Publications

Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark-ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities' activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input-output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.

Noncarceral conviction is a common outcome of criminal court cases: for every person incarcerated, there are approximately three who were recently convicted but not sentenced to prison or jail. We extend the binary-treatment judge IV framework to settings with multiple treatments and use it to study the consequences of noncarceral conviction. We outline assumptions under which widely used 2SLS regressions recover margin-specific treatment effects, relate these assumptions to models of judge decision-making, and derive an expression that provides intuition about the direction and magnitude of asymptotic bias when a key assumption on judge decision-making is not met. We find that noncarceral conviction (relative to dismissal) leads to a large and long-lasting increase in recidivism for felony defendants in Virginia. In contrast, incarceration (relative to noncarceral conviction) leads to a short-run reduction in recidivism, consistent with incapacitation. Our empirical results suggest that noncarceral felony conviction is an important and overlooked driver of recidivism.

This paper estimates the consumer surplus from using alternative payment methods. We use evidence from Uber rides in Mexico, where riders have the option to use cash or cards to pay for rides. We design and conduct three large-scale field experiments, which involved approximately 400,000 riders. We also build a structural model which, disciplined by our new experimental data, allows us to estimate the loss of private benefits for riders when a ban on cash payments is implemented. We find that Uber riders who use cash as means of payment either sometimes or exclusively suffer an average loss of approximately 40–50% of their total trip expenditures paid in cash before the ban. The magnitude of these estimates reflects the intensity with which cash is used in the application, the shape of the demand curve for Uber rides, and the imperfect substitutability across means of payments. Welfare losses fall mostly on the least-advantaged households, who rely more heavily on the cash payment option.

We exploit a unique event to study the extent to which popular attitudes towards trade are driven by economic fundamentals. In 2007, Costa Rica put a free trade agreement (FTA) to a national referendum. With a single question on the ballot, 59% of Costa Rican adult citizens cast a vote on whether they wanted an FTA with the U.S. to be ratified or not. We merge disaggregated referendum results, which break new ground on anonymity-compatible voting data, with employer–employee, customs, and firm-to-firm transactions data, and data on household composition and expenditures. We document that a firm’s exposure to the FTA, directly and via input–output linkages, significantly influences the voting behaviour of its employees. This effect dominates that of sector-level exposure and is greater for voters aligned with pro-FTA political candidates. We also show that citizens considered the expected decrease in consumer prices when exercising their vote. Overall, economic factors explain 7% of the variation in voting patterns, which cannot be accounted for by non-economic factors such as political ideology, and played a pivotal role in this vote.

Substantial advances toward global decarbonization have been made in areas such as electricity generation and the electrification of building heat and road transport, yet the decarbonization of energy-intensive industries remains a formidable but crucial challenge. Decarbonization of the industrial sector, whose direct emissions account for about 25% of global carbon dioxide, is essential for transitioning the world economy toward a sustainable growth path. With present technologies and policies, such decarbonization appears technically possible, but difficult and costly. Here, we highlight the pressing need for new lines of research on two emerging frontiers. The first quantifies how industrial decarbonization technologies and policies interact with the broader economy. The second builds on growing data availability and policy experience with industrial decarbonization to provide broad-scale ex post quantifications of its impacts as an essential empirical complement to a largely modeling-based literature to date.

We develop a method of solving rational expectations models with dispersed information and dynamic strategic complementarities. In these types of models, the equilibrium outcome hinges on an infinite number of higher-order expectations which require an increasing number of state variables to keep track of. Despite this complication, we prove that the equilibrium outcome always admits a finite-state representation when the signals follow finite ARMA processes. We also show that such a finite-state result may not hold with endogenous information aggregation. We further illustrate how to use the method to derive comparative statics, characterize equilibrium outcomes in HANK-type network games, reconcile with empirical evidence on expectations, and integrate incomplete information with bounded rationality in general equilibrium.

Neither theory nor existing empirical evidence support the notion that wealth taxation reduces saving. Theoretically, the effect is ambiguous due to opposing income and substitution effects. Empirically, the effect may be masked by misreporting responses. Using geographic discontinuities in the Norwegian annual net-wealth tax and third-party-reported data on savings, I find that wealth taxation causes households to save more. Each additional NOK of wealth tax increases annual net financial saving by 3.76, implying that households increase saving enough to offset both current and future wealth taxes. This positive effect on saving is primarily financed by increases in labour earnings. These responses are the combination of small negative effects of increasing the marginal tax rates and larger positive effects of increasing average rates. My findings imply that income effects may dominate substitution effects in household responses to rate-of-return shocks, which has implications for both optimal taxation and macroeconomic modelling.

