Microeconomic Theory Workshop, 2005/06 - 2011/12

| 2005/06 | 2006/07 | 2007/08 | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | 2011/12 |

To find the Archives for more recent years, go to the Events/Seminars page and scroll to the bottom, Past Events

Aug. 31 Rene Saran, University of Maastricht, “Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem” (with Norovsambuu Tumennasan) [Paper]
Sep. 7 Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University, “Framing Rules without Guiding Bypassing: A Model of Persuasion with a Bounded Rational Agent” (with Jacob Glazer) [Paper]
Sep. 14 Mihai Manea, MIT/Cowles visitor, “Bargaining in Dynamic Markets with Multiple Populations” [Paper]
Sep. 21 Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University/Cowles visitor, “Who Cooperates and How: Experimental Play of Noisy Repeated Games” Paper A: “Who Cooperates in Repeated Games?” (with Anna Dreber and David G. Rand) [Paper] and Paper B: “Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World” (with David G. Rand and Anna Dreber) [Paper]
Sep. 28 Alessandro Bonatti, MIT/Cowles visitor, “Career Patterns and Career Concerns” (with Johannes Hörner) [Paper]
Oct. 12 Marco Battaglini, Princeton University/Cowles visitor, “The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic Analysis” (with Salvatore Nunnari and Thomas Palfrey) [Paper]
Oct. 19 Nageeb Ali, University of California, San Diego, “Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies”
Oct. 26 Joel Sobel, University of California, San Diego, “Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games”
Nov. 2 David Rappoport, Yale University, “Can Borrowers Benefit From Taxes on Borrowing?”
Nov. 9 Pierpaolo Battigalli, University of Bocconi, “Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty” [Paper]
Nov. 16 Xavier Gabaix, NYU/Cowles visitor, “Game Theory with Sparsity-Based Bounded Rationality” [Paper]
Nov. 30 Mihalis Yannakakis, Columbia University, “Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes” [Paper]
Feb. 22 Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, “The Price of Anarchy: Out-of-Equilibrium Guarantees, Intrinsic Robustness, and Beyond” [Slides]
Feb. 29 Andrew Postlewaite, University of Pennsylvania, ”Cautiousness” (with Olivier Compte) [Paper]
Mar. 21 Stephen Morris, Princeton University, “Extremal Information Structures of the First Price Auction”
Mar. 28 Roland Strausz, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, ”The Benefits of Sequential Screening” (with Daniel Krähmer) [Paper]
Apr. 4 Olivier Gossner, Paris School of Economics, “The Robustness of Incomplete Penal Codes to Payoff Perturbations”
Apr. 11 Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University, “Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach”
Apr. 18 Ennio Stacchetti, New York University, ”Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method” (with Tomasz Sadzik) [Paper]
Apr. 25 Frédéric Koessler, Paris School of Economics, “Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations” (with Jeanne Hagenbach) [Paper]
Sep. 8 Sebastian Kranz, University of Bonn/Cowles Visitor, “Infinitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers” (with Susanne Goldluecke) [Paper]
Sep. 15 Ran Spiegler, Tel Aviv University and University College London, “Price Competition Under Limited Comparability” (with Michele Piccione) [Paper]
Sep. 22 Joel Watson, University of California, San Diego, and Cowles Visitor, “A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games” (with David A. Miller) [Paper]
Sep. 29 Andrea Prat, LSE, “Screening with an Approximate Type Space,” (with K. Madarász) [Paper]
Oct. 6 Mehmet Ekmekci, Northwestern University/Cowles Visitor, “Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation” (with Alp E. Atakan) [Paper]
Oct. 13 Andrew Postlewaite, University of Pennsylvania/Cowles Visitor, “Plausible Cooperation” (with Olivier Compte) [Paper]
Oct. 20 David Ahn, UC Berkeley, “The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem” (with Santiago Oliveros) [Paper] and “Combinatorial Voting” (with Santiago Oliveros) [Paper]
Oct. 21 Uzi Segal, Boston College, “The Case for Discrimination”
