Microeconomic Theory Workshop, 1998/99 - 2004/05

| 1998/99 | 1999/00 | 2000/01 | 2001/02 | 2002/03 | 2003/04 | 2004/05 |

To find the Archives for more recent years, go to the Events/Seminars page and scroll to the bottom, Past Events

Sep. 9 Alessandro Lizzeri, New York University, “Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment” (with Paolo Dudine and Igal Hendel) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Sep. 15 William Sandholm, University of Wisconsin, “Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games” [Paper]
Sep. 22 Mark Armstrong, University College London, “Competition in Two-sided Markets” [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Sep. 29 Ran Spiegler, University of Tel Aviv, “Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations” [Paper]
Oct. 6 Klaus Schmidt, University of Munich, visiting Yale, “Contracts, Fairness and Incentives” (with Ernst Fehr and Alexander Klein) [Paper]
Oct. 13 Pierpaolo Battigalli, University of Bocconi, visiting New York University, “Dynamic Psychological Games” (with Martin Dufwenberg)
Oct. 20 Hector Chade, Arizona State University, “Simultaneous Search” (with Lones Smith) [Paper]
Oct. 27 Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern University, visiting New York University, “Information Dynamics and Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change” (with George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig) [Paper]
Nov. 3 Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn, visiting Yale, “Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Times” (with Thomas Kittsteiner) [Paper]
Nov. 10 Sandro Brusco, Stony Brook, “Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Multiple Objects and Known Budget Constraints” (with Pino Lopomo)
Nov. 17 Olivier Compte, ENPC. CERAS, Paris, “Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers: A New Perspective on Multi-Party Bargaining” (with Philippe Jehiel) [Paper]
Dec. 1 Thomas Wiseman, University of Texas at Austin, “Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture” (with Preston McAfee) [Paper]
Feb. 15 Rajnish Mehra, University of California, Santa Barbara, “Junior is Rich: Bequests as Consumption” (with George M. Constantinides, John B. Donaldson) [Paper]
Feb. 23 Kuznets Lecture Series: Robert Townsend, University of Chicago, “The Thai Economy: Growth, Inequality and the Evaluation of Financial Systems”
Mar. 2 Paolo Siconolfi, Columbia University, “General Equilibrium in Economies with Asymmetric Information” (with Aldo Rustichini), based on Paper 1 and Paper 2
Mar. 23 Alvaro Sandroni, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, “Testing Knowledge”
Mar. 30 David Cass, CARESS and University of Pennsylvania, “Multiple Equilibria and Sunspots in Securities Markets with Investment Restrictions” (with Suleman Basak, London Business School; Juan Manuel Licari, University of Pennsylvania; and Anna Pavlova, Sloan School, MIT) [Slides] [CARESS Rules]
Apr. 6 Helios Herrera, ITAM-CIE, “Group Formation and Voter Participation” (with Cesar Martinelli) [Paper]
Apr. 13 Yossi Feinberg, Graduate Schoool of Business, Stanford University, “Games with Incomplete Awareness,” based on the following: “Subjective Reasoning — Games with Unwareness” [Paper] and “Games with Incomplete Awareness” [Paper]
Apr. 20 Max Amarante, Columbia University, “States, Models and Unitary Equivalence: A Reconsideration of Ellsberg’s Paradox”
Sep. 3 Itzhak Gilboa, Tel-Aviv and Yale University, “Probabilities: Frequencies Viewed in Perspective”
Sep. 11 Susan Athey, Stanford University, “Dynamic Auctions with Persistent Private Information” (with Kyle Bagwell, Columbia University) [Abstract]
  Joint with Applied Micro Workshop and SOM Micro Strategy Workshop (SOM)
Sep. 17 Andy Skrzypacz, GSB Stanford University, “Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design” (with Peter M. DeMarzo and Ilan Kremer) [Paper]
Sep. 24 In-Koo Cho, UIUC, “Montonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction” [Paper]
Oct. 1 Elchanan Ben-Porath, Hebrew University, Israel, “Rationalizable Expectations” (with Aviad Heifetz) [Paper]
Oct. 8 David Levine, UCLA, “Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi” (with Drew Fudenberg) [Paper]
Oct. 15 Muhamet Yildiz, MIT and Yale University, “Rationalizability and Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs on Equilibrium Actions,” based on the following: “Rationalizability and Finite-Order Implications of Equilibrium” (with Jonathan Weinstein) [Paper] and “Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty” (with Jonathan Weinstein) [Paper]
Oct. 22 Péter Esö, Northwestern University, “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction” (with Balázs Szentes) [Paper]
Nov. 5 Felix Kubler, Stanford University, “The Accuracy of Numerical Solutions For Dynamic GEI Models” (with Karl Schmeddlers) [Paper]
Nov. 12 Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Columbia University, “College Admissions with Affirmative Action” [Paper]
Nov. 20 Michael Riordan, Columbia  University GSB and Yale University, “Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization” (with Yongmin Chen) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Micro Workshop and Micro Strategy Workshop (SOM)
Dec. 3 Bart Lipman, Boston University, “Temptation-Driven Preferences” (with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini) [Paper]
Dec. 10 Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Princeton University, “Electoral Competition with Asymetrically Informed Voters” (with Faruk Gul)
Feb. 18 Andy Postlewaite, University of Pennsylvania and Yale University, “Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices” (with George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson) [Paper]
Feb. 25 Paul Milgrom, “Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand” Tjalling C. Koopman Memorial Lectures
Mar. 3 Kfir Eliaz, New York University, “Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement” (with Debraj Ray and Ronny Razin) [Paper]
Mar. 24 Roger Myerson, University of Chicago, “Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy” [Paper]
   Joint with Seminar on Formal Models in Politics
Mar. 31 Leonardo Felli, LSE, visiting New York University, “Firm-Specific Training” (with Christopher Harris) [Paper]
Apr. 7 Marco Battaglini, Princeton University, “Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilites” (with Stephen Coate) [Paper]
Apr. 21 Shmuel Zamir, Hebrew University/Cowles visitor, “On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions” (with Philip J. Reny) [Paper]
Sep. 4 Hanming Fang and Giuseppe Moscarini, Yale University “Overconfindence, Morale and Wage Setting Policies”
Sep. 11 Luis Rayo, GSB Chicago University, “Relational Team Incentives and Ownership” [Paper]
   Joint with Micro/Strategy Workshop
Sep. 18 Phil Reny, University of Chicago, “Reinterpreting Mixed Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Baynesian Views” (with Arthur J. Robson) [Paper]
Sep. 25 Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University, “When is Reputation Bad?” (with David K. Levine) [Paper]
Oct. 2 Edward E. Schlee, Arizona State University, “Expected Consumer’s Surplus as an Approximate Welfare Measure” [Paper]
Oct. 9 Yossi Feinberg, GSB Stanford University, “Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games” [Paper]
Oct. 16 Itzhak Gilboa, Tel Aviv University/Cowles visitor, “Accuracy vs. Simplicity: A Complex Trade-Off” (with Enriqueta Aragones, Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler) [Paper]
Oct. 17 Steve Coate, Cornell University, “On the Desirability of Campaign Contribution Limits” [Paper]
  Joint with Applied Microeconomics Seminar
Oct. 23 Dino Gerardi, Yale University, “Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is – An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication” (with Leeat Yariv) [Paper]
Oct. 30 Ilya Segal, Stanford University and Institute for Advanced Studies, “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand” [Paper]
Nov. 6 Rajiv Vohra, Brown University, “The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects” (with Francoise Forges and Jean-Francois Mertens) [Paper]
Nov. 13 Colin Campbell, Rutgers University, “Implementation and Orderings of Public Information” [Paper]
Nov. 20 Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn, “Potentials and Implementation: A Generic Impossibility Theorem” (with Philippe Jehiel and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn) [Paper]
Dec. 4 Attila Ambrus, Harvard University and Yale University, “Coalitional Rationality in Normal and Extensive Form Games” [Paper]
Dec. 11 Francoise Forges, Cergy-Pontsoise, “The Ex-Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game” [Paper]
Mar. 5 Herakles Polemarchakis, Brown University, “Pareto Improving Taxes and Observability” (with P.J.J. Herings) [Paper]
Mar. 26 Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University, “Large Robust Games” [Paper] and Ex-post Stability in Large Games” [Paper]
Apr. 2 Matthew Rabin, University of California, Berkeley, “Piecemeal Preferences”
Apr. 8 Hyun Song Shin, London School of Economics, “Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets” (with Franklin Allen and Stephen Morris) [Paper]
   Joint with Macroeconomic Workshop
Apr. 16 George Mailath, University of Pennsylvania, “Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations” (with Martin W. Cripps and Larry Samuelson) [Paper]
Apr. 23 Peter Norman, University of Wisconsin, “An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods” (with Hanming Fang) [Paper]
May 21 Thomas Quint, University of Nevada, Reno, “On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming” (with Jun Wako)
Sep. 12 John Roemer, Department of Political Science, Yale University, “Does Democracy Engender Equality” [Paper]
Sep. 19 Debraj Ray, Department of Economics, New York University, “Persistent Inequality” (with Dilip Mookherjee) [Paper]
  Joint with International and Development Workshop
Oct. 3 David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv University, “Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach” (with Itzhak Gilboa) [Paper]
Oct. 10 Tzachi Gilboa, Tel Aviv University, “Contextual Separation Theorems” (with David Schmeidler) [Paper]
Oct. 17 Larry Samuelson, University of Wisconsin, “Information-Based Relative Consumption Effects” [Paper]
Oct. 24 Steve Tadelis, Stanford University, “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism”
Oct. 31 Antonio Rangel, Stanford University, “Addiction, Conditioning, and the Visceral Brain” (with Douglas Bernheim)
Nov. 7 Matthew Jackson, California Institute of Technology, “Social Networks and the Dynamics of Employment and Wages” (with Toni Calvo-Armengol)
Nov. 14 John Geanakoplos, Yale University, “Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered” (Based on CFDP 1305 and CFDP 1315)
Nov. 28 Ennio Stachetti, University of Michigan, “Aspirational Bargaining” (with Lones Smith)
Dec. 5 Christoper Harris, Institute of Advanced Studies, “Instantaneous Gratification” (with David Laibson) [Paper]
Apr. 3 Chris Shannon, University of California, Berkeley, Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets (with Luca Rigotti) [Paper]
Apr. 10 Timothy Van Zandt, INSEAD, Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty (with Kieron Meagher and Hakan Orbay) [Paper]
Apr. 17 Joel Watson, University of California, San Diego, Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail [Paper]
Apr. 24 Alessandro Lizzeri, New York University, Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’ (with Nicola Persico) [Paper]
May 1 Philippe Henrotte, HEC, On Pricing Kernels and Dynamic Portfolios [Paper]
May 9 Alvin Roth, Harvard University, Last-minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-prize Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet (with Axel Ockenfels) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Sep. 6 Giuseppe Moscarini, Yale University, “The Law of Large Demand for Information” (with Lones Smith)
Sep. 13 Muhamet Yildiz, MIT, “Sequential Bargaining without a Recognition Device Part I: Model and Sequential Bargaining without a Recognition Device Part II: Reaching an Agreement”
Sep. 20 Larry Blume, Cornell and Yale University, “If You’re So Smart, Why Aren’t You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets”
Sep. 27 Adam Brandenburger, Harvard Business School, “Epistemic Conditions for Iterated Admissibility” (with H. Jerome Keisler)
Oct. 4 Marco Battaglini, Princeton University, “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk”
Oct. 11 Martine Quinzii, “Capital Markets Equilibrium with Moral Hazard” (with Michael Magill, UC/Davis and Yale University)
Oct. 18 Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University, “Efficient Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Values” (with Kim-Sau Chung)
Oct. 25 Estelle Cantillon, Harvard Business School and Yale University, “Electoral Rules and the Emergence of New Issues Dimensions”
Nov. 1 Akihiko Matsui, Tokyo and Georgetown University, “A Theory of Money with Market Places” (with Takashi Shimizu) [Paper]
  Joint with Macroeconomics Workshop
Nov. 8 Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University, “Second Opinions and Price Competition”
Nov. 15 Rani Spiegler, Institute for Advanced Studies, “Experimentation and Bargaining Dynamics”
Nov. 29 Phillippe Jehiel, ENPC, University College and Institute for Advanced Studies, “Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium”
Dec. 6 Hongbin Cai, University of California, Los Angeles/Yale University, “Optimal Committee Design with Heterogeneous Preferences”
Feb. 14 Bill Sudderth, University of Minnesota, “N-person Games of Survival”
Feb. 21 Menahem Yaari, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “A Credit Market a la David Hume”
   Joint with Cowles Foundation Seminar
Feb. 28 Ilya Segal, Stanford University, “Collusion, Exclusion and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining”
Mar. 21 Jeremy Bulow, Chief, Federal Trade Commission, “Selling a Company: When to Run an Auction”
Mar. 28 Michael Mandler, Royal Holloway College, University of London, “Compromises between Cardinality and Ordinality in Preference Theory and Social Theory”
Apr. 11 Svetlana Boyarchenko, University of Pennsylvania, “Capital Accumulation under Non-Gaussian Processes and the Marshallian Law”