Positive assortative matching refers to the tendency of individuals with similar characteristics to form partnerships. Measuring the extent to which assortative matching differs between two economies is challenging when the marginal distributions of the sorting characteristic (e.g., education) change for either or both sexes. We show how the use of different measures can generate different conclusions. We provide an axiomatic characterization for the odds ratio, normalized trace, and likelihood ratio and provide a structural economic interpretation of the odds ratio. We use our approach to show that marital sorting by education substantially changed between the 1950s and the 1970s cohorts.

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost." We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.

This paper introduces a decomposition of welfare assessments for general dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous individuals. The decomposition is based on constructing individual, dynamic, and stochastic weights that characterize how welfarist planners make trade-offs across individuals, dates, and histories. Guided by the compensation principle, it initially decomposes a welfare assessment into an efficiency and a redistribution component, while the efficiency component is further decomposed into (1) aggregate efficiency, (2) risk sharing, and (3) intertemporal sharing components. Five minimal examples and three applications illustrate the properties of the decomposition and how it can be used to draw normative conclusions in specific scenarios.

As businesses increasingly rely on granular consumer data, the public has increasingly pushed for enhanced regulation to protect consumers’ privacy. We provide a perspective based on the academic marketing literature that evaluates the various benefits and costs of existing and pending government regulations and corporate privacy policies. We make four key points. First, data-based personalized marketing is not automatically harmful. Second, consumers have heterogeneous privacy preferences, and privacy policies may unintentionally favor the preferences of the rich. Third, privacy regulations may stifle innovation by entrepreneurs who are more likely to cater to underserved, niche consumer segments. Fourth, privacy measures may favor large companies who have less need for third-party data and can afford compliance costs. We also discuss technology platforms’ recent proposals for privacy solutions that mitigate some of these harms but, again, in a way that might disadvantage small firms and entrepreneurs.

This paper investigates the intergenerational transmission of socio-emotional skills during childhood, using data from the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) in the United Kingdom. This dataset enables us to measure two dimensions of socio-emotional development: internalising and externalising skills. More importantly, we can use multiple measures of parents’ skills collected during both their childhood and their adulthood. Whereas parent–child skills are strongly related when both are measured contemporaneously, they remain correlated when both are measured in childhood, with a stronger transmission observed from mothers to their children. The BCS70 data finally enable us to estimate the correlation between the grandmother’s internalising skill and the grandchildren’s skills, after accounting for parental skills.

Objective

To examine a 2018 rule change allowing pediatric providers to bill the child’s Medicaid ID for post-partum depression (PPD) screening of mothers conducted during well-child visits, and document its relationship with PPD treatment and infant hospitalizations.

Study setting and design

Screening rates during well-child visits are calculated at the zip code level and used in linear probability and Instrumental Variable (IV) models to examine increases in screening after the policy change and relate them to PPD treatment and infant hospitalizations.

Data sources and analytic sample

Individual-level Medicaid claims were used to compute PPD screening rates and measures of PPD treatment and infant hospitalization.

Principal findings

The policy was associated with increases in screening rates, although take up was uneven and overall screening rates remained low at 8.8%. There was little overall increase in treatment, although in zip codes in the top third of screening rates, higher screening was associated with 10.1% higher probability of maternal treatment. Zip codes with high fractions in poverty and/or minority had low screening rates, but screening was more likely to be associated with increases in treatment in these areas. There are no effects in the full sample of children, but among children above the poverty line, the observed increases in screening reduced the probability of infant hospitalization in the first six months by 7.7%.

Conclusions

The policy change had only limited success increasing screening, but increased screening could lead to more maternal PPD treatment and lower infant hospitalization rates if accompanied by expanded access to PPD treatment.

Two opposed interested parties (IPs) compete to influence citizens with heterogeneous priors which receive news items produced by a variety of sources. The IPs fight to capture the coverage conveyed in these items. We characterize the equilibrium level of capture of item as well as the equilibrium level of information transmission. Capture increases the prevalence of the ex ante most informative messages and can explain the empirical distribution of slant at the news-item level. Opposite capturing efforts do not cancel each other and instead undermine social learning as rational citizens discount informative messages. Citizen skepticism makes efforts to capture the news strategic substitutes. Because of strategic substitution, competition for influence is compatible with horizontal differentiation between successful media. In equilibrium, rational citizens choose to consume messages from aligned sources despite knowledge of the bias in a manner consistent with recent empirical evidence.

We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (1) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (2) additional data enhances the value of advertiser–consumer matches, and (3) the allocation of advertisements follows an auction-like mechanism. We contrast data-augmented auctions, which leverage the platform’s data advantage to improve match quality, with managed-campaign mechanisms that automate match formation and price-setting. The platform-optimal mechanism is a managed campaign that conditions the on-platform prices for sponsored products on the off-platform prices set by all advertisers. This mechanism yields the efficient on-platform allocation but inefficiently high off-platform product prices. It attains the vertical integration profit for the platform and the advertisers, and it increases off-platform product prices while decreasing consumer surplus, relative to data-augmented auctions.