Oct. 28 Klaus Ritzberger, Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, “Foundations of the Theory of Extensive Form Games” [Background papers: Paper 1, Paper 2, Paper 3]
Nov. 3 Christian Ghiglino, University of Essex, “Strategic Information Transmission in Networks” (with Andrea Galeotti and Francesco Squintani) [Paper]
Nov. 10 Peyton Young, University of Oxford, “Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems” (with Bary S.R. Pradelski) [Paper]
Nov. 17 Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University and Cowles Visitor, “Discounting and Patience in Optimal Stopping and Control Problems” (with John K.-H. Quah) [Paper]
Dec. 1 Lucas Maestri, Yale University, “Dynamic Contracting under Adverse Selection and Renegotiation” [Paper]
Feb. 9 Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Università Bocconi /Cowles visitor, “Ambiguity and Robust Statistics” (with Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio) [Paper]
Feb. 23 Debraj Ray, New York University, “Poverty and Self-Control” (Introduction) (with B. Douglas Bernheim, Sevin Yeltekin) [Paper]
   Joint with Development Workshop
Mar. 2 Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT, “Cascades in Networks and Aggregate Volatility” (with Daron Acemonglu, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi) [Paper]
Mar. 23 Peter Klibanoff, Northwestern University, “Relevance and Symmetry” (with Sujoy Mukerji and Kyoungwon Seo) [Paper]
Mar. 30 Marciano Siniscalchi, Northwestern University, “Recursive Vector Expected Utility” [Paper]
Apr. 6 Meg Meyer, Nuffield College, Oxford University, “The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering” (with Bruno Strulovici) [Paper]
Apr. 13 V. Bhaskar, University College London, “Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching” (with Ed Hopkins) [Paper]
Apr. 20 Pradeep Dubey, Stony Brook University/Cowles visitor, “The Allocation of a Prize”
Apr. 27 Philipp Strack, University of Bonn/Yale visitor, “Continuous Time Contests” (with Christian Seel) [Paper]
May 4 Kareen Rozen, Yale University, “Optimally Empty Promises”
Sep. 2 Lucas Maestri, Yale University, “Efficiency in Bargaining with Interdependent Values”
Sep. 9 Joel Watson, University of California San Diego, “Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and its Interaction with the Technology of Investment” (with Kristy Buzard) [Paper]
Sep. 16 Herakles Polemarchakis, University of Warwick, “Suboptimality, Identification and Economic Policy”
Sep. 23 George Noldeke, University of Basel, “The Competitive Benchmark in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Markets”
Sep. 30 Phil Reny, University of Chicago, “On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games” [Paper]
Oct. 7 Ken Binmore, University College London, “Rational Decisions in Large Worlds”
Oct. 14 Stephen Morris, Princeton University, “Strategic Distinguishability” (with Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi)
Oct. 21 Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University, “School Choice”
Oct. 28 Marco Battaglini, Princeton University, “Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory” (with Stephen Coate) [Paper]
Nov. 4 Konstantin Sonin (New Economic School) “Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments” [Paper]
Nov. 11 Sylvain Chassang, Princeton University, “Selective Trials, Information Production and Technology Adoption”
Nov. 18 Itzhak Gilboa, University of Tel Aviv, “A Unified Model of Induction”
Dec. 2 Stephan Lauermann, University of Michigan, “Adverse Selection and Search” (with Asher Wolinsky) [Paper]
Feb. 17 V.V. Chari, UMN, FRB Minneapolis/Cowles visitor, “Reputation and Sudden Collapse in Secondary Loan Markets” (with A. Shourideh and A. Zetlin-Jones) [Paper]
Feb. 24 Donald Brown, Yale University, “ADM: A Theory of Optimisim-Bias in Decision-Making under Uncertainty” (with Anat Bracha)
Mar. 3 Abhijit Banerjee, MIT, “Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India” (with Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, Jeanne Lafortune) [Paper]
   Joint with the Development Workshop)
Mar. 24 Federico Echenique, Caltech/Cowles visitor, “The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content” (with Chris Chambers and Eran Shmaya) [Paper]
