(Editor) Growth of the electric industry Electric generating stations and the associated transmission and distribution systems are high ticket items as are the costs of fuel and of operating the industry. The country presently spends about $150 billion annually on electricity. It is the country’s largest industry, with assets of over $400 billion (Edison Electric Institute Statistical Yearbook, 1985). The country’s electric generating capacity and the end use of electricity grew exponentially for about 70 years, starting at the beginning of the century, with a doubling period of roughly seven years (see figure 10-1). Over much of this period electric utility planning could simply consist of laying a ruler on such a logarithmic plot. The utilities could then, knowing plant construction times, write out purchase orders. Improvements in power generating technology allowed electric rates to decline, which permitted the market to expand to accommodate the additional supply. The prospective growth was a heady vision and provided much of the stimulus for the supporters of nuclear power. An example of such extra polation made in 1971 is shown in figure 10-2 (The U.S. Energy Problem, 1971). Another forecast (Electrical Power Supply and Demand Forecasts for the United States Through 2050, 1972) projected an installed capacity of 1.5 million MV(e) in the year 2000, of which 45 percent was to be nuclear. For the year 2050 the installed capacity would have risen to 5.2 million MW(e), of which 88 percent was to be nuclear.
Paperback: Springer | October 2013 | ISBN: 9401074909
Either lending must be secured or otherwise some form of default or bankruptcy rules are required to provide a disincentive against strategic default. When many time periods are involved, the mere specification of a penalty which is sufficient for one period of trade, is not sufficient. The complete specification of even a two period game requires that both the treatment of creditors (including seniority conditions) and the nature of the rehabilitation of the debtor must be specified. This paper explores these problems.
We utilize the strategic market game approach to analyze the role and function of a mutual bank with variable fractional reserves, redemption in gold and endogenous interest rate formation. We specify the conditions of enough money and its distribution. Using the continuum of traders model, we show existence and optimality for the case of no bankruptcy as well as for the case in which there exists the potentiality of bankruptcy. Finally, we analyze the relationship of the gearing ratio and the bankruptcy penalty with respect to the resulting equilibrium allocations.
We utilize the strategic market game approach to analyze the role and function of a mutual bank with variable fractional reserves, redemption in gold and endogenous interest rate formation. We specify the conditions of enough money and its distribution. Using the continuum of traders model, we show existence and optimality for the case of no bankruptcy as well as for the case in which there exists the potentiality of bankruptcy. Finally, we analyze the relationship of the gearing ratio and the bankruptcy penalty with respect to the resulting equilibrium allocations.
Either lending must be secured or otherwise some form of default or bankruptcy rules are required to provide a disincentive against strategic default. When many time periods are involved, the mere specification of a penalty which is sufficient for one period of trade, is not sufficient. The complete specification of even a two period game requires that both the treatment of creditors (including seniority conditions) and the nature of the rehabilitation of the debtor must be specified. This paper explores these problems.
We introduce a strategic market game for an exchange economy not having enough commodity money. We show the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium for any finite replication economy with a mutual bank, we then show that efficient trade can be achieved in the limiting economy by expanding the money supply through the use of fractional reserves, where the commodity money is demonetized and used for reserves. The means of exchange becomes bank credit backed in part, by “gold.” However, efficiency can not be achieved in general as a non-cooperative equilibrium of a finite player game or a finite exchange economy.
We introduce a strategic market game for an exchange economy not having enough commodity money. We show the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium for any finite replication economy with a mutual bank, we then show that efficient trade can be achieved in the limiting economy by expanding the money supply through the use of fractional reserves, where the commodity money is demonetized and used for reserves. The means of exchange becomes bank credit backed in part, by “gold.” However, efficiency can not be achieved in general as a non-cooperative equilibrium of a finite player game or a finite exchange economy.
This paper considers two basic problems: The first is the necessity for introducing government money (as contrasted with individual credit) and an infinitely lived government in an overlapping generations economy. The second concerns the evaluation of the price of an infinitely productive asset in an economy without a natural discount factor.