Alex Frankel Publications

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that "society" dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its "disagreement cost." We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.

US colleges often justify test-optional admissions policies as promoting diversity by reducing their reliance on standardized test scores. But a college that mandates test scores can decide how to use those scores. Wouldn't more information allow a college to make decisions it prefers? Indeed, this paper identifies a broad set of assumptions under which test-mandatory policies are always weakly better for colleges. We then discuss how alternative assumptions might rationalize test-optional policies.

Data-based decision making must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a framework in which, due to such manipulation, data become less informative when decisions depend more strongly on data. We formalize why and how a decision maker should commit to underutilizing data. Doing so attenuates information loss and thereby improves allocation accuracy.

We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent’s natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase—due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology—more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about natural actions. We explore a new externality: showing agents’ actions to additional observers can worsen information for existing observers. Applications to credit scoring, school testing, and web searching are discussed.

How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro–Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation‐biased CB's private information on both these dimensions. We find that greater CB competence—more private information—about policy objectives is desirable while greater competence about operational shocks need not be. When the CB has less private information about operational shocks, the public infers that monetary policy depends more on the CB's information about objectives. Inflation expectations become more responsive to monetary policy, which mitigates the CB's temptation to produce surprise inflation.