A sketch of a game theoretic approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions is presented in a nontechnical, nonmathematical manner. The detailed argument and specifics are presented in previous articles and in a forthcoming book.
We consider the relationship between the length of life of individuals and the assets they own and their influence on trustless trade. In particular in some structures a role for government or an outside bank may be called for to support an equilibrium. An example of an OLG model with production illustrates the need for expanding the fiat money supply if population growth is greater than zero.
The role of long lived assets is considered in serving as hostages to extend the domain of trustless trade in an exchange economy. Assuming that individuals have life cycle preferences, we consider the most general set of utility functions consistent with these preferences and a stationary equilibrium for an OLG economy. The influence of the type of asset, durable or storable on the need for money is considered.
The role of long lived assets is considered in serving as hostages to extend the domain of trustless trade in an exchange economy. Assuming that individuals have life cycle preferences, we consider the most general set of utility functions consistent with these preferences and a stationary equilibrium for an OLG economy. The influence of the type of asset, durable or storable on the need for money is considered.
We consider the relationship between the length of life of individuals and the assets they own and their influence on trustless trade. In particular in some structures a role for government or an outside bank may be called for to support an equilibrium. An example of an OLG model with production illustrates the need for expanding the fiat money supply if population growth is greater than zero.
A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
This paper is designed to combine the game theoretic investigation of the static or equilibrium properties of large strategic market games together with the investigation of some very simple dynamics, which nevertheless are sufficient to show differences between two related games, one in which both borrowing and trade take place. The role of banking reserves emerges as relevant and sensitive to the transient state dynamics.
Several 100,000 player games are simulated and the behavior is constructed with the analytical prediction for the games with a continuum of agents.
This paper studies stationary noncooperative equilibria in an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably many time periods, no credit or futures market, and a measure space of agents — who may differ in their preferences and in the distributions of their (random) endowments. These agents are immortal, and hold fiat money as a means of hedging against the random fluctuations in their endowments of the commodity. In the aggregate, these fluctuations offset each other, and equilibrium prices are constant.
We carry out an equilibrium analysis that focuses on distribution of wealth, on consumption, and on price formation. A careful analysis of the one-agent, infinite-horizon optimization problem, and of the invariant measure for the associated optimally controlled Markov chain, leads by aggregation to a stationary noncooperative or competitive equilibrium. This consists of a price for the commodity and of a distribution of wealth across agents which, under appropriate simple strategies for the agents, stay fixed from period to period and preserve the basic quantities of the model.
We hope that, in future work, we shall be able to address additional features of the model treated here, such as borrowing and lending at appropriate (endogenously determined) interest rates, the endogenous production of the commodity, overlapping generations of agents, and bankruptcy and treatment of creditors.
Gold and tobacco have both been used as money. One difference between the two is that gold yields utility, on account of its beauty, without diminishing its quantity. Tobacco yields utility when it is consumed. If this were the only difference, which would be the better money?
Several models of exchange are presented here to illustrate various conceptual problems in the microeconomic model of the velocity of money and the meaning of and cost of liquidity in an exchange economy without exogenous uncertainty.
Several models of exchange are presented here to illustrate various conceptual problems in the microeconomic model of the velocity of money and the meaning of and cost of liquidity in an exchange economy without exogenous uncertainty.