded rationality in general equilibrium.

Neither theory nor existing empirical evidence support the notion that wealth taxation reduces saving. Theoretically, the effect is ambiguous due to opposing income and substitution effects. Empirically, the effect may be masked by misreporting responses. Using geographic discontinuities in the Norwegian annual net-wealth tax and third-party-reported data on savings, I find that wealth taxation causes households to save more. Each additional NOK of wealth tax increases annual net financial saving by 3.76, implying that households increase saving enough to offset both current and future wealth taxes. This positive effect on saving is primarily financed by increases in labour earnings. These responses are the combination of small negative effects of increasing the marginal tax rates and larger positive effects of increasing average rates. My findings imply that income effects may dominate substitution effects in household responses to rate-of-return shocks, which has implications for both optimal taxation and macroeconomic modelling.

Positive assortative matching refers to the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to form partnerships. Measuring the extent to which assortative matching differs between two economies is challenging when the marginal distributions of the sorting characteristic (e.g., education) change for either or both sexes. We show how the use of different measures can generate different conclusions. We provide an axiomatic characterization for the odds ratio, normalized trace, and likelihood ratio and provide a structural economic interpretation of the odds ratio. We use our approach to show that marital sorting by education substantially changed between the 1950s and the 1970s cohorts.

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost." We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.