A series of models (kept simple in order to stress the structure of the models and the nature of the questions) are described and problems are posed pertaining to a dynamic economy with various possibilities for the issuance of fiat money, credit and insurance.
JEL Classification: 311, 315
Keywords: Strategic market games, Dynamic programming, Fiat money, Credit
It is suggested here that there are many highly different purposes for the study and application of theories of oligopolistic competition, monopolistic competition, and allied topics. This paper sets the different purposes and questions in context, then makes criticisms and suggestions as to where to go from here.
It is suggested here that there are many highly different purposes for the study and application of theories of oligopolistic competition, monopolistic competition, and allied topics. This paper sets the different purposes and questions in context, then makes criticisms and suggestions as to where to go from here.
This companion volume to Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions sketches a unification of several branches of political economy on the basis of the theory of games.
The book is in five parts. Part I, Basics, discusses the factors that make economic decision making different from properties of economic goods, money, and wealth. Part II, Oligopoly, studies static, one-sided, open models of oligopolistic competition — models in which the selling firms are treated as active players with strategic discretion while the customers are represented by a simpler demand function. The main thesis advanced is that game theory can unify many seemingly diverse approaches to this basic problem.
Part III, Cooperative Models of Closed Economic Systems, deals with the relationship between the Edgeworth and other cooperative approaches and the general equilibrium model of a completely closed economy, with both buyers and sellers. Part IV, Strategic Models of Closed Economic Systems, reviews closed models of the economy expressed as games in strategic form and solved using the noncooperative equilibrium solution. Here money and financial institutions emerge as the linking mechanism between the partial equilibrium analysis of the theory of the firm and oligopoly theory and the general equilibrium analysis.
Part V, Externalities and Public Goods, explores a number of applications, including land ownership, voting, and the assignment of joint costs. The book concludes with an outline of a series of games within a game as a portrayal of a politicoeconomic process in a democratic society with a two-party system and public and private sectors. The approach adopted points the way toward a possible reconciliation of micro- and macroeconomics and an integration of economic, political, and sociological descriptions in the study of the short-term functioning of the state.
Paperback: MIT Press | February 1987 | ISBN: 0262691124
Volume 6 of the North-Holland Systems and Control Series and contains the following essays: “Game theory,” M. Shubik; “A critical assessment of quantitative methodology as a political analysis tool,” Ralph E. Strauch Duels and George Kimeldorf; “Requirements for the theory of combat,” H. K. Weiss; “Lanchester attrition processes and theater-level combat models,” Alan F. Karr; and “Differential games,” Y. C. Ho and G. J. Olsder.
Part III, Cooperative Models of Closed Economic Systems, deals with the relationship between the Edgeworth and other cooperative approaches and the general equilibrium model of a completely closed economy, with both buyers and sellers. Part IV, Strategic Models of Closed Economic Systems, reviews closed models of the economy expressed as games in strategic form and solved using the noncooperative equilibrium solution. Here money and financial institutions emerge as the linking mechanism between the partial equilibrium analysis of the theory of the firm and oligopoly theory and the general equilibrium analysis.