This paper characterizes the effects of ambiguity aversion under dispersed information. The equilibrium outcome is observationally equivalent to a Bayesian forecast of the fundamental with increased sensitivity to signals and a pessimistic bias. This equivalence result takes a simple form that accommodates dynamic information and strategic interactions. Applying the result, we show that ambiguity aversion helps rationalize the joint empirical pattern between the bias and persistence of inflation forecasts conditional on household income. In a policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) with ambiguity-averse agents, the policy rule features higher average inflation and increased responsiveness to fundamentals.
We propose a theory of gradualism in the implementation of good policies, suitable for environments featuring time consistency. We downplay the role of the initial period by allowing agents both to wait for future agents to start equilibrium play and to restart the equilibrium by ignoring past history. The allocation gradually transits toward one that weighs both short- and long-term concerns, stopping short of the Ramsey outcome but greatly improving upon Markovian equilibria. We use the theory to account for the slow emergence of both climate policies and the reduction of global tariff rates.
This paper develops estimates of TFP growth adjusted for movements in unobserved factor utilization for a panel of 29 countries and up to 37 years. When factor utilization changes are unobserved, the commonly used Solow residual mismeasures actual changes in TFP. We use a general equilibrium dynamic multi-country multi-sector model to derive a production function estimating equation that corrects for unobserved factor usage. We compare the properties of utilization-adjusted TFP series to the standard Solow residual, and quantify the roles of both TFP and utilization for international business cycle comovement. Utilization-adjusted TFP is virtually uncorrelated across countries, and does not generate much GDP comovement through its propagation. Shocks to factor utilization can more successfully account for international comovement.
With dispersed information, how much can agents learn from past endogenous aggregates such as prices or output? In a rational-expectations equilibrium, if general equilibrium effects are strong enough, aggregates no longer perfectly reveal underlying fundamentals. In this con- founding regime, the effects of informational frictions are persistent over time, and the aggregate outcome displays an initial underreaction followed by a delayed overreaction relative to its perfect- information counterpart. In a standard New Keynesian model, we show that the confounding regime is more likely to arise under a dovish monetary policy rule.