Apr. 18 Lars Peter Hansen, University of Chicago, “Robustness and Pricing with Uncertain Growth”
   Joint with Cowles Foundation Seminar and Macroeconomics Workshop
May 3 Michael Whinston, Northwestern University, “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities” (with Ilya Segal) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Sep. 8 Alvaro Sandroni, Northwestern University, “Calibration with Many Checking Rules” (with Rann Smorodinsky and Rakesh Vohra) [Paper]
Sep. 9 Rohan Pitchford, Australian National University, “Incomplete Contracts and the Problem of Social Harm” (with Christopher M. Snyder) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Sep. 15 Nicola Persico, University of Pennsylvania, “Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives” (with A. Lizzeri) [Paper]
Sep. 23 Hyun Song Shin, Nuffield College, Oxford University, “Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt” (with Stephen Morris) [Paper]
Sep. 29 Aviad Heifetz, University of Tel Aviv, “Doubting Others’ Faultlessness and Cooperation in Centipede Games” (with Ady Pauzner) [Paper]
Oct. 6 Glenn Ellison, MIT, “Evolution of Standards and the Economics Publishing Process”
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Oct. 13 Robert Rosenthal, Boston University, “Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment” (with Donald J. Dale and John Morgan) [Paper]
Oct. 20 Faruk Gul , Princeton University, “Temptation and Self-Control” (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer) [Paper]
Oct. 27 Francesca Cornelli, London Business School and Wharton, “Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers” (with David D. Li) [Paper]
   Joint with Finance and Accounting Seminar
Nov. 3 Steven Matthews, University of Pennsylvania, “Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity”
Nov. 10 Philip Reny, University of Chicago, “An Ex-Post Efficient Auction” (with Motty Perry) [Paper]
Nov. 17 Michael Schwarz, Harvard University, “Decision Making Under Extreme Uncertainty” [Paper]
Dec. 1 Jon Levin, Yale University and Stanford University, “The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems” (with Susan Athey) (Note: No figures available) [Paper]
Dec. 9 Dirk Bergemann, Yale University, “Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design”
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Mar. 1 Efe Ok, New York University, “Utility Theory with Incomplete Preferences (with Juan Dubra)
Mar. 22 Yaw Nyarko, New York University, “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs” (with Andy Schotter)
Mar. 29 Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University, “Simple Procedures, Approachability and Correlated Equilibria, or You Won’t Regret It” (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
Apr. 4 Roland Benabou, Princeton, “Self-Confidence: Intrapersonal Strategies” (with Jean Tirole) [Paper]
   Joint with Macroeconomics Workshop
Apr. 5 Sandeep Baliga, MEDS, Northwestern, “Not Invented Here”
Apr. 19 Aldo Rusticini, Boston University, “Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space” (with Eddie Dekel and Bart Lipman)
Apr. 27 Pierre-André Chiappori, Chicago, “Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information” [Abstract]
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop and Workshop Trade and Development
Feb. 4 Lloyd Shapley, University of California, Los Angeles, “The Walras Core”
Feb. 10 Ben Polak , Yale, “Decomposable Choice Under Uncertainty” (with Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii)
Feb. 17 Hamid Sabourian, Cambridge University, “Complexity, Equilibrium Selection and Bargaining”
Feb. 24 Marciano Sinischalchi, Princeton University, “Belief, Revision and Forward Induction” (with Pierpaolo Battigalli)
Mar. 3 Ilya Segal, University of California, Berkeley, “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation” (with Mike Whinston)
Mar. 24 Ted O’Donoghue, Cornell, “Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility” (with George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin)
Mar. 31 Bill Zame, University of California, Los Angeles, “Does Market Incompleteness Matter?” (with David K. Levine)
Apr. 7 David Cass , University of Pennsylvania, “Financial Equilibrium with Restricted Market Participation” (with Paolo Siconolfi and Marcos Lisboa)
Apr. 14 Ronel Elul, Brown, “Collateral, Credit-History and the Financial Decelerator”
Apr. 15 Steve Tadelis, Stanford, “Procurement, Contracts: Fixed Price vs. Cost Plus” (with Patrick Bajari)
   Joint with Applied Microeconomics Workshop
Apr. 21 Sven Rady, Stanford University, GSB, “Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly”
May 5 Philippe Aghion, UCL, “Capital Market Imperfections and the Instability of Open Economies” (with Banerjee and Bacchetta)
   Joint with Macroeconomics Workshop