Mar. 31 Francis Bloch, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris/Cowles visitor, “Markovian Assignment Rules” (with David Cantala) [Paper]
Apr. 7 Olivier Tercieux, CNRS, Paris School of Economics/Cowles visitor, “Subgame-Perfect Implementation under Value Perturbations and the Hold-Up Problem” (with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, and Takashi Kunimoto) [Paper]
Apr. 14 Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics/Cowles visitor, “Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons” (with Andrea Attar and François Salanié) [Paper]
Apr. 21 Philipp Kircher, University of Pennsylvania/Cowles visitor, “Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market” (with Leo Kass) [Paper]
Sep. 17 Kfir Eliaz, Brown University, “Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing” (with Ran Spiegler) [Paper]
Sep. 24 Robert Anderson, University of California, Berkeley, “Equilibrium in Continuous-Time Financial Markets: Endogenously Dynamically Complete Markets” (with Roberto C. Raimondo)
Oct. 1 David Martimort, Université de Toulouse, “Mechanism Design with Bilateral Contracting” (with Vianney Dequiedt) [Paper]
Oct. 8 Itzhak Gilboa, Tel-Aviv University, visiting Cowles, “Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model” (with Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, David Schmeidler) [Paper]
Oct. 15 Xavier Vives, IESE Business School, “Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information” [Paper]
Oct. 22 Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo, “Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring” [Paper]
Oct. 29 Tomasz Sadzik, NYU, “Beliefs Revealed in Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium” [Paper]
Nov. 5 Bruno Biais, Université de Toulouse/Cowles, “Liquidity Shocks and Order Book Dynamics” (with Pierre-Olivier Weill) [Paper]
Nov. 12 Tri Vi Dang, University of Mannheim/Cowles, “Information Acquisition, Noise Trading, and Speculation in Double Auction Markets” [Paper]
Nov. 13 Leeat Yariv, Caltech, “Matching Through Decentralized Markets” (with Muriel Niederle) [Paper]
Nov. 19 Peter Eso, Northwestern KSM-MEDS, “Wait and See: A Theory of Communication Over Time” (with Yuk-fai Fong) [Paper]
Dec. 3 David Miller, UC San Diego/Cowles visitor, “Enforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies” (with Nageeb Ali) [Paper]
Dec. 10 Alessandro Bonatti, Yale University, “Collaborating” (with Johannes Hörner) [Paper]
Feb. 25 Nicolas Vieille, HEC Paris, “Dynamic Sender Receiver Games”
Mar. 4 Juuso Välimäki, Helsinki School of Economics, “Private Information in Games of Timing” (with Pauli Murto)
Mar. 25 Christian Hellwig, UCLA, “Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt” (with Guido Lorenzoni) [Paper]
Apr. 1 John Geanakoplos, Yale University, “Rationally Discounting an Uncertain Future” (with J. Doyne Farmer) [Paper]
Apr. 8 Andrew Postlewaite, University of Pennsylvania, “Belief Formation” (with Olivier Compte) [Paper]
Apr. 15 Adam Szeidl, UC Berkeley, “Fishing for Fools” (with Ulrike Malmendier)
Apr. 22 Bart Lipman, Harvard University, “Implementation and Partial Provability”
Apr. 29 David Levine, Washington University in St. Louis, “Self Control, Risk Aversion and the Allais Paradox” (with Drew Fudenberg) [Paper]
Sep. 12 Johannes Hörner, Northwestern University/Cowles Visitor, “Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons” (with Nicolas Vieille) [Paper]
Sep. 19 Marcin Peski, University of Chicago, “Learning through Theories” [Paper]
Sep. 26 Eric Maskin, Princeton University, “Evolution and Repeated Games” (Background material: “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games”(with Drew Fundenberg) [Paper]
Oct. 3 Srihari Govindan, University of Iowa, “Decomposition Algorithms for Games,” “A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games” (with Robert Wilson) [Paper] and “A Canonical Decomposition Algorithm to Compute Equilibria of N-Player Games with Arbitrary Accuracy” (with Robert Wilson) [Paper]
Oct. 10 Bruno Biais, Toulouse School of Economics, “Accident Risk, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard” (with T. Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve) [Paper]
   Joint with Finance and Accounting Workshop 
Oct. 17 Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University, “Comparative Testing of Experts” (with Nabil I. Al-Najjar) [Paper]
Oct. 23 Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute, “Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy” (with Felix Bierbrauer) [Paper]
   Joint with Micro Theory Lunch
Oct. 24 Timothy Van Zandt, INSEAD, “Interim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces for Supermodular Games” [Paper]
Oct. 31 Jerry Green, Harvard University, “Choice, Rationality and Welfare Measurement” (with Daniel Hojman) [Paper]
Nov. 7 Philipp Kircher, University of Pennsylvania, “The Sorting Effect of Price Competition” (with Jan Eeckhout) [Paper]
Nov. 14 Haluk Ergin, Washington University (St. Louis) “A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation” (with Todd Sarver) [Paper]
Nov. 28 Marco Ottaviani, LSE, “Aggregation of Information and Beliefs in Prediction Markets” (with Peter Norman Sorensen)
Dec. 5 Vasiliki Skreta, NYU, “Transparency and Commitment” [Paper]
Feb. 27 Navin Kartik, University of California-San Diego, “Opinions as Incentives” (with Yeon-Koo Che) [Paper]
Mar. 26 John Geanakoplos, Yale University, “The Leverage Cycle in an Anxious Economy”  Related papers: “Emegring Markets in an Anxious Global Economy” [Paper] and “Liquidity, Default and Crashes” [Paper] and “Promises Promises” [Paper])
Apr. 2 Olivier Compte, ENPC, “Repeated Games and Limited Information Processing Preliminary and Incomplete” (with Andrew Postlewaite) [Paper]
Apr. 9 Yossi Feinberg, Stanford University, “Testing Multiple Forecasters” (with Colin Stewart) [Paper]
Apr. 16 John Geanakoplos, Yale University, “Credit Cards and Inflation” (with Pradeep Dubey) [Paper]
Apr. 23 Philippe Mongin, CNRS & HEC School of Management, “The Premiss-Based Approach to Logical Aggregation” (with Franz Dietrich) [Paper]
Apr. 30 Francoise Forges, Universite Paris-Dauphine, “Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets” (with Enrico Minelli) [Paper]
Sep. 10 Roland Benabou, Princeton University, “Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets” [Paper]
Sep. 20 Yuliy Sannikov, UC Berkeley, “Agency Problems, Screening and Increasing Credit Lines” [Paper]
Sep. 27 Daron Acemoglu, MIT and Visitor, Yale, “Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World” (with Victor Chernozukov and Muhamet Yildiz) [Paper]
Oct. 4 Wojciech Olszewski, Northwestern and Visitor, Yale, “Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Test” (with Alvaro Sandroni) [Paper]
Oct. 11 Ulrich Horst, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, “Dynamic Systems of Social Interactions” [Paper]
Oct. 18 Anat Admati, GSB Stanford, “The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice” (with Paul Pfleiderer) [Paper]
Oct. 25 Jeroen Swinkles, Washington University “Moral Hazard with Bounded Payments” (with Ohad Kadan) [Paper]
Nov. 01 Faruk Gul, Princeton University, “The War of Information” (with Wolfgang Pesendorfer) [Paper]
Nov. 08 Olivier Gossner, MEDS Northwestern, “When Is the Reservation Value in a Repeated Game Equal to the Minmax Payoff?*” (with Johannes Hörner) [Paper]
Nov. 15

Antoni Calvo-Armengol, UAB, “Investing in the Creation of Synergies: Building Socio-economic Networks*” (with Antonio Cabrales and Yves Zenou) [Paper]

Nov. 29 Sergei Izmalkov, MIT, “Perfect Implementaion of Normal-Form Mechanisms” (with Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali) [Paper]
Dec. 6 Andrea Wilson, Harvard, “Sustainable Reputations with Finite Memory” [Paper]
Feb. 28 William D. Sudderth, University of Minnesota, “Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games” (with Ashok P. Maitra) [Paper]
Mar. 7 Ennio Stacchetti, New York University, “Insider Trading with Stochastic Valuation” (with René Caldentey) [Paper]
Mar. 28 Larry Epstein, University of Rochester, “Subjective States: A More Robust Model” (with Kyoungwon Seo) [Paper]
Apr. 4 Nicola Persico, New York University, “Factions and Political Competition” (with José Carlos Rodriguez-Pueblita and Dan Silverman) [Paper]
Apr. 11 Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords” (with Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz) [Paper]
Apr. 18 Mark Armstrong, University College London, “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling” (with John Vickers) [Paper]
Apr. 25 Joe Halpern, Cornell University, “Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators” (with Ittai Abraham and Danny Dolev) [Paper]
May 2 William Zame, UCLA, “Incentives, Contracts and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms” [Paper]
Sep. 7 Markus Brunnermeier, Princeton University, “Clock Games: Theory and Experiments” (with John Morgan) [Paper]
Sep. 21 Sudipto Bhattacharya, London School of Economics, “Knowledge Licensing, Patents, and Optimal Organization of Research and Development” (with Sergei Guriev) [Paper]
Sep. 28 George Mailath, University of Pennsylvania, “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: What Have We Learned”
  Joint with Cowles Lunch Talk
Oct. 6 Hao Li, University of Toronto, “Competing for Talents” (with Ettore Damiano and Wing Suen) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Micro Workshop
Oct. 12 Matthew Jackson, California Institute of Technology, “Social Networks and Economic Behavior”
   Joint with Cowles Lunch Talk
Oct. 19 Eytan Sheshinski, Hebrew University, “Socially Desirable Limits on Choice” [Paper] and “Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities” [Paper]
Oct. 26 Adam Brandenburger, Stern School of Business, NYU, “Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation?” (with Amanda Friedenberg) [Paper]
Nov. 2 Johannes Hörner, Northwestern University, “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring” (with Wojciech Olszewski) [Paper]
Nov. 9 Larry Samuelson, University of Wisconsin, “Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control” (with Georg Nöldeke) [Paper]
Nov. 16 Francesco Squintani, University College London, “Preemption Games with Private Information” (Hugo Hopenhayn)
Nov. 30 Douglas Gale, New York University, “Decision Making under Uncertainty” (with Syngjoo Choi, Ray Fisman, and Shachar Kariv)
Dec. 1 Philip J. Reny, University of Chicago, “On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games” [Paper]
Dec. 7 Luis Rayo, University of Chicago Grad. School of Business, “Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness” (with Gary Becker) [Paper]
   Joint with Applied Micro Workshop
Feb. 8 Balázs Szentes, University of Chicago, “An Evolutionary Approach Towards Time Preferences” (with Emil Iantchev) [Paper]
Feb. 15 Bernard DeMeyer, University of Paris-1 (Pantheon Sorbonne)/Cowles visitor, “On the Strategic Origin of the Brownian Motion in Finance” (with Hadiza Moussa Saley) [Paper]
Feb. 22 Lones Smith, University of Michigan/Cowles visitor, “Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another” (with Andreas Park) [Paper]
Mar. 1 Jean-Francois Mertens, CORE/Cowles visitor, “Intergenerational Equity and the Discount Rate for Cost-Benefit Analysis” (with Anna Rubinchik-Pessach) [Paper]
Mar. 22 Roger Lagunoff, Georgetown University/Cowles visitor, “Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions” [Paper]
Mar. 29 Ori Haimanko, BenGurion University of Negev/Cowles visitor, “Wages versus Prizes with Envy and Pride” (with Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos) [Paper]
Apr. 5 H. Peyton Young, The Brookings Institution, “Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium without Knowing You Have an Opponent” (with Dean P. Foster) [Paper]
Apr. 12 Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University/Cowles visitor, “Game Theory on the Universal Type Space, Part 2” [Paper]
Apr. 19 Massimo Marinacci, Université  di Torino, “Static and Dynamic Variational Preferences.” Based on the following: “Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences” [Paper] and “Dynamic Variational Preferences” (both with Fabio Macceroni and Aldo Rustichini) [Paper]
Apr. 26 Stony Brook Conference to Honor Robert Aumann
May 3 Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University/Cowles visitor, “Optimal Use of Communication Resources” (with Olivier Gossner and Penélope Hernandez) [Paper]