We partner with Ecuador’s government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families’ preferences. Results show that accounting for preferences yields substantial welfare gains. Counterfactual analyses suggest that alternative mechanisms offer limited improvements compared to the benefits of preference inclusion and coordinated assignments. Household survey data on beliefs and satisfaction support these findings, indicating that centralized school choice systems can deliver significant welfare effects in developing countries.
This paper studies school choice and information frictions in Haiti. Through a randomized control trial, we assess the impact of disclosing school-level test score information on learning outcomes, prices, and market shares. We find evidence that in markets where information was disclosed, students attending private schools increased test scores. The results also suggest private schools with higher baseline test scores increased their market share as well as their fees when the disclosure policy is implemented. While prices and test scores were not significantly correlated in the baseline survey, they exhibited a significant and positive correlation in treatment markets after information disclosure. These results underscore the potential of information provision to enhance market efficiency and improve children’s welfare in context such as Haiti.