The US-China trade war created net export opportunities rather than simply shifting trade across destinations. Many "bystander" countries grew their exports of taxed products into the rest of the world (excluding the United States and China). Country-specific components of tariff elasticities, rather than specialization patterns, drove large cross-country variation in export growth of tariff-exposed products. The elasticities of exports to US-Chinese tariffs identify whether a country's exports complement or substitute the United States or China and its supply curve's slope. Countries that operate along downward-sloping supplies whose exports substitute (complement) the United States and China are among the larger (smaller) beneficiaries of the trade war.
In 2018, the United States launched a trade war with China, marking an abrupt departure from its historical leadership in integrating global markets. By late 2019, the United States had imposed tariffs on roughly $350 billion of Chinese imports, and China had retaliated on $100 billion of US exports. Economists have used a diversity of data and methods to assess the impacts of the trade war on the United States, China, and other countries. This article reviews what we have learned to date from this work.
We study optimal dynamic lockdowns against COVID-19 within a commuting network. Our framework integrates canonical spatial epidemiology and trade models and is applied to cities with varying initial viral spread: Seoul, Daegu, and the New York City metropolitan area (NYM). Spatial lockdowns achieve substantially smaller income losses than uniform lockdowns. In the NYM and Daegu—with large initial shocks—the optimal lockdown restricts inflows to central districts before gradual relaxation, while in Seoul it imposes low temporal but large spatial variation. Actual commuting reductions were too weak in central locations in Daegu and the NYM and too strong across Seoul.
After decades of supporting free trade, in 2018 the United States raised import tariffs and major trade partners retaliated. We analyze the short-run impact of this return to protectionism on the U.S. economy. Import and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in imports and exports. Prices of imports targeted by tariffs did not fall, implying complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. The resulting losses to U.S. consumers and firms that buy imports was $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP. We embed the estimated trade elasticities in a general-equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. After accounting for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP. Import tariffs favored sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, and the model implies that tradeable-sector workers in heavily Republican counties were the most negatively affected due to the retaliatory tariffs. JEL Code: